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Preface 
A voluminous study about a philosophical culture that is somewhat exotic, suspect to many, 
and bound up with a system whose collapse was applauded world-wide, may appear as 
something very abstract and academic. It is academic indeed, but at the same time it is a most 
personal attempt to make sense of an individual experience of roughly a decade, and to develop 
a suitable conceptual framework. In this respect, the present book embodies the contact and 
collision of different philosophical cultures. To share this experience is, hopefully, to 
understand the specific nature of these cultures. 
Many people have contributed to the at times ponderous production process of this 
book, from William Veder who first showed me the way to Soviet Russia to the students who 
assisted me in my work. I care to express my gratitude to all those people who gave their moral 
and material support, as well as to those who stimulated and steered the work itself. I want to 
thank Ludwig Heyde for the inciting discussions about Hegel, Edward Swiderski, for his 
critical encouragement, and especially Machiel Karskens, for his excellent coaching, his trust, 
and his free and open mind. Further, I want to thank Jeroen Jongmans and Rinus van de 
Warreburg for their indispensable support in the final stage. 
Most of all I thank Vera, for her patience and endurance through many years, and for 
the concerted production of two wonderful human beings, Tanja and Judith, who through their 
liveliness and affection have forced me to focus on essentials, and who have just overfulfilled 
their first five-year plan. To these three ladies I dedicate this book. 
Evert van der Zweerde, 
Nijmegen, October 1994 

A Note on Transcription 
In this study, a consistent choice is made in favor of the so-called ISO-transliteration The chief 
advantage of this transliteration is its one-to-one correspondence with the Russian original The 
disadvantage is, naturally, that it does not give an immediate clue to pronunciation However, 
any transcription that comes close to a main Western language is strange to other languages 
For example, English "kh" for Cyrillic "X" is not logical for a Dutchman or a German, whereas 
German "schtsch" for Cyrillic "Щ" is difficult tor English or Dutch readers This is esp 
important in cases of alphabetical order in indexes or bibliographies the Soviet philosopher 
Щипанов would figure under Sc in German [Schtschipanov], Sh in English [Shchipanov], 
Sj in Dutch [Sjtsjipanov], and Ch in French [Chtchipanov], whereas the ISO-transliteration 
creates a new category with Sc [S6ipanov] An advantage of the use of the Czech hacek ""' is 
that is does not suggest any familiarity to non-Slavic speakers This is the reason why "X" for 
Cyrillic "X" is not a good choice either, since it does suggest a (wrong) pronunciation in most 
languages And who would look for Nikita Sergeeviö ChruSCev [Хрущев] under "X" 
[Xruscev] rather than Ch (in ISO [Chruscev], Dutch [Chroesjtsjov], and German [Chruschtschev-
]) or Kh (in English [Khrushchev] or French [Khruchtchev])'' 
For practical purposes I give below the Russian azbuka, the ISO-transliteration, the common 
Dutch transcription,1 and the Library of Congress-transliteration 
1
 Borrowed from J W Be/emer Len geschiedenis van Rusland van Runk tot Вгег/ле (Amsterdam Van 
Oorschot, 1988) ρ 392f 
Russian ISO-transliteraüon Dutch transcription Library of Congress 
A, a 
Б,б 
B, В 
Г, г 
Д , Д 
Е,е 
Е,е 
Ж, ж 
Э,з 
И,и 
Й,й 
К, к 
Л, л 
М,м 
Н,н 
0 , о 
Π, π 
Ρ, Ρ 
C, с 
Τ, τ 
У-У 
Φ,» 
Χ, χ 
tí, Η 
4 ,4 
Ш,ш 
Щ,Щ 
ъ 
Ы,ы 
ь 
Э, э 
Ю,ю 
Я, я 
а 
b 
V 
g 
d 
e 
e 
ζ 
7 
1 
J 
k 
1 
m 
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Ρ 
г 
s 
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eh 
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5 
56 
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ju 
ja 
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A Note on Language 
A full investigation of Soviet philosophical terminology would require a separate study, the 
more so since it would have to include a comparison with Russian philosophical terminology 
It would certainly be rewarding to pursue such an endeavor, if only because it might help 
understand part of what is going on in contemporary, post-Soviet philosophy ' Generally 
speaking, Soviet philosophy has promoted the predominance, in philosophical discourse, of 
certain unclanties that belong to Russian (and other Slavic languages) as such 
The clearest example is, I think, the absence of articles, which yields the possibility to 
leave undecided whether one is speaking of "man ', "a man", or 'the man", all three of them 
being correct translations of человек, whether one means "a" or ' the" revolution, or whether 
one speaks of "laws of development" (in general, as a formal category), "some laws of 
development" (leaving open whether there are more such laws), or "the laws of development" 
(giving an exhaustive list) Of course, Russians would never have survived if their language 
did not offer the possibility to be more precise on this point, but Russian does not, contrary to 
Germanic and Romance languages, force to bring clarity by its very structure Thus we read, in 
a review of books on history of philosophy 
"Already in the very choice of figures and in the division of the history of philosophy into periods dealt with in 
the separate volumes, the plan can be clearly perceived to realize Lenin s idea of the inner dialectical conlradic-
tonness {vnutrennjaja dialektiieskaja protivoœëivost] of the historical process of philosophy, the / an 
essential feature of which is the struggle of materialism and idealism " 2 
This is one of the many points in Soviet philosophical literature where the lack of 
articles m Russian leaves one guessing whether this a an essential feature or the essential 
feature, and it is, in cases like this, very useful for Soviet philosophers to leave this question 
open 
Another case of possible ambiguity is the word «poskol'ku», which means both "since" and 
"in so far as", the first pointing to a reason or cause, the second to a distinction or a conditional 
relation The Russian word in fact covers a whole range of meanings from a weak "because" 
("since" or "as") to a conditional "so far as" or "to the extent to which" з 
' A highly interesting dictionary with a wealth of examples, of contemporary post Soviet newspeak in 
Russian was published recently in Bremen by Gassan Gusejnov (Gusejnov 1994) 
2Zajcenko&c 1981 ρ 179f 
3Cf O2egov 1983'4 ρ 503, where «v kakoj mere» [ to which extent ) and «tak kak» [ because , since ] are 
given as synonyms 
xui 
Thus, a sentence like "человек, поскольку з н а е т т р у д ы В И Ленина, 
з н а е т законы р а з в и т и я общества " can have two rather different meanings on the 
one hand, it can be translated as "a man, in as far as he knows some works by V I Lenin, 
knows some laws of development of society" and as "man [Homo sapiens], because he has 
read the works of V I Lenin, knows the (all) laws of development of society" The first 
sentence means that you cannot read texts by Lenin without getting an idea of what "laws of 
development" are, the second that ever since Lenin has written his works, mankind is in the 
possession of full knowledge of the laws of development that govern society 
To be sure, it is possible to bring clarity into these two meanings by adding words 
'человек, который знаком с некоторыми трудами В И Ленина, 
обязательно имеет некое представелние о законах развития об­
щества," as opposed to "Человек, из-за того, что знает труды В И 
Ленина, знает все законы развития общества" The point is, however, that 
Russian leaves room for unclarity, and that this room has been thankfully exploited in Soviet 
ideology 
A further example is a favorite word connected with the intellectual activities of both the 
klassikanarksizma-leninizma and the current Party leadership the verb «ukdzyvat'- ukazat'» 
which means both "to show", "to point out" and even "to explain", but also "to give orders" 
(an «ukazatel» is an index or indicator, an «ukaz» is a decree) Now, it is not difficult to find 
an explanation for this mixture of meaning m Russian history (when a Czar or President is 
supposed to possess some superior form of insight in Russia's destiny, to show the way and 
to give orders /s identical), but the word obtains a special coloring when it accompanies a 
quotation from Lenin's works 
"The revolution in philosophy, earned out by К Marx and Г Engels, had nothing in common with a nihilistic 
denial of the achievements of previous philosophy and ot knowledge in general As V I Lenin has shown / 
ordered Г ukazyval], the very genius of Marx consisted in the fact that he answered the questions raised by his 
excellent predecessors, in this he «leaned on the sound foundations of human knowledge, won under capita­
lism » " ' 
A fourth example, finally, is the identity, in Russian, of passive and reflexive verbs When we 
read, for example, that "as a creative doctrine, the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism con­
tinuously «razvi vaetsja» on the basis of a generalization of world-historical experience, and the 
1
 Konstantinov &c 19826, ρ 27 reference is to V I Lenin Zadaii sojU70v molodeii [Tasks of the Youth 
UnionsJ, in Lenin PSS XLI, ρ W 
xiv 
achievements of the natural and social sciences,"1 there is no way to decide whether this 
"creative doctrine" is being developed -by somebody- or is developing, being, in the latter 
case, a process without a subject — the words "creative doctrine" in fact strongly suggest the 
second, absurd interpretation Again, Russian does have a lexical possibility to give an answer 
to this dilemma by either adding, m the instrumental case, the natural subject that does the 
developing, e g «sovetskimi filosofami [by Soviet philosophers]», or by adding an adverb 
like «samostojatel'no [independently]» or « sama soboj [on its own]» Which means that the 
unclanty is not accidental When we read, for example, that "After the resolution of the Central 
Committee of the VKP(b) about the journal Pod znamenem marksizma [Under the Banner of 
Marxism] (1931), the participation of philosophers in the solution of the tasks of constructing 
socialism was activated {aktivizirovalosY' [Ch4n], this formulation is ambiguous: «akti-
vizirovalos'» can mean both "became more active" and "was activated", thus leaving undecided 
whether the philosophers became more active participants in the construction of socialism out 
of their own 2 
2Konstanlinov &L 19826, ρ 3 
2Prochorov &c 19751, XXII, entry Rossijskaja federauja,' ρ 255 

Introduction 
' While there are also Hegelians elsewhere, it seems that the Soviet Union is 
the country where the influence of the German thinker is by far the most 
alive - with unexpected results 
IM Bochenski, 1967' 
On the 31st of December, 1991, the Soviet Union formally ceased to exist This logically 
meant the end of Soviet philosophy, too, as it did with Soviet industry, Soviet nuclear 
warheads, and Soviet caviar Soviet philosophy is part of history, but what do we mean when 
we say that it belongs to the past9 What exactly are we referring to, when we speak about 
"Soviet philosophy"9 Is "Soviet philosopher" an indication of geographic provenance, like 
"Australian philosopher" or "Dutch philosopher", an indication of a philosophical position, like 
"existentialist philosopher" or "Neo-Thomist philosopher", or an indication of "bolshevik 
militancy" and political regimentation9 In the case of Soviet philosophy, the three seem to 
coincide What is -or was- Soviet philosophy9 
The present study is an attempt to answer that question, to investigate and analyse the 
"Soviet philosophical phenomenon" (Blakeley),2 to grasp its essence, and to show its 
complexity This analysis is historical and critical It is historical, because it treats Soviet 
philosophy as a phenomenon in philosophy's history, coming into existence and ceasing to 
exist within a definite historical period in a definite part of the world, and also because Soviet 
philosophy is studied here as something given, an "object", not -at least not primarily- as a 
partner or opponent in philosophical dialogue It is critical, not because it "criticizes" Soviet 
philosophers from a different philosophical position, but because it does not accept at face 
value the appearance of Soviet philosophy, the way it presented itself, or the ways it was 
reacted to It is an attempt to try to understand why it appeared the way it did, and why it 
provoked the reactions it did provoke And it seeks to establish a conception of philosophy, on 
the basis of which Soviet philosophy can be understood as a philosophical phenomenon The 
present study thus is philosophical in the sense that it offers a philosophical understanding of a 
philosophical phenomenon, departing from a (meta-)philosophical conception of philosophy, 
not in the sense of entering into dispute over certain philosophical issues with "Soviet col­
leagues ' It is, first of all, a critical discussion of, not with Soviet philosophy 
As a matter of fact, this study has its origin in an attempt at such a discussion with 
Soviet philosophy My first encounter with Soviet philosophy dates back to 1981, when I 
attended a Hegel-Congress in Stuttgart, and listened to a paper by ΤI Ojzerman on "G W F 
Hegel and the Heritage of I Kant" Ojzerman's contribution puzzled me, because it consisted 
xvii 
Introduction 
of an intelligent and interesting analysis of the "positive negation" by Hegel of Kants 
subjective idealism, but was winded up with the declaration that "we find, in these doctrines, 
an elaborate raising, analysis, and grasp of basic problems of philosophy As to their solution, 
however, it is only possible from the position of a scientific-philosophical world-view, that has 
inherited and combined the greatest achievements of preceding philosophy — materialism and 
dialectics Such a scientific-philosophical world-view is the philosophy of Marxism, the further 
development whereof will doubtless be stimulated by critical philosophical-historical research, 
especially by the investigation of German classical philosophy "3 A few years later I came to 
know Oj/erman personally as a 'typically Soviet' philosopher it is not accidental that he is a 
main 'hero' in the present story 
Urged by the first aspect of Overman's lecture, I went to the USSR to find out what 
more they" had to say about German idealism, esp Kant and Hegel I found out, during two 
stays at Moscow State University in 1984 and 1986, that, first of all, history of philosophy 
was a quantitatively and qualitatively important branch of Soviet philosophy, secondly, that it 
was linked to the central disciplines of Soviet philosophy, dialectical and historical materialism, 
through an elaborate theory of the history of philosophy, and, thirdly, that the latter tended 
towards a Hegelian position This resulted in a shift from the initial question What do they say 
about " to the question "How do they perceive of philosophy's history9" and 'Why is the 
dominant theory in this field a form of Hegehanism"9 These questions form a first focus of this 
book 
But I also found that it was impossible to ask these question in a direct manner not 
only would it require a much more profound knowledge of classical German philosophy than I 
possessed, but also, and more importantly, it would be necessary to answer some more general 
questions about Soviet philosophy Thus, the second aspect of Ojzerman's lecture proved to be 
of equal importance as the first The result was a second focus of research, and a substantial 
part of the next ten years was spent on an attempt to answer the question What is Soviet 
philosophy9" Obviously, the order between the two focuses had to be reversed The present 
book is a main result of thai endeavor, and indeed makes it possible to raise that initial question 
"What do they say about 9" in the first place 
But there is no "them" left Why study Soviet philosophy after the decay of the system that 
upheld it9 There can be two kinds of reasons to study past philosophy, philosophical and 
historical ones From a philosophical perspective what might be interesting about Soviet 
philosophy would be its content, what Soviet philosophers were saying / writing, the theories 
they developed However, what can be expected from Soviet philosophy, when, as one 
XVl l l 
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Western specialist on the subject, James Scanlan, wrote "Just as dialectics does not sit well 
with materialism, neither, it seems, does history,"4 and we further know that Soviet 
philosophy was, by its own definition, dialectical and historical materialism9 To ask this 
question is to ask why Scanlan wrote the book he wrote, and to answer it is to read that book, 
and find out that Soviet philosophy did not fit to its own definition The philosophical 
perspective thus leads to a historical perspective, to questions about place and function of 
philosophy within the "Soviet system" 
The present book seeks to unite the historical and the philosophical perspective, and to 
find out how philosophy existed historically withm a limitied period of time and within the 
confines of a specific "system ' The conclusions reached apply, naturally, to the object of 
study itself, but they have a wider application, too A possible field of application is "Soviet-
type" societies, of which a few are still extant (Cuba, PR China, PR Korea), and that might 
reemerge at other times and places · A third field of application is more general, more 
philosophically interesting, and more speculative It concerns general hypotheses about the 
nature of philosophy and of what is called ' ideology ', about their possible and actual relations, 
and about their relation to society and history The hypotheses developed in the present study 
in order to explain and understand the phenomenon of Soviet philosophy as it has existed 
historically, may give insight into the nature of philosophy, ideology, and history of 
philosophy in general The precise determination of their value, however, falls beyond the 
scope of the present investigation 
There are, in my opinion, five good reasons for this study 
A first reason is that Soviet philosophy is a fact of philosophy's past, and must become 
part of its history, ι e of the current account of that past As an episode in philosophy's 
historical development, it has largely gone unnoticed, due to its self-protessed image and to the 
"inner block" it contained The idea of Soviet philosophy as a 'dark age ' risks to become a 
received view as a result of the overall rejection of the Soviet period in post-Soviet Russia (not 
to mention other ex-Soviet republics) History of philosophy never is a neutral account of 
things past, but a permanently reproduced and rewritten historical retrospective of present 
philosophical culture it is the story of philosophy about its past But its historical adequacy 
resides on the accessibility of the past This provides a first reason to record ' that past 
'Soviet philosophy esp in Ihe Stalinist period was not limiled to the territory of the USSR, but covered the 
other countries of the Soviet block as well Western scholars of Soviet philosophy equally did not confine 
themselves to sources in Russian only This aspect falls outside the scope of this study here Soviet 
philosophy is understood as everything in some sense (pretending to he) philosophical legitimately existing in 
the USSR in Russian or translated from or into Russian 
XIX 
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A second reason is that, notwithstanding the overall rejection just mentioned, post-
Soviet philosophy, esp in Russia, will be influenced and marked by its own recent past, if 
only because of its opposition to it. Even the "darkest" age is not a gap Therefore, a proper 
understanding of the Soviet period that preceded contemporary Russian philosophy is essential 
for a proper understanding of the latter And, for the same reason, this is a task that should not 
be fulfilled by Russian historians of philosophy alone —just as no one would turn exclusively 
to Soviet authors for a history of pre-revolutionary Russian philosophy The greater distance of 
the Western observer, as well as deeply-rooted standards of historical investigation are of great 
value in this respect 
A third reason is that Soviet philosophy is an important chapter in philosophy's history, 
deserving appropriate attention, not in spite of but because of its "dark" sides It demonstrates a 
possible existence of philosophy, an alternative philosophical culture, which, moreover, was 
contemporaneous with Western philosophical culture Both to the extent to which philosophy 
"suffered" under Soviet circumstances, and to the extent to which it, in some respects, 
flourished, this can only enrich our conception of philosophy, our recognition of its possible 
functions, our understanding of the conditions of its development, our awareness, finally, of 
the fragility and force of free human thought 
A fourth reason for investigating Soviet philosophy is that it offers a -rare- occasion to 
study a philosophical culture in its entirety, and -as opposed to cases from history- through a 
form ol "participant observation" This perspective is comparable to that of an anthropologist 
who, like Claude Lévi-Strauss, regards the culture he studies as a possible alternative way of 
organizing human society, but at the same time as laying bare general structures of human 
culture, that he would not be likely to uncover as a mere participant of his own culture From 
this angle, this book is an attempt to develop a theoretical model of philosophical culture 
through a case-study of such a culture 
Last but not least, a fifth reason is that Soviet philosophers did do valuable work, in 
this case in theory of the history of philosophy [Ch 12] The works in that field, studied within 
the framework of my investigation, have not failed to leave their mark on the ideas that guide 
this study. Which, conversely, and to the extent to which this study is regarded as valuable, 
implies that the "dark" period of Soviet philosophy was not "just dark". Although I can not 
exclude the possibility that the same insights might have been gained elsewhere, I do believe 
that Soviet philosophers were attentive to certain aspects of philosophy to an extent that will be 
hard to find anywhere else. 
XX 
Introduction 
It is good academic practice to begin a philosophical study with an account of the present state 
of the discussion about the subject at hand, a status quaestioms In the present case, this is 
difficult, because different fields are brought together, as far as I know, for the first time, and 
each of these fields would require a separate status queastwms To some extent, these will be 
dealt with separately in each of the parts With respect to the specific field of Soviet history of 
philosophy [Part IV], that forms the case material of this study, IFN, there is no problem it 
simply has hardly been studied at all With respect to Soviet philosophy in relation to ideology 
[Pan III], important interpretations have been developed by authors like Alain Besançon, Leszek 
Kolakowski, Bernard Jeu, and they will be discussed in passing As to the historical develop-
ment of Soviet philosophy [Part II], extant studies display great variety in scope, approach, and 
philosophical background, and relate to different episodes and periods Most of them highlight 
aspects of the "Soviet philosophical phenomenon", and they are discussed in due course As to 
the first part, finally, meta-philosophy, philosophy of the history of philosophy, and ideology 
are vast subjects in their own right with masses of literature, impossible to survey Therefore, I 
have not attempted to reflect the "present state ' in these fields, but developed my own ideas, 
inspired by Hegel, some Soviet authors, and Western authors on theory of the history of 
philosophy, and by some important authors on ideology (Althusser, Thompson), esp in 
relation to Soviet philosophy (Kline, Kolakowski) 
Some concepts obtain a specific, more or less technical meaning in this study, and they 
are elucidated in the appropriate places the concepts of philosophy and esp of philosophical 
culture [Ch 1], the concept of history of philosophy [Ch 2], and the concept of ideology as a 
function of theory [Ch 3] References to primary and secondary sources are given in endnotes, 
with full references in the "Bibliography ' Cross-references, finally, are given in small type 
and between square brackets to chapters and (sub)sections 
The period considered in this book is the Soviet period (1917-1991) Its earlier stages 
receive ample treatment in the historical part [Chapters 4 and 5], as well as in the historical chapter 
of the part on IFN [Chapter 10] The analysis of the "Soviet philosophical phenomenon" [Partili] 
concentrates on the 1980s, as does the case-study on IFN [Part Г ] As to the concluding phase 
of Soviet philosophy, the period of perestrojka and after, it is discussed in the historical part 
[Chapter 6 u], as well as in the part on IFN [Chapter 11 iv and 12 ïv] 
As to source-material, it comprises a selection of publications by Soviet philosophers, 
and most Western secondary sources However, as a result of the attempt to analyze a 
philosophical culture, I have not limited myself to the published theoretical work of Soviet 
philosophers and Western discussions of these, but also have made wide use of "penphencal" 
materials, reflecting the domestic affairs of Soviet philosophical culture, ranging from surveys 
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of PhD-subjects to CPSU documents. A crucial though not easily retraceable role is played, 
finally, by the many interviews I took from Soviet philosophers, conversations, attended 
lectures and staff-meetings, etc. 
With respect to the method of investigation, it has been largely intuitive, as it should be 
in this kind of investigation. I have tried to approach Soviet philosophy without any sort of 
preconception, be it prejudices about the Soviet system or a specific position in or on 
philosophy. Rather, all three of them have developed in the course of this investigation (in this 
sense it is truly participant). Moreover, there was no methodological conception available that 
would fully suit my purposes, and I therefore have been largely forced to find my own way — 
with all the concomitant advantages and disadvantages. 
Still, three methodological principles can be mentioned that have guided me in my inves-
tigation: anti-manicheism, anti-conspirationalism, and anti-idealism. 
In judging history one should stay radically clear, I believe, from manicheic schemes 
(attributing, e.g., the Soviet system to diabolic forces, as did Nikolaj Berdjaev).5 History is 
concretely made by man, i.e. by men and women, not by "mankind", and as such it entirely 
depends on what people choose or refuse to do in a (to them) given concrete historical 
situation. 
Secondly, I have tried to refrain from any kind of "conspiracy theory" (this may seem 
obvious, but it is in fact difficult when dealing with Soviet philosophy). There is no reason to 
suppose a plan behind Soviet philosophy, an attempt to "fool" anybody into believing 
something. Rather, one should try to explain why particular phenomena are predominant. My 
"metaphysical intuition" has been that historical reality permanently yields a variety and 
plurality of possible ways of acting and reacting, and that there always are reasons why some 
of these ways become predominant, while others do not. For example, a dogmatic attitude with 
respect to fundamental philosophical questions is always a possibility, and the question 
therefore is not so much where dogmatism comes from -"dogmatic attitude" or some form of 
narrowmindedness-, but why it plays a specific role in a concrete situation. 
Thirdly, I have tried to observe the principle that ideas do not shape history. This is not 
to deny the importance of ideas, but it is to deny their independent motive force. We always 
have more ideas at our disposal than are required to determine our action, and consequently the 
ideas themselves can not make up for our choice. What shapes history -as far as human beings 
are concerned- always takes on an ideal form, but it is not the idea that "does" anything, but 
someone having lhai idea. As Friedrich Engels' put it, albeit not very elegantly: "Alles, was die 
Menschen in Bewegung setzt, muß durch ihren Kopf hindurch.6 
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This book is made up of four Parts, each divided into three chapters, and further divided into a 
varying number of sections and subsections. The first part is introductory, elaborating the 
"theoretical tools" needed for the other three: the idea of a philosophical culture, a conception of 
philosophy's historical nature, and a conception of ideology in relation to philosophy [Chapters 
1-3]. It does not claim great meta-philosophical originality, a trail-blazing view on Hegel, or an 
epoch-making conception of ideology. What is does claim is that the three conceptions that are 
developed in this first part are, first, tenable positions, and, second, adequate tools for the 
tasks performed in the remaining three parts. 
The second part consists of a concise history of Soviet philosophy. Although it draws 
heavily on existing secondary sources, it is a valuable contribution to scholarship because, 
first, it is an attempt to cover the entire Soviet period in philosophy, whereas other studies 
either concentrate on certain aspects or branches, or discuss limited periods only,? secondly, it 
tries to do justice to the often strongly differing approaches to Soviet philosophy, and thirdly, it 
includes part of recent, "post-Soviet" source material. To those few readers who already are 
well familiar with Soviet philosophy, the latter two are the only new elements, to any other 
reader it provides the historical material drawn upon in the next part. 
The third part is the central part of this book, as it consists of an attempt to understand 
the nature of Soviet philosophy, to "grasp the Soviet philosophical phenomenon". It is original 
in the sense that I know of no comparable attempt to analyze Soviet philosophical culture as 
such, pointing to its relation to ideology as its differentia specifica, and not assessing that 
relation in purely negative terms, but as an objective condition of philosophical activity in the 
USSR. It will be of interest to those who are interested in the historical phenomenon of Soviet 
philosophy, whether they already possess some familiarity with it or not, as well as to those 
who are interested in Marxism. 
The fourth part is a case-study into one of the branches of Soviet philosophy, IFN. It 
seeks to apply the general analysis of the third part to a concrete field of philosophical activity 
in the USSR. At the same time, it is an attempt to write the last, still missing chapter of 
"philosophical sovietology". As such, it presents a lot of work done by Soviet historians in 
philosophy -in this respect it is the most "descriptive" and "empirical" part-, but also analyzes 
IFN as a part of Soviet philosophical culture. It is of interest, therefore, to those who want to 
know about the Soviet view of the history of philosophy and to those who are interested in 
Soviet philosophy as a whole. And it is here, finally, that the theoretical conceptions of Soviet 
philosophers are discussed, that have formed part of the inspiration of this study. In this 
respect, the fourth, concluding part refers back to the first, introductory part. 
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The subjects treated in the first part return in the other parts: Part II [Chapters 4-5], in its 
description of the development of Soviet philosophical culture, and relies on the theoretical 
model developed in Chapter 1. In Part III [Chapters 7-9] this historical account is complemented 
by an analysis of Soviet philosophy in relation to ideology, which depends on the conception 
of ideology developed in Chapter 3, linked, in chapter 9, to the idea of philosophical culture. 
Part IV [Chapters 10-12] offers a survey and analysis of one branch of Soviet philosophy, 
istoriko-fìlosofskaja пайка [history of philosophy as a science: IFN], discussing in more detail 
one element of historically developing Soviet philosophical culture (including its relation to 
ideology) [Chapters 10 and ill, and critically investigating Soviet conceptions of the history of 
philosophy [Chapter 12]. This part thus picks up the three themes of Part I, and concretizes the 
subject-matters of Parts II and III. 
As a whole, this book is not only an academic study, but also a personal "story". It is the story 
of a confrontation of philosophical cultures. Even if, in the end, this confrontation has 
confirmed me in certain "typically Western" convictions, such as the primary importance of 
intellectual freedom for the flourishing of philosophical thought, it was confronting all the 
same. From my very first encounter with Soviet philosophers, I have experienced a peculiar 
mixture of familiarity and strangeness: the experience of speaking the same language of 
philosophers, and yet of saying completely different things. Nor has the transition from Soviet 
to post-Soviet made any major difference in this respect: Russian philosophical culture 
sometimes is even more confronting than Soviet philosophical culture was. This confrontation 
is hard to express in precise terms, and any attempt to do so immediately appears as an unjust 
exaggeration. Still, it is what is behind this study. It is even essential to it, because it makes it 
possible for this difference to appear. If it is true that philosophy only exists as individual 
philosophical thought, then such a confrontation between philosophical cultures can only 
happen in an individual philosopher. Which, by the same token, implies that the individual is 
not what the confrontation is about. It is a confrontation of philosophical cultures. The basic 
pretension of this book is to let that confrontation take place, and to make it as explicit as 
possible. 
*** 
XXIV 
Introduction 
1 Bocheiíski 1967b, ρ 192 
2Blakeley 1973, ρ 140 
3 0jzerman 1983, ρ 318 
4Scanlan 1985, ρ 214 
5 "Die christliche Wahrheit hat sich in der Fülle des Lebens nicht zu verwirklichen vermocht, — also 
unternehmen die bösen Machte die Realisierung der christlichen Wahrheit" (Berdjaev 1953, ρ 9f) 
6 F Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach [MEWXXI], ρ 298 
7 Of course, general books like Zapata 1988 or Copleston 1986 do contain brief chapters on Soviet philosophy 
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PART ONE 
THREE THEORETICAL OVERTURES 
"Es geht vernünftig 7U Mit diesem Glauben an den Weitgeist mussen wir 
an die Geschichte und insbesondere an die Geschichte der Philosophie 
gehen " ' 
G W F Hegel, 1817 
" truth is not manifest, as a rule '2 
KR Popper, Wo') 
Introduction 
This first part serves two ends one is to provide the theoretical framework of this study, and, 
more precisely, to create a conceptual apparatus fit to the specific end of analyzing Soviet 
philosophy, the other is to intensify the reader's susceptibility to certain aspects of doing 
philosophy, which are easily neglected because we tend to take for granted the concrete 
existence and 'situatedness' of our own philosophical activity, but which are essential if we 
seek to understand Soviet philosophy 
The present book aims at an understanding of the historical phenomenon of Soviet 
philosophy This may seem an non-problematic choice -just as one might study Medieval 
Jewish, or contemporary Japanese philosophy- but it is, in fact, a rather complicated one. it 
means to study a supposed whole of phenomena, factors, and features, that together constitute 
a historically, geographically, and politically determined entity caUed "Soviet philosophy" In 
the course of its existence, Soviet philosophy has been the subject of numerous studies, 
displaying a wide variety of approaches As might be expected, these approaches highlight 
different aspects of Soviet philosophy while underexposing others, and although I do not think 
that a final synthesis of these approaches could ever be realized (if only because of the different 
philosophical and political positions behind them), yet a study of Soviet philosophy as a whole 
requires an mtegralapproach In this respect, I have had to 'invent' my own method to some 
extent, partly inspired by existing approaches (Jeu and Scanlan, and the school of "philosophi-
cal sovietology"), partly by some Soviet / Russian philosophers 
It is not, however, simply a question of devising the right method and then applying it 
to the object at hand Like any possible object of investigation, Soviet philosophy is a specimen 
of a kind of object But there is a significant difference when a biologists sets out to study, 
say, Grass Carp (Ctenopharyngodonideila), he already knows that they are fish, that they 
belong to the Bony Fishes (Ostheichthyes), that they are, more specifically, Cypnnids 
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[Carps] 3 A Western philosopher studying Soviet philosophy, however, is more like a Grass 
Carp studying Mudskippers (Penophthdlmus spec ), and his spontaneous judgment will be that 
they are not fish at all, or that they arc partly fish, partly something else Likewise, the natural 
reaction of Western philosophers to Soviet philosophy has been either to treat it as a unique 
object, and therefore as not being philosophy in our sense, or as philosophy plus something 
else In the first case, the 'Sovietness' of Soviet philosophy is seen as excluding any genuinely 
philosophical nature, in the second case everything Soviet about Soviet philosophy is 
discarded as irrelevant In both cases, philosophy is identified with philosophy as we know 
and practice it ourselves wc recognize the familiar and disregard the unfamiliar 
In opposition to this abstract reasoning, I take 'Sovietness' to be a possible determination of 
philosophy, and Soviet philosophy thus as another, a different specimen of philosophy Soviet 
philosophy, just as much as Chinese, African, or Russian philosophy is, at first sight, a 
strange object Yet, to the extent to which we feel inclined to call it philosophy, it must be both 
strange and familiar to us, different from, and identical with our philosophy The study of any 
foreign or 'strange' philosophy presupposes a conception of philosophy that allows for both 
difference and identity, and this conception will evidently be a philosophical conception of 
philosophy, ι e a "meta-philosophy" This applies as much to a Western philosopher studying 
contemporary Soviet and Russian philosophy as it does to a 20th-century Dutch philosopher 
studying Buridan, a Hegelian studying Lakatos, or a European investigating African 
philosophy However, in most cases we do not realize this because identity overrules 
diflerence The strangeness of Soviet philosophy is certainly striking in some respects, and has 
struck most Western philosophers hard enough to make them further ignore it, and to 
disqualify it as either bad philosophy or not philosophy at all Both reactions, however, 
inescapably presuppose an answer to the question "what is philosophy9" 
Likewise, to study Soviet philosophy and take it seriously also presupposes such an 
answer, and to make that answer explicit is to develop a conception of philosophy in this 
respect any study of a strange' philosophy has a reflexive structure, is at the same time a self-
ìnvestigation This obligation to reflect upon one's own position as to what philosophy is, 
comes to the fore at an individual level So, my encounter with Soviet philosophy, both in texts 
and in individual Soviet philosophers, has confronted me with the question "is this philosophy, 
and if so, what does that tell about philosophy"7 This question took concrete shape as the 
question about the precise nature of Soviet philosophy, with equal stress on 'Soviet' and on 
'philosophy' From this perspective, there is a personal or existential side to the present study 
it can be seen as my attempt to (re)shape a viable conception ot philosophy after and out of the 
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confrontation with Soviet philosophy. This, however, does not make the endeavor a personal 
one: it is in individual confrontation, in personal reflection and 'crisis', that the difference 
between various philosophies becomes concrete. There is no other place: texts do not conflict, 
standing peacefully next to each other on bookshelves, theories -more or less coherent sets of 
statements and arguments- do exclude each other logically, but they clash only between or 
within the individuals that 'embody' them, turning them into positions. 
A first aim of this introductory part thus is to develop an arguable conception of 
philosophy that allows for there being philosophies in the plural, i.e. that allows for a concrete 
unity of identity and difference [Chapter l]. 
A second aim is the elaboration of an equally hypothetical conception of the history of 
philosophy [Chapter 2]. The reason for this is, in the first place, that the object of our research is 
a historical phenomenon: Soviet philosophy came into existence, developed, and disappeared 
within the confines of the 20th century, and if we want to interpret it, we need a historical 
conception of philosophy. The point of departure in developing this conception of the history 
of philosophy is Hegel's conception: it still stands as a major attempt, and a permanent source 
of inspiration for contemporary conceptions, if only because it offers a clear formulation of the 
problem. Also, it has been the major source of Soviet theories in this field, and the dominant 
trend in Soviet theory of the history of philosophy was a Hegelianizing trend. The conception 
that results from my discussion with Hegel is admittedly speculative and hypothetical. Its 
viability will have to be shown in the analysis of Soviet philosophy as a historical 
phenomenon, as well as in the discussion of Soviet and post-Soviet conceptions; the latter, in 
their turn, have not failed to leave their mark on my conception, too. 
The third aim envisaged here is an assessment of the possible relation of philosophy to 
ideology, and the development of a conception of ideology that is both arguable in its own 
right, and fit to the purpose of understanding the way(s) in which ideology was related to 
philosophy in the Soviet case [Chapter 3]. In elaborating this conception I shall make selective 
use of a number of authors on ideology, and notably of George L. Kline and John B. 
Thompson, without raising any claim as to a conclusive or exhaustive discussion of either the 
subject or the literature. 
Most Western discussions of Soviet philosophy turn around its alleged ideological 
nature, and in the definition that Soviet philosophy gave of itself, the notion of ideology is 
predominant, too. The very emergence of a specialized discipline within Western philosophy, 
philosophical sovietology, aiming at the study of Soviet philosophy, was an effect of the 
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(political, military, and) ideological antithesis arising after World War II. The 'suspicion' on 
the Western side of both Soviet philosophy and philosophical sovietology, and the Soviet 
opposition to the outcomes of this discipline give further evidence of the ideological tension of 
this endeavour [Ch.4-5]. It is less than clear, however, how ideology is related to philosophy. 
Drop the theme "philosophy & ideology" among a group of philosophers, and it will divide 
them into two camps: to some all philosophy is (a form of) ideology, by which they understand 
a means to further a particular interest by hiding it behind a veil of rationality, universality or 
disinterestedness, to others philosophy is the exact opposite of ideology, to some, finally, most 
philosophy is ideology with the exception of "scientific" philosophy.4 
Thus, Soviet philosophy seems to be singled out by a particular relation to 'ideology'. I 
fully agree with this global judgment: the relation to ideology indeed is the central and decisive 
element in Soviet philosophy. However, I believe that a precise analysis is still lacking: 
philosophy in the USSR was related to ideology in more than one way. To determine and 
analyze these ways is a main aim of this study. To that end, I shall develop a conception of 
ideology that: i) allows us to present Soviet ideology as a perhaps extreme, but not a unique 
case of ideology, ii) does not place ideology and philosophy in the same category iii) does not 
treat philosophy and ideology as mutually exclusive things, and iv) allows us to employ a 
sliding scale with respect to the extent to which Soviet philosophical work was ideological. 
In the conclusion to this first part as a whole, the conceptions of philosophical culture, of the 
historical nature of philosophy, and of ideology will be connected in an attempt to account for 
the possible existence and development of philosophy in an explicitly 'ideologized' historical 
situation. 
*** 
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CHAPTER ONE 
What is Philosophy? A Speculative Definition 
"In order to escape, in the name of truth (which... continues to govern all 
philosophizing), popular and contradictory relativism, philosophy at present 
must offer an understanding of the actual pluralism in philosophy."' 
A. Peperzak, 1992 
The question "what is philosophy?" constantly (re)appears in philosophy, often in the inverted 
form of the disqualification that "this is not philosophy" or of the rhetorical question "but is this 
philosophy?" Of course, attempts have been made in the past, and will be made in the future, to 
neutralize this question by establishing a philosophical school, providing answers to one or 
more of the aforementioned questions of nature, object, method, and results of philosophy. 
This may facilitate actual philosophical research, but with respect to the question as to what is 
philosophy, it entails a delay rather than a solution, and it will pop up again sooner or later. It 
is not accidental that the first article from the well-known Historisches Wörterbuch der 
Philosophie to appear as a separate book was the entry "Philosophie", covering some 350 
densely printed pages, a feat unimaginable in any science^ 
The question about the exact nature, method, and aim of philosophy appears to be one 
of the eternal questions of philosophy, coming to the fore especially strongly in contemporary 
Western philosophy with its variety of positions and traditions. This could be seen as an 
indication of utter decadence. The answer, however, is that the permanent (re)appearance of the 
question "what is philosophy?" is not accidental, and not a sign of weakness, but essential to 
philosophy, and an indication of a growing awareness of its own nature: philosophy is 
precisely the kind of (human) thought that has to ask that question, i.e. that must define itself 
ever and ever again. In this respect it is unique: no science can function without a given field of 
objects, a method (or methods), and generally accepted discoveries. In this respect, too, the 
question whether philosophy is a science or not, can not be answered conclusively: it continues 
to "divide philosophers into two camps", because both the position that philosophy is, and the 
position that it is not a science, are not only possible, but actual philosophical positions, i.e. 
ways in which philosophical thought determines itself. Science, by contrast, does not (have to) 
determine itself in order to be science — on the contrary: the question whether astronomy is a 
science, and if so, what kind of, is not a scientific, but a philosophical question. 
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The present chapter is divided into four sections: first of all, I shall try to develop a tenable 
conception of philosophy [l.i], and subsequently use this as a basis for an exploration of the 
concrete existence of philosophy: the notion of 'philosophical culture' [l.ii], and, finally, 
discuss what I regard as the possible functions of philosophy [l.iii]. 
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Li Basic Structure of Philosophy: Thought. Truth. Theory, and Text 
So, what is philosophy? For the present purpose I shall start from a speculative definition of 
philosophy, and use it as the basis of an admittedly hypothetical conception. Upon this 
definition, philosophy actually exists in the act of thought (i.e. in thinking: cogitado), it aims at 
truth, takes the form of theory, and is objectivized in text. Departing from this abstract 
definition, we can define philosophy more concretely as "any free, self-determining act of 
thought of a finite individual being, that is an attempt at a irae understanding of (some) reality 
by rational means, i.e. the elaboration of a theory, in relation to a given tradition, in a concrete 
social and historical situation, and objectivized as a text'.1 In what follows, I shall first 
elaborate this initial, abstract definition, and then turn to the more concrete conception of 
philosophy. 
Thought 
Starting with the initial, abstract definition, philosophy is a form of thought, that defines itself 
as philosophical, that determines its proper method and object, not accepting anything as 
'given'. The concept "thought" is adequate, because it unites the subjective side, viz. the actual 
thinking, and the objective side, viz. what is thought, i.e. theory-: thinking necessarily departs 
from some previous form of theory, and necessarily results in some subsequent form of 
theory. Philosophy is self-determining -and in that sense free- rational, individual thought, 
because it can posit (accept, agree with) or negate (deny, reject) any element of previous 
theory. This freedom implies the need to found itself, and since no foundation is absolutely 
secure in this respect: it either relies on some alleged fact (for example that there already are 
synthetic a prion judgments that are known to be true), an axiom that can not further be 
substantiated without begging the question (such as Spinoza's causa sui), a profound belief 
(such as Hegel's belief in Vernunft governing the world), or a practical or moral choice (such 
as the strife for ataraxia). This implies that philosophy always is a position. Therefore, 
although philosophical thought does not accept anything as given, it has to take something as 
its point of departure. This alone makes every philosophical position tentative. Hence, "free 
thought" does not mean "thinking whatever you want", but "thinking freely with respect to 
anything given". In that respect, philosophy always takes something as given. Any determina-
tion and demarcation of philosophy, however radical, or however strongly suggested by 
current academic practice, is a philosophical position already. 
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What "rational" means becomes most clear when we define it negatively: not by means 
of sensual or introspective experience, not from belief or tradition, not from authority, not from 
emotion, etc.8 These may be the sources that yield the object of philosophical thought, but they 
can never function as a conclusive argument: whenever they do function as an argument, they 
presuppose a philosophical position that says that this (sense-data, the Scripture, ideaeclaraeet 
distinctae, or the word of Lenin) is to be taken as argument, and that position can not itself be 
based on the kind of argument it favors. 
Finally, philosophy is individual in that it only exists as the thought of individuals, in 
individual minds: if nobody is thinking there is no thought and no philosophy. This does not 
imply of course that philosophy is identical with its being individual, or that it is subjective in 
any psychologist sense of the term. What it does imply is that there is no other place for 
philosophy to exist than individual thinking beings. 
Truth 
Philosophy thus has to be actually thought by somebody, and in this respect philosophy is 
subjective. At the same time, philosophy is not a subject-oriented form of thought: on the 
contrary, it aims at a true understanding of some reality as it objectively exists. Truth in this 
traditional sense of correspondence of the content of judgments with an objective state of 
affairs is never manifest. But even if the aim of philosophy, viz. true understanding [episteme] 
is an illusion, as some philosophers (e.g., skeptics, pragmatists) have always claimed, and 
even if truth is not what is important about philosophy (happiness or political action may be 
held to be more important), it is what it is about. Truth is important as the aim of philosophy, 
as its desired rather than as its achieved result. Since truth, with the exception of analytical 
truth, is not manifest, every philosophical position can always legitimately be questioned. 
What 'thought' and 'understanding' are, is, of course, subject to philosophical and 
scientific discussions that we can not even begin to touch upon here. The least one can say is 
that any explicit 'understanding' takes a propositional form, saying that something is (not) such 
and such, or right or wrong. These propositions are asserted to be at least hypothetically true. 
A proposition has an objective meaning -its 'logical content'- which is to be distinguished 
from its being claimed to be true by somebody, if only because the logical content does not 
change with the propositions being claimed (not) to be true. Thus, propositions are the matter 
of philosophy. 
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Theory 
One of the peculiarities of philosophy that makes it universal, is that the question which kinds 
of propositions or concepts count as philosophical is and remains open. As a rule, an attempt to 
understand some reality will be expressed in a set of propositions, which are, to some extent 
and with some measure of logical cogency, interconnected (which may be null: it is a possible 
philosophical position that a true understanding of reality must be expressed by means of 
isolated aphorisms). Thus, the matter of philosophy, propositions, appears as a set of 
propositions, i.e. as a 'theory', which may range from a more or less elaborated idea to an 
argument, a position, a hypothesis, or a system. This content (matter & form) of philosophy 
must be distinguished from its existence, i.e. from its actually being thought by somebody in 
space-time. 
Philosophy thus consists of (sets of) propositions that state "what is" or "ought to be", 
that is claimed to render a true understanding of some reality. As truth is not manifest, any 
philosophical theory is -to use Popperian terms- conjectural, every thesis a hypothesis. 
Text 
The way in which philosophical thought, claimed as a possible truth (conjecture), and 
formulated as a theory, becomes objective, and thereby accessible to others, is text. Although 
written text seems to be the most appropriate form, other forms of expression (scheme, image, 
drawing, sphere, picture) can not a priori be excluded. Philosophy often is expressed as 
spoken text, which, of course, exists only briefly (but can be recorded). Finally, the history of 
philosophy offers examples of 'philosophical performance': Diogenes of Sinope, or the 
jurodivye in Ancient Kievan Russia.9 All this points to the fact that although philosophers may 
have good reasons to prefer certain, textual forms of expression, there is no a priori argument 
why this should be so. This must be bome in mind when we speak of text. 
The objectivization of thought is indispensable as the access to somebody's thought, 
and thus to the theory that forms the content of that thought. This distinction implies the 
possibility to separate theory from its being thought. In fact, this is what we do most of the 
time: we are not so much interested in what, e.g., Kant actually thought, but in 'his' theory 
precisely in as far as it is not 'his', and if the theory we are interested in turns out not to be 
"what Kant really thought", this is only a minor problem. Conversely, we can take an interest 
in what Kant "really thought", because we expect a clarification of certain problems in 'his' 
theory. Of course, a philosophical text 'contains' philosophical theory only potentially: the 
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'theory' contained in it has to be rethought in order to become actual philosophical thought 
again, in order, that is, to make it present. At the same time, the content of the text, the 
'theory', can be used in other ways, too: it can be studied historically, e.g. with respect to the 
occurrence of certain concepts, it can be taught and learned, it can be enjoyed aesthetically, 
parts of it, even separate statements, can be isolated from their context and used in a different, 
e.g. an ideological context, or form part of a world-view [ Weltanschauung]. 
Thus, the circle is completed: the text, final objective product of individual thought, forms the 
possible basis of subsequent thought. A case could be made that philosophical thought always 
takes its departure from some sort of given 'text' in a wider sense of the term: a myth, a 
religious doctrine, a scientific theory, a description of an experience, or a state of affairs. If that 
is true, philosophical thought, however free and self-determining it may be, never begins from 
scratch, out of itself: it is autonomous, but not automatic, since it is provoked by something 
given. Philosophical thought is free, not in the sense that a philosopher can think "whatever 
(s)he likes", but in the sense that it can confirm or deny any given position. 
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l.ii Concrete Existence of Philosophy: Four Determinants of Philosophical 
Culture 
In order to offer a more concrete conception, I have defined philosophy as "any act of thought 
of a finite being, that is an attempt at a true understanding of (some) reality by rational means, 
ι e the elaboration of a theory in relation to a given tradition, in a concrete social and historical 
situation, and objectivized as a text" What does this mean9 First of all, the expression "any act 
of thought of a finite being" points to a (possible) plurality it means to regard philosophy not 
as somethmg substantial, but as something categorical, as a genre There are many 'things' that 
can be called 'philosophy' because they share certain characteristics They may form a unity in 
some sense, but such a 'unity' can not be presupposed it has yet to be shown Philosophy 
only exists as individualized thought in space-time In this sense, there is not such a thing as 
Philosophy, but only thought that defines itself as philosophical in relating itself to other 
thought "Philosophy" exists only as a project and as a (historical) reconstruction 
Further, to regard philosophy as an "attempt" means that it always is an action, 
something done This means two things in the first place, an action presupposes an agent, a 
subject who decides to perform that action, ι e a will, which m tum presupposes a goal or an 
end, secondly, "to attempt" implies the possibility of failure The "finite individual being(s)" 
(as far as we know human beings), are beings that exist in time and space, and are limited in 
both respects They are in history and in society, and exist in a concrete socio-histoncal situa­
tion Further, these beings are individual beings, and thus philosophy is done individually 
If we try to point out in what the concrete existence of philosophy consists (disregarding, for 
the moment, the historical nature of that existence), we can distinguish four objective 
determinants The first is the individual 'agent'oí thought [1] If philosophy is primarily 
individual thought, the individual must be a necessary condition for the existence of 
philosophy But an individual is always some individual At this point, a set of accidental 
factors comes into play intellectual capacities, personal inclination, prejudices, etc Even if one 
regards it as an ideal to eradicate everything personal (singular) from the subject of philosophy, 
and tum it into a pure vehicle of reason, it might be argued that to claim its realization it to close 
one's eyes for actual singularity This is important, because it is at the individual level that 
subjective freedom comes into play the extent to which an individual philosopher* develops 
his or her thought freely 
*I employ the word philosopher here in the neutral sense of 'someone doing philosophy 
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The second determining factor is of a totally different nature the field of possible philosophical 
positions [2] * The content of philosophical thought-a theory- does not depend on its actually 
being thought, and every possible position is situated in a field of positions, that is both 
unlimited and objective [Ch 2 n] Unlimited, because an unlimited number of positions can be 
thought and made into a theory Many of these positions may not make sense to us, but that 
does not make them less possible The only limitations of the field of possible positions are 
those of logical impossibility Objective, because the content of each of these positions, and the 
logical relations between them do not depend on their being actually thought or not 
philosophical positions exclude and imply each other along lines that are given In this respect, 
again, an individual can never think "whatever (s)he likes" what some philosopher thinks is 
always objectively related to other positions, either actually existing, or already elaborated by 
somebody else, or merely thinkable 
In the third place, philosophy as it actually exists is determined by a given material basis a 
body of texts [3] We are used to a situation in which all 'major' and many 'minor' 
philosophical texts are easily accessible, and it is hard to imagine a different situation But if we 
think of the vast editorial work invested at present m a definitive edition of Hegel's works, the 
number of unedited Medieval texts, or the difficult access to 'forgotten' philosophers, we 
realize the importance of this material basis Western philosophy would have a different face if 
Herachtus' writings were conserved in their entirety 
In the fourth place, finally, philosophy is always and necessarily done in a concrete situation 
[4] Being primarily individual thought, philosophy necessarily takes place here or there, and 
is essentially local There are no 'neutral places' The situation in which philosophy takes place 
yields its conditions of existence (political circumstance -academic freedom or lack thereof, 
presence / absence of censorship, ideological pressure, etc -, dominant cultural trends, public 
image of philosophy, socio-economic status of philosophers), and also provides the actuality 
-issues that are regarded as urgent or essential- to which philosophical thought react (or 
refuses to do so) The actual situation in which philosophical thought exists is determining in a 
selective, not in a productive way it determines which philosophical positions (appear to) make 
sense, which positions are dominant or subdominant, influential or marginal, politically 'safe' 
or 'nsky', etc The concrete situation also determines whether there can be a plurality of 
"This notion is inspired by Ρ В Scheurer, Revolutions de la science et permanence du réel (Paris PUF, 1979), 
esp chapter 10, Le champ des possibles (pp 249-269) 
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actually represented positions at all. At the same time, philosophical thought is distinct from the 
situation in which it exists -and thus not simply part of it- in that it can distinguish itself from 
any given determinant. 
The Idea of a Philosophical Culture 
These four determinants -the individuals, the field of positions, the material basis, and the 
situation- are visualized in the following picture as four partly overlapping pentagons, yielding 
three different levels: the element 'in its pure form' [the four bright triangles (1 - 4)], the 
overlaps with the two neighboring elements [the four darker pentagons in the corners (A - D)], 
and the 'center' in which they coincide [the darkest square in the middle]. The four deter-
minants are objective in the sense that they are given to philosophical thought. At the intersec-
tions of these four, four elements arise, that I label the 'pillars' of philosophical culture. These 
'pillars' make up the nature and 'quality' (or: 'level') of any given philosophical culture. 
In the first place, the intersection of individual thought and the field of logically 
possible positions, yields the spectrum of actually existing positions [A]. This field, though it 
may be very vast -as in contemporary Western philosophical culture-, is necessarily finite (if 
only because there is a finite number of philosophers), and thus a part of the field of possible 
positions, which means, conversely, that the field of possibles is partially realized. Note that 
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the field of actually existing positions is not identical with the positions that are dominant. If 
some philosopher develops a version of, say, Stoic ethics, without being able or wanting to 
communicate with other current positions, his position is part of the field of actually existing 
positions, and it is objectively related to other positions, but it is isolated within the philosophi-
cal culture in question. 
In the second place, the intersection of the field of possible positions and the material 
basis forms what we usually call philosophical heritage [B]: the totality of elaborated positions, 
i.e. theories that we have access to through 'texts', and of acknowledged questions and 
problems that these positions either try to resolve or give rise to. Though being a product of 
history, this heritage at any present moment is actual, its historical nature irrelevant. It is a 
major point of orientation for present positions, positively or negatively. It is both a 'reservoir' 
of token positions ("Platonism", "psychologism") that serve as ready-made rejections of actual 
attempts by present philosophers, and a reservoir of positions that can be 'revived' or 
'rehabilitated'. 
In the third place, the intersection of material basis and socio-politico-cultural situation 
is the basis of philosophical industry [C]: production and distribution of texts and handbooks, 
journals and publishing houses, congresses and conferences, philosophical faculties and 
institutes, systems of instruction. The conjunction of the concepts of philosophy and industry 
may strike as odd or even unseemly, but it is a fact of modern society that philosophy takes 
place mainly within an economic and institutional context. It is an activity, mainly, of 
professional philosophers, i.e. of people who have been trained and are being paid for doing 
philosophical teaching and research. These are economic activities in a strict sense, just as, by 
the way, it is an economic activity to be a student, i.e. to produce oneself as a well-trained 
intellectual [Bildung]. This means that philosophy is a field of economic activity, too, a part of 
national economy.10 
The socio-economic pillar of philosophical culture is easily ignored, because we tend to 
regard it as a mere limitation. But even while philosophical industry is not, in itself, 
philosophical, it does determine what philosophers actually do: the very fact of the existence of 
the philosopher as a profession, with the simultaneous existence of 'professionalism' and 'anti-
professionalism', is a major factor in determining philosophical culture, and its place and 
function in society. Socrates was accused of spoiling the youth of Athens, today philosophers 
are accused of not yielding practically applicable results. In a word, the notion of philosophical 
industry points to the economically embedded existence of philosophy. The nature and extent 
of philosophical industry can differ greatly from one philosophical culture to another — it is a 
mere two centuries ago that a philosopher who wanted to develop a theory divergent from 
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'school philosophy' (Neo-Scholasticism, Wolffian school-philosophy), had to do so on his 
own, i.e. had to be, in fact, financially independent from institutional philosophy (Pierre 
Gassendi,11 Baruch de Spinoza). With respect to any philosophical culture, it is always 
worthwhile to ask what exactly philosophers are being paid for. 
In the fourth place, at the intersection of the situation in which philosophy exists, and 
the population of philosophers, we can discern the public space of philosophy, the domain 
where it takes place [D]. Here we are dealing with such factors as: freedom of expression, 
publication, and discussion, means and lines of communication, recognition of philosophers as 
participants in debates on actual issues, public image of philosophy, sense of community 
among philosophers, mutual recognition of differences of opinion as a condition for debate, 
etc. The extent to which a philosophical community exists within this public space, is of 
essential importance: such communities can offer a relatively secured area where attempts at 
philosophical theory can be made without immediately having to defend them in the public at 
large (where philosophers often limit themselves to fighting the negative image of philosophy), 
they can offer ways to the general public space of a given society, or they can be closed, 
protecting philosophers against political persecution. 
These four pillars determine the actual state and quality of any philosophical culture. The field 
of actually present positions determines the capacity of philosophical culture to establish the 
relations of exclusion and inclusion between positions, the actual presence of positions reduces 
the possibility to ignore them as possibilities, or to make caricatures of them, the presence of a 
large number of mutually exclusive positions easily generates relativism, etc. In general, the 
field of actually present positions determines the level of differentiation of philosophical 
culture. The philosophical heritage determines the strength of tradition:* when the philosophical 
heritage is centered around one philosophical position, philosophy comes close to 'normal 
science', when it is organized around a few oppositions, several strongly delineated paradigms 
will be present, whereas when it is very diverse, there will be little orientation, a situation that 
reaches its peak in contemporary, 'post-modern' Western philosophical culture. The state of 
philosophical industry determines the extent of objectivization: the pace of circulation of newly 
developed positions, but also the extent to which a philosopher can 'take his time' to develop a 
position ("publish or perish"), and the level of philosophical formation. The public space, 
finally, determines the quality of discussion: the extent to which philosophy can be done freely 
and publicly, but also the extent to which there is one central discussion or a plurality of discus-
*In the literal sense of what is "passed on" [oaderc] to future (generations) of philosophers. 
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sions. Together, these four parameters -differentiation, tradition, objectivization, and 
discussion- determine the appearance of a particular philosophical culture. 
The notion of philosophical culture is important because it is the place where 
philosophy is developed, where positions enter in conflict, give rise to new positions, become 
dominant or subdominant, influential or marginal. As philosophical positions are developed 
within a philosophical culture, the favoring or disfavoring by the concrete situation is mediated 
by it. A philosophical culture can protect philosophical thought from immediate situational 
selection. What makes individual philosophers member of a philosophical culture is a shared 
background: a recognizable field of present positions as the point of reference, a common 
heritage, the same philosophical industry, and a common public space. Philosophical culture is 
necessarily local and historical, existing here or there, now or then. It is local even if it is 
global, it is historical even if it is continuous, and it is plural even if it single. Of course, it 
sometimes is difficult to draw precise lines between philosophical cultures (is Dutch 
philosophy a separate philosophical culture in contemporary Western philosophy?), there are 
such things as 'subculture' or 'counterculture' (which are both part of and distinct from the 
dominant culture), and there can be a 'clustering' of philosophical cultures (a process under 
way in Western Europe). Philosophical cultures partly exist because they define themselves as 
such, and their separate existence can be questioned: the model just outlined could therefore be 
refined with the notion of a level of unity and of separation of given philosophical cultures. 
Nevertheless, the idea of philosophical culture has been sufficiently worked out to serve our 
purpose of analyzing Soviet philosophy as a philosophical culture of its own, sufficiently 
differing in several respects from Western philosophy to allow us to oppose Western and 
Soviet philosophy despite the further differentiation within each of them. 
Icebergs' of Philosophy 
A philosophical culture is where philosophy is (re)produced and developed. Generally 
speaking, three forms of (re)productive activity can be discerned: the production of theories, 
the formation of future philosophers, and the reproduction of philosophical culture. It is at this 
level, too, that the importance of small philosophers becomes clear: researchers who clarify 
concepts, or elucidate the logical relations between different positions, historians who 
(re)produce the philosophical heritage, teachers who produce knowledge and competence in 
students, a dean, a librarian, who (re)produce the conditions of philosophical culture. 
There is a romantic trend in Western philosophical culture to focus on the figure of the 
great philosopher exclusively: the ideal of the genuine philosopher as the originator of a grand 
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philosophical conception. Evidently, the 'bearers' of philosophical culture are philosophers. 
But within the framework of a given philosophical culture, there are several kinds of 
philosophers: 'small', 'medium', and 'great' philosophers. Clearly, a philosophical culture can 
not exist without 'small' and 'medium' philosophers. At the same time, when we are interested 
in philosophical theory, we turn our attention to the great names rather than to the small figures 
whose teaching or detailed work prepared for a grand theory to come into existence. 
Philosophical cultures, in this way, resemble icebergs: * we see only the tip that emerges from 
the surface, and although we know that a large volume of ice is necessary for the tip to emerge, 
we are not so much interested in it. 
.Ж. Ж. A 
"Great" philosophers "Great" philosophers "Great" philosophers 
From this perspective, world philosophy appears as a multitude of distinct philosophi­
cal cultures, something like a collection of icebergs, of which we, as a rule, only perceive the 
'tips': the 'great' représentants (and the great texts). If Soviet philosophy was a philosophical 
culture in the sense outlined above, it must be one of the icebergs in the picture above. A 
question that will have to be answered is what kind of iceberg Soviet philosophy was, and why 
it remained largely unnoticed. The obvious answer is: because of the absence of great 
philosophers, but this answer, as I shall argue, is incomplete [Ch.9]. 
Historians of philosophy are trained to concentrate on philosophical theories, schools, 
and great thinkers, their interactions, and their relations to science, literature, religion, politics. 
This works if we study our own philosophical culture. Soviet philosophy gives, however, 
'Imagine the dark middle square that represented philosophical culture in the earlier picture, to be a pyramid 
viewed from above, and to be floating in a sea of cultural and intellectual phenomena, and the image of the 
iceberg appears (the air representing the medium through which we look at other icebergs from our own). 
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occasion to study a philosophical culture as part of a specific social and political system, and 
this urges us to turn our attention to those 'unphilosophical' aspects that are usually dis-
regarded. I think that we can learn a lot from this, even if the Soviet case is an extreme one. Or, 
to put this more strongly: it is of great importance for any philosopher to realize the position 
and function of philosophers within the intellectual community, the educational system, and the 
society they are working in. One does not have to agree with Marx' 11th Feuerbach-thesis to 
see that it does point at an important and, moreover, philosophical question, part of the 
complex question "what is philosophy?" 
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l.iii Possible Functions of Philosophy 
Of equal importance for the present purpose of providing a conceptual framework and 
theoretical background for the study of Soviet philosophy, is a brief discussion of the different 
functions philosophy can perform. Here it is important to bear in mind the distinctions made 
above between thought, truth, theory, and text. Philosophy is primarily thought, aiming at 
truth, and the content of that thought, i.e. the alleged truth, is theory in a wide acceptance of 
that term. But whereas thought exists only briefly in minds, the objectivation of that thought, 
and the medium of its communication, the text, acquires a more permanent nature, as does, in a 
different way, the theory that forms the content of thought and is expressed in text. 
The main function of a philosophical text is to be the expression and (re)presentation of some 
philosopher's thought, an objectivization intended, basically, to make the reader or the author 
rethink what was thought already (I omit the hermeneutic riddles connected with the idea of 
'rethinking'). However, author, text, and reader exist in a concrete situation, which creates the 
possibility of other functions.* 
Fl If the primary function of philosophical thought is to yield a true understanding of 
(some) reality, the primary and most proper function of philosophical theory is to be such a 
true understanding, and the primary function of a philosophical text is to make that theory 
accessible and 'rethinkable'. This primary function can be called the epistemic function of 
'For practical purposes, i.e. cross-reference from other places where this differentiation of functions is employed 
(Part III, Chapter 8.i and 9.i, and Part IV, Chapter lO.i and 12.i), I have numbered them Fl - F9. 
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philosophy, because it appeals to my and others' capacity to understand, as finite beings, the 
same reality by the same rational means in the same way. 
In addition to the epistemic function, there is a pair of functions that are closely related both to 
each other and to the epistemic function, and which we can call the critical (and self-critical) 
and the foundational (and self-foundational) functions of philosophy. 
F2 Being a rational affair, philosophy has to do with argument, more precisely with the 
establishment and judgment of (un)sound argument. Philosophy is always a position, and any 
argument in favor ofthat position can be unsound or untrue. Therefore, philosophy is radically 
rational, i.e. critical: it is capable of questioning virtually everything (including itself), and of 
showing the non-conclusiveness of arguments. This critical function is esp. important when 
philosophical theory serves as the foundation of something else, e.g. of a practical decision. 
F3 For the same reason, but the other way around, philosophy performs a foundational 
function: philosophical theory can be claimed to provide a rational foundation for something, 
e.g. for a certain political order, a scientific practice, a way of living, a world-view, and often 
philosophers seek this type of foundation with respect to other forms of thought or action. 
Moreover, philosophy is self-founding, and thus necessarily performs a foundational function. 
This function borders on the ideological function: rational foundation must come to a halt at 
some point, giving way to mere position, and if foundation is to remain effective, it must 
become ideological [СЬ.З.ііі]. This is also why part of the 'greatness' of great philosophers is 
that they make explicit their points of departure when these can not be further rationally 
founded. 
If the epistemic function of philosophy is linked to truth, and thus based, in the 
language of traditional logic, on the principle of identity, the principle of non-contradiction and 
the principle of excluded third, the critical and foundational functions are primarily linked to the 
notion of sound theory, and based on the principle of sufficient ground.12 When we are 
critical, we question the tenability of a given theory, and when we try to found something on 
such a theory, we depart from its supposed truth. So, formally speaking, if the epistemic 
function seeks to answer a question of the form "S is P?", and gives an answer of the form "S 
is (not) P", the critical and foundational function take the form of "A —> B" (A and В both 
being propositions of the form "S is (not) P"), the (self)foundational function following the 
direction of the arrow, the (self)critical function taking the opposite direction. 
F4 Another possible function of philosophy is doctrinal: the transmission of the content of 
philosophical theory to others. It may be argued that this is an improper function, typical of 
20 
Part One: Three Theoretical Overtures 
authoritarian ways of thinking and behaving: good philosophy would have to activate, from the 
outset, the philosophical capacities of people. But in order to reach the stage where the 
epistemic function can come into full play, a propaedeutic stage is needed, during which the 
mind is 'filled' with philosophy. The doctrinal function thus plays an important part in 
philosophical instruction, and the importance of the work done by historians of philosophy 
partly resides in the same function: they sustain and improve the accessibility of a philosophical 
heritage. This explains why so much energy is spent, in contemporary philosophy, on the 
unjustly loathed practice of 'retelling' other, esp. foreign, philosophers' thought. Finally, the 
doctrinal function of philosophy is important with respect to world-view: certain philosophical 
theories, often in a simplified form, form part of the cultural heritage, thus shaping their 
perception of the world. 
F5 Further, philosophy can perform a technical function: to engage in philosophical 
thought is to train certain intellectual capacities. The development of these formal capacities is 
decisive for the quality of philosophical thought and theory, and conversely, the quality of 
existing philosophical thought is decisive for the fruit achieved by its employment for technical 
training. 
F6 A further possible function of philosophy, bordering on the technical function, is 
methodological: not only is philosophy a laboratory of ways of thinking, but also, by reflecting 
upon existing (scientific, philosophical) theory, philosophy can improve (or deteriorate) 
method. An example is the development of dialectic. 
F7 Philosophical theories can perform an ideological function, when they function as a 
motivation or legitimization of past, present, or future action or status quo. The ideological 
function includes an employment of the truth-claim of philosophical theory, but essentially 
excludes the critical function of philosophy: as I have indicated above, ideology comes in 
where the foundational function of philosophy fails but still works [see, in extenso, Chapter 3]. 
F8 Of course, philosophical texts and theories can perform an aesthetic function: they can 
be beautiful, harmonic, symmetric, triadic, etc. The aesthetic appeal of philosophical theories 
might well be more important than we are willing to admit. 
F9 Finally, philosophy can perform an existential function: it can make people happy, 
wealthy, honored, or famous, and it can be an ideal of life (Greek theoria). 
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To visualize these different possible functions of philosophy schematically: 
The Functional Aptness of Philosophy 
Generally speaking, philosophy is very apt to perform an epistemic function, and a (self)foun-
dational or (self)critical function. It is rather apt to perform a doctrinal function, and partly apt 
to perform an ideological function, quite apt to perform technical and methodological functions, 
not very apt, as a rule, to perform an existential function, and it may perform an aesthetic 
function. To be sure, any of these functions can be claimed to be the main function of 
philosophy, but any account of the functions of philosophy is itself a (meta-)philosophical 
position, performing an epistemic function. 
The different functions of philosophy can exclude each other: the doctrinal function is at 
odds with either a critical or an epistemic function, and the same is true of the ideological 
function. The foundational function is the obverse of the critical function, and comes close to 
the ideological function. Finally, the technical function, the obedient doctrinal function, and the 
critical function are not easily combined with an existential function of philosophy (which is 
why people who await some sort of personal salvation from philosophy protest against these 
functions). 
If the epistemic function is linked to the 'essence' of philosophy, two others, the critical 
and the foundational function, are the nearest 'applications' of this primary function. The 
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ideological function, as we have seen, borders on the foundational function, and will be esp. 
strong if philosophy touches upon the socio-politico-cultural situation in which a philosophical 
culture exists. The existential function is closest to personal life, whereas the doctrinal function 
is particularly strong in (philosophical) instruction. 
Any actually existing philosophical culture is marked by a specific, and variable 
constellation and interplay of these functions. The existence of distinct philosophical cultures is 
one of the ways in which philosophy is individuated, and allows us to speak of "Soviet 
philosophy": the assessment of the actual functions performed by Soviet philosophy will 
therefore be part of our analysis. When we speak of Soviet philosophy we are not speaking of 
something within the same category as existentialism, neo-thomism, or logical positivism. 
What we are in fact referring to, is an integral part of the Soviet social and political 'system', 
i.e. to a specific philosophical culture, with its specific spectrum of actually existing positions, 
philosophical heritage, philosophical industry, and public space. In this respect, Soviet 
philosophy belongs to the same category as, say, "Medieval philosophy", or "modern Western 
philosophy": it points to the sum of activities of people called philosophers within a society, 
including the function of those activities within that society, including also the variety of 
philosophical positions, trends, 'schools', philosophers great and small. 
What has been absent in this first chapter is the historical nature of philosophy as it exists in a 
concrete situation. This will be the subject of the next chapter. Of special importance for our 
subject is the possibility of an ideological function of philosophical theory next to other 
functions — the third chapter will consist in the development of a suitable conception of 
ideology. 
*** 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Why is Philosophy Historical? Towards a Realist Conception* 
"Even if Hegel serves mainly as a bone of contention in contemporary 
philosophy, he remains the figure in whose immense shadow philosophy is 
done " '3 
К Boey, 1992 
"Jede Philosophie ist Philosophie ihrer Zeit, , sie kann also nur 
Befriedigung fur die Interessen gewahren, die ihrer Zeit angemessen sind " 1 4 
G W F Hegel, 1817 
In Western philosophy a field of philosophical investigation, that of the theory (philosophy) of 
the history of philosophy, has come into being 1 5 It started with a Methodenstreit in German 
philosophy around 1800, and a second one around 1900,16 it included extended discussions, 
after World War П, in France and Italy,17 and, in later years, advancements in France,18 
Germany,19 the Anglo-Saxon world, 2 0 and the Netherlands 2 1 Nevertheless, Hosle's 
complaint about the absence of a discipline "philosophy of the history of philosophy" is 
justified 22 The numerous publications, esp in the 1980s, on "philosophy of the history of 
philosophy" and "history of the history of philosophy",23 stand rather isolated 2 4 Soviet 
historians of philosophy have achieved considerable results in the same area, barely noticed or 
studied by their Western colleagues 2 5 As a matter of fact, this Soviet discussion came much 
closer to an independent discipline, taking into account large sections of non-Soviet work, 
covering both the history and the philosophy of the history of philosophy, and, moreover, 
displaying a unity of practice and theory [IV 12] 
The central question is "Why does philosophy have a history9" The assumption that 
philosophy does have a history has become widespread since the turn of the 18th and 19th 
century,26 but was largely absent until then It is evident that there has been philosophy in the 
past, too, but it is less evident to speak of it in terms of 'the history of philosophy', as it rests 
upon the assumption that past philosophy is relevant to present philosophy, because it is where 
present philosophy came from And so, past philosophy is the past of philosophy, ι e. is its 
past 
Until circa 1800 people thought about philosophy's past differently In book A of his 
Metaphysics, Aristotle included a summary of positions held by previous philosophers He 
thought they could strengthen his own theory, either by adding something to it or correcting it, 
or by not having anything substantial to add 2 7 Aristotle regarded his predecessors as 
'This Chapter is partly an elaboration of ν d Zweerde 1993 
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colleagues, much like present-day philosophers do with respect to their predecessors within 
their own tradition This is the 'spontaneous' attitude of every philosopher to philosophy's 
past It is seen as a collection of possible positions that may function as an addition to, or a 
correction on contemporary philosophical discourse This attitude is essentially а-histoncal Its 
natural complement is doxographic historiography of philosophy, the rendering of "the lives 
and opinions of eminent philosophers" (Diogenes Laertius) 28 With the increasing availability 
of the material basis of past philosophy (texts), doxography has shifted towards survey and 
summary, but essentially remains the same a well-arranged collection of attempts at 
philosophical truth at the service of present attempts This has been the predominant form of 
historiography of philosophy from Greek Antiquity up to ± 1800 
What was lacking until ± 1800, was the idea that philosophy's past is the history of 
philosophy, ι e its historical precondition This idea appeared for the first time in Kant's Kritik 
der remen Vernunft, where Kant announces a "History of pure reason [Geschichte der remen 
Vernunft]" as part of his philosophical system, 29 and in his famous Preisschnft über die 
Fortschritte der Metaphysik, esp m the so called ' Lose Blatter" Kant argued that there are 
three methods in metaphysics a dogmatic, a skeptic, and a critical one, which must be 
conceived as necessary stages 
"Es sind also drei Stadien, welche die Philosophie zum Behuf der Metaphysik durchzugehen hatte [italics mine, 
EvdZ] Das erste war das Stadium des Dogmatism, das zweite das des Skeptizism, das dritte das des Kriti/ism der 
reinen Vernunft "3° 
The first two stages, dogmatism and skepticism, are a necessary condition to get to the 
stage of the critique of human reason, with the appearance of this last stage however, 
philosophy is released from its age-long "Schwanken", and reaches a final and stable stage 31 
The idea of history of philosophy as an inevitable process, leading to a true philosophical 
system was thus hinted at by Kant, but the central place in the discussions about the historical 
nature of philosophy is occupied by Hegel's conception, as a point of departure, a main 
opponent, or simply as the philosopher who has clearest of all formulated the problem 
"Die erste philosophisch grundlegende Theorie der Geschichte der Philosophie und eine ihr angemessene 
Durchfuhrung, die auch das geschichtliche Eigenrecht früherer philosophischer Positionen würdigt, ist zweifellos 
von Hegel entwickelt worden Jede gegenwartige Bemühung um den philosophischen Sinn von Philosophiege-
schithtsschreibung muß sich damit auseinandersetzen "32 
Hegel is the point of departure of my own attempt to develop a conception of the 
history of philosophy, too It is not my aim to enter into a full discussion of Hegel's concep-
tion of the history of philosophy as such, or of the relation between that conception and his 
actual historiography зз Hegel's conception is not the object of my research, but one of its 
instruments I shall amend it to my own ends 34 This undoubtedly will not do full justice to 
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Hegel's texts,35 but it will do justice to some of his intuitions. In this chapter I will, in the firs 
place, discuss Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy [2.i], then point out foui 
challenging elements of this conception [2.ii], and conclude with an attempt to use these 
elements for the purposes of this study, i.e. to account for the historical existence ol 
philosophy [2.iii]. 
Departing from distinctions made by Vittorio Hösle and the Soviet historian of philosoph) 
Zachar Abramoviô Kaménskij (b. 1915),361 shall employ, here and elsewhere, the following 
concepts ratherstrictly: 
1. "philosophy's past" (or "past philosophy") refers to the totality of historical facts tha 
can, in some relevant sense, be called "philosophical" (writing these lines, as well a¡ 
reading them will belong to this category after they take place); 
2. "philosophy's history" (or "history of philosophy as a process") means the selection о 
facts from philosophy's past that somehow belong to an account of or story about pasi 
philosophy; 
3. "history of philosophy" means these accounts and (his)stories, both separately -"< 
history of philosophy"- and in their totality, viz. the differentiated and permanenti} 
rewritten history about its past of present philosophy, ideally : 
3a. "historiographical practice" (or "historiography"), i.e. the actual writing of a history ol 
philosophy, including preparatory, e.g.philological work; 
3b. "theory of the history of philosophy" : 
3b.i theoretical conceptions of philosophy's history ("philosophy of the history ol 
philosophy"); 
ЗЬ.іі theory of history of philosophy as a discipline, including: 
• methodology; 
• didactic; 
• history of the history of philosophy. 
27 
Chapter 2 Why is Philosophy Historical7 Towards a Realist Conception 
2.i. Hegel's Conception of the History of Philosophy 
It was Kant's discovery, that a system of philosophical knowledge must contain a conception 
of the history of philosophy In Kant, this meant that philosophy had to answer the question 
"how it came to be" Hegel s claim was much stronger philosophy itself, as a phenomenon in 
history, is part of the reality that philosophy pretends to understand Hegel, the probable 
originator of the very concept of historicity, 37 was the first to develop a conception of the 
history of philosophy as part of his philosophical system, linked to his conception of 
philosophy,38 which enabled him to take the neh philosophical heritage both philosophically 
and historically serious, as opposed to the doxographic and "critical" (Kantian) approaches 
practiced before him Hegel thus brought together two lines of development the establishment 
of histonography of philosophy as a historical discipline,39 and the philosophical reflection on 
philosophy's past as on what preceded one's proper position Hegel treated the history of 
philosophy in his frequent lectures on the subject, being the first major philosopher to do so at 
all,40 and elaborated his conception in the "Einleitung" to those lectures 41 
Hegel's initial question is how there can be a history of philosophy, since the very concepts of 
philosophy and history seem to exclude each other 
" Geschichte und Philosophie erscheinen schon fur sich nach der gewohnlichen Vorstellung von Geschichte als 
sehr heterogene Bestimmungen Die Philosophie ist die Wissenschaft von den notwendigen Gedanken, die 
Erkenntnis dessen, was wahr (und) darum ewig und unvergänglich ist, Geschichte dagegen hat es nach der 
nächsten Vorstellung von ihr mit Geschehenem, somit Zufälligem, Vergänglichem und Vergangenem zu 
tun "42 
On the one hand, the existence of a multitude of philosophies is an undeniable fact 
' Î S ist genug gegründete Tatsache, daß es verschiedene Philosophien gibt und gegeben hat "4 3 
On the other hand, the aim of philosophy is truth, which is essentially one 
"Die Wahrheit aber ist eme, - dieses unüberwindliche Gefühl oder Glauben hat der Instinkt der Vernunft 44 
This implies that there can only be one philosophy, viz the true understanding of 
reality,45 or no philosophy at all The obvious conclusion would seem to be that one 
philosophy is true, whereas the others at best approach philosophical truth to some extent 46 
This conclusion, however, is rejected by Hegel, because this is what each philosophy pretends 
(in that respect they are all equal) This "abstract opposition of truth and fallacy '47 reduces the 
history of philosophy to a collection of opinions [Meinungen] 48 Hegel, by contrast, attempts 
to develop a conception of philosophy that includes a history of philosophy as essential to 
philosophy itself 
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"Wir mussen dies begreiflich machen, daß diese Mannigfaltigkeit der vielen Philosophien nicht nur der 
Philosophie selbst -der Möglichkeit der Philosophie- keinen Fintrag tut, sondern daß sie zur Existenz der 
Wissenschaft der Philosophie schlechterdings notwendig ist und gewesen ist, - dies ihr wesentlich ist "4 9 
" die philosophische Erkenntnis dessen, was Wahrheit und Philosophie ist, laßt diese Verschiedenheit [of 
systems of philosophy, EvdZ] selbst als solche in einem ganz anderen Sinn erkennen Die Erläuterung 
hierüber wird uns die Bedeutung der ganzen Geschichte der Philosophie aufschlössen "50 
For Hegel, to understand why philosophy has a history is to demonstrate that it must 
have a history only what is necessary is rational51 
The Concrete Development of Philosophical Truth 
The history of philosophy is not, according to Hegel, accidental to philosophy it belongs to its 
very nature 52 The central notions employed by Hegel are those of development and con-
cretion 53 The historical sequence of philosophical systems is understood as the gradual 
development of a single philosophy,** each system of philosophy expressing and elaborating a 
particular principíeos each further system 'sublating' the earlier system, ι e not just refuting it, 
but absorbing its principle a moment in the proper system 56 
"Das allgemeine Resultat der Geschichte der Philosophie ist 1 daß zu aller Zeit nur eme Philosophie gewesen 
ist, deren gleichzeitigen Differenzen die notwendigen Seiten des einen Prinzips ausmachen 2 daß die Folge der 
philosophischen Systeme keine zufallige, sondern die notwendige Stufenfolge der Entwicklung dieser 
Wissenschaft darstellt, 3 daß die letzte Philosophie einer Zeit das Resultat dieser Entwicklung und die Wahrheit 
in der höchsten Gestalt ist, die sich das Selbstbewußtsein des Geistes über sich gibt Die letzte Philosophie 
enthalt daher die vorhergehenden, faßt alle Stufen in sich, ist Produkt und Resultat aller vorhergehenden "57 
Philosophical truth is the result of the work of generations of philosophers, and it is 
only after this work is done that it becomes fully clear what philosophy really is not just a 
theory about reality, but the adequate self-realization (in the double meaning of "becoming real" 
and"becoming aware") of the rational substance of reality 
"Das Resultat ist der Gedanke, der bei sich ist und darin zugleich das Universum umfaßt, es in intelligente [NB 
not "intelligible , EvdZ] Welt verwandelt "58 
Philosophy is the 'highest' form of development of the Idea, because it is the 'place' 
where rational substance fully becomes substance-subject 
"Die Idee ist so, konkret an sich und sich entwickelnd, ein organisches System, eine Totalität welche einen 
Reichtum von Stufen und Momenten m sich enthalt Die Philosophie ist nun Гиг sich [italics mine EvdZ] das 
Erkennen dieser Entwicklung und ist als begreifendes Denken selbst diese denkende Entwicklung "59 
In the global process of development, philosophy is conceived of as a form of 
knowledge, and when it achieves its perfection it realizes itself as that development fully 
adequate knowledge of (about) reality is fully adequate realization (in the double sense just 
indicated) of philosophy, ι e fully adequate knowledge of reality itself [ал und fur sich] 
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Philosophy thus is "die sich denkende Idee, die wissende Wahrheit,"«) but this only becomes 
manifest when philosophy is actually completed, when it achieves, within the system of 
philosophy, a proper understanding of itself: 
"Diese Bewegung, welche die Philosophie ist, findet sich schon vollbracht, indem sie am Schluß ihren eigenen 
Begriff erfaßt, d ι nur auf ihr Wissen zurücksieht " 6 1 
The result of philosophical development thus is not the discovery of an abstract truth, 
but part of the concrete development of reality. Of course, Hegel's philosophy has the form of 
a system of categories, the inner, logical 'movement' whereof takes place "in the pure realm of 
thought",62 but this should not lead us to think that the content of philosophy is abstract: 
"Das Allgemeine, formell genommen und neben das Besondere gestellt, wird selbst auch zu etwas Beson-
derem "63 
"In der Tat steht die Philosophie im Gebiete des Gedankens, sie hat es damit mit Allgemeinheiten zu tun, ihr 
Inhalt is abstrakt, aber nur der Form, dem Elemente nach, in sich selbst ist die Idee wesentlich konkret, die 
Einheit von unterschiedenen Bestimmungen ( ) Die Philosophie ist dem abstrakten am feindlichsten, fuhrt 
zum Konkreten zurück "б 4 
Applying the concept of concretion to the history of philosophy means that philosophy 
exists only in the unity of universal [Allgemeines] and particular [Besonderes]· philosophy 
exists as this or that philosophy, in space, and in time, and as the thought of individuals 
[Ch 11]. This means that philosophy exists both as the logical development of concepts in the 
system of philosophy itself, and as the emergence, existence, and fate of philosophy in history: 
"Die andere Weise aber, daß die unterschiedenen Stufen und Entwicklungsmomente in der Zeit, in der Weise des 
Geschehens, an diesen besonderen Orten, unter diesem oder jenem Volke, unter diesen politischen Umstanden 
und unter diesen Verwicklungen mit denselben hervortreten -kurz, unter dieser empirischen Form-, dies ist das 
Schauspiel, welches uns die Geschichte der Philosophie zeigt " 6 5 
The development of philosophy is a historical process, the emergence of philosophy a 
historical event,66 not only because they take place at some moment in natural time, but also 
because they are conditioned by history: philosophy came into existence in Ancient Greece, 
because, Hegel argues, it was there that thought became free, free thought and political 
freedom emerging as part of the same process 67 
The 'inner logic' at work in the historical development of philosophy is identical, 
according to Hegel, with the inner logic of the conceptual development of the system of 
philosophy: 
"Dieselbe Entwicklung des Denkens, welche in der Geschichte der Philosophie dargestellt wird, wird in der 
Philosophie selbst dargestellt, aber befreit von jener geschichtlichen Äußerlichkeit, rem im Elemente des 
Denkens"68 
"Nach dieser Idee behaupte ich nun, daß die Aufeinanderfolge der Systeme der Philosophie in der Geschichte 
dieselbe ist als die Aufeinanderfolge m der logischen Ableitung der Begriffsbestimmungen der Idee Ich behaupte, 
daß, wenn man die Grundbegriffe der in der Geschichte der Philosophie erschienen Systeme rein, dessen 
entkleidet, was ihre äußerliche Gestaltung, ihre Anwendung auf das Besondere und dergleichen betrifft, 
[behandelt], so erhalt man die verschiedenen Stufen der Bestimmung der Idee selbst in ihrem logischen Begriffe 
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Umgekehrt, den logischen Fortgang fur sich genommen, so hat man dann nach seinen Hauptmomenten de 
Fortgang der geschichtlichen Erscheinungen; aber man muß freilich diese reinen Begriffe m dem zu erkennt 
wissen, was die geschichtliche Gestalt enthalt."*»9 
Although Hegel allows for divergences of historical order and logical order, 7° and i 
his historiographical practice the identity of logic and history is less strictly applied,71 an 
though Hosle may be right that Hegel's conception does not hang on such a strong identity," 
it has been a major ground for rejecting his conception as being a mere 'projection' of his ow 
system onto past philosophy.73 
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2.Ü. Four Challenging Elements of the Hegelian Conception 
Hegel's conception contains several elements of particular interest 
a In the first place, we feel spontaneously offended by the absolute pretension and 
immodesty of Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy, when he situates his own 
philosophical system at the end of the historical development of philosophy as its result?* 
totalizing all previous development 
"Die der Zeit nach letzte Philosophie ist das Resultat aller vorhergehenden Philosophien und muß daher die 
Prinzipien aller enthalten, sie ist darum die entfalteste reichste und konkreteste ' 7^ 
Consequently, the concluding chapter of Hegel's Vorlesungen , in which he 
discusses the present stage of philosophy, ι e his own system, is headed "Resultat' 
"Bis hierher ist nun der Weitgeist gekommen Die letzte Philosophie ist das Resultat aller [italics mine EvdZ] 
früheren nichts ist verloren, alle Prinzipien sind erhalten Diese konkrete Idee ist das Resultat der Bemühungen 
des Gentes durch fast 2500 Jahre (Thaies wurde 640 vor Christus geboren), seiner ernsthaftesten Arbeit, sich 
selbst objektiv zu werden, sich zu erkennen "7f> 
Hegel seems to put an end to the very history of philosophy if his system is the single 
true system of philosophy, then there would be little left in terms of future development But 
this is not Hegel's position not only does he rightly hold that as a historian he can not look into 
the future,?? he also makes explicit the historical nature of the "result" 
"Dies ist nun der Standpunkt der jetztigen Zeit, und die Reihe der geistigen Gestaltungen ist ihr jetzt damit 
geschlossen (italics mine, EvdZ] ' 7 8 
Hegel's absolute idealism thus is "the actual self-comprehension of spirit [italics mine, 
EvdZ],"79 and this implies that another time will require and yield a new self-comprehension 
His conception of the history of philosophy thus is not a projection but a (rational) reconstruc-
tion 
But even though Hegel can not be blamed for the "idiotic notion"80 as if the history of 
philosophy had ended, the question remains what is left for philosophy after Hegel It would 
seem that, on the one hand, his philosophy is itself "child of its time", and can not satisfy our 
present interests, but, on the other hand, something essential was achieved in it,si that has to 
and therefore will reappear in present philosophy According to Hosle, Hegel's most recent 
reincarnation, this is indeed the case The merit of post-Hegelian philosophy is "to have 
analyzed some topics more profoundly than Hegel," but it represents, "in its structural 
foundation [in ihrem strukturellen Grundansatz] in all its varieties a relapse [Ruckfall] beyond 
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Hegel," and it will only find its proper place "when it will be... incorporated as a moment in 
objective idealism."82 
The key to this problem is that Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy is a conse-
quence of his conception of philosophy, and the latter, in turn, a consistent elaboration of the 
classical notion of philosophy dominant in the Western tradition ever since Parmenides and 
Plato. The pretension of Hegel's philosophy is not 'his' pretension, but as the pretension of 
that tradition. The two central notions of philosophy as "knowledge of the true [ Wissen des 
Wahren]", and of the absolute totality of substance -"the true is the whole [ das Wahre ist das 
Ganze]"- imply a notion of true philosophy as self-comprehension of the Absolute. If, 
therefore, the outcome of his conception of the history of philosophy is unacceptable, we are 
referred back to the notion of philosophical truth. 
From a historical point of view, the moment in which the historical nature of 
philosophy is formulated as a philosophical problem, and the moment in which the project of 
Western philosophy as (attempt at) episteme becomes fully explicit and problematic, coincide: 
Hegel makes clear what it means to pretend that philosophy is true knowledge of reality. When 
he states, in the Phänomenologie des Geistes, that "to demonstrate that time is ready for the 
elevation of philosophy to a science would be the only genuine justification for the attempts to 
achieve that goal, since they would simultaneously show its necessity and fulfill it,"83 he 
points out that if philosophy really takes its mission seriously, it has to assume that it will 
appear concretely, sometime and somewhere as truth an und fur sich. In the same way as, in 
Hegel's interpretation, Jesus Christ was "a being that itself is knowledge [italics mine, EvdZ], 
i.e. Revelation."^ 
Why is this so provocative? For precisely the same reason as Christian revelation, if 
taken to be knowledge, is provocative: it excludes the possibility of its own falsehood. This is 
not a problem for Christianity as a religion, because it rests on an act of faith. The problem 
arises when religion is claimed to be -as it is by Hegel- "wahres Wissen". A basic contradiction 
in the Western philosophical tradition arises from the fact that it can not be, by its very 
definition, hypothetical. This means, however, that its truth must be either manifest, i.e. a 
revelation, or subject to an act of faith. In his commentary on the "Einleitung" of Hegel's 
Heidelberger Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1817), Peperzak has brought 
out this point in all clarity: 
"Herewith, Hegel clearly expresses that the only genuine beginning of philosophy consists in a free act that 
coincides with the 'belief in reason [Glaubean die Vernunft]'...."8S 
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Hegel's philosophy founds itself in a belief in its capacity to achieve true knowledge, 
that can not be further substantiated except in the cogency of its actual execution: it can not be 
proved, but only shown. But if it is true that philosophy resides, in the final analysis, in a free 
act, it is the result of a choice, which implies that philosophy itself, whatever its further 
elaboration, and however synthesizing or totalizing it may be, is a position [Ch.i.i]. This applies 
both to the "belief in reason" and to the opposite position, viz. the rejection of the notion of 
manifest truth. It is because truth is not manifest that Hegel's absolute idealism becomes a 
position, evoking a counter-position. 
b. A second important feature of Hegel's conception is the singularity of the historical 
process of philosophy: even if Hegel's own system is not its final result, it is a stage and focus 
through which philosophy had to pass.86 The "pilgrimage of truth through time"87 follows a 
single, but complex line, with a starting point, necessary stages, and an end. But does this nar-
rowing-down of the history of philosophy to a single 'mainstream' of Greek-Chris-
tian-Germanic philosophy, and of which Hegel believes himself to represent the totalizing end, 
not mean that Hegel forced all past history into the straitjacket of his LoghY! 
The question, again, is not about Hegel's arrogance. From a formal perspective, Hegel 
is right: if 'his philosophy embodies philosophical truth, then it musí contain every valuable step 
towards truth made by previous philosophers, it must be the result of the history of 
philosophy, and the logic of development, once properly understood, must lead to his 
philosophy. This alone, however, neither implies the fact of a historical development of 
philosophy (it might be that Hegel discovered a lost truth), nor its unity. Even if we agree with 
Hegel that philosophy does not develop Ъу itself, but has to be developed by philosophers, 
this does not imply that all philosophers have been developing one and the same philosophy. 
At this point, it becomes clear that Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy rests not 
only on his idea of philosophy, but also on his philosophy of history.88 Philosophy, as it 
develops -by being developed- through historical time, not only exists in history, but also 
comes out of history. 
с This leads to a third point: the correspondence of philosophy's history with history in 
general. Hegel, absolutizing philosophy and historicizing the absolute, by the same token 
historicizes philosophy. History is the self-realization of absolute spirit through a sequence of 
'epochs', stages [Gestalte] of World-Spirit, with, at each stage, philosophy as its highest, 
'concluding' form, in which Weltgeist comes to a full realization of itself as absoluter Geistß9 
Philosophy and world history are not simply simultaneous, but identical in a strict sense: 
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"Die bestimmte Gestalt einer Philosophie ist also nicht nur gleichzeitig mit einer bestimmten Gestalt des 
Volkes, unter welchem sie auftritt, mit ihrer Verfassung und Regierungsform, ihrer Sittlichkeit, geselligem 
Leben , mit ihren Versuchen und Arbeiten in Kunst und Wissenschaft mit dem Untergange der Staaten, in 
denen dies bestimmte Prinzip sich geltend gemacht hatte, und mit der Entstehung und dem Emporkommen 
neuer, worin ein höheres Prinzip seine Erzeugung und Entwicklung findet Der Geist hat das Prinzip der 
bestimmten Stufe seines Selbstbewußtseins jedesmal in den ganzen Reichtum seiner Vielseitigkeit ausgearbeitet 
und ausgebreitet ( ) Von diesen mannigfaltigen Seiten ist die Philosophie eine Form, die höchste Blute, sie 
fisti der Begriff seiner ganzen Gestalt, der Geist der Zeit als Geisr sich denkend vorhanden Das vielgestaltete 
Ganze spiegelt in ihr als dem emfachenBœnnpunkt, dem sich wissenden Begriff desselben, sich ab [italics 
Hegel's, underlining mine, EvdZ] "9° 
The duration of the development of philosophy thus is not determined by the capacity 
of philosophers to develop philosophy, but by the fact that the principle of each stage of world 
history first must be developed in all concreteness, before a philosophical understanding of it 
can be achieved 91 At the same time, philosophy paves the way for the transition to a new 
stage, because the full development of the principle in question, enabling its understanding, 
means that the principle has lost its raison d'être, since it is understood as a realization of 
World Spint, a particular and thus limited Gestalt 
" die Philosophie (ist) ganz identisch mit ihrer Zeit , sie ist Wissen des Substantiellen ihrer Zeit ( ) Die 
Philosophie steht jedoch andererseits der Form nach über ihrer Zeit, indem sie als das Denken dessen, was der 
substantielle Geist derselben ist, ihn sich zum Gegenstande macht Insofern sie im Geiste ihrer Zeit ist, ist er ihr 
bestimmter weltlicher Inhalt, zugleich ist sie aber als Wissen auch darüber hinaus, stellt ihn sich gegenüber, 
aber dies ist nur formell, denn sie hat wahrhaft keinen anderen Inhalt Dies Wissen selbst ist allerdings die 
Wirklichkeit des Geistes, das Selbstwissen des Geistes, Dies Wissen ist es dann, was eine леие Form der 
Entwicklung hervorbringt, Die Philosophie ist also die innere Geburtstatte des Geistes, der spater zu 
wirklicher Gestaltung hervortreten wird [italics mine, EvdZ] " 9 2 
It is important to note that Hegel employs a threefold meaning of the word philosophy, 
first of all, the one philosophy of which the history of philosophy is the development, 
secondly, 'epochal philosophy', and, thirdly, the individuation of philosophy into 
'philosophies' (Plato, Anstotle, Spinoza) He also employs two concepts of time natural time 
(time and space being the forms of Äußerlichkeit), and historical time (the realm of Weltgeist) 
Confusion arises from the fact that, to put it briefly, history exists concretely in nature (which 
is a way of saying that every historical event is a physical event, too) 
The three meanings of philosophy and the two meanings of time fit to each other The 
one philosophy is not in time, but 'above' it, since it belongs to the realm of the absolute Idea, 
logically preceding time as part of its externalization into Nature, epochal philosophy cor-
responds to the necessary sequence of stages of Weltgeist in historical time [Zeit as Zeitalter]; 
and the individuation of epochal philosophy into philosophies corresponds to natural time even 
if Hegel's philosophy, as the concluding stage of Modem philosophy, represents absolute 
Spint, returning back to itself out of time, it still had to be given a definite form in 1817-1839 
in Heidelberg and Berlin as Hegels system 
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As to philosophical epochs, Hegel distinguished only two: Greek philosophy and 
Germanic (Christian) philosophy, with Medieval philosophy as a period of fermentation 
[Gären] and preparation.93 When Hegel qualifies philosophy as "ihre Zeit, in Gedanken 
erfaßt,"9* we must bear in mind that he means historical, not natural time, and epochal 
philosophy: it is modem philosophy as a whole, as totalized by Hegel, that is the full understan-
ding of Modernity. 
The idea of epochal philosophy rests upon the 'Achilles' heel' of Hegel's philosophy of 
history, viz. the "Belief in World Spirit [Glauben an den Weltgeist]",95 and the "grand 
presumption that, in this respect too, the way of the world has been rational — which is what 
gives the history of philosophy its importance in the first place..."96 Epochal philosophy is the 
concrete unity of the universal (the one true philosophy) and the particular (the many 
philosophies), and it is where the necessary "inner history" and the contingent "outer 
history"9? of philosophy come together: without the second the first would be pure logic, 
without the first the second would be mere externality [Äußerlichkeit]. This concrete unity is 
fully realized only when, at epochal turning-points like Hegel's own philosophy, the universal 
(absolute, inner, necessary, rational) recognizes itself in and as the concrete universal, i.e. as 
concreticized in particularity (including the relative, external, contingent, irrational). 
For our present purpose, it is important to focus on the precise relation of inner and 
outer history. 
i. First of all, for Hegel, the exteriorization of philosophy into epochal philosophies is 
necessary as part of the gradual realization of World Spirit. This process takes a lot of (natural) 
time and human effort, but that is irrelevant inasmuch as the process itself is rational: 
"Es ist allerdings eine lange Zeit..., welche der Geist dazu braucht, sich die Philosophie zu erarbeiten. (...)Was 
die Langsamkeit des Geistes betrifft, so ist zu bedenken, daß er nicht pressiert ist, nicht zu eilen und Zeit genug 
hat... (...) Er... treibt sein Werk im Großen, er hat Nationen und Individuen genug zu depensieren. .. .der Weg 
des Geistes ist die Vermittlung, der Umweg. (...) 
Die erste Folge... ist diese, daß das Ganze der Geschichte der Philosophie ein in sich notwendiger, konsequenter 
Fortgang ist; er ist in sich vernünftig, durch seine Idee bestimmt [underlining mine, EvdZ]."98 
"Es ergibt sich daraus die Ansicht... daß... wir es doch nicht mit Vergangenem zu tun haben. Der Inhalt dieser 
Geschichte sind die wissenschaftlichen Produkte der Vernünftigkeit, und diese sind nicht ein Vergängliches."99 
ii. Secondly, the individuation within a given epoch of moments of the idea into distinct 
philosophies also is necessary: 
"Die Mannigfaltigkeit ist im Flusse... Die Unterschiede, die in der Idee liegen, werden als Gedanken gesetzt; das 
ist das erste. Das zweite ist, daß diese Unterschiede zum Bestehen kommen müssen, der eine hier, der andere da. 
(...) Solche vollständige Gestaltung des Gedankens ist eine Philosophie."100 
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They have to become objective and to exist as philosophy A or В of philosopher X or 
Y, m order for philosophy -in the epochal sense- to recognize and resume them as its own 
determinations and distinctions 
"Jedes System ist in einer Bestimmung, allein es bleibt nicht dabei, daß sie so außereinander sind ( ) Die 
Weise, wonach jedes sich als Selbständiges setzte wird wieder aufgehoben, nach der Expansion tritt Kontraktion 
ein "101 
"Die zweite Bestimmung, die aus dem Bisherigen folgt, ist die, daß lede Philosophie notwendig gewesen ist und 
noch ist, keine also untergegangen, sondern alle als Moment eines Ganzen in der Philosophie erhalten sind ( ) 
Was widerlegt worden, ist nicht das Prinzip dieser Philosophie, sondern nur dies, daß dies Prinzip die absolute 
Bestimmung sei [underlining mine, EvdZ] "102 
ш Thirdly, it is necessary that each principle be elaborated into the concrete form of a 
philosophical system 
"Wir werden uns besonders auf die Betrachtung der Prinzipien beschranken Jedes Prinzip hat eine Zeitlang die 
Herrschaft gehabt, daß in dieser Form dann das Ganze der Weltanschauung ausgeführt worden, das nennt man ein 
philosophische System "ЮЗ 
As we see, these three levels each entail a proportion of necessity and contingency, necessity 
becoming decreasingly important as we descend it is contingent how long an epoch lasts and 
how many generations are 'spent', it is contingent where, when, and by whom philosophies 
are developed, and the exact shape of philosophical systems, their elaboration into world-
views, their details, are contingent, too The only reason for contingency, ι e for the 
externality that marks the historical development of philosophy, is that it is necessary for the 
appearance of necessity as such, and it is only to this extent that it can be understood As 
Dusingcomments 
"Notwendig sind dann in der Geschichte diejenigen Ereignisse und in der Geschichte der Philosophie diejenigen 
Prinzipien und deren Abfolge, die fur das suksessive Zu sich selbst-kommen des Weitgeistes oder des absoluten 
Geistes konstitutiv sind, als zufällig können Ereignisse, Gedanken und zeitliche Folgen von Lehren gelten, die 
zwar auftreten, aber ihr Gegenteil an ihrer Stelle ebenso zulassen, die jedoch jenes Zu sich kommen des realen 
Geistes nicht verhindern ''04 
Philosophy, Hegel declares, does not deal with what is contingent,·05 what is 
important is "to recognize in the empirical form [Gestdlt] and appearance, in which philosophy 
historically comes to the fore, its progress as development of the Idea," and to this end "one 
has to bring along the knowledge of the Idea " Otherwise 
" bietet sich dem ideenlosen Auge freilich nur ein unordentlicher Haufen von Meinungen dar "'06 
"Man muß wissen, was man in den alten Philosophen oder in der Philosophie jeder anderen bestimmten Zeit zu 
suchen hat, oder wenigstens wissen daß man in solcher Philosophie eine bestimmte Entwicklungsstufe des 
Denkens vor sich hat "Ό7 
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At this 'border' of necessity and contingency, Hegel situates the distinction between a 
philosophical and an empirical history of philosophy, the latter not deserving the name of a 
science '°8 
This, however, results in an abstract division of philosophical and empirical history of 
philosophy, corresponding to an, in the end, abstract opposition of inner and outer history (it is 
tempting to see the very of spatial metaphor "inner — outer as an indication of what Hegel 
himself disqualified as " Verstandsmetaphysik") Because the contingent is not rational 
[vernünftig], it is only understandable and a possible object ot science as contingency, not as 
this or that contingent phenomenon This leaves out much of the subject-matter of history of 
philosophy as d both philosophical and historical discipline In fact, the global correspondence 
at the epochal level, in combination with the necessary objectivization of all "principles" into 
philosophies, relieves Hegel from the task to investigate the concrete development of 
philosophical positions 
Hegel states an a prion necessity -what must emerge will emerge-, and this makes the 
actual differentiation of positions, and the actual influence of one philosophy on another 
historically irrelevant and irrational there is no necessity in it since the effect would have arisen 
anyway The differentiation of positions within a philosophical epoch resembles, in the 
Hegelian vision, a field in which a hidden mycelium yields, as a true "Listder Vemunñ ', the 
separate mushrooms which are the different philosophies, whereas in fact each position arises 
as a rational (at least in its intention) reaction to (an) earlier one(s) The Hegelian schematism, 
turning a necessary condition into a sufficient one, proves too much, depriving concrete history 
of much of its rational content * And the same criticism applies to the concrete relation of 
individuated philosophy to surrounding history here again, the thesis of global correspondence 
warrants the rationality and Zeitgemaßheit of Philosophy, but removes the (ír)rationality and 
the (Un)zeitgemdßheit of how philosophers reacted to their actuality 109 
d A fourth provocative element is Hegel's thesis that the historical development of 
philosophy is globally progressive, and that "the present is superior " ι ю Is this true7 And if 
so should we be Hegelians today7 In order to answer these questions, we must realize that 
Hegel gives a philosophical and a historical reason for the impossibility to adhere to a past 
philosophy, one The first consists in the irreversible progress of philosophy itself earlier 
positions are criticized, negated, and sublated by subsequent philosophical thought, and once 
they are, to adhere to them would mean not to be rational The second reason is that "every 
'The ultimate reason for this is Hegel ь attempt to understand all out οί Ά single, sufficient and necessary 
condition, viz absolute Idea 
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philosophy is philosophy of its time," and only fit "to satisfy those interests, that are ap-
propriate to its time [ihrerZeit angemessen]."' · ' Past philosophies are irrevocably outdated: 
"Aus diesem Grunde aber befriedigt den Geist, in dem nun ein tiefer bestimmter Begriff lebt, eine frühere 
Philosophie nicht. (...) Deswegen leben wohl die platonische, aristotelische usf. Philosophie, alle Philosophien 
zwar immer und gegenwärtig noch in ihren Prinzipien; aber in dieser Gestalt und Stufe, auf der die platonische 
und aristotelische Philosophie war, ist die Philosophie nicht mehr. Wir können nicht bei ihnen stehenbleiben, 
sie können nicht wieder erweckt werden. Es kann deswegen heutigentags keine Platoniker, Aristoteliker, Stoiker, 
Epikureer mehr geben."112 
Hegel is mistaken at this point, again, by the idea of manifest truth. Not only is it 
perfectly well possible to be a Platonist, Epicurean, or Hegelian today, but the actual existence 
of more or less orthodox 'incarnations' of past positions even is a major factor in the 
remarkable plurality of contemporary philosophy, one of its positive and productive features. 
(For example, these lines would not have been written the way they are, if the Hegelian 
position were not 'reincarnated' in present philosophy by Hösle.) What is impossible is to be a 
more or less orthodox Epicurean or Hegelian and be regarded by the majority of philosophers 
and / or a significant proportion of the public as offering a proper understanding of our time: 
orthodox Platonists and Hegelians isolate themselves from contemporary philosophical culture, 
but at the same time the existence of a multitude of 'abstract', isolated, unzeitgemäße 
philosophical positions is invaluable as a 'living laboratory' of possible positions.113 A 
consequence of Hegel's idea of later philosophy rendering earlier positions obsolete is that a 
polemical relation to them becomes impossible: we have no reason to take them seriously as 
possibly true. At the same time, past thought can only be provoking, inspiring, and stimulating 
for present thought to the extent to which present philosophers treat it as possible truth (the 
present discussion with Hegel testifies of this). 
In defence of Hegel, we may put forward that, against the background of the 
philosophic-historical tradition of his age, his historiography of philosophy is precisely an 
attempt to do justice to the philosophers and the philosophies of the past: 
"Das Verhalten gegen eine Philosophie muß also eine affirmative und eine negative Seite enthalten; dann erst 
lassen wir einer Philosophie Gerechtigkeit widerfahren."114 
Moreover, every philosophical position that claims to be true, ipso facto declares all 
other positions, past or present, to be false. But ongoing discussion and argument is not done 
justice to by Hegel's conception. His philosophy not only excludes other positions formally (as 
any position does), but seems to exclude them materially as well: it is impossible to think 
something different. This type of philosophy does not appear as a position but as the totality of 
all possible positions. There seems to be no position left, from which philosophical thought 
could be (further) developed. 
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And yet, in the period after Hegel, and due to the absolute claim posited there in the 
name of Reason, a development took place that can be characterized as a "formation, 
unprecedented in intensity, of systems that deny reason as such."·'5 Hösle disposes of these 
systems as being fundamentally inconsistent: they seek to validate "anti-Reason... the Will, 
Life, Existence etc." as a philosophical position, ι ·6 But their very emergence shows that the 
Hegelian conception, too, is a position, not a manifest truth. 
Hegel does not discuss the obvious possibility that there is an unsurmountable gap 
between the idea of philosophy, Wissen des Wahren,"7 and the actually existing attempts at 
such a Wissen by finite (human) beings. The attempt to create a pluralist concept of truth, 
though contradictory in itself, is one of the jobs of 20th century philosophy, and means the 
finalization and secularization of philosophy: it is a protest of necessarily finite thought against 
its own infinite pretension, exemplified in Hegel's philosophy. Because truth is not manifest or 
revealed, we do not accept any concrete philosophy as the point of departure of our interpreta­
tion of the history of philosophy. Therefore, history of philosophy is not part of a system of 
philosophy, nor a purely philosophical discipline, but an independent philosophical and 
historical discipline. 
HegelAmended 
Yet we can not simply dispose of the Hegelian conception, since it does point to important 
features of philosophy as it historically exists, and it does confront us with irreducible choices. 
It shows, in the first place, how the idea of philosophy as true knowledge leads to a notion of a 
single philosophy, and to a totalizing conception of philosophy's past. The tragic beauty of 
Hegel's (and Hösle's) attempts to reconcile the absolute truth-claim and the historical existence 
of philosophy confronts us with the choice between the idea of manifest truth, and an idea of 
rational thought that regards it as a finite and self-founding attempt at truth, and thus as a 
position. In the second place, it has become clear how the idea of manifest truth implies the 
singularity of the historical process of philosophy: to drop that idea does evade this consequen-
ce, but does not exclude the existence of order in the history of philosophy. On the contrary, it 
leads to the idea of a possible plurality of lines of development. 
In the third place, although we have rejected the abstract distinction between the 
necessary and the contingent, claiming that there is more to be understood in the history of 
philosophy than Hegel's conception seems to allow for, it is indeed "conspicuous that all 
synthetic thinkers are at the end not only of philosophical epochs, but aJso of historical 
epochs."··8 Refusal of the belief in Weltgeist implies the obligation to offer an alternative 
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explanation for this phenomenon. And even if, in the fourth place, we reject Hegel's totaliza-
tion of philosophy's history, it still is his merit to have opened our eyes to the fact that all past 
philosophy is historically limited, and, at the same time, of possible value for present 
philosophy. 
If we replace, first of all, the notion of manifest truth by that of finite attempt and position, we 
can replace the single philosophy (as a 'logic') by an equally singular, but virtually unlimited 
field of possible philosophical positions. This, secondly, enables us to accept the idea of order 
in philosophy's past: not a mere multitude of attempts or subjective opinions, but a plurality of 
'tracks', drawn by generations of philosophers through the field of possible positions, 
concretely linked by individual rational thought (acceptance, rejection, negation, sublation), 
offering the possibility of rational reconstructions (histories of philosophy). It is important to 
note, in this respect, that philosophical thought always relates itself to neighboring positions, 
and that every reconstruction is performed from a position within the field: both are essentially 
local, and there is no external position. 
In the third place, the idea of a concrete situation in which philosophy exists allows us 
to point out the selective determination of philosophy by history: some positions are favored, 
others disfavored by that situation (as perceived by philosophers). It also explains the 
emergence, near the end of historical 'epochs', of forms of objective idealism: there always are 
objective idealists (Platonists, Hegelians, Höslians), but it is around major historical tran-
sitions, when many people have the idea that an epoch is nearing its end, that these grand 
syntheses gain force and attractivity. In the fourth place, this allows us to see the historical 
development of philosophy as progressive, not in the sense of necessarily ever higher stages, 
but in the sense of accumulation of already elaborated and thus, in principle, rethinkable, 
positions, as well as in the sense of arriving at a deeper understanding of its own nature. 
Thus, the "latest philosophy" virtually is "the result of all preceding philosophies", "the most 
developed, the richest, and the most concrete."119 Philosophical culture, in its present stage, 
contains all previous philosophy. It is present in the material basis, mediated in the philosophi-
cal heritage, reproduced in philosophical instruction, and rethinkable by actual philosophical 
thought. In this way, a contemporary Western philosophers has access to a much wider range 
of elaborated positions than any philosopher of earlier ages (including Hegel). Philosophy can 
always learn from the past, and the richer the (accessible) past the more there is to learn. 
However, the 'lessons' from history often are negative rather than positive: one can not state, 
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for example, the finite nature of all attempts at truth by philosophers without being accused of 
relativism, nihilism, or skepticism [quod sit demonstrandum]. 
Philosophy is "its time, grasped in thought," 12° inasmuch as philosophers attempt to 
grasp what their age is about. It is true that philosophers, in analyzing Modernity, become post-
Modernists, but that is not the same as to say that Modernity realizes itself to be a finite 
realization of absolute spirit in a concrete philosophical system. This realization takes place in a 
philosophical culture as a whole. Rejecting the 'absolutist' pretension here at the same time 
makes possible the rejection of the 'historicist' identification of philosophy with its time.121 
Philosophy, as historically situated individual thought, is never totally identical with its time, as 
it distinguishes itself, as free thought, from 'its own' time, and it can do so in two ways: either 
by denying its historicity and ascribing to itself the status of a realm of pure freedom, or by 
realizing it and by recognizing freedom as the limit of determination. Hegel's greatness is to 
have perceived that the second of these two ways is the more 'productive' one. 
Finally, every philosophy is "philosophy of its time", historically limited, and 
"therefore can only satisfy... the interests of its time".122 Hegelianism no longer can satisfy 
our interests, because it is at odds with present reality, including contemporary philosophy. 
But it remains possible to be a Hegelian today, as much as it is possible to discard and 
disregard his thought. The first, to the extent to which Hegelians are 'orthodox', implies a 
degree of Unzeitgemäßheit, the second means to ignore the fact that post-Hegelian philosophy 
is not 'free' from Hegel when it rejects it: contemporary philosophical culture therefore gains 
when Hegelianism is present, i.e. included in the spectrum of actually existing positions. 
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2.Ш The Historical Nature of Philosophy 
If present philosophy is made up of the totality of facts and acts that can, in some relevant 
sense be called "philosophical", then past philosophy must be the totality of such facts and acts 
that have been. Philosophy's past thus is a permanently growing field of "possible 
knowledge", but accessible to present philosophy only to the extent to which it is objectivized 
as "text", thus constituting philosophy's history At this point, my discussion and amendments 
of Hegel can be linked to the idea of philosophical culture [Ch 1 n] For what does it mean that 
philosophy has a history"' 
ι First of all, it means that the emergence of philosophy is historically conditioned It is a 
historical situation [4] that realizes a necessary condition for free individual thought [ 1 ] to posit 
itself Here, again, Hegel is a major source of inspiration 
"Das Denken muß fur sich sein, in seiner Freiheit zur Existenz kommen Diese allgemeine Bestimmung, das 
Denken, das sich selbst setzt, ist abstrakte Bestimmtheit Sie ist der Anfang der Philosophie, dieser ist zugleich 
ein Geschichtliches, Sagen wir, zum Hervortreten der Philosophie gehort Bewußtsein der Freiheit, so muß 
dem Volke, wo Philosophie beginnt, dies Prinzip zugrunde liegen, nach der praktischen Seite hangt damit 
zusammen, daß wirkliche Freiheit politische Freiheit aufblühe ( ) In der Geschichte tritt daher die Philosophie 
nur da auf, wo und insofern freie Verfassungen sich bilden " 1 2 3 
By the same token, the philosopher is a historical product As Hegel stressed, 
philosophy has to be done by philosophers, it is a form of work -"die Arbeit des Geistes"124-, 
an activity [ Tätigkeit] of people Philosophy thus has to be done at some place, at a specific 
time, and by an individual philosopher, ι e by a "son (or daughter) of his time".125 
и In the second place, philosophical thought is historical in that it relates to previous 
(preceding or earlier) thought, first of all by means of negation of one or several elements of 
that previous thought (here the logic of'development emerges) In this sense, it is true 
"daß die weiter gebildete Philosophie einer spateren Zeit wesentlich Resultat der vorhergehenden Arbeiten des 
denkenden Geistes ist, daß sie hervorgetrieben von diesen früheren Standpunkten, nicht isoliert fur sich aus 
dem Boden gewachsen ist ' ' 2*> 
We can accept this quite literally, as long as we do not identify "philosophy" with any 
philosophical system 
Secondly, philosophy, as soon as it has emerged [1], creates its own past as its first 
movement, and any subsequent movement relates objectively to this first movement as to what 
has already been done in philosophy A first line is drawn through the field of possible 
positions [2], marking a point from which other lines and patterns can take shape This means 
that the part(s) of that field explored thus far are themselves a historical fact These actually 
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elaborated positions are objectivized in text(s) and constitute a material basis of philosophy 
[3], that is historically accumulative Not, however, the kind of "growth of knowledge" that 
seems to be the privilege of science Rather it is an accumulation of already elaborated 
positions, with their problematic sides, possible critique, and mutual relations 
Thirdly, individual thought, the formation of lines and patterns in the field of possible 
positions, and the accumulation of a material basis, take place in a concrete situation [4], which 
determines the mechanisms of selection which render some positions actual and zeitgemäß, 
others marginal, oppositional, and unzeitgemäß, and which creates the public space of 
philosophy [D] It is the historical situation that selects the themes that come to the fore in the 
public space as being of actual importance even if philosophers claim the right to decide what 
is actually important, the 'fate' of their theories is not thereby determined As one Soviet 
historian of philosophy wrote 
"The point is not that the content and composition of the philosophical doctrines of Plato, Descartes, Hegel, and 
others, is changing, but that their significance within the spiritual lite of contemporary society may change 
Quite often when social circumstances have changed, hidden possibilities of past doctrines become actual, what 
was in the background moves to the front and, inasmuch as the heritage is a component of developing cultural 
systems, the meaning changes of what looked and was perceived differently in other contexts " ' 27 
in In the third place, once philosophy has become embedded in a historical, socio-political 
situation as one of its distinguishable elements, individual philosophical thought has to take 
into account this public space [D] as its condition of existence, which it can accept, ignore, 
protest against, or tum into a subject of investigation, but not do away with This public space 
also displays a first differentiation of possible functions of philosophy, e g a distinction 
between the epistemic and the ideological function, and philosophy is confronted with the fact 
that it affects the socio-political situation It is the in public space that the situation in which 
philosophy exists becomes a theme for philosophy philosophers 'deal with' their own time, 
try to achieve a " Wissen des Substantiellen ihrer Zeit", and in this respect, too, philosophy 
depends on history The public space is the place where the spectrum of actually existing 
positions, with their relations of mutual inclusion and exclusion, takes shape [A] As the 
material basis, the 'body' of available texts, grows, and actually existing positions relate 
themselves to earlier thought, paying their dues to the philosophers they (think they) learned 
from, a philosophical heritage takes shape [B], the changing whole of already elaborated 
positions and problems that are regarded as relevant for present philosophical culture This 
heritage is 'fixated' in instruction, in accepted and non-accepted forms of objectivization 
(genres of text and the like), ι e in a historically changing philosophical industry [C] (the first 
examples whereof are, in the Western tradition, the philosophical schools of Antiquity) 
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Since each of these four 'pillars' [A to D] is related to the others, but also has a 
histor(icit)y of its own, it is impossible to single out one of them as determining the others 
Together they determine a specific, historically changing and developing philosophical culture, 
m which the level of differentiation, the strength of tradition, the extent ofobjectivization anà 
the quality of discussion have previous developments as their necessary, but not sufficient 
condition As Hegel rightly stressed, "what we are, we are, at the same time, historically," '28 
but we have to make ourselves be what we potentially [an sich] are 
"Dies ist ebenso unsere und jedes Zeitalters Stellung und Tätigkeit, die Wissenschaft, welche vorhanden ist, zu 
fassen und sich ihr anzubilden, und ebendann sie weiterzubilden und auf einen höheren Standpunkt zu erheben 
Indem wir sie uns zu eigen machen, machen wir aus ihr etwas Eigenes gegen das, was sie vorher war " 1 2 9 
iv In the fourth place, inasmuch as philosophical culture has to be reproduced by 
subsequent generations of philosophers ('small', 'medium', and 'great'), it is historically 
developing This development is virtually progressive in the sense that its maximally attainable 
level is never inferior to what it was before, but it always requires work to achieve this 
maximum, and it depends on favorable or unfavorable conditions The development only 
seems to be automatic when it is continuous and uninhibited First and foremost among these 
conditions is political freedom when Hegel pointed to "free constitutions" as a condition for 
philosophy, he pointed not only to a historical condition for the emergence of philosophy, but 
also to a permanent condition of its existence to the extent to which free constitutions 
disappear, free thought, though it may still posit itself, is endangered 
As a matter of historical fact, Western philosophy has seen a diversification of the 
public space [D] of philosophy from the agora in Athens, through monastic orders in Medieval 
Europe, the constitution of universities, and the "intellectuels" of the 18th century, to the 
philosophical faculties of the present Generally speaking, this diversification has favored the 
development of a plurality of positions, schools, journals, and traditions. Once a degree of 
diversity has been attained, it is retained as an ideal 
Growing differentiation of the spectrum of actually existing positions [A] leads to an 
increasing complexity of philosophical thought itself [1], having to take into account all these 
possibilities, but also to a desire to draw a clear line between good and bad philosophy, 
philosophy and pseudo-philosophy, contemporary and outdated philosophy The net result of 
this is that an ever greater part of the field of possible positions [2] has been explored and 
elaborated, feeding the philosophical heritage [B], the growth whereof also has led to a greater 
significance of history of philosophy as an independent discipline Due to the tendency of 
'present' -beginning at least with Aristotelian and Platonist positions in the Middle Ages-
philosophical positions to seek part of their foundation in philosophy's past, the assessment of 
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that past has become increasingly important, which includes the establishment of a material 
basis [3]). This, along with the growing complexity of the philosophical heritage itself, and the 
institutionalization of education, has been one of the reasons for the expansion of philosophical 
industry [C], and a growing professionalization of philosophy, including the inevitability of ad-
ministrative work, required to (re)produce, in a given situation [4], the public space of 
philosophical culture [D], a public space that, at the same time, displays a diversification into 
academic and non-academic 'discourses'. 
In concrete philosophical culture, the four 'pillars' each have their own historicity and 
momentum, but the concrete situation is, in the end, the decisive factor with respect to the 
development ofthat culture: social, political, and economic factors do not directly influence, let 
alone "determine" individual philosophical thought, but they yield the conditions of existence 
of philosophical culture, and thus determine the level of differentiation, the strength of 
tradition, the extent of objectivization, and the quality of discussion, in a word, the level of 
philosophical culture. For example, the historically changing situation can diminish the 
subjective freedom of philosophers when it makes them feel obliged to yield a positive 
contribution to the actual problems of the society they live in (Russian philosophy offers ample 
evidence). It can decrease the number of active professional philosophers, due to economic 
development (as in Russia today), 13° or political choice (as when they are expelled for political 
reasons — Russia 1922). It further may exert a negative influence on the spectrum of actually 
existing positions through unification and planning. The reduction of the material basis 
(burning texts or putting them in closed library departments), the regimentation of philosophi-
cal instruction, the curtailing of philosophical publication, censorship, etc. all can change the 
character of philosophical culture, and cause its decline. All these factors have devastating 
effects on philosophical culture, even if they do not completely destroy it. Philosophical culture 
therefore never is permanently or automatically 'improving' or 'progressive'. 
v. In the fifth place, philosophical culture includes a growing awareness of its own 
historicity and situatedness, as the contrast sharpens between the subjective condition of 
philosophy, viz. free individual thought, on the one hand, and the objective 'burden' of its 
past, incarnated in philosophical culture, on the other. This awareness comes to the fore in the 
bloom of meta-philosophical discussions, in the growing importance and sophistication of the 
ideological self-defence of philosophy, in the recognition by philosophers of a "free con-
stitution" as a major condition for a flourishing philosophical culture, and in the awareness of 
the different functions of philosophy. 
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It is this growing awareness, too, that makes possible different reductions of 
philosophy to one of the factors that shape its face. Philosophy always takes place in a concrete 
socio-historical situation of the individual philosopher, and this can serve as the point of 
departure of various forms of reductionism: 'historicism' (Dilthey), psychologism, economism 
/ sociologism (as in Marxism, for example), sexism (Irigaray), etc. From this perspective, the 
Hegelian conception also is a reductionism, which can be called 'philosophism': a reduction of 
philosophical thinking to its logical content. An important task, still ahead, is to conceive of the 
historical embeddedness of philosophy without landing in historicism, of socio-economic 
conditions of philosophy without ending in economism or 'vulgar' sociologism, of in­
dividuality without finding oneself back as a subjectivist or psychologist, and, last but not 
least, to think the philosophical relevance of philosophy's past without becoming a 
'philosophist'. 
The present state of philosophy is a multitude of attempts to comprehend reality, to 
formulate one's thought, to convince others, to clear up problems, etc. If this is the case here 
and now, we may safely conclude that it has been like that always and everywhere. But 
although we see a multitude, it is not chaotic: we do not perceive a single order, but we do 
perceive specific patterns and lines. They are objective, but not all objectivity: there are other 
patterns and lines, too. It is only a matter of a single pattern in as far as we identify ourselves 
with one specific tradition or position. These patterns and lines are in fact very familiar: we 
point them out every time we describe the logic of an existing discussion, for instance in an 
educational situation, or when we try to connect past positions with ones that are taken today. 
The present study, too, is an attempt to reconstruct such a pattern. 
So far, the theme of ideology has been touched upon twice: once as one of the possible 
functions of philosophical theory [Ch.l.iii], the second time as an element of the historical 
situation of philosophy [Ch.2.iii]. Ideology is one aspect that has to be taken into account if we 
try to understand philosophy as it concretely exists. With respect to Soviet philosophy, the 
relation of philosophy to ideology is of primary importance [Part Ш], and it is therefore 
necessary to make it the subject of a separate discussion in the next chapter. 
*** 
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CHAPTER THREE 
What is Ideology? A Suitable Conception 
" l'idéologie ne dit jamais «je suis idéologique» "'31 
L Althusser, 1976 
"Der Unterschied zwischen Ideologie und Wissenschaft ist nicht der 
Unterschied zwischen Luge und Wahrheit Sie unterscheiden sich durch ihre 
soziale Funktion und nicht durch den Grad ihrer Wahrhaftigkeit "'32 
L Kolakowski, 1960 
The concept of ideology has a long history, ізз
 m
 the course of which strongly different 
conceptions have been elaborated 134 Ame Nœss reportedly distinguished eighteen different 
meanings of "ideology" 135 John В Thompson recently divided these into neutral and critical 
conceptions >36 Like Thompson, I refrain from an attempt at what he calls "some grand and 
sweeping synthesis " Unlike him, I shall try to unite the 'neutral' and the 'critical' approach, 
treating ideology as an inevitable, but not 'evil' phenomenon My goal is a conception that 
allows for a discussion and evaluation of the phenomena in Soviet reality that either were 
labelled ideological by others, or qualified themselves as such, focusing on the relation of 
ideology to philosophy I shall argue that both an identification and a radical opposition of 
ideology and philosophy must be avoided This goal is achieved by avoiding the category 
mistake of regarding ideology as a kind of consciousness or theory, and by developing a 
conception of ideology that entails both 'neutral' and 'critical' elements 
The proof of the pudding is in the eating, ι e in an application of this conception to 
Soviet philosophy in relation to ideology [Panni], a subject discussed by several scholars 13? If 
ideology and philosophy would belong to the same category, that of forms of thought or of 
theory, there are three possible relations between them they would have to be identical, 
mutually exclusive, or one including the other In the first case, Soviet philosophy is simply 
'absorbed' by Marxist-Leninist ideology In the second case, it becomes difficult to differen­
tiate within Soviet philosophy it either is only seemingly philosophy, but in fact ideology, or it 
is philosophy, but then it has to be totally separate from ideology If, finally, the concept of 
philosophy includes that of ideology or vice versa, one would have to be a specific kind of the 
other 
I shall defend the thesis that Soviet philosophy was philosophy, and that at the same 
time the ideological function of this philosophy is a fact Therefore, both the opposition of 
ideology and philosophy, and their identification will not do for our purpose, as they either 
deprive Soviet philosophy of its philosophical nature, or split it into two unrelated realms, or 
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disenable us to distinguish between those cases where ideology does, and where it does not, 
impede philosophy. An adequate analysis of Soviet philosophy presupposes a more differen-
tiated concept of ideology. The present chapter therefore is not meant to offer a full treatment of 
philosophical and scientific discussions of ideology, but to develop, partly intuitively, partly 
inspired by others, a suitable conception, fit to the general purpose of this study. 
What Kind of Thing is Ideology? 
In the first chapter, ideology has been presented as one of several possible functions of 
philosophy [Ch.l.iii], and in the second chapter as one of the factors in the historical situation in 
which philosophy exists [Ch.2.iii]. I deliberately propose to regard ideology as a function. 
Hence, to say of what is performing an ideological function, that it is itself 'ideology', is 
derived usage, based on the fact that what performs an ideological function may do so more or 
less permanently or exclusively. As a starting-point I use George Kline's definition of 
ideology, formulated in an article on the relation of Soviet philosophy to ideology: 
"Ideology ¡s a relatively coherent set of theoretical claims and practical valuations which function to organize the 
commitment and action of social groups and may serve this purpose equally well whether the theoretical claims 
are true, false, or indeterminate in truth-value."1^ 
The core of this definition is that "ideology isa... set of claims etc... which function... 
and serve a purpose". Without that functioning, what remains is a "set of claims and 
valuations". This means that ideology is a possible function of that set, not its 'nature'. 
Reformulating Kline's definition: "Ideology is a (possible) function of a relatively coherent set 
of theoretical claims and practical valuations, namely to organize the commitment and action of 
social groups, and it may serve this purpose equally well whether the theoretical claims are 
true, false, or indeterminate in truth-value." Thus restated, it is made up of three parts: 
i. ideology is a (possible) function of a relatively coherent set of theoretical claims and 
practicalvaluations; 
ii. this function is to organize the commitment and action of social groups; 
iii. it may serve its purpose equally well whether the theoretical claims are true, false, or 
indeterminate in truth-value. 
In what follows, these three shall be discussed [З.і, З.іі, з.ііі]. I shall argue that to each of them 
some amendments must be made in order to arrive at the suitable conception this chapter aims 
at. This will result in the following reformulation: 
50 
Part One Three Theoretical Overtures 
ι ideology is a possible function of any more or less explicit and elaborated, relatively 
coherent, and more or less consistent set of particular or universal theoretical claims and 
practical valuations, ι e of a theory, 
и the ideological function is to motivate, ι e organize the commitment and action of social 
groups, and to legitimize a specific status quo or the past action of social groups, that 
may, but need not be the 'bearers' of the theory in question The ideological move itself 
contains three elements a claim as to the truth of the 'theory' concerned, an exclusion 
of alternative possibilities, and a transition from 'theory' to practice Each of these 
elements can be 'backed' by, or complement physical force, and at least one on these 
elements has to be concealed, 
in a 'theory' serves this purpose, irrespective of whether the theoretical claims are true, 
false, or indeterminate in truth-value, not necessarily depending on whether the 
'subjects (originators)' or the 'objects (addressees)' of ideology sincerely adhere to its 
content And it can be, to a greater or lesser extent official, ι e developed and guarded 
by an ideological authority (The same holds for the practical valuations ) 
Finally, a few important consequences of this conception will be indicated [3 iv], in preparation 
for an answer to our initial question this part as a whole seeks to answer, the question about the 
possible existence and development of philosophy m an explicitly 'ideologized' socio-histoncal 
situation 
3.i. Ideology as a Possible Function of Theory 
If ideology is not a kind of theory or consciousness, but a function, then what kind of thing 
can perform it7 This question is pressing, as there are cases where we speak of such-and-such 
ideology, and not of world-view or theory (e g, Marxism-Leninism, or Nazism) According 
to Kline, what performs an ideological function is a "relatively coherent set of theoretical claims 
and practical valuations" According to an author from a different background, Svetozar 
Stojanovic,'39 ideology is a "set of ideas", that can be used by social groups to justify or 
discredit a social order 14° According to Thompson, to study ideology is "to study the ways in 
which meaning serves to establish and sustain relations of domination " | 4 1 
These definitions, in the first place, emphasize the functional nature of ideology What 
performs an ideological function is not itself ideological 
" it is crucial to stress that certain symbolic phenomena, are not ideological as such but are ideological 
only in so far as they serve, in particular circumstances, to maintain relations of domination We can not read 
the ideological character of symbolic phenomena off the symbolic phenomena themselves "142 
Hence, that which performs an ideological function can therefore exist independently 
this function, and the ideological function does not belong to the nature of those things they do 
not function ideologically 'out of themselves', but have to be used Of course they do have to 
suit that use 
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In the second place, Thompson's meaningful symbolic phenomena, Kline's sets of 
theoretical claims and practical valuations, and Stojanovic sets of ideas all point to a set of more 
or less explicit ideas, claims, and valuations. They must be somehow related to the goal that is 
to be achieved by the ideological function: they will be about human nature, social reality, 
political aims, moral values, etc. This is what I have called a theory [Ch.l.i]. The distinction 
between theory and ideology as a possible function of it, also implies that an ideology can 
perform other functions, too. A Party-controlled ideology like Soviet Marxism-Leninism can, 
along with its primary, ideological function, perform an epistemic function -conveying 
knowledge about historical and present reality-, or an existential one, in giving meaning to 
some people's lives. 
Ideology thus is a function that 'theories' can perform, or that they can be used for. 
Ideology may take the form of an explicit set of claims and valuations: Marxism-Leninism or 
Nazism had this form. But in other cases there is no such explicit, clear-cut 'text'. This is often 
part of the efficacy of ideology (e.g., the ideology of free enterprise, while legitimizing the 
economic and social life of large parts of the world, is not systematically worked-out and 
defended, though it may form part of political programmes, scientific studies etc.). A 
distinction should be made, finally, between spontaneous, natural, and elaborated, artificial 
ideology. 
The "meaningful symbolic phenomena" that function ideologically, however spontaneous, 
subjective, or even subconscious they may be, can always be made (more) explicit (though that 
may harm their ideological functioning), and then will turn out to be sets of propositions 
(including valuations = propositions of the form "X is (not) right / to be done"). This means 
that, as far as the meaning of that which is used ideologically is concerned, it will be some 
descriptive or normative theory. Whatever performs an ideological function is, if made fully 
explicit, a form of theory. 
The Aptness of Forms of Theory 
A 'theory' that can perform an ideological function, can be: 
• an already existing 'theory', e.g., a religious faith (Islam, Christianity), a secular world-
view (humanism, New Age), a scientific or philosophical theory, i.e. something that 
already functions in other contexts, and that is found fit to serve an ideological purpose 
(for example: the use of Christianity in the motivation and legitimization of the 
"Scramble for Africa"); 
• an already existing 'theory', that is adapted in order to serve an ideological purpose (an 
example is "scientific socialism", i.e. the transformation of a partly philosophical, 
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partly sociological, partly economic theory into the ideology of 19th century labor 
movement); 
• a 'theory' that is designed for the purpose; probably, is typical of the "ideological 
state", the state in which virtually every political act has to be legitimized in terms of 
one explicitly 'ruling' ideology (classical example: Soviet Marxism-Leninism). 
These possibilities represent a sliding scale, and together make up a typical development of 
dominant ideological mechanisms. As Stojanovic says, ideologies "with time, as they exhaust 
themselves,... increasingly try to defend themselves consciously at the expense of truth."143 
When theories exclusively or predominantly perform an ideological function, they are called 
ideologies, and they can be given further qualifications (e.g., radical, moderate, militant, 
sophisticated, simple, etc.). When forms of theory are subordinated to their ideological 
function, i.e. when their content is to some extent determined by a primary ideological 
function, we speak of ideologized forms of theory. 
Which theories can perform an ideological function depends both on the concrete socio-
historical situation, and on certain features of those theories. Part of the socio-historical 
situation are such factors as: education, secularization, economic expectations, social tensions 
and differences, recent history, political status of social groups and national minorities, 
dominant cultural features, prestige of established science, dominant ideologies, or even such 
seemingly irrelevant things as the way historical time is recorded (fin de siècle). The aptness of 
theories to perform an ideological function can be empirically described. Above all, they must 
have some bearing on socio-political reality (naturally, socio-political bearing is a contingent 
feature, and the rejection of socio-political reality also bears on socio-political reality). Theories 
can be ideologically effective, because they make sense of otherwise irrational reality (any 
theory about a national mission), because they are indeterminable in truth-value (religious 
creeds, Utopian ideas), because they appeal to strong feelings (eschatological or apocalyptical 
theories), because they are closely linked to successful scientific theories (social darwinism), 
because they are exotic (Oriental wisdom), or because they appeal to common sense 
(liberalism, consumerism, humanism). 
Which theories actually function ideologically depends upon the socio-historical 
situation in general, and, within that situation, upon local factors.144 Here, we meet with the 
difficult empirical research of the intricate development of ideological motives, positions, and 
processes. 145 Theoretical claims and practical evaluations can be highly variable in content: 
they may range from "Nature was created for the sake of Man" to "Within 5 years, Soviet 
productivity rates will be the highest in the world", and from "Beware of foreign agents" to 
"l'État, c'est moi." 
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To conclude: if the specificity of ideology is not to be found in what it is, but in how it 
functions, this means that it does not belong to the same category as science, religion, 
philosophy, world-view etc. Moreover, science and philosophy can function as ideology, and 
still be science or philosophy. A 'theory' is ideological only in as far as it actually functions 
ideologically. It is possible that its content makes no sense outside an ideological context, but 
even then it is not the theory as such that is ideological: it may be an extremely simple, 
empirically empty, or contradictory theory (racist theories, for example). When exposed and 
criticized as such, it may loose its 'ideological aptness'. The theory, finally, may be more or 
less explicit, and its ideological function may be more or less manifest. 
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3.Ü. Ideological Function in Society: The Ways of Ideology 
Theoretical claims and practical valuations occur in science, philosophy, religion, world-view, 
and everyday life. Science and philosophy are "relatively coherent and more or less consistent 
sets" of such claims and valuations. However, ideology depends neither on this coherence or 
form, nor on its content-matter. What singles out ideology is something else: these sets 
"function to organize the commitment and action of social groups" (Kline). It is not ideology 
when somebody is saying that people should (not) do certain things, or that a status quo is 
(not) right, but when these verbal utterances work, i.e. when they make people (not) do certain 
things, or makes them (dis)approve of a status quo. So, when somebody is telling us that we 
should build shelters because the sky will fall upon our heads, then this may be true or false, or 
indeterminable in truth-value (unless the sky actually falls), and there is no ideology at play. 
But when people actually start building shelters and hiding in them, i.e. when their "commit-
ment and action is organized", then we are dealing with ideology, and then it is relatively 
unimportant whether the 'theory' is true or not. 
If the point of ideology is that it actually works, the question arises as to how it works. In fact, 
there is a great variety of ideological moves,146 and it is impossible to single out one fun-
damental or dominant ideological move.147 Universalization, for instance, is a widespread, and 
often highly effective ideological move: "X is right because it is done everywhere", or: "We are 
entitled to do Y because our interests coincide with those of humanity as a whole" (Soviet 
foreign policy, US intervention in Somalia). But the opposite move, particularization, may be 
equally effective. Stojanovié rightly points to Nazism, which "often attacked conceptions and 
ideologies referring to universal human interests, and it did so explicitly in the name of special 
racial and national interests." i48 According to him, many Marxists, under the influence of 
Marx' criticism of bourgeois-democratic ideology, "unjustifiably define all ideologies as sets of 
ideas by which special interests are disguised as universal interests."!49 Soviet ideology 
provides us with a fine example of anti-universalist ideology in the accusation of "cos-
mopolitism" as opposed to Soviet "patriotism". In fact, any form of nationalism or patriotism is 
a combination of particularization and generalization, mediated by the pseudo-subject "nation". 
The "national interest" is presented inwardly as a general interest, while outwardly it is 
presented as a legitimate particular interest. 
Another classical example is rationalization: to present any arbitrary action or situation 
as reasonable, i.e. as either founded upon or defensible by rational considerations. But, appeal 
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can also be made to emotions: an example is Stalin's appeal to xenophobia before, to patriotism 
during, and to anti-semitism after World War Π. Which ideological moves are particularly 
effective, and therefore widespread, depends on socio-historical circumstance. Moreover, in 
one and the same situation, different ideological moves may be effective in different groups. A 
typical example is the move to present industrial products as "scientifically founded", which is 
a highly effective ideological move that makes people buy anything from expensive toothpaste 
to radial tires, but that in other social groups makes people run to the alternative drugstore. 
Motivation and Legitimization: Two Directions of Ideology 
All ideological moves, however, seem to share the following formal characteristics: 
• a truth-claim with respect to the 'theory' in question; 
• an exclusion of alternatives; 
• a transition from 'theory' to practice. 
As Kolakowski remarked, "knowledge of reality alone will not get anybody to do some­
thing."150 First of all, in order to get someone to do or accept something, the 'theory' that is to 
function ideologically must be claimed as true (as is contained in the verb "to be": such-and-
such is (not) the case or is (not) right or is (not) valuable) and to some extent be accepted as 
true. It must be not just some idea or hypothesis, but -to the 'producers' and the 'consumers' 
of the ideological phenomenon!- knowledge. Secondly, the necessity of action (something 
must be done) and status quo (some order must exist) must be secured. This requires the 
exclusion of alternative possibilities. Finally, the link between knowledge and action / 
acceptance, i.e. the transition from theory to practice, has to be realized, which, in a fully 
explicit ideological move, takes the form of a connecting operator like "because", "since", 
"hence" or "therefore". Very often ideological moves lose much of their force once made 
explicit, because the connecting operator points to the principle of sufficient ground, and thus 
to possible questioning. More often that not, therefore, the "theory" and the "call for action / 
acceptance" are not explicitly linked. At this point, we also see that an ideological move stands 
between an order, where grounds are superfluous, and an argument, which is vulnerable. The 
formula of an explicit ideological move reads: 
"X (action / status quo) must (not) be done / accepted, because S is (not) P" 
Any ideological move can be counter-acted, always facing possible questioning or doubt with 
respect to the legitimacy, necessity or desirability of an action or status quo. Any action can be 
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not performed, any status quo changed, which is why to say that "something has (or had) to be 
done" or that "there is no alternative" are important ideological moves A major function of 
ideology is the exclusion of present alternatives, and here ideology and repression often are 
complementary 
It is not adequate to limit ideology to the legitimization of status quo, as Thompson 
appears to do when focusing on ideology as a way to establish or sustain relations of 
domination Most of his examples are convincing, but the question anses why his analysis is 
limited to relations of domination, and does not extend to attempts to annihilate or subvert such 
relations When, for example, he describes as one of the modes of ideology the mode of 
fragmentation, meaning among others "the construction of an enemy, either within or without, 
which is portrayed as evil, harmful or threatening and which individuals are called upon 
collectively to resist or expurgate,"151 it is clear that this mode applies to oppositional 
movements as well (national liberation movements, religious sects, emancipatory movements 
all deploy this strategy). 
Thompson seems to be aware of this, when he states that "whether the symbolic 
forms serve to sustain relations of domination or to subvert them, to bolster up powerful 
individuals and groups or to undermine them, can be resolved only by studying how these 
symbolic forms operate in particular socio-historical circumstances [italics mine, EvdZ]." 152 
In his view, only in the first of these cases can the symbolic forms be said to function 
ideologically 1 5 3 Attempts to discredit, subvert, or annihilate relations of domination are, by 
Thompson's definition, "contestatory symbolic forms or, more specifically, incipient forms 
of the critique of ideology."^* This may be true, but it does not exclude that these "contes­
tatory symbolic forms" can, at the same time, themselves perform an ideological function. No 
oppositional group will limit itself to the critique of the 'theories' that legitimize a dominant 
order, for the simple reason that critique alone can not organize the commitment and action of 
the oppositional group 
In spite of obvious differences between established political power and contestatory 
oppositional movements, the ideological phenomena connected with them are very similar Nor 
is the difference between them that of a 'backing' by a "repressive organ" (Althusser) * 
Moreover, if to motivate is to make somebody do something, and to legitimize is to make 
somebody accept something, ι e not do something against it, then, conversely, to motivate is 
to legitimize in advance In concrete cases the two come very close- when all political parties in 
a parliamentary democracy try to persuade citizens to go to the polls, preferring their vote for 
'Not necessarily a siafe organ it may be a Freudian slip on Althusser's part, but the Politburo of a Communist 
Party is, of course, a very effective repressive organ, too 
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another party to their not voting at all, they engage in 'ideological self-defence of democracy', 
and they are motivating and legitimizing at the same time. 
Kline's definition indicates these two directions, when he states that ideology functions 
to organize the commitment and action of social groups. Motivation and legitimization do not 
exclude each other, but the accent can be more to the one or to the other. The clearest example 
is the shift that occurs when a social group seizes political power: a motivating ideology 
becomes the legitimization of established power, i.e. of a status quo. When it is a motivating 
force, ideology is pointed 'inwardly', to the people whose commitment and action is to be 
motivated. When it is a legitimizing force, ideology can be pointed both inwardly (within the 
group of individuals) and outwardly (publicly), or both at the same time: a government that 
claims that the war it has just started was inevitable (a theoretical claim) and just (a practical 
valuation) is both reassuring itself, trying to organize the commitment of its citizens and the 
action of its soldiers, and justifying its policy vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
The Place of Ideology 
Ideology begins where argument ends, but 'theory' continues to work, i.e. to organize 
commitment and action through legitimization and motivation. So, from the perspective of 
theory, the ideological function comes into play where the foundational borders on the critical 
function, and 'precludes' the turn from the first into the second [Ch.l.iii]. From the perspective 
of power, ideology fills the space between rational persuasion and physical force. From the 
perspective of action, finally, ideology organizes all socially and politically relevant actions and 
commitments to the extent to which people are neither compelled to them, nor led by rational 
consideration or emotion. This is why, for example, war is loaded with ideological 
phenomena. Ideology is often approached (and condemned) from an ideal of transparent, 
rational argument, pure theory, openness, etc. From this perspective, it appears as delusion, or 
distorted consciousness. 
There is some ground in this approach, as I shall point out in the next section, but we 
should not forget that ideology is a main alternative to the exercise of power through physical 
force. This point was elaborated esp. by Louis Althusser and Antonio Gramsci.155 Althusser, 
who took up Gramsci's idea,'56 regarded ideology as a complement to repression. The 
dominant class, holding state power, exercises its power in two ways: by means of the 
"repressive state organ [appareil répressif d'État]" (army, police, censorship, etc.), and 
through a conglomerate of "ideological state organs [appareils idéologiques d'État]" (church, 
school system, family, media, etc.). The first organ works primarily through repression, the 
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second mainly through ideology, but the point is that they work together. 157 j 0 the extent to 
which the ideological organs are effective, the repressive organ is superfluous, but if the 
ideological organs fail, the repressive organ comes in to preserve dominant class power and 
reproduce relations of production.158 
Ideology here is just the other side of the same coin. The Gramscian notion of 
"hegemony" is equal to the exercise of power by the dominant class by means of its (dominant) 
ideology. 159 However, the concept of hegemony has another side, that of the acceptance and 
'active consent' by the majority of people with regard to the actual status quo. '60 What puzzled 
Gramsci was the remarkable strength and flexibility of modern capitalist liberal democracy as a 
culture or common tradition.161 This strength resides in a stable combination of the state 
[societàpolitica] and civil society [società civile], with an increasing importance of the latter.1^ 
What the working class therefore should do, is to establish its own culture and civilization in 
order to become dominant at the level of ideology, that is, as it were, develop a "counter-
hegemony", based upon a "counter-ideology" provided by the "organic intellectuals" of the 
working class.163 
If we recognize, with Thompson, "that there are systematically asymmetrical relations of power 
which are based on considerations other than class," '64 and retain the Gramscian concept of 
hegemony and "counter-hegemony", we come close to the actual role of ideology in contem-
porary, 'softened' capitalist-bourgeois society. It then appears as a system with a strong civil 
society, and a broad acceptance -active consent and commitment, organized through the 
ideology of liberal democracy and civilization-of the basic political and social structures ofthat 
society, but with a variety of oppositional forces within that overall structure, attempting to 
remedy asymmetrical relations of power that are based upon a plurality of differences (gender, 
age, ethnic origin, etc.), and therefore can not be reduced to a single antagonism.165 Each 
oppositional force develops its own, local "counter-hegemony", requiring to this end (and for 
the sake of its proper internal organization and stability) an ideology that counters the correspon-
ding part of dominant "bourgeois" ideology (which, by the same token, can no longer be 
regarded as a single ideological block, but as the sum of the ideologies of most groups in 
society). This system, finally, is flexible enough to 'absorb', in due time, a considerable part 
of these oppositional ideologies, in the form of a plurality of media, a multi-party system, a 
pluralist educational system, regular and alternative medical care, etc. So, ideology has to do 
with power, but not exclusively with relations of domination: it comes 'from above' and 'from 
below'. It is situated between coercion and rational or emotional persuasion, between order and 
argument, and between repression and acceptance. 
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З.ііі Limits of Ideology: Truth. Belief. Transparency 
Is ideology "false consciousness"? Yes, said Marx, Kolakowski,166 and Stojanovic". 167 No, 
said Lenin, and with him Soviet Marxism-Leninism: a scientific, objectively true ideology is 
possible, and a fact: it is Marxism-Leninism itself [Ch.7.i]. Like Kline and Thompson, I think 
that ideology may, but need not be "erroneous": "they [ideological symbolic forms, EvdZ] may 
be erroneous or illusory, indeed in some cases ideology may operate by concealing or masking 
social relations, by obscuring or misrepresenting situations; but these are contingent pos­
sibilities, not necessary characteristics of ideology as such."16^ The point is that ideology is 
relatively indifferent to truth and falsity. Indifferent, because ideological processes or moves 
may achieve their goal, irrespective of the truth or falsity of the propositions they are based 
upon (esp. if these remain implicit), but relatively indifferent because the question whether 
these propositions are true or false, can undermine the ideological function under con­
sideration. 
Truth 
This brings us to the third part of Kline's definition, which says that ideology may "serve its 
purpose equally well whether the theoretical claims are true, false, or indeterminate in truth-
value" (and whether its practical valuations are right, wrong or irrelevant). The efficacy of 
ideology does not directly depend on theoretical truth or practical adequacy, but as its 
functioning at least partly depends on the plausibility of the theory in question, truth and 
adequacy do bear on its effectiveness in the end. The fact that Soviet production figures fell 
short of expectations year after year did make Soviet ideology less effective, as did the alleged 
permanent increase of popular support for the present leadership, expressed in yet more 
decimals in the poll results. The discrepancy between the claims and valuations proudly 
presented by official Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideologists and the actual facts of Soviet life did 
diminish the credibility of the former. Or, to take an example from contemporary Russian 
ideological life: the fact that the "Protocols of the Elders ofZion" are a fraud does not make any 
difference to inveterate anti-Semites,'69 but it does make their ideology less attractive to others. 
Truth is not manifest: if we understand the notion of truth in the traditional, 'strong' 
sense of the correspondence of (sets of) propositions with reality, we have to acknowledge that 
'theories', whether they are scientific, philosophical, or weltanschaulich, are, as a rule, not 
true, false, or indeterminate in truth-value, but undecided, or, at best, shown to be false. In 
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science the notion of true theory has been replaced by that of currently strongest hypothesis. 
Ideological mechanisms require a stronger sense of truth, which is why, for ideological 
purposes, scientific theories, e.g., the theory of the evolution of natural species, or the Big 
Bang theory about the origin of the universe, are elevated from the level of presently preferable 
hypothesis to that of 'true theory'. 
This is important, because "false" ideology often is contrasted with science or another 
form of "true theory". This is particularly clear in the case of Althusser, who discusses 
ideology from the standpoint of "scientific knowledge [la [sic!] connaissance scientifique]".™ 
Stojanovic develops the thesis of ideology as 'untrue consciousness' in defining it as a "set of 
ideas which social groups use, at the expense of truth [italics mine, EvdZ]."'7' He adds to the 
notions of false -"a set of untruths"- and distorted -"a mixture of truths and untruths"- that of 
lying consciousness, differing from false consciousness in that the proponents of ideology are 
aware of its untruthfulness (his example is Nazism).'72 However, if a mixture of truths and 
untruths can serve as an ideology, falsity can not be the decisive factor. The limit case of a 
mixture of truths and untruths is a set of propositions, composed of any number of true, and 
one false proposition. Quite often, however, the truth or falsity of propositions is hard to 
assess, esp. of the kind of propositions that seem to be typical of ideology, such as "History is 
a progressive development", or "The proletariat embodies the future of humanity". It is not 
hard to see that these statements can perform an ideological function, irrespective of whether 
they actually represent truths or untruths. Still, Stojanovic' expression "at the expense of truth" 
points to an essential feature of ideology: it has to be dogmatic, i.e the propositions in question 
have to be stated, and suggested rather than argued for. Which is why ideology often goes 
along with some kind of suppression of critical, independent thought, why ideologies tend to 
become dogmatic and 'orthodox', and why implicit ideologies are often more effective than 
explicit ones: the latter are more readily exposed to criticism. 
A theory that functions ideologically may be true or false, illusory or adequate, consistent or 
self-contradictory. It may function in either of these cases, but it may cease to do so when the 
question as to truth or falsity of the propositions involved is answered, and therefore effective 
ideological functioning is threatened when this question is raised. Ideology is vulnerable to 
critical thought- thought that seeks to distinguish the tenable from the untenable, the true from 
the false and indeterminate. By the same token, however, critical thought can be an element of 
ideological mechanisms, and strengthen them: it is no coincidence that the principle of kritikai 
samokrìtika [criticism and self-criticism] was an indispensable part of official Soviet Marxism-
Leninism. '73 
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A true theory can perform an ideological function, but the claim of 'true ideology' sets 
one further step, namely that a theory functions ideologically by virtue of its being true. But 
when the theory that performs an ideological function is shown to be true, ideology stops being 
ideology, and becomes conclusive argument. When it is shown to be false, ideology also 
stops, and becomes unsound argument, and to the extent to which it continues to work, 
delusion. In other words, something true or false can function as ideology, and the truth-claim 
is part of an ideological phenomenon, but ideology can not function as true or false. But, 
however clear the concept of truth in relation to ideology may be, it is a rare occasion that a 
'theory' is shown to be true. In practice theories may very well continue to function 
ideologically, regardless of the fact that they are critically examined, questioned, or said to be 
demonstrably false. But they may function less successfully: while some adherents to a certain 
ideological move may become more deeply convinced or fanatical when their theory is being 
criticized, the same move may become less attractive to others, and the group that adheres to it 
may become insulated. 
Many 'theories' are not only difficult, but virtually impossible to prove or disprove. In 
such cases, critical examination is menacing, too, but in a different way: a successful 
demonstration that a theory, which functions ideologically, is impossible to (dis)prove, turns it 
into a (set of) article(s) of faith. This reduction may be harmful to the ideological function to the 
extent to which "article of faith" is regarded as a negative qualification. But to some, articles of 
faith, esp. religious ones, are of a higher order than (dis)provable scientific hypotheses. 
Critical examination is devastating to the ideological function only in a situation that 
claims to be science-oriented, rational, and critical, as was the Soviet situation. This also gives 
a partial explanation of the aptness of philosophical theories to perform an ideological function. 
In a science-oriented context, philosophical theories in a way are ideal candidates: they do raise 
a truth-claim, and reject (like science) authority and belief as grounds to hold certain 
propositions, but at the same time they are not really (dis)provable.174 They therefore delay to 
a distant future the final answer as to their truth: they are indeterminate in truth-value without 
dropping their claim to be true, and thus are possible truths that remain possible. 
Belief 
The functional success of ideology equally does not necessarily depend on the level of 'belief, 
on the extent to which the 'producers' or the 'addressees' of ideology are actually convinced of 
the truth or adequacy of the claims and valuations they profess. In the long run, however, an 
ideology that is not (really) believed in is liable to become a hollow ritual, and will increasingly 
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depend on other factors, esp repression This point is missed in conceptions of ideology like 
that of Althusser, the "general theory of state-organized and ideologically secured social 
reproduction"175 Althusser argued that ideology is the representation that people have of their 
imaginary relation to their real conditions,'76 and that these ideas only exist in their "actions, 
inserted in practices, regulated by rituals, which are determined by the ideological organ where 
the ideas of this subject stem from "'77 Indeed, the aspect of representation, of 'ideas', though 
necessary, is secondary when we speak of ideology This is why world-views are not as such 
ideological, although they very often perform an ideological function A world-view is a form 
of 'theory', presupposing a subject who actually "perceives the world" * Ideology, by 
contrast, is a function of forms of theory, and one of those forms is world-view 
For Althusser, the ideas, belief, and commitment somebody has are material acts, and it 
is only this material existence of ideology that counts However, these acts, practices, rituals, 
and, finally, "ideological organs" (a church, an educational system), are not the mode of 
existence of the ideas of the person who performs these acts, for the simple reason that he does 
not have to have those ideas, e g his belief in the god of Christianity, in order to perform those 
acts The same acts may be 'manifestation' of both 'true belief and 'opportunism' In other 
words, Althusser rules out the possibility of mere ritual and of hypocrisy (and its difference 
with sincerity) The same point is missed, but 'from the other side' by those conceptions of 
ideology, exemplified by Boris Groys, that stick to the notion of personal conviction, of a 
subject who is the sincerely believing bearer of ideology 
" the generally accepted view of the essence of ideology as a concept presupposes lhat the basic principles of 
the ideology are shared by the bearer uncritically and with complete faith that is, the sincerity of the ideology 
bearer is assumed "'78 
This is to identify ideology and world-view, ι e to regard ideology as a form of 
consciousness or theory, not as a function, and it deprives us of the possibility to regard 
"sincere belief' or "conviction" as a significant, but not decisive factor Ideology is neither a 
matter of subjective conviction, nor an autonomous "process without a subject", but precisely 
the connection between the two As Engels rightly wrote 
"Alles, was die Menschen in Bewegung setzt, muß durch ihren Kopf hindurch, aber welche Gestalt es in diesem 
Kopf annimmt hangt sehr von den Umstanden ab "'79 
The distinction of ideology and belief also explains the possibility that ideology 
becomes ritual, while continuing to function effectively E g , in a religious community, where 
people still participate in ideological processes, without believing the 'theory' behind it The 
'Which is contained in the very word view ', indicating that something is being regarded (German Welt-
anschauung, Russian mirovozzrcmc, and Dutch Wereldbeschouwing have the same connotation) 
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point is that ideology not simply makes people (not) do things it also is what enables them to 
account for what they have (not) done or are (not) doing or will (not) do, and one of the ways 
to account for something is to point to "sincere belief' To motivate or legitimize by means of 
ideological moves is not to bring about some strange kind of transfiguration, but to account for 
actions in terms that are not (easily) contested within a given society or social group 
Transparency 
Ideology conceals its own ideological nature l go This is why the notions of "absence of 
ideology' or ' end of ideology" are powerful ideological motives they appeal to our frequent 
unawareness of ideological processes, and to our desire to be liberated from them Ideology is 
an elusive phenomenon because it hides its own working' m order to (better) realize it What 
is concealed, however, is not the motivating or legitimizing function, nor the 'theory', which 
may be fully explicit, but one or more of the three essential features mentioned above truth is 
presented not as claimed but as manifest, an action or status quo is presented as the only 
possibility, ι e the exclusion of alternatives is hidden, and the transition from theory to practice 
is presented as inevitable or natural, ι e as not subject to decision If we agree with Althusser 
that ideology of necessity hides its own ideological character,181 it becomes questionable 
whether official Soviet Marxism-Leninism, which declared itself ideology, was ideology at all 
[Ch 7 in] 
One can not perform an ideological move and, at the same time, say that one does so * 
And of course, we always accuse others of ideology '82 Yet, to perform an ideological move is 
not to lie The speaker may realize that he is performing an ideological move, nor is the content 
of what he says necessarily untrue it is incomplete, and it goes unquestioned, but that does not 
make it a he Moreover, it is possible to acknowledge the ideological nature of an act of 
motivation or legitimization that we perform ourselves, and continue to perform it This is the 
case when people continue to go to church although they no longer 'truly' believe, or when 
they continue to participate in political structures, e g , elections, although they (think they) 
have exposed parliamentary democracy as an ideological state organ Whether or not it is a 
matter of mauvaise foi, is another question, but Althusser was right that we may sometimes say 
that we actually arc "subject to ideology [je suis dans l'idéologie]", even though we far more 
often say that we were ["j'étais dans l'idéologie'] 183 In the first case, what we really are 
saying is that we consciously (willingly or reluctantly) participate in what we know or think to 
be an ideological phenomenon 
'One could therefore call ideological moves a kind of cryptc-performative speech acts 
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3.1V A Reformulation and Some Consequences 
Having discussed its parts, our definition of ideology now reads as follows 
ι Ideology is a possible function of any more or less explicit and elaborated, relatively 
coherent, and more or less consistent set of particular or universal theoretical claims and 
practical valuations, ι e of a theory, 
и The ideological function is to motivate, ι e organize the commitment and action of 
social groups, and to legitimize a specific status quo or the past action of social groups, 
that may, but need not be the 'bearers' of the theory m question The ideological move 
itself contains three elements a claim as to the truth of the 'theory' concerned, an 
exclusion of alternative possibilities, and a transition from 'theory' to practice Each of 
these elements can be backed by, or complement physical force, and at least one on 
these elements has to be concealed, 
ni A 'theory' serves this purpose, irrespective of whether the theoretical claims are true, 
false, or indeterminate in truth-value, not necessarily depending on whether the 
'subjects (originators) or the objects (addressees)' of ideology sincerely adhere to its 
content And it can be, to a greater or lesser extent oificial, ι e developed and guarded 
by an ideological authority (The same holds for the practical valuations ) 
This definition has some important consequences 
Ideology is Not an Evil 
In modem, democratic society, ideology is widespread, but not designed or guarded by (a) 
specific social and or political group(s) or organization(s) It is largely spontaneous (feminism, 
environmentahsm, syndicalism) It is not monopolized, but occurs in a situation of plurality 
and competition, not unchallenged, but critically followed and 'checked' by 'competing' 
ideologies and relatively "socially unattached" intellectuals It is only partly and indirectly 
linked to established (political) power, never bound up with a radical transition of opposition to 
the establishment of power, and occurring in a society where ideology is quickly recognized 
and exposed It is an indispensible part of human existence and of social life, that can become 
dangerous, and therefore has to be 'checked by critical discussion 
Ideology is an inevitable phenomenon of any non-utopian society with its different 
interests 
' Da jede politische Tätigkeit einer Ideologie bedarf kann die Ideologie als soziale Erscheinung nicht vernichtet 
werden ' '84 
But it is not a totally elusive and uncontrollable, all-embracing phenomenon The 
extent to which it is present or dominant in a given society, or the ways in which it works, is 
the result of several factors, not immune to human action The role of ideology can (be) 
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increase(d) or diminish(ed), and ideological phenomena can be (made) more or less harmful. If 
it is an inevitable part of any non-utopian society, ideology can neither be an apríori negative 
function nor a 'neutral' social phenomenon. In the first place, how we evaluate any given 
'ideological phenomenon', i.e. any use of 'theory' for 'ideological ends', depends on our own 
political and moral position, and in the second place, it may be more or less harmful, depen-
ding on the concrete form it takes, as well as, again, our own position. 
Ideology is harmful to the extent to which it is designed and or guarded by (a) specific 
social and or political group(s) or organization(s). It can be more or less official, i.e. developed 
and adapted to new circumstances by a body of professional ideologists, guardians of 
ideological orthodoxy. Officialdom is most strongly present in cases where ideology is linked 
to an established state, such as the USSR, or to a 'closed' political organization (terrorist 
groups, fundamentalist sects, militant political parties). 
Ideology is harmful to the extent to which it is monopolized, less harmful if it occurs in 
a situation of plurality and competition. In a multi-party system, established party-ideologies 
can be monopolized by, for example, the "scientific bureau" of those parties, and although the 
difference with a one-party system is enormous, this is due not to the content of the ideology, 
i.e. to the 'theory', but to the fact that it is monopolized, and linked to a firmly established 
central power. 185 Ideology less harmful when it is linked to oppositional 'counter-power', or 
when political power passes from one political party to another (or at least can do so). Further, 
ideology becomes a harmful phenomenon to the extent to which it goes unchallenged, less 
harmful when it is critically followed and 'checked' by critique or competing ideologies. 
Finally, ideology can be harmful to the extent to which it 'goes unnoticed', much less when 
there is an awareness of ideological mechanisms. 
Judgment of Ideology 
Ideology is a widespread, often harmless, sometimes dangerous, and always 'risky' 
phenomenon of any socio-historical situation. As such, it can be judged positively or 
negatively, depending on the socio-historical situation, and on our own position within it. It is 
not hard to find examples of ideological moves that are judged differently. One example is 
nationalism, which can be formally expressed as follows: "X ought (not) to be done / 
prevented and / or is (not) (un) just, because it does (not) promote / harm (the) interest(s) of 
('our') nation N," and which can function within the context of liberation movements as well 
as that of authoritarian regimes. 
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There are different parameters along which we appreciate ideological phenomena: 
Plideologization<—> deideologization (increase / decrease of) the extent to which 
motivation / legitimization of acts / status quo 
is required, and of the extent to which forms 
of theory primarily serve as ideologies; 
P2 unification <—> diversification (increase / decrease of) the extent to which the 
ideological terms in which motivation / 
legitimization has to be performed tend to 
belong to one and the same theory; 
P3 submission <—> emancipation the extent to which motivating / legitimizing 
ideological phenomena serve the interests of 
powerful or dominant social groups, or those 
of minorities or suppressed groups; 
P4 ritualism / cynicism <—> sincerity / the extent to which (members of) social 
conviction groups adhere to and believe in the 'theories' 
thatfunctionideologically; 
P5 legitimization <—> motivation the extent to which ideological phenomena 
primarily perform a legitimizing function, or, 
on the other hand, primarily work as a 
motivatingfactor; 
P6 mystification <—> clarification the extent to which relations of dominance are 
concealed and / or this concealment, i.e. 
ideology itself is concealed. 
Part of the position that emancipation is better than domination, that clarity and sincerity are to 
be preferred to mystification and cynicism, is a preference for the notions on the right of each 
parameter. However, we should be aware of the fact that, in order to promote and stimulate 
developments from left to right, we will have to engage in ideological processes ourselves, 
based on a theory about enlightenment and emancipation. Finally, our preference for the right-
hand column is not absolute: males may generally favor emancipatory movements, but make an 
exception for feminism. "True conviction", applauded in the case of liberation theologians, is 
judged negatively as "fanatical belief' in the case of Muslim fundamentalists. Extreme 
diversification may be regarded as loss of orientation, etc. Still, generally speaking, the notions 
in the right-hand column seem to belong together, standing as they do for plurality, openness, 
'civilization' and freedom. Likewise, the notions in the left-hand column also seem to belong 
together: they stand for oppression, totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, and indoctrination. 
Critique of Ideology, or Freedom from Ideology? Towards a Reflexive Conception 
Ideology could only be 'done without' if true knowledge were an achieved fact, i.e. manifest, 
if morality were fully transparent and obvious, if people would no longer be under the pressure 
to act, and if people would no longer be obliged to account for their actions. Since none of 
67 
Chapter 3: What is Ideology? A Suitable Conception 
these conditions is fulfilled, ideology is an indispensable element of social and political life. 
The fact that we can think a situation in which it is not, means that the idea of absence of 
ideology can work as a kind of "regulative idea". 186 However, we should be well aware that 
absence of ideology is a logical possibility, which says nothing about its being a real pos-
sibility. Even from the thesis that any ideological move can be made explicit, and "unmasked", 
it does not follow that all ideological moves that organize one's commitment and action can be 
made explicit at the same time, and under exclusion of the emergence of new ones. This has 
two important consequences: the first is that the regulative idea of "freedom from ideology", as 
soon as it becomes an ideal, begins to function ideologically itself, in the form of motivation or 
legitimization (when the claim is raised that ideology is ruled out already). The second 
consequence is that the critical potential of this idea is local in space and time. We can criticize 
and 'unmask' concrete ideological moves as such, but we can not attempt any 'global 
deideologization'. '87 
Consequently, a radically critical conception of ideology presupposes the existence of 
disinterested intellectuals as a social group, capable of recognizing, identifying, analyzing, and 
criticizing ideological phenomena or processes. However, since intellectuals themselves are a 
social group, they are nor disinterested, and they must develop an ideology 'from below'. But 
is it necessary to stick to the idea that we should nullify, through critique of ideology, every 
ideological process? In fact it is itself a typical example of ideology, legitimizing what 
intellectuals are doing. At the same time, if we agree that the recognition, identification, 
analysis and criticism of ideological phenomena and processes is and remains a highly 
important element of modem society, and further agree that this is best done by 'intellectuals' 
(philosophers, journalists, social and political scientists, publicists, (oppositional) politicians), 
we might also acknowledge that the ideology of a freischwebende Intelligenz is an important 
stimulant for intellectuals to actually perform that function, and not recline into relativism and 
cynicism. 
Therefore, I propose a reflexive rather than a critical conception of ideology, in order to 
avoid the illusory notions of either a deideologized society or of ideology-free intellectuals. One 
might call this conception 'post-modern' in the sense that it rejects the idea of enlightenment as 
an achievable end, as a realizable and then stable situation.'88 As long as people live in 
societies in which asymmetrical relations of domination and authority occur, as long as people 
have conflicting interests, and as long as they stand under the practical obligation to perform 
actions, ideological phenomena and processes will continue to exist and arise. 
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Conclusion to Part One 
This first part has yielded the instruments for an investigation and analysis of Soviet 
philosophy as a historical phenomenon, by presenting a meta-philosophical conception of 
philosophy, a realist conception of philosophy's historical nature, and a suitable conception of 
ideology. 
In the first chapter, I have introduced the idea of a philosophical culture, marked by four 
distinguishable features: level of differentiation, strength of tradition, extent of objectivization, 
and quality of discussion. These are based on four relatively independent 'pillars': the spectrum 
of actually existing positions, the philosophical heritage, philosophical industry, and the public 
space of philosophy. And they reflect four Objective' determinants of every concretely existing 
philosophy: thinking individuals, the field of logically possible positions, a material basis, and 
the socio-historical situation in which philosophy exists. In doing so, I have taken into account 
both the basic structure of philosophy -(self-determining, free) thought, truth, theory, text- as 
well as the existence of philosophy in concrete social, political, and cultural reality. 
Philosophical cultures resemble pyramids, with the work of 'small' philosophers at the 
basis, and the great philosophers, important theories, and classical texts at the tip. Due to the 
natural tendency to focus on these tips, philosophical cultures appear as icebergs, floating in 
society and culture, their broad basis submerged. Inasmuch as we usually study our own 
philosophical culture, and take most of its determinations for granted, this submerged basis 
remains largely unnoticed. However, when we seek to understand the specificity of an other 
philosophical culture, such as Soviet philosophy, we have to pay attention to the whole of that 
culture. 
Philosophy can perform different functions within a given situation. The chief function 
is the epistemic function, two further functions are the (self)critical and (self)foundational 
function, and another important function is an ideological function, which is a possible 
function not of thought, truth, or text, but of theory. 
In the second chapter, this speculative conception of philosophy has been linked to a historical 
perspective, treating philosophical culture as a historically developing whole, developing 
according to its inner logic of development (its 'dynamics'), and to its interaction with history 
at large. The main source of inspiration has been Hegel, but I have refused to accept his basic 
theses about the monolinearity of the inner logic and about the intrinsic rationality of history. 
Inner logic and historical embeddedness are not identical, neither of them can be said to 
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determine the historical development of philosophical culture, and both form part of its 
explanation This conception tries to do justice to two important intuitions of Hegel ,while 
seeking to evade their 'absolute' unity Once freed from Hegelian absolutism, several elements 
of his conception have proved to be valuable, and even brilliant contributions to a realist 
conception of the history of philosophy 
First, the emergence and continued existence of philosophy as free, self-determining 
thought is historically conditioned, by the joint appearance of political freedom and subjectively 
free thought Secondly, philosophy, once emerged, is reaction to previous philosophy, and in 
this respect present philosophy is the result of preceding development Thirdly, each of the 
four relatively independent 'pillars of philosophical culture has a histor(ici)ty of its own, and 
together they make for the development of philosophical culture Fourthly, philosophical 
culture, as it is (re)produced by generations of philosophers, is growing Increasing differentia­
tion and complexity of the spectrum of actually existing positions, accumulation of philosophi­
cal heritage, expansion and institutionalization of philosophical industry, and professionaliza-
tion and diversification of the public space of philosophy This is not automatic progress, but a 
rise of the already attained, and henceforth attainable level of philosophical culture Finally, the 
historical nature of philosophy appears in the growing awareness of its historicity, and in the 
emergence and growing importance of history of philosophy as a discipline 
The third chapter has focused on ideology This is crucial to a proper understanding of Soviet 
philosophy, often (dis)qualified as апсіііа ideologiae In order to take that 'accusation' 
seriously while staying clear from an identification of Soviet philosophy with Marxism-
Leninism -an identification practiced both by Soviet philosophy itself and by its 'bourgeois' 
adversaries-1 have worked out a conception of ideology as a possible function of theories If 
ideology is a function of theory, and theory the product of thought, this means that it is neither 
a form of thought (or consciousness') nor of theory, and in both respects neither identical nor 
incongruous with philosophy 
A number of aspects of 'ideology' have been discussed, which has led to conclude that 
ideology 1) is not a particular kind of theory, but a possible function of any theory to organize 
the commitment and action of social groups in two ways, namely motivation and legitimization, 
u) entails three elements -a truth-claim, an exclusion of alternatives, and a transition from 
'theory' to practice- at least one of which must be concealed, in) is complementary to other 
forms of exercise of power, ïv) is not "false' and not functioning ' at the expense of truth", but 
under suspension (or exclusion) of the question as to the truth of the theory' involved — 
ideology does serves its purpose relatively independently of the truth and adequacy of the 
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'theory'; v) is not necessarily 'believed in' by its producers or addressees, but functions, 
again, relatively independently of 'belief; vi) is not an 'evil', but an inevitable fact of any non-
utopian society; vii) can be judged both negatively and positively, according to a number of 
parameters, and depending on the judge's proper position. 
Having elaborated conceptions of philosophy, its history, and ideology, one question remains 
unanswered: how is philosophy, concretely existing as a philosophical culture, related to 
ideology as an inevitable phenomenon of society? And, with respect to Soviet philosophy; how 
can philosophy exist and develop in an explicitly 'ideologized' socio-historical situation! The 
answer to the second question is aimed at by the present study as a whole. I shall conclude this 
part with a general answer to the first question. 
In the first place, the product of philosophical thought is philosophical theory, and 
ideology is a possible function of theory. As we have seen, there are several reasons why 
philosophical theory is well-fit to perform an ideological function. On the other hand, being 
rational and thus (self)foundational and (self)critical, philosophical thought is a permanent 
menace to any ideological functioning of the theories it has produced. It seeks consistency and 
transparency of argument, it does not, in principle, accept anything as given, and it exposes its 
own presuppositions as such. 
The relationship of philosophy to ideology thus is ambiguous. A 'solution' of this 
ambiguity is to subordinate philosophy to its ideological function, but that presupposes the 
obstruction of the critical function of philosophical thought. As philosophy is primarily an 
activity -thought- yielding theories, and ideology is a function that can be performed by 
theories, to ideologize philosophy is to subordinate an intellectual activity to the ideological 
function of the theories it yields. In that case, the aptness to perform an ideological function 
becomes a main criterium for the valuation and the (non)acceptance of philosophical theories. 
In the second place, philosophers themselves can relate in different ways to the 
ideological function of the theories they produce. The same ambiguity arises again, since 
philosophers exist in the concrete situation of philosophical culture. A 'solution' to this 
ambiguity is to conceive of philosophy as opposed to ideology, and even as its critical 
counterpart. However, while the critical function of philosophy indeed suits such a conception, 
it tends to ignore the fact that philosophy can not 'immunize' itself against a possible ideologi-
cal function of its theories (for the simple reason that it does not 'control' the situation in which 
it exists). The fact of its objective relation to ideology affects philosophical culture in various 
ways. Some philosophers will adapt their thinking, interiorizing ideological mechanisms, 
others will oppose their thought as a realm of purity against the foulness of ideological 
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discourse, others will engage in forms of "double-speak', and still others will make explicit 
what happens with the theories they develop 
At the same time, once philosophers acknowledge ideological function of the theories 
they produce, they may actively deploy that function, and try to influence the situation in which 
they exist This may appear far-fetched, but is, in fact, very familiar When, for example, 
philosophers act as partisans of freedom they are engaging in ideology, to the extent to which 
their activity indeed furthers political or academic freedom, or protects philosophical culture 
against infringements Their theory about freedom as indispensibic part of civil society and a 
necessary condition for a flourishing philosophical culture functions ideologically My own 
thesis that philosophical thought is free and self-determining thought is circular, and a case of 
the self-foundational function of philosophy But this does not imply that the situation in which 
philosophy exists, should correspond to that alleged nature of philosophy So, when 
philosophers act as defenders of freedom, they attempt to let a theory function ideologically Of 
course, this means suspension of the critical function of philosophy This also explains the 
paradoxical situation in which philosophers claim a right to freedom of research in order to 
investigate the determination of philosophy by socio-economic factors 
In the third place, philosophy itself has, in order to (continue) to exist, to be a legitimate 
affair Philosophy nevens an evident element of social and cultural life Hence, an 'ideology 
of philosophy' has to be deployed in order to account for the existence, extent, and nature of 
philosophical culture The meta-philosophical 'theory' about philosophy that functions 
ideologically does not coincide with that function, but it will often be adapted or subordinated 
to it This theory, moreover, can be developed 'from below' or 'from above' The need for 
ideological legitimization becomes more important as philosophical culture becomes 
institutionalized Thus, professional philosophers often have to tell, to the authorities they 
depend upon financially, stones about the scientific nature of what they are doing These 
theories do not necessarily reflect an actual state of affairs, nor are they forcibly believed in by 
the people who propound them Also, professional philosophers may feel the need to legitimize 
their activity in the eyes of 'the public, and to this end they may have to tell stones about, for 
example, the social relevance or cultural significance of what they are doing, stories that tend to 
work in an ideological manner, too 
So, in any concrete socio-histoncal situation, a philosophical culture (or plurality 
thereof) is culturally, socially, and economically embedded by means of a 'theory' about 
philosophy That theory functions ideologically, ι e it organizes the commitment and action of 
social groups through motivation and legitimization, irrespective of whether the theory in 
question is true or not, and while critical investigation as to its possible truth is suspended, at 
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least within the context of their ideological functioning, irrespective also of whether 
philosophers actually believe the theory in question. Since the theory that functions as ideology 
of philosophy is, as a rule, produced by philosophers (because they are the social group that 
seeks legitimacy), it will be a (meta)-philosophical theory, using the accumulated self-
perception of generations of philosophers, i.e. drawing upon the philosophical tradition of the 
given philosophical culture. The 'ideology of philosophy' thus is not something external, but 
an integral part of philosophical culture: it is its lifeline to the concrete socio-historical situation. 
By the same token, it reflects both that culture and the situation in which it exists, as is 
exemplified by the frequently encountered comparison of contemporary philosophical culture 
with a market. The idea of a market, with its notions of competition and free choice, is not 
easily contested image in the situation of Western philosophy, and hence serves to legitimize 
philosophy (but in the Soviet situation it would not). Nor are these ideological phenomena 
'evil': they are inevitable, and their possible harm is inversely proportional to the extent to 
which they are recognized and acknowledged. 
*** 
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Gestalt eines intellektuellen Reiches erbaut Wenn die Philosophie ihr Grau in Grau mall, dann ist eine Gestalt 
des Lebens alt geworden, und mit Grau in Grau laßt sie sich nicht verjungen, sondern nur erkennen, ", cf esp 
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Genüsse und Beschäftigungen bezeichnet, die nicht der äußeren Notwendigkeit als solcher angehören " 
131 Althusser 1976, ρ 114 
132Ko)akowski 1960, ρ 24f 
133 A comprehensive, but instructive account of this history can be found in Thompson 1990, pp 28-52, 
more exhaustive is Romberg &c 1976 
134 A comprehensive status quaestioms can be found in Thompson 1991 
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"Philosophical thought never died, the "free heart of culture", as К Marx 
named philosophy, was beating even in those years that were the most 
difficult for our Motherland ( ) Works of a high philosophical and 
scientific level were created in our country, although it was by far not 
always possible to publish them " ' 
Voprosv filosofi!. 1988 
Introduction 
The second part of this study aims at a comprehensive account of the development of Soviet 
philosophical culture There are many accounts of Soviet philosophy in the subsequent stages 
of its development, ranging from neutral surveys to analyses of its inner logic of development 
or attempts at philosophical refutation. A first objective of the present part is to bring together 
the main results of those studies, esp to those readers who have no familiarity with the 
subject, as well as to assess the different approaches practiced by Western scholars. As shall 
become clear, these approaches reflect aspects of Soviet philosophy in the subsequent stages of 
its development, as well as the authors' philosophical and political position. 
A second aim is to set a few steps towards a history of Soviet philosophy. Such a 
history is the more urgent in view of the present tendency to leave the Soviet period out from 
the history of Russian philosophy, as a mere gap during which nothing happened worth 
mentioning.2 As a matter of fact, post-Soviet Russian philosophy can no more deny its own 
recent past, than Soviet philosophy could annihilate its Hegelian and Marxist background. But, 
as Bakhurst rightly remarks, "no adequate, comprehensive history of Soviet philosophy has 
yet appeared from either a Soviet or Western author."3 In the present study, I have tried to 
observe the required distance, as well as to take into account some new materials.4 
A third aim is to prepare the ground for an analysis of Soviet philosophy m the next 
part [Part Ш], and for the study of one specific branch of Soviet philosophy, istonko-
fìlosofskaja пайка [history of philosophy as a science] [Part IV]. In this part, my goal is to 
present Soviet philosophy, in its historical development, objectively enough to enable the 
reader's critical own judgment. As a first, provisional definition we can determine Soviet 
philosophy as "philosophy as part of the political and social system of the USSR", thus 
distinguishing is from a merely geographical designation "philosophy m the USSR" (which 
would fail to account for its Soviet character) or "Russian philosophy in the Soviet period" 
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(which would exclude philosophy in other languages than Russian), but also from a designa-
tion concerning content, such as "Soviet dialectical and historical materialism", since this is 
not, as I shall show, what made Soviet philosophy Soviet philosophy. 
For practical reasons, this part has been divided into three chapters. There is considerable 
agreement among Western scholars with respect to the periodization of Soviet philosophy, due 
to the intimate relationship of philosophical development to the general development of the 
USSR as a political system — which already points to an important treat of Soviet philosophi-
cal culture. For the reader's convenience, a survey of the parallel development of philosophical 
culture and Soviet system has been included in the form of an "Overview of Soviet History". 
The main turning points suggested in both Western and Soviet sources have been observed 
here, too.5 Bound up, in its genesis and subsistence, with the USSR as a state, a system and a 
superpower, Soviet philosophy can be regarded as the result of a process that began with the 
seizure of power by the bol'sevik faction of the Russian Social-Democratic Labor Party in 
1917. 
The first chapter traces the genesis of Soviet philosophy [Ch.4:1917-1946]. The result of 
the first period is Soviet philosophy, defined as a philosophical culture that is fundamentally 
subordinated to its function as part of "official ideology", and is the subject of the second 
chapter of this part [Ch.5:1947-1975].* The concluding chapter discusses the result of the second 
period: "mature" Soviet philosophy, marked by compromise and "stagnation [zastoj\", and 
then part of the process of perestrojka and glasnost' [Ch.6:1975-1991]. 
As a whole, this part employs the idea of philosophical culture as elaborated in the first part 
[Ch.l.ii]. The idea behind this is that we can only gain an understanding of Soviet philosophy if 
we regard it as it existed in a specific historical situation, determined by the four determinants 
(individual thought, field of possible positions, material basis, and socio-politico-cultural 
situation), and by the four 'pillars' of philosophical culture (public space, specter of actually 
existing position, heritage, and philosophical industry). If we focus on philosophical theory 
alone, regarding the remainder as mere "circumstance", we will never understand Soviet 
"It must be noted right away that, contrary to the others, the years 1965 and 1975 are rather hypothetical and 
approximate. 
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philosophy. This means that I will largely refrain from a critical discussion of what Soviet 
philosophers were saying, and concentrate on how and under which conditions they were 
speaking.6 
*** 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Shaping of Soviet Philosophy (1917-1946) 
"The fate of dialectical materialism has proved to he truly tragic: it was torn 
out of the vivid flow of philosophical thought and turned into a Stale 
religion."? 
A.L. Nikiforov, 1990 
This chapter traces the genesis of Soviet philosophy from Bolshevik seizure of power, and the 
practical exclusion of non-Marxist philosophy, and passionate discussion among Soviet 
Marxists, to the official intervention of the Party in philosophical controversy and the 
elimination of "disagreement on the philosophical front" in favor of orthodox Marxism-
Leninism (1917-1930 [4.i]), the subsequent submission of all philosophical activity in the 
USSR to that orthodox position, culminating in the virtual reduction of dialectical and historical 
materialism to a single text ascribed to Stalin in person (1931-1938 [4.ii]), and the resulting 
"dead period" (1938-1946 [4.iii]). 
4.i Civil War and Inner Pluralism in Soviet Philosophy f 1917-1930) 
It is an exaggeration and a misunderstanding to claim that, on 25 October (7 November) 1917, 
Marxism came to power in Russia. The successful subjection of an already existing revolution 
to their own goals by the bol'seviki under Vladimir Il'ic Lenin [Ul'jánov] (1870-1924),8 was 
not so much due to their Marxist conviction as to their high level of organization as a profes-
sional revolutionary party, and to their "opportunism": the subordination of all possible means, 
including philosophy, to one primary goal, viz. the establishment and consolidation of Soviet 
power.9 At this point, the roots of Leninism are not to be found in West European Marxism, 
but in Russian narodniCestvo [populism] and in the radical, "nihilist" revolutionary intelligen-
cija and its notion of a small, conspirational organization as the executor of the historically 
inevitable.10 
Lenin certainly was not a philosopher, nor did he pretend to be one," but he did read 
"a good deal of philosophical literature, an astonishing amount, indeed,"12 he did attach great 
significance to philosophical issues, and he did elaborate a significant position in philosophy. 13 
Apart from his distinction between a philosophical and a scientific, physicalist conception of 
matter, and, consequently, between philosophical and physicalist materialism,14 Lenin's 
contribution to philosophy consists in an attempt at its radical politicization through his notion 
of partisanship [partijnost"]: any philosophical position, according to him, is either materialist 
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and politically progressive, or idealist and thus reactionary [Ch lui]. The "Leninist style of 
philosophizing", which consists in simplification of an opponent's position and radical 
polarization of two positions, is a mere consequence of this politicization. 
Evidently, a trend towards politicization of philosophy is present in Marxism itself, '5 
and in this sense Aleksandr Leonidovic Nikiforov (b 1940) is right to state that Stalin, while 
moving away from Lenin's political programme, "in relation to philosophy merely drove to its 
logical end [italics mine, EvdZ] the process of politicization and vulgarization of Marxism, 
begun by the followers of Marx and Engels."16 Certainly, this is one "logical end" of 
Marxism, and it only is the only one if we believe that Leninism indeed is the only true heir of 
Marxism '7 In order to understand why in Russia this line came to dominate, one has to take 
into account other factors '8 
One thing is certain- the success of the October Revolution fundamentally changed the 
ideological function of Marxism from that of motivating, and steering a revolutionary 
movement to one of organizing and legitimizing already established Bolshevik power and 
policy [Ch7n-iri]· 
"Once the revolution had heen a success, the central concern ot theory vis-a-vis developments in Russia could no 
longer be revolution, it became the construction of a communist society " ' " 
The genesis of Soviet philosophy was determined by the fact that a party came to 
power, whose leaders were convinced ol both the practical and the theoretical relevance of an 
orthodox Marxism, adopted as a ready-made doctrine by Georgi) Valentinovic Plechánov 
(1856-1918), and adapted to Russian conditions by Lenin 2° It would be a mistake to think of 
Lenin as a pure "instrumentalist",21 who regarded philosophy as a mere instrument in class 
struggle. Although his was the practical perspective of a professional revolutionary, he also 
believed that Marxism reflected objective truth 22 
'The Marxist doctrine is omnipotent, because it is true ( ) It is Ihe rightful successor of the best that mankind 
has created in the 19lh century in ihe form ot German philosophy, British political economy, and French 
socialism [italics mine, EvdZ] "23 
By the same token, the success of the revolution was appreciated as evidence of the 
truth of Marxist theory,24 and this was in line with Marxian ideas, too: 
"In der Praxis muß der Mensch die Wahrheit, daß heißt die Wirklichkeit und Macht, die Diesseitigkeit seines 
Denkens beweisen [italics mine, EvdZ] "25 
Despite the logical inconsistency (from the thesis that a true theory has to be practically 
successful it does not follow that a practically successful theory is true), it is quite understan-
dable that the convinced Marxists that seized political power in 1917 perceived it that way It is 
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this linking of political power and a specific philosophical doctrine that marks the beginning of 
Soviet philosophy 
In the years immediately following the October revolution ( 1917-1921 ), the Soviet government 
was engaged in Civil War, reconquest of lost territories*, War Communism, and the suppres-
sion of internal opposition This was a period of considerable cultural and intellectual freedom, 
and in this respect a continuation of the preceding period,26 but it also was a period of "civil 
war" in philosophy, of a persistent and intensifying struggle of Bolshevik theoreticians and 
politicians against the 'idealist philosophy of bourgeoisie and landlordism [burzuazno-
pomeSâiâ'ja¡deaìisticeskaja filosofíja] '27 Academic philosophy took advantage of the feeble 
control of the Soviet government of the 16 Russian universities in 1917, only 4 were located 
on Russian territory (Moscow, Petrograd, Кагап' and Saratov),28 and even there, academic 
freedom, acquired in February 1917,29 was not immediately nullified Nikolaj AleksandroviS 
Berdjaev (1874-1948) was appointed professor of philosophy at Moscow university as late as 
1920, non-Marxist philosophers continued to teach,10 and non-Marxist books and journals 
(Mysl'. Mysl' ι slovo) could appear 31 
The end of this one-sided 'civil war m philosophy" was marked by a series of events 
the closing down, in 1921, of the Faculty of History and Philology, where philosophy was 
housed,32 of the university of Moscow,33 the dismissal of all university professors in 
philosophy,34 the banishment (unexpected, according to Nikolaj Onufnevic Losskij (1870-
1965))35 m 1922, on Lenin's orders,16 of 161 leading intellectuals, including "the most 
representative part of Russian idealist philosophers",37 and, finally, the founding, also in 
1922, of the journal Pod znamenem marksizma [Under the Banner of Marxism] PZM1. the 
"mouthpiece of militant materialism [organ vomstvuju^cegomateridlizma]", as Lenin called it, 
and designed to fight the "qualified lackeys of religious superstition [diplomirovannych lakeev 
popovSöwy] "38 
In 1922, Soviet political power was extended to the humanities, and social science, and 
freedom of discussion in these fields became the privilege of Marxist philosophers Only a few 
non-Marxist philosophers (Pavel Aleksandrovi6 Florenskij (1882-1937), Aleksej Fedorovic 
Lósev (1893-1988), Gustav Gustavovic Spet (1879-1937)) were more or less able to pursue 
their philosophical and scientific activity during the 1920s 39 Publication of non-Marxist 
philosophical texts was very limited 40 
So, by 1922 Marxism had become, from one of many philosophical sects", the 
"official philosophy ' of an established regime, marginalizing other positions, and allowing for 
"The RSFSR was formed in 1918 the USSR in 1922 
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"internalpluralism"* within Marxism only41 This pluralism was real during these first years, 
the leading theoreticians in Soviet Marxism were Aleksandr Aleksandrovic Bogdánov 
[Malinóvskij] (1873-1928),42 the founder of empmomomzm, Anatoly Vasil'evic LunaCárskij 
(1875-1933), the author of bogostroitei'stvo [God-building], and Nikolaj Ivanovic Buchann 
(1888-1938), the main theoretician of NEP [New Economic Policy] Lenin was not regarded 
as an important theoretician 43 Marxist internal pluralism was greatly stimulated by the fact that 
the new government was forced to abandon, in its actual policy, central Marxist principles like 
the ' withering away" of state structures, market economy, and money 44 
The Search for Orthodoxy 
The years following the annihilation of non-Marxist philosophy (1922-1931) are most of all 
characterized by the building up of philosophical cadres by the Party 45 This was done at the 
Institut Krasnoj Professury [Institute of Red Professors, IKP] (f 1921),46the Kommums-
ticeskdjdAkddemijd [Communist Academy] (f 1918),47 which housed an Institut fìlosofìi 
[Philosophical Institute] since 1928/9,48 and at the Kommumsticcskij Universitet im 
Sverdlovd [Communist Sverdlov-University] (f 1919, since 1919 the Vys^ajaPartijnajdSkola 
pn CK) 49 As a recent Soviet source subtly remarks 
'A considerable part in the simplification of philosophical culture and in the lowering ot the demanded level was 
played by the fact, that to the field ot philosophy and the other humanities arrived insufficiently educated, 
sometimes even semi literate people, who introduced into spiritual life, together with their enthusiasm, extreme 
intolerance a penchant lor the revolutionary phrase, and an ideology, hypercritical with respect to what was 
achieved by preceding culture 5 0 
This period was further marked by the aforementioned "internal pluralism", stimulated 
by PZM. and by the OMcestvo voinstvuiuscich matenahstov [Association of Militant 
Materialists, OVM],51 established in 1924 ^ Until 1931, Soviet Marxist philosophers engaged 
in three subsequent discussions,53 the most famous of which was that between "dialecticians" 
and "mechanists" The first later were called "debonnists" after their leader, Abram Moiseevic 
Debónn [Ióffe] (1881-1963), the latter "buchannists" after Buchann, who was accused of 
being their leader *>4 Among Debonn's followers were Tan Ernestovic Sten (1899-1937), who 
reportedly gave Stalin his philosophical training in 1925-1928, " and Nikolaj Afanas'eviC 
Karev (1901-1935) Leading 'mechanicists" were Ljubov' Isaakovna Ortodoks [Aksel'ród] 
T h e terms official philosophy [Dicnstphilosophic] and philosophical sects {philosophisches Sektierertum) 
are borrowed from Wilhelm Goerdt who had taken them from the Russian philosopher V V Rozanov 
sluzebnaja tilosotija/ tilosotit\ovamcpo dolgu чіи/by and tilowfckoe sckUnMvo (Goerdt 1984 ρ 67f 
and η 41) together with intentai pluralism [Binnenpluralismw;] a term coined by Goerdt himsclt (ibid , ρ 
7If) these concepts are apt to describe the dynamic of the philosophical situation both before and after 1917 
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(1868-1946), Ivan Ivanovo Skvorcóv-Stepánov (1870-1928), Vladimir Nikolaevie Sarabjánov 
(1886-1952), and Arkadij Kliment'evi6 Timirjázev (1880-1955) This internal pluralism was 
supported by Lenin, who in 1921 gave permission to let his political opponents Aksel'rod and 
Deborm,56 teach at the Svcrdlov-university, because "he knew that it was not possible to find 
better authors to recruit for the elaboration of a detailed programme and of school-textbooks in 
philosophy "57 
A first discussion was provoked by the radical article "Philosophy overboard1" by Sergej 
Konstantinovic Minin (1882-1962), in which he denied, in the name of Marx and Lenin, the 
very right of existence of a Marxist philosophy, as separate from either positive science or 
Marxist political ideology 58 Vehement reactions from Marxists like Debonn, Aksel'rod, and 
Buchann to this, and similar "liquidationist" articles by Vladimir Viktorovic Adorátskij (1878-
1945) and Emmanuel Semenovic Encmen (1891-19"),59 resulted,60 and the discussion was 
ended in 1923 by a resolution of the Central Committee, in which Encmen's theses were 
condemned 6 ' 
The second discussion began shortly after Lenin's death (21 January 1924): 
"The discussion related mainly to the status of Marxist philosophy and its relation to the natural sciences If 
according to the "mechanists' there can not exist a separate and isolated field of philosophy, which in principle 
is identified by them with the results of natural science, for the ' dialecticians" Marxist philosophy does possess 
an independent status and a specific content It is a methodology and an epistemology "62 
The "mechanicists" held that a materialist conception of the world entailed the 
interpretation of both nature and history as mechanical processes. They denied "dialectical 
jumps" from anorganic to organic, and from organic to "conscious matter", reduced dialectics 
to a method to express objective change in the material (physical-chemical) world, and 
excluded the possibility of determination of social being by social consciousness. This last 
tenet fitted badly into the ideology of triumphant communism trying to build socialism. The 
"dialecticians", by contrast, regarded philosophy as an independent discipline, based on 
materialist dialectics,61 and standing m a relation of mutual dependence with the sciences. 
Kotakowski summarized their position as follows 
"Der Marxismus fordert deshalb einen standigen Auslausch der Ergebnisse zwischen der Philosophie und den 
Einzelwissenschaften, denn wahrend die Philosophie ohne das »Material«, das ihr die Naturwissenschaft und die 
Sozialwissenschaften liefern, sinnlos ist, sind die Wissenschaften ohne die Fuhrung der Philosophie blind "M 
In 1925, Friedrich Engels' Dialektik der Natur was published by the Institut Marksa-
Engel'sa [Marx-Engels Institute, forerunner of IML] m Moscow, and became a powerful 
weapon in the hands of the "dialecticians", who elevated this manipulated65 manuscript to the 
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rank of a classical text of Marxism 66 in 1929, the "dialecticians" found further support in 
Lenin's Filosofskie tetrady [Philosophical Notebooks], esp. in his admiration of Hegel's 
Wissenschaft der Logik This second discussion, philosophically the most interesting one, 
lasted until 1929,67 and was ended by a resolution at the "Second All-Union Conference of 
Marxist-Leninist Scientific Institutes", organized by the "debonnists", in which mechanicism 
was condemned as a "manifest deviation from the positions of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. 
The Conference holds it indispensable to expose the errors and to carry on the criticism of the 
mechanicist tendency from the point of view of consistent Mdrxism-Lenmism [italics mine, 
EvdZ]."68 Debonnist victory was complete, as is manifest the word of gratitude to "our leader 
and friend" Debonn by Karev: 
'Carrying out the assignments and instructions by Lenin, Abram Moisecvif has succeeded in founding a 
philosophical school that has reached the remotest corners of the Union, the school of orthodox Mdrxism-
Lcnwnm {italics mine, EvdZ] ( ) Abram Moisccvií was the only one who followed Lenin's instruction-
s "69 
For a short time, the debonnist interpretation of Marxist-Leninist philosophy 
dominated, in line with Debonn's teacher, and the "creator" of the term "dialectical 
materialism", Plechanov,70 the debonnists saw it as a philosophical system, having as its basic 
category the material substance of the world, which, in a series of dialectical jumps, ultimately 
produced the human mind, the highest form of matter, capable of formulating dialectical 
materialism, ι e the self-consciousness of the material substance According to Koiakowski, 
Debonn conceived of dialectical materialism as a synthesis of Hegelian dialectics and Feuer-
bachian materialism, having three parts- a general methodology or "logic" (materialist 
dialectics), and two "applications", dialectics of nature (dialectical matenalism), and dialectics 
oí history (historical materialism) 7I Despite the victory of the "debonnist" position, the 
underlying issue of this discussion was to recur at several instances in Soviet philosophical 
history 72 
The third, and historically most important discussion was that between "debonnists" and "bol-
shevizators",73 provoked by the notorious "article of three [ stat'ja trcch]" in Pravda. 7 June 
1930 74 Of these three, Mark Bonsovic Mitin (1901-1987), Pavel FedoroviÊ Jüdin (1899-
1968), and Vasilij Nikiforovic Ral'cévic,75 at least Mitin and Judin belonged to the Party 
organization within the IKP, and their article was explicitly backed by the editorial board of 
Pravda. ι e by the Central Committee 1(> The "debonnists", reacting instantly with an "article 
of ten [stat'/a desjati]",11 "warning against the dissolution of philosophy in the political slogans 
of the day,"78 were fighting a lost battle the anti-debonnist campaign was too well-organized 
and too powerful. Stalin himself denounced debonnism as "menshevizing idealism."79 The 
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discussion was ended on 25 January 1931 by a resolution of the Central Committee,80 in 
which both "mechanicism" and "deborinism (menshevizing idealism)" were condemned in 
favor of an "orthodox" positional 
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4.Ü Establishment of Orthodoxy (1931-1938) 
This is not the place to enter into the details of these discussions, which are fairly well 
documented in Western (and, recently, Russian) literature anyway 82 It is important, however, 
to determine some crucial elements in the "making of Soviet philosophy", because they are of 
key importance for an understanding of Soviet philosophy It might seem that the struggle 
between mechamcists and dialecticians was about a purely philosophical issue, viz the 
question whether philosophy had to be replaced by positive science, or whether a dialectical 
materialist philosophy (ontology) was needed in order to assimilate and unify the results of 
science Arguments for both positions were found in Engels and Lenin However, the 
theoretical issue was increasingly pushed aside by the practical, organizational question of the 
dominance of politics over science Until 1929, natural science, mathematics, and the Academy 
of Sciences had experienced relatively little pressure, the Party and the Soviet government 
being concerned with the creation of its proper cadres 81 
According to Lccourt, the "dialecticians ' represented an offensive position, attempting, 
in the name of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, to subordinate science and technology to the 
authority of the party, while the "mechamcists", however dogmatic in theoretical questions, 
stood for a defense of freedom of scientific research, which they felt threatened As to the 
"bolshevizators", their victory not only achieved the subordination of scientific research to 
immediate political goals, but also had lasting effects on philosophy 
"Prenant acte du rôle moteur de la philosophie sur tous les fronts de la bataille idéologique (elle) fia 
philosophie EvdZ] aura désormais mission dêtre, en toute occasion sans broncher davantage la servante de 
cette politique elle sera réservée a un corps de specialistes fonctionnaires d appareil charges de garantir de leur 
autorite dialectique la justesse de la ligne suivi '84 
The successive discussions, starting out as disputes between convinced Marxists, 
ended with the appearance of a "new breed'85 of philosophers, the " party-philosopher",86 
people like Mitin, Judin, Mark Moiseevic Rozentál' ( 1906-1975), or Aleksandr Aleksandrovic 
Maksimov (1891-1976), whose saying m philosophy depended upon their connection to 
political leadership, and not upon their intellectual capacities, as was still the case with Deborin, 
Aksel'rod, and others An interview with the longest-living of this first generation of party-
philosophers, Mitin, the "typical example of the Soviet party-philosopher [Musterexemplardes 
pdrteihongenSowjetphilosophen],"^ in 1981 clearly shows the frame oí mind of these people 
their job was to hand on orders from on high to the philosophers working in the field of 
research and education 88 
98 
Part Two: A Concise History of Soviet Philosophy 
The vicissitudes of Deborin and Aksel'rod are telling in this respect. Aksel'rod's 
"intransigence and adherence to principle" brought her in conflict with "official philosophical 
leadership", and she was in disgrace from 1925 until her death in 1946.»9 Deborin was the 
leading Soviet Marxist philosopher from 1922 until 1931, firmly established in this position by 
Lenin's famous statement that "the editors and collaborators [of PZM. EvdZ] should, in my 
opinion, form a kind of "association of materialist friends of Hegelian dialectic"."90 Deborin, 
graduated in 1908 from the philosophical faculty of the university of Bern, Switzerland, 9' had 
a sound historical knowledge in philosophy, and a clear understanding of the difference 
between philosophy and ideology: he and his compatriots were the last to stand publicly for the 
indépendance and specific nature of philosophy, vainly protesting against its subjection to 
immediate political goals92. He succumbed, and could after his dethroning continue his 
academic career, and escape the Stalin purges through a self-critique in 1933,93 unlike his 
closest collaborators, Sten and Karev, who were both arrested and executed.94 
The fact that the official philosophy that arose after the condemnation of "menshevizing 
idealism" differed from "deborinism" only in one significant point,95 clearly shows that the 
point of this last "discussion" was the elimination of independent work in philosophy. Soviet 
philosophy was to be determined, in the last resort, by the highest Party authorities, not by the 
director of the Institut filosofa of the Communist Academy, the leader of the OVMD, or the 
editor-in-chief of EZM (three posts held by Deborin). This meant the establishment of the Party 
as the ultimate authority in philosophical questions,9^ which implies that everything in 
subsequent Soviet philosophy must be regarded as either urged or allowed by the Party 
authorities, or again as something they could not prevent. 
Philosophical discussions seldom end: they develop into other discussions, or they fade 
away. The discussions of the 1920s, however, were ended by interventions from above in 
1923, 1929, and 1931: "Philosophical controversy had come to an end by political decree."9? 
This termination of philosophical discussion meant the end of "internal pluralism", and the 
establishment of Marxism-Leninism as an orthodox philosophical doctrine.98 According to 
Goerdt, the expression "Marxism-Leninism" was coined by the "deborinists" to indicate their 
position as (the only) true heirs of Lenin." Apparently, Deborin was the founding father of the 
sanctification of Lenin, of his transformation into a klassikmarksizma-leninizma [classic of 
Marxism-Leninism], and into the Marxist philosopher of modern times.100 In 1924, a few 
days after Lenin's death, Deborin published "Lenin, the Militant Materialist." l°i This text, 
published in tens of thousands of copies, represents one of the classical texts of Soviet 
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philosophy.102 Deborin called Lenin the "brilliant continuator of Marx," qualifying him as the 
incarnation of Marx' 11th thesis on Feuerbach.103 
Deborin qualified Leninism a "the revolutionary Marxism of the era of the disintegration 
of capitalism and the birth of socialism",104 a formulation that barely differs from the one 
employed by Iosif Vissarionoviô Stalin [Dzugasvfli] (1879-1953) in April of the same year. '°5 
Both are forerunners of the later standard definition of Leninism as "Marxism of the epoch of 
imperialism and the construction of socialism".106 Yet it must be noted that Deborin as., 
though sanctifying Lenin as a revolutionary and a true Marxist, did not regard him an original 
philosopher. Karev rightly stated, in 1924, that "Lenin would have been most surprised if one 
had told him that he had opened a new era in Marxism," ι °? and Deborin equally rightly wrote, 
in 1929, i.e. at the height of his power, that "Plechanov was most of all a theoretician, Lenin 
most of all a practical worker, a politician, a leader."108 
The "internal pluralism" was already dominated by the notions of orthodoxy and heresy 
at least after Lenin's death.109 Also we meet with the phenomenon of "quotatology", to 
become so common in Soviet philosophy: in the text by Deborin just referred to, 46 out of 53 
quotations are from Lenin, and all of them have the function of authoritative arguments (as do 
the few quotes from Engels' Anti-Diihiing). This is the establishment of orthodoxy: quotations 
from the classical authors of Marxism are decisive arguments. This orthodoxy is easily 
transformed into selective use of authoritative quotations for the author's proper purposes. As a 
matter of fact, all participants in the discussions of the 1920s referred to Marx and Engels, and 
esp. Lenin, to establish their own point of view as the right one, as "true to Lenin."110 In this 
sense we may conclude our discussion of this crucial period by qualifying it as the period of 
the search for the right, orthodox line in philosophy. So, Marxist(-Leninist) philosophy is 
Marxist philosophy, understood as the only true, orthodox continuation of Marxism, excluding 
any deviant interpretation of Marxism, and "Stalinist philosophy" is nothing but the warranting 
of this Marxist-Leninist philosophy by its immediate link to political power. As early as 1929, 
Stalin was put forward in Pravda as "true continuator of the cause of Marx and Lenin..., 
staunch fighter for the purity of Marxism-Leninism."1 ' ' 
It is important to note that the discussion between "deborinists" and "orthodox" Marxist-
Leninists was a political one, dealing with a philosophical "heresy" in order to establish and 
legitimize immediate political control over philosophy and science. The establishment of 
orthodoxy by the Party displayed a pattern that became a recurrent element in Soviet 
philosophical culture: the differentiation and crystallization of two "extreme" positions out of 
the inner logic of development of Soviet philosophy, and a third, "intermediate" position, 
becoming, through an official decision, the new orthodox position. Mitin es. repeated the 
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arguments of the mechamcists, condemned both mechamcism and deborimsm, and then 
returned to "debormist" positions in a most cynical manner1 1 2 For example, the entry 
"Filosofija" in the Bol'sajd Sovetskdjd Enciklopedija (vol LVII, 1936)) was signed by Mitin, 
but mainly written by the imprisoned Sten (executed 1937) "Mitin merely added choice 
swearwords [otbomaja rugan'], aimed at the author and at all philosophers who had suffered 
with him "из 
To regard the orthodox position, explicitly adopted as such in 1931, as a philosophical 
position, a third interpretation of Marxism-Leninism, ' 1 4 is to miss a point, unless it means to 
point to the radical pohticization and "instrumentalization" of Marxism as a possible conse­
quence of Marxism itself 
"Es ist die sozialpolitische Praxis der Übergangsperiode' der Jahre 1929/30, die die Partei veranlaßt, die 
Philosophie wieder mit der sozialpolitischen Realität in Einklang /u bringen Der Zwang, den eingeleiteten 
sozialistischen Aufbau zu rechtfertigen, veranlaßt die Partei, Gedanken zu unterstutzen, die den absoluten 
Determinismus so weit aufbrechen, daß ihre sozialpolitische Initiative und die Richtung dieser Initiative durch 
kein Dogma der sowjetischen Philosophie beschrankt wird ' 15 
The true objective of the condemnation was not disguised at that time,ι 1 6 nor was it 
later 
"After the resolution of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) about the journal Under the Banner of Marxism 
(1911) the participation of philosophers in the solution of the tasks of constructing socialism was activated * 
Marxist Leninist philosophy gained a dominant position not only in the social, but also in the natural 
sciences "H7 
The Domestication of Philosophical Thought 
The resolution of 1931 was a decisive blow the period following this elimination of 
"disagreement on the philosophical front" [raznoglasie na fìlosofskom fronte] ' 18 (1931-1938), 
led to what is generally referred to by Western scholars as the "dead period" in Soviet 
philosophy ' 19 This period, partly coinciding with Stalinist terror (1935-1938), can be labelled 
the period of the domestication of philosophy120 Its results were the subjection of philosophy 
to immediate political goals -an "actualist"121 interpretation of Leninist partijnost'-122, the 
elevation of Stalin to the rank of a philosophical genius,123 and the suppression of all 
independent philosophical thought, Marxist or not It must be noted, however, that the period 
until 1936 was not at all "dead ', but relatively productive,124 and a period of lively, though 
increasingly insulated discussion, notably at MIFLI, the breeding-place of such important and 
diverse Soviet philosophers as Eval'd Vasil'evic Il'énkov (1924-1979), Zachar Abramovic 
*See Note on Language 
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Kaménskij (b 1915), Teodor ΠΊδ Ojzermán (b 1914), or Georgi) Solomonovic Pómeranc (b 
1917/8) 125 
Γη 1932, the histonco-philosophical faculty of MGU was turned into the independent 
Moskovskij Istonko-Filosofskij Institut [MIFI], and m 1934 the inclusion of a faculty of 
literature created the Moskovskij Istonko-Filosofskij ι Literatumyj Institut [MIFLI] '26 This 
MIFLI was "an oasis in a world of growing terror," where bourgeois" subjects like Classical 
Greek and Latin were reintroduced, '27 and it was the only place where philosophy was 
taught '28 Its historical importance resides mostly in its staf f of partly pre-revolutionary, partly 
Soviet formation, passing on scholarly methods and intellectual tradition to a following 
generation In 1936-1938 the philosophical faculty was closed for two years, and after its 
reopening in 1938 its standards went down When the faculties of MIFLI, evacuated during 
World War II,129 returned to Moscow "nothing remained of the IFLI tradition at the facul­
ty "no 
Marxism-Leninism was established in order to smooth any difference between Marxism 
and Leninism, thus making of the latter not an interpretation of the former, but its 'Leninist 
stage' [lemnskif cUp] 1 1 ] This orthodox position, aptly described by Hollak as "eine 
Generalisierung der dialektisch materialistischen Thesen Fr Engels' und der historisch-
materialistischen Thesen des spateren Marx"112 was selective Works that did not 'fit' into it, 
such as Lenin's Füosofskie tetrady (1929), or Marx' Okonomisch-philosophischeMdnusknpte 
(1844) (1932),131 were excluded from the Soviet edition of their Complete Works '34 Instead 
of an orthodox Marxism-Leninism in the sense of ' thought as true as possible to that of the 
kldssikf', there emerged a compulsory "general line",115 expounded in a single textbook 
[ucebnik] |1f> 
Si les bolchcvisatcurs ont cchouc dans leur tentative de rallier les scientifiques, ils ont par contre réussi a la 
mime epoque a unifier I enseignement de la philosophie dans 1 ensemble du système éducatif de I URSS A cet 
egard le fan le plus important est sans doute 1 apparition des premiers manuels a usage national de materialisme 
dialectique (redige par Miline) et de materialisme historique (redige par Ra¿umo\skij) dans lesquels figurent des 
presentations schématiques et dogmatiques du marxisme '1^ 
This process did not take place unchallenged For example, in 1935 the new ucebnik, 
edited by Mitin,'11* was severely criticized by Gngonj Eruchimovic Glézerman (1907-1980) 
for being schematic, abstract, and unfit for educational practice '39 The final sub|ection of 
philosophy was achieved in 1936 through a well-orchestrated condemnation of the work of 
Mitin and the other party-philosophers as outdated, abstract, scholastic, and defiled by 
quotations from Trockij 14° Simultaneously, an institutional unification of science took place 
the union ot the Communist Academy and the 'bourgeois Academy of Sciences,141 which 
yielded one central Institut filosofa [IF], ruled by the bolshevizators' |42 The relatively high 
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productivity of Soviet philosophy during the first part of the 1930s dropped sharply after 
1936 143 
In many cases this "domestication ' of philosophy meant the physical destruction of 
philosophers 
"N A Karev I К Luppol, Ja E Sien S Ju Semkovskij G G Spet Ρ A Florenskij and a great number of 
other creative thinkers [mnozatvo drugich mysljaSCich filosofavi were executed, or died in the camps ' '44 
A definite end was made to independent non Marxist thought the few remaining 
représentants were silenced in the early 1930s Losev was arrested in 1930, shortly before the 
private publication of his Dialektikamifa [The Dialectic of Myth],|45 "the last book legally 
printed in the USSR that expressed opposition to Marxist-Leninist principles " , 4 6 The book, in 
which Losev qualified dialectical materialism as a "crying absurdity [vopijusäaja 
ne/epostj"','47 was banned immediately Its author was condemned to ten years of labor camp 
after an official campaign, adorned by a speech by Politburo-member Lazar MojseeviC 
Kaganóvic (1893-1991) at the 16th Party-Congress against the idealist" and "class enemy" 
Losev 148 Losev served his sentence at the Belomorkanal from 1930 until 1933,149 when he 
was allowed to return to Moscow and resume his scientific work, albeit with a ban on 
philosophical publications until 1953 iso Other idealist philosophers (Florenskij, Spet) also 
were (in 1933 and 1935) "groundlessly subjected to repression" '51 
It is important, however, to note that philosophers who were willing to admit their 
"heresy" after condemnation, were not liquidated or severely punished Thus, Deborin was still 
chairman of the Section of Social Sciences of the AN SSSR in 1935-37,152 taught philosophy 
at MGU as late as 1945, i51 and published until shortly before his death in 1961 '54 Mitin also 
escaped terror and pursued his career by admitting his faults ' " This points to a significant 
separation of philosophical conviction and individual philosopher the latter had become a 
"philosophical worker ', an apparai&A,'56 whose "primary task became the education of the 
masses and the training of the teachers in the new monolithic world view of the Party " ' 57 
To qualify this period as "Stalinist philosophy" is adequate only if we realize that this is not a 
philosophical qualification "Einen besonderen 'Stalinismus" hat es im sowjetischen Dogma nie 
gegeben "'58 Likewise, to say that " for roughly the next two decades after the condemnation 
of 1931, the only significant voice to be heard in the realm of Soviet thought was that of 
Joseph Stalin,"'59 is adequate only if we regard this Orthodoxy" not as Stalin s philosophical 
view,'60 but as a carefully prepared and supervised instrument in the hands of the Party It is 
misleading to think that anyone (including Stalin himself) actually regarded Stalin as a 
philosopher The "ever greater adulation of Stalin as the philosopher,"'6' was the formdl 
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elevation of the actual Party-leader to the rank of a klassikmaiksizma-lemnizma, and not a 
result of Stalin's personal megalomania, or an expression of increasing admiration of "the 
theoretician of victorious socialism, the founder of a comprehensive, scientific theory of 
socialist society'^62 The term "personality cult [kul't hcnosti]", employed in this connection 
instead of Sfa^n-cult, is appropriate in the sense that Stalin с s. achieved this goal by creating a 
Lemn-cult, and a cult of the person of the past and present leader oí the USSR and the Party 
(as the true heir of Lenin) '63 
The shaping of Soviet philosophy, resulting in the "dead period", was a tragic episode. 
The philosophically and historically interesting question, is not whether the party-philosophers 
who came to power were philosophical illiterates, ideological zealots, or mere apparatciki, but 
why this "orthodox" philosophy came to dominate in the USSR Clearly, the Soviet system 
had to submit science and technology to its political goals, and one way to do this was to 
domesticate independent philosophical thought. At the same time, it had to retain the form of 
philosophy, as Us own legitimacy depended on (an interpretation of) Marxist theory [Ch 8] It is 
unproductive to ascribe this development to Bolshevik "pnmitivism", to diabolic forces,164 or 
to deduce Stalinism from Marxism as its "natural" and necessary consequence The fact of the 
matter is that, in a largely controlled public space, and on the ruins of philosophical tradition, 
one position, "debonnism", fitted best to that situation, was favored, manipulated, and turned 
into an official doctrine. This process was part of a broader process that led to the establish-
ment of a single authority in ideology, philosophy, and politics 165 The theoretical authority in 
any field, Stalin, was entitled to exert full practical control over any field of intellectual or 
scientificactivity: 
"And, fulminating a ban against the others, who already were no longer among the living, Stalin, justifying the 
title of coryphaeus of all sciences, established a new order in biology, but also in linguistics and political 
economy " '66 
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4.iii The "Dead Period" in Soviet Philosophy (1938-1946) 
The so-called "dead period" (1938-1946) began with the canonization of Marxism-Leninism in 
the "Kratkij kurs" [Istonjd VKP(b) (kratkij kurs), History of the All-union Communist Party 
(bolshevik) (short course)], and the reduction of Maixist-Leninist philosophy to its philosophi­
cal chapter, the catechism-like Odialekticeskomiistoriceskommatenahzme [On Dialectical and 
Historical Materialism],'67 ascribed to Stalin '68 It reached apart from the 85 million 
newspaper and journal copies in which it appeared, ' 6 9 a total edition of 35,762 000 copies by 
1949,·™ and 301 editions until 1953. ' 7 ' Until the publication of Stalin's Marksizm ι voprosy 
jazykoznanija [Marxism and Questions of Linguistics] in 1950, it was the authoritative text in 
Soviet philosophy: 
"Already in 1938 by a special resolution of the CK VKP(b) on November 18th the Kratkij kurs istorii VKP(b), 
and thus the chapter "O dialektiCeskom ι lstonccskom materializme," were proclaimed to be "an encyclopedia of 
fundamental insights in the field of Marxism-Leninism," in which was given 'the official interpretation, verified 
by the CK VKP(b), of the basic questions of the history of the VKP(b) and of Marxism-Leninism, not 
permitting any arbitrary interpretations' " 1 7 2 
The transformation of Marxist philosophy into an instrument of absolute power, '73 and 
instrumental nature of Stalin's philosophical opus тают are illustrated by the fact that its 
assertions are of a sufficiently general nature to account for almost any concrete phenomenon 
or Party policy, and, by the same token, to serve as evidence of the permanent confirmation of 
true dtamat and istmat by practice.'74 Of course, this makes the theory "empirically empty",'75 
but that is no problem if there is no competition As Volkov aptly commented: 
"As a popular exposition of Marxism, as a supply for «likbez» [abbreviation for "likvidacya bezgramotnobti", 
the Soviet alphabetization campaign, EvdZ] in the field ot philosophy, this work was not worse, perhaps even 
better than many others And next to others it might have been very useful But the point is precisely that there 
already was no «next to» It was the only, the unique one It was at once declared the peak of Marxist-Leninist 
thought And its author — the genius of geniuses of all ages and peoples, a coryphaeus of all sciences " | 7 Й 
With the important exception of history of philosophy [Ch 10 и b],'7 7 philosophizing 
was reduced to the "repeated exposition of and commenting upon the works and ideas of 
Stalin."178 The poverty of Soviet philosophical work in this period is aptly demonstrated by 
the total absence of philosophical content in a survey of Soviet philosophy through 1919-1944 
by Mitin ' 7 9 Wetter, who studied this period intensively, concluded that only very few original 
monographs were produced ' so PZM led a gloomy existence, becoming an organ of anti­
fascist propaganda. ' 81 In 1944, "in the arduous war-conditions of those years [it] somehow 
imperceptibly "closed itself down" [samozafcry/s/a]"'82 because it "just did not have the 
strength to come out" ' 8 3 The philosophical faculty of MIFLI was reopened in 1938, but 
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professional philosophy had been effectively annihilated, as "university life in the Soviet Union 
reached its lowest ebb " 1 8 4 
Still, World War II also was a period of a certain relaxation of control It was in 1942 
that Losev was brought in to teach formal logic at MGU, and he even was, for a moment, 
intended to become the chairman of the logic department185 (founded 1943 or 1947 according 
to others'86) In 1944, Losev was once again accused of idealism, and transferred to 
MGPI 1 8 7 Textbooks in traditional, 'bourgeois" logic were published by Valentin Ferdinan-
dovic Asmus (1894-1975) and Pavel Sergecvic Popov (1892-1964), '88 and they also laid the 
foundations for the flourishing of formal logic, and mathematical logic, after Popov had 
brought in Sofija Aleksandrovna Janovskaja (1896-1966), at the philosophical faculty of 
MGU !89 It was during the war years, also, that attempt were made at a more or less objective 
and scholarly account of philosophy's history [Ch 10 и b] 
Early Western Reactions lo Soviet Philosophy 
It is no surprise that early Soviet philosophy could not warm the hearts of non-Soviet 
philosophers 
Until 1948 al Itasi few Western philosophers would have hesitated in characterizing Soviet philosophy as a 
tedious and distasteful mixture of naive but confident dogma and childish but unskillful aggressiveness 19° 
One ol the earliest treatments of Soviet philosophy, setting a tone to be reheard, was 
Berdjaev's The «General Line» of Soviet Philosophy 1 9 1 The pioneer of Western critical study 
of Soviet philosophy has been Gustav A Wetter (1911 1991), who started lecturing on Soviet 
diamat in Italy m 1943 1 9 2 Berdjaev's and Wetter's interpretation of Soviet ideology as a 
pseudo-religion, and of Soviet philosophy as a quasi-theology, together with the accom­
panying connotations of these metaphors, has become a central notion in much of Western 
work on Soviet philosophy | 9 1 
This highly critical approach contrasts with the "naive neutrality" in the work of another 
pioneer scholar of Soviet philosophy, John Somerville (b 1905), who set another trend in 
Western studies of Soviet philosophy the attempt to approach it as a philosophical position like 
any other Somerville wrote "the first Western book on Soviet philosophy from an examination 
of original sources"194, and his merits were quickly appreciated 195 According to Somerville, 
Soviet dialectical materialism was a "living philosophy, 1 9 6 "probably one of the least 
understood philosophies in the world today, and certainly the most misrepresented,"197 and 
Stalins О dialekticcskom ι istoriceskom matenahzme "the best authoritative bird's eye 
view " 1 9 8 
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Admitting a "certain amount of sympathy," '99 Somerville attempted to refute the 
received view that Soviet philosophy was not pursued "as a higher intellectual subject", 
arguing that "at least one year of compulsory study of philosophy is the rule in universities and 
also m the great majority of other institutions of higher study and training," that "this study ot 
philosophy is not merely of the principles of dialectical materialism, but embraces a historical 
survey of the different schools and thinkers from pre-Socratic to contemporary times," and that 
"books are constantly appearing in large editions, not only works of contemporary thinkers 
writing as dialectical materialists, but those of the classic representatives of the various schools 
in the history of philosophy "2°° Mistaking these facts as signs of "philosophical life", 
Somerville did point to the importance attached to philosophy in the USSR, as well as to the 
fact that Debonn and Timirjazev, in 1931 found guilty of "menshevmng idealism" and 
"mechanism", as well as the 'debonnist" Ivan KapitonoviC Lúppol (1896-1943),20' were still 
active as professional philosophers,202 and that Bucharin, though accused of holding the 
wrong philosophical views, was not executed on that ground, but on the accusation of 
conspiracy 201 As Somerville had it with unintended irony, "the principle acted on in the Soviet 
Union is not that the holding of incorrect philosophical views by a given individual must result 
in dangerous political activity "204 
The result of the process, described in this chapter, was Soviet philosophy, which can be 
defined as philosophy, fundamentally subordinated to the ideological authority of the 
Communist Party, and as an mtegralpart of the Soviet system Irrespective of fluctuations in 
actual political control or pressure, censorship etc , Soviet philosophy was forged during the 
1920s, and unified, glorified and petrified during the 1930s and World War II Stalin's 
philosophical masterpiece shows that the primary functions of philosophy, viz the epistemic, 
(self-)cntical, and (self-)foundational functions, were subordinated to a doctrinal and 
ideological function [Part in, Introduction] In being transformed into an instrument of the Party, 
philosophy lost its inner truth criteria 205 Therefore, a revival of philosophy in the USSR, ι e 
the end of the "dead period", would have to consist in a return of these internal criteria of truth, 
of its epistemic function, recognized as having a value of their own, independent of criteria of 
practical usefulness The second half of the 1940s witnessed attempts at such a revival m 
precisely this way, while retaining -and even reconfirming- its Soviet character, whereas the 
1950s and 1960s showed that an actual emancipation of philosophical thought inevitably would 
conflict with the fundamental subordination of philosophy to its ideological function 
*** 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
From Frost to Spring and Back Again (1947-1975) 
" what would Mnrx and Engels say if Ihey learned thai philosophical 
works are distributed among the people in tens ot millions of copies' This 
is the true triumph of Marxism, and a living proof that the great doctrine of 
Marx-Engels Lenin Stalin has become the doctrine of our entire people, and 
on this foundation unequalled in the world, our philosophy must flourish 
Be worthy of our epoch — the epoch of Lenin Stalin, the epoch of our 
people, the victorious people' (Stormy, prolonged applause) '206 
A A ¿danov, 1947 
This chapter deals with the period that starts with the "birthday of Soviet philosophy", as 
Thomas Blakeley called it (24 June 1947),207 and traces the development of Soviet philosophy 
through three subsequent phases a period in which philosophical work was not merely 
controlled, but "organized" from above and that lasted until Stalin's death (5 March 1953) and 
subsequent "destahnization" (1947-1954 f5i]), the period of "thaw", in which, for the first 
time, Soviet philosophers started to act as independently thinking individuals, a process that 
soon made clear that it is impossible to let philosophical thought develop freely, and at the same 
time determine its outcome and unity as "Marxist-Leninist" (1955-1965 [5 и]), and the third 
phase of this second period, which ended with the attempt to put the ghost back into the bottle 
(1965-1975 [5 ml). 
5.i The "Stillbirth" of Soviet Philosophy (1947-1954) 
After World War II, the USSR was in need of highly qualified cadres, and a new period m 
Soviet philosophy began 2°8 The demand for well-prepared teachers of philosophy was felt 
acutely 2 0 9 At the same time, the Party's ideological grip had to be tightened The "dead 
period" was ended by, again, a Party intervention in 1947, the Central Committee of the 
CPSU, through its secretary for Agitation and Propaganda, People's Commissar [= minister] 
of Culture, Politburo-member Andrej Aleksandrovic ¿danov (1896-1948), organized a 
discussion at the IF Roughly a quarter of all active philosophers at the time took part in this 
discussion,210 which was intended to arouse Soviet philosophy from its lethargic state, 211 
since "our Party is in utter need ot an increase in philosophical work "212 
This incitation from above, part of "zdanovscind" (1946-1948),2|3 was pointed against 
the book Istonja zapadno-evropejskoj filosofa [History of West European philosophy] by 
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Georgij Fedorovic Aleksándrov (1908-1961) [Ch 10 и с] But this was a pretext2'* to transmit a 
message to all Soviet philosophers 
If u so happened that the book by comrade Alcksandrov has won (he recognition of the majority of our 
philosophical workers, that it was nominated lor the Stahn-pnze thai it was recommended as a textbook, and 
called lorlh numerous favorable reviews this means that, evidently, many philosophical workers share comrade 
Alcksandro\ s mistakes And this points to serious trouble [neblagppoluCie] on our theoretical front The 
circumstance, that the book did not provoke the least significant protest that the interference of the Central 
Committee and of comrade Stalin personally was needed to lay bare the shortcoming of this book means that 
developed Bolshevik critique and seit criticism are absent at the philosophical front 215 
The essence of the intervention was included m Zdanov's address 'about the situation 
at our philosophical front" 2 1 6 First of all, Soviet philosophers were summoned to be more 
productive 
It is well known, that the philosophical production is utterly insufficient in quantity and poor in quality "217 
Secondly, they were urged to turn their attention to present-day issues,2'8 to abandon 
their "moscocentnsm',219 and to trade scholastic discussions220 and 'quotatology [ cifaf-
шсечг о]" 2 2 ' for a more creative and Leninist style This meant philosophical discussion 
within the Soviet camp, and uncompromising ideological battle against "bourgeois idealism" 
and all kinds of deviation from Marxism-Leninism 2 2 2 The discussion as a whole presents a 
fine example of kntikd ι samokiitika, kntika coming from ¿danov, or, e g , Mark Petrovic 
Baskin (b 1899) 
"We write all papers in the same manner and with the same result Why9 ( ) It we write a really original 
article that contains the authors proper ideas, and that is beyond the scope of the stereotyped forms, established 
by the board of editors it is not accepted, or as is even more Irequently the case U is adjusted in such a way as 
to destroy everything individual 22^ 
The samoknlikd came from the accused himself, but was extended to the whole 
collective 
We comrades, arc greatly indebted to our Party We experience this especially painfully and sharply, because 
our people and our Party are presently carrying on a most intensive job, have deployed a true battle for 
communism We want to be and we will be worth) soldiers in that battle in that struggle 2 2 4 
Nor were the "party-philosophers" spared the criticism, when, e g, Kamenskij 
contrasted Mitin, Judin, Vasilij Josipovic Svetlóv (1899-1955) and Grigonj Stepanoviö 
Vaséckij (1904-1983), the successive directors of the IF, with himself and others 225 
' Please name me if but one of their woiks that presents a new page in philosophical science, that would be an 
original contribution to philoviphy '2 2^ 
Was this the long-awaited liberalization and revival of philosophical thought in the 
USSR7227 The story is more complicated While speaking in Stalin's name, ¿danov seems to 
have tried to confine the usurpation of science by philosophy and ideology under way in a 
number of sciences at that time (the best known "affair is the story of "lysenkoism" in genetics 
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and biology) 228 ¡ n 1944, the power of the two chief "bolshevizators", Mitin and Jüdin, had 
received a severe blow they were removed as editors of P?M. and lost their leading positions 
in IF and IML 229 According to Zapata, this offensive of the CK210 was conducted by Zdanov 
in order to push forward a new generation of philosophers, notably Vaseckij and Bonifatij 
Michajlovic Kedrov (1903-1985) 231 Stalin and the 'bolshevizators" launched a counter-
campaign,232 and from this perspective the 1947 conference then would appear as an attempt to 
settle this controversy 233 Zdanov partly succeeded in enforcing his policy, turning the newly 
founded journal, Voprosy Filosofi! [Problems of Philosophy, VF], into a stronghold of anti-
lysenkoism for some time 
Zdanov's stress on the reactionary nature of Hegelian philosophy must be understood 
in terms of anti-German war propaganda But his stress on the outdated character of the 
discussion about Hegel had another meaning as well it was basically an ' anti-debonnist" 
position, claiming that philosophy and ideology should not interfere directly with science 
Zdanov stressed the importance of' partijnost" in philosophy, but he supported Kedrov m the 
latter's defence of ' ideologically neutral" science,234 as against the opposing of "bourgeois" 
and 'proletarian" science, typical of Lysenko and his colleagues 235 Kedrov became editor-m-
chief of VF, which published some controversial articles a plea against the interference of 
philosophers in physic, 236 an article by the anti-lysenkoist 11 Smal gauzen,237 and a protest 
by Kamenskij against the ideologically motivated inflation of the importance of Russian 
philosophers as trailblazers of dialectical and historical materialism [Ch 10 u c] 
It is important to make a clear distinction between two lines of development in Soviet 
philosophy One is the control of the Party over science This was ideologically legitimized 
through an offensive philosophy that claimed ι) to provide the proper, ι e dialectical method 
for all scientific work, and u) to represent a universal philosophical system, didmat and istmat, 
into which virtually all results of science would have to find their place This control, for 
obvious reasons, was gradually reduced in the post-War years Formal science (mathematics, 
logic), natural science, and social science were "liberated" roughly in that order 
However, this gradual liberation of science from philosophy and ideology should not 
be confused with the other line of development, viz the emancipation of philosophy itself from 
subordination and reduction to its function as part of Soviet ideology This emancipation took 
place much more slowly, and less successfully The subordination of philosophy to ideology 
was realized mainly through the notion of pjrtijnost, which left no room for 'ideologically 
neutral philosophy The emancipation of philosophy from its subjection to political goals, was 
attempted ι) by separating certain fields of research from philosophy, thus following the 
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example of the sciences, n) by turning parts of the philosophical "system" into relatively 
independent specialisms, and 111) by trying to counteract the general ideological pressure on 
philosophy The first move has been rathei successful, the second has had considerable, but 
often unnoticed success, and the third has generally proved to be futile 
Checking the Soviets at the Ideological Front 
The ideological offensive at the end of World War II made one thing very clear Soviet 
philosophy could not be regarded as a philosophical position or school like any other, as 
Somerville had suggested The offensive period in Soviet philosophy (1947-1955) was met 
with a Western "counter-offensive", which treated Soviet dialectical materialism as the 
"philosophical creed"238 of the Communist block Ever since, Western study of Soviet 
philosophy has been dominated by a sovietological, instead of a historical perspective The 
pioneers of 'philosophical sovietology", Wetter and Josef M Bocheríski (b 1902), never 
concealed the political and ideological relevance of their endeavour 
' die Kenntnis der Lehre die den Glauben der Kommunisten aller Lander ausmacht, ist sicherlich nicht ohne 
ein gewisses Interesse 239 
"Communism now appears not only as a physical threat but also as a spiritual challenge "240 
'Seine [ι e , Wetters, EvdZ] vornehmste Absicht war es, durch sein Werk wirklich ausreichendes dokumenta­
risches Material fur die geistige Auseinandersetzung mit dem Bolschewismus zugänglich ли machen Als sich 
unmittelbar nach dein Siege der Alliierten der bolschewistische Linfluß aus das kulturelle Leben des Westens 
luhlbar verstärkte konnte man allenthalben die leslstellung machen daß der geistige Abwehrkampt durch den 
Mangel einer wirklichen Kenntnis der philosophischen Lehre des Bolschewismus besonders erschwert wurde 
Diesem Ubelstand wollte der Verldsser abhelfen '2-4 
' die Sicherheit in der Auseinandersetzung ist nur durch ein systematisches Studium der Gesamtideologie 
möglich [all italics mine EvdZ] '242 
However, both Wetter and Bocheiiski aimed at a philosophical critique of Soviet 
Marxism Although they rejected it as a system,243 and were hostile to Soviet communism, 
their critique was pointed more against the dogmatic form and the militant "style" of Soviet 
philosophy than against its content, more against the conditions under which philosophers who 
were both able and willing to say something original had to work,244 than against what they 
might say Wetter perceived positive elements in even the most dogmatic Soviet philosophy, 
Stalin's О dialekticeskom ι istoriceskom matcnahzme 2 4 5 
Limits of Incitation From Above 
The 1947 conference "inaugurated a period of renewed philosophical activity "2 46 In 1948, 82 
students were being prepared at the IF for an academic career in philosophy, and 40 volumes 
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were planned for publication.247 But the revival of Soviet philosophy was short-lived: after 
Zdanov's death (1948) a campaign was launched against Kedrov by Maksimov, who was to 
physics what Lysenko was to biology, accusing him of "cosmopolitanism" and of underes-
timating the contribution of Russian scientists and philosophers. 248 Kedrov was forced to 
resign and publicly confess his "violation of the Leninist principle of partijnost' [partisan-
ship] ."249 
It is important to note that, regardless of the extent to which Zdanov, as against Stalin, 
stood for a more liberal policy, the resuscitation of Soviet philosophy was a Party initiative. In 
this respect, the subordination of professional philosophy to Party policy and to official 
ideology was reinforced, not weakened. But on the other hand, the quick reaction of 
philosophers like Kedrov or Kamenskij in favor of relatively autonomous philosophy 
"showed... the powers and capacities that were dormant and fallow in Soviet scientists and 
philosophers, as well as the fact that one push was enough to bring them to the fore and 
reactivate them."250 
The discussion of 1947 also confirmed the separation of philosophical position and 
personal fate. Aleksandrov was summoned to correct his views, and when he did, the career of 
this Stalin-prize laureate suffered in no way.251 Even more telling is the fact that Aleksandrov, 
one of the editors of the first Soviet attempt at a universal history of philosophy, that was 
criticized in 1944, was the victim of criticism again in 1947 for his work on the history of 
Western philosophy, but was given the task, in the same year, to conduct the writing of the 
new general Istorija Filosofi! [History of Philosophy] [Ch.lO.ii.c]. What really was at stake in 
this discussion was not Aleksandrov's work, but the reinforced subordination of Soviet 
philosophy to its ideological function, and its use as a weapon in the fight between Bolshevik 
materialism and bourgeois idealism.252 
The materials of the 1947 discussion made up the first issue of VF,2« until 1958 the 
only Soviet philosophical journal. Soviet philosophy has always centered around it, and in this 
respect we may indeed, with Blakeley, call 24 June 1947 "the birthday of contemporary Soviet 
philosophy".254 It is not so evident, however, that the period from 1947 to 1955 , according to 
Graham "the darkest period of state intervention in artistic and scientific realms,"255 brought 
any improvement in the field of philosophy. Discussions on quantum theory and relativity 
theory, theories that had both been condemned as "bourgeois" and "idealist",256 were 
suppressed when their goal, the establishment of official position, was achieved.25? The 
philosophical authority of the party not only remained unchallenged, the Party did actually 
interfere as an active arbiter. 258 The greater output desired by Zdanov was very slow in 
coming.259 According to a recent Soviet source: 
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'The discussion about the book by G h Alcksandrov had highly lamentable consequences not only for work on 
the history of philosophy, but for all philosophical research In the following years the, anyway unimportant, 
number ot publications on philosophical problems noticeably diminished ( ) The increase of the requirement 
for the theoretical level ot philosophical investigations was treated in such a way, that ever) thesis had to be 
corroborated by a corresponding quotation, preferably from the works of I V Stalin Everything that was not 
confirmed by quotations, ι с really was an idea ot the author of the work himself, was nearly always criticized 
as otscbjatind [something of one's own making! " 2 6 0 
As to official doctrine, there was no substantial change The Kratkij kurs remained the 
central text in philosophical instruction, and the point of reference of Soviet philosophy. On the 
other hand, however, formal logic was introduced, together with psychology, as an obligatory 
subject in higher education in 1946,261 which resulted in a lengthy discussion about the status 
and interrelation of dialectical, formal (= syllogistic), and mathematical (= symbolic) logic.262 
This discussion, lasting at least until the late 1950s, may appear as abstract and technical, but m 
fact it touches the heart of Soviet dialectical materialism As Grujic has shown, diamaiadopted 
the Hegelian notion of formal logic as a "lower" form of logic, to be sublated into a logic of 
content 263 As a result, formal logic was associated with metaphysics, idealism, and for­
malism, while "dialectical logic" was regarded as reflecting the laws of development of 
thought, and of material reality in general The 1946 decision meant the recognition of 
traditional, formal logic as a canon of correct thought, and confronted Soviet philosophy with 
the problem of its relation to dialectical logic 
In 1948, Asmus' textbook of classical, formal logic was criticized for being apolitical, 
and formalist, a synonym for "bourgeois" 2 6 4 The development of modern symbolic logic was 
counteracted In 1947 and 1948, "two classics written by major contributors to the develop­
ment of modern logic"26'' (Hilbert and Ackermann, and Alfred Tarski) appeared in Russian 2 6 6 
An attack in VF followed in 1950, condemning this initiative as an ideological digression,26? 
with the argument that a materialist logic presupposes "the assumption of the object, body as 
substance, as bearer of properties and relations [italics mine, EvdZ]," whereas in "bourgeois" 
logic the object evaporates into a field of relations 2 6 8 The next round of the debate was a 
discussion in VF in 1950/1 about the question whether formal logic was a separate scientific 
discipline, or a philosophical discipline (and thus a possible competitor of dialectical logic). A 
majority defended the "orthodox" thesis of two distinct logics, formal and dialectal, the 
primacy and superiority of the latter, and the reactionary class nature of the former, but an 
"innovative" minority -Asmus, N1 Kondakov, Konstantin SpindonoviC Bakrádzc (1898-
1970)- "sought to resolve the problem in a substantially new manner, recognizing formal logic 
as the sole logic, and accepting to work out a delicate and hardly orthodox redefinition of the 
role and significance of dialectical logic "269 The discussion ended with a condemnation of the 
"innovative" thesis as "bourgeois" in VF,270 and with the acceptance of a "doctrine of 
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materialist logic as a staged unity [gestufteEinheit] of formal and dialectical logic." 271 This and 
other discussions in VF did have a recognizable philosophical point, even if they were 
terminated by Party decisions. 
This "offensive period" was not so much marked by a "struggle of partisan philosophers" 
against bourgeois philosophy and science, as by a struggle of professional philosophers, 
convinced Marxists, but genuine scholars like Asmus272 or Kedrov273 against "ignorant 
careerists and ideological zealots."274 As Bochenski put it, there was an "unbridgeable gap 
between the supporters of barbarian reactionary nonsense and the philosophers."275 During 
this period, new "party-philosophers" came to the fore who were to dominate Soviet 
philosophy until its breakdown in the 1980s: Fedor Vasil'evic Konstantinov (1901-1991), who 
reportedly could not "avoid mistakes in spelling even when silent,"276 Pëtr Nikolaevic 
Fedoséev (1908-1990), who as vice president of the AN "controlled the social sciences in the 
USSR for fifteen years and faithfully supported mutually exclusive ideas for every regime 
since the 1940s,"277 or Michail Trifonovic Iovcuk (1908-1990).278 So, 1947 started a period 
of professionalization and revival of discussion, that was substantially hampered by the 
reinforced subordination of philosophy to a primarily ideological function. Soviet philosophers 
received an incitation to do philosophy, but they were not given the proper conditions to 
actually do so.279 
The last phase of "Stalinist philosophy" was dominated by two further "authoritative 
texts" by the leader himself. The first was Marksizm i voprosyjazykoznanija [Marxism and the 
Problems of Linguistics],28·) an attack on the theory of Nikolaj Jakovlevic Marr (1864-1934) 
on language as a class-biased phenomenon. In this text, which first appeared as an interview in 
Pravda. Stalin argued sharp-wittedly that if a capitalist employer gives orders to an exploited 
worker, language must be a class-neutral medium of communication, not belonging to the 
ideological superstructure, but, like machines and other material production factors, to the 
realm of forces of production, equally well serving a socialist society as a capitalist order.281 
This position had some effect on philosophy, esp. on logic282 and philosophy of science.283 
Two years later, Stalin intervened in the field of political economy with his Ekonomieeskie 
problemy socializma ν SSSR [Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR],284 claiming 
that there exist general economical laws, valid for socialist economy as well, thus opposing 
"voluntarist" and "subjectivist" tendencies, and in fact clearing the way for "neutral" economic 
science as a condition for an adequate Party policy.285 Although this was yet another 
intervention from above,286 and although Soviet philosophy remained subjected to Party 
control,287 this "pragmatic turn" had the positive effect of restoring the autonomy of some 
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sciences, and the recognition of the importance of such autonomy 2 8 8 This gave some room to 
philosophy, to the extent to which it could lean towards these sciences (logic to mathematics, 
philosophy of science to natural science) 
Giowth of Soviet Philosophical Industry 
As a whole, the period from 1947 until 1955 showed some progress, and demonstrated the 
inner tensions of the ' system ' of Soviet ' diahistomat' Also, as Bochenski and others have 
carefully documented, this period meant a considerable quantitative and qualitative growth of 
philosophical industry 2 8 9 
• in 1947 there were only 3 philosophical faculties290 (one of these was abolished in 
1951291), but "since then the number of philosophical faculties at universities has been 
greatly mcreased,"2<-)2 their number steadily growing to 10 in the 1980s, 
• the number of students at these faculties grew from perhaps 450 in 1947 through 1 150 
in 1951 to a roughly estimated 2,000 in 1954,293 the number of professional 
philosophers grew from (at the most) 400 in 1947 to some 1,500 in 1955,294 
• the number ol institutions, where a graduate study [aspiranturd] in philosophy was 
actually done, rose from 6 in 1947 to 30 in 1953/4 (1948 1951 10, 1951/2 28),295 
and the number ot graduate students doubled from 1,000 to 2 000 between 1951 and 
1954,296 
• the number of candidate s dissertations exploded from 10 in 1945 through 66 in 1947, 
75 in 1948, to 240 in 1948-51 (annual average 80), 203 in 1951/2 (101 per year), and 
469 in 1953/4 (annual average 234),297 
• the "number ot philosophical books published annually quadrupled in the decade 1948-
1958,"298 
• as to journals, finally, even though VF remained the only journal, it grew considerably 
in size Irom 2 issues a year in 1947 through 3 over 1948-1950 to 6 in 1951-1957, and 
12 since 1958, from 879 pages299
 a
 year in 1947 to 1,423 in 1955, and over 2,000 
since 1958, and from 20,000 copies in 1947 to 50,000 in 1956 10° 
Over the same period, a certain decentralization took place to the Russian province and to the 
other Soviet republics 3°i In 1947, V S Iovcuk stated that there were only two philosophical 
institutions of any significance in the ' periphery in the Ukraine, and in Azerbaydzhan 302 
This situation changed for example, in 1947 all 66 candidate s dissertations were defended at 
Moscow-located institutions, but by 1954 the proportion had dropped to 36% зоз A 
philosophical faculty was opened at the Kazach State University in Alma-Ata in 1949,304 and 
the Academies of Sciences of a number ot Soviet republics opened departments, sections, or 
institutes of philosophy зоч Book publication was ' increasingly decentralized,"106 and to some 
extent local philosophical centers emerged 307 
Philosophically irrelevant as this growth and decentralization may appear, they became 
important factors in the further development of Soviet philosophy Apart trom a general growth 
of scientific research and secondary education, they were a result of the decision to let 
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philosophy perform an important doctrinal function in higher education in transmitting ruling 
ideology As to decentralization, it was not an attempt to found independent regional 
philosophical centers (even if that was the effect), but rather part of a policy of "sovietization" 
As a whole, the period under discussion as a whole (1947-1954) demonstrated that the attempt 
to revive philosophical thought under immediate control of political authority could hardly be 
successful At the same time, developments in certain fields pointed the way to a possible 
recognition of at least some freedom of thought and expression for Soviet philosophers as ¿ 
necessary prerequisite for creative development 
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5.Ü A Cautious Revival of Philosophical Thought (1955-1968) 
If there is reason to question the "birth" of Soviet philosophy in 1947, there is no reason to 
doubt that the period from Stalin's death to the running down of "thaw" {ottepel"] (1955-1968) 
was a period of hope and creativity. Stalin's death in 1953 brought little immediate change in 
Soviet life, including philosophy, although it became manifest that the monolithic nature and 
the ideological unity "should be seen as a postulate rather than as a reality."-108 According to 
Hanak, the process of "destalinization" was already begun in 1954, and led by Kedrov,309 but 
on the whole the politically uncertain period immediately after Stalin's death was marked by 
ideological tightening rather than relaxation.310 The pragmatic and common-sense approach of 
the final phase of Stalin's rule gave way to dogmatism and "theoretical arteriosclerosis".311 
Stalin was dropped as a klassik marksizma-leninizma without delay,312 the edition of 
his Collected Works was abruptly stopped (completed only in the West in 1967), and 
quotations from his work became scarce. His place being taken by the CPSU itself: 
"In ihc new History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Stalin is scarcely ever mentioned. The eulogy 
of Stalin which permeated the Short Course is replaced by a similar eulogy of the Parly."3 '3 
Stalin's On Dialectical and Historical Materialism was replaced by collectively written 
textbooks.314 But even though there were some changes in official doctrine, esp. the return of 
the negation of negation as a "law" of materialist dialectic,315 orthodox Marxism-Leninism as 
forged in the 1930s on the whole remained intact.31^ Shortly after Stalin's decease, an exercise 
in kritika i samokrítika was organized, which in no way implied a questioning of the final 
authority of the Party.317 On the contrary, Soviet philosophers were at pains not to throw out 
the Marxist-Leninist baby with the bath water of "personality cult".3'8 In sharply critical 
articles in Pravda. Kommunist, and VF, Soviet philosophers were called to trade their dogma-
tism,319 scholastic discussions,320 and quotatology [c/fafnicesfvo]321 for discussion and 
conflict of opinion,322 and to stick to their trade instead of writing on subjects only remotely 
connected to philosophy,323 and in general to produce more and better work.324 But the other 
side of this call for more productivity and creativity was made more than clear: 
"Flatly repudiating philosopher M.T. Ioviuk's suggestion that various trends or tendencies might be admitted 
within the framework of a general Marxist world view, the editors of Kommunist exclaim: "Marxism-Leninism 
rests upon a single theoretical foundation — dialectical and historical materialism; hence there cannot be any 
question of different ideological trends within the framework of a Marxist world view."32-'5 
It is not surprising that Soviet philosophers were somewhat reluctant in answering this 
call. As Kline concluded cynically: 
"The... only hopeful sign on the philosophical horizon is... a slightly increased hospitality toward the ideas of 
non-Marxisl-Leninist thinkers. But this at present is little more than a program and promise for future action. 
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There is no sign al all of any slackening of the generally authoritarian and dogmatic character of Soviet 
philosophy and no indication ot any genuine Ireedom of philosophic reflection discussion or criticism 326 
All this leads to the conclusion that Stalin's person was not of such overriding 
importance, at least not as far as philosophy was concerned To blame Stalin personally -his 
megalomania, paranoia, tyranny, self-glorification127- was a main way for Nikita Sergeevtò 
Chruscev (1894-1971), a close collaborator of the deceased, to save his own and the Party's 
skin 
'In denouncing Slahn Khrushchev thrust all hlame for all abuses upon him and the delects of his personality, 
he thereby freed the Party and Us leaders -especially Khrushcho who did the unmasking- of any taint of evil 
( ) Moreover whatever was accomplished in positive terms during Stalins reign is not to be attributed to the 
person of Stalin but to the Party Henceforth the Party is to receive all the praise lor the accomplishments of the 
Soviet Union Stalin all blame for its crimes 3 2 8 
So, the well-known epithet of "personality cult [kul't ¡icnosti]" applies equally well to 
"destalinization" itself 329 This kul't hënosti has been a permanent fact of Soviet life, beginning 
and ending with the glorification of "uncle Lenin", and finding its philosophical counterpart in 
Stalin's profoundly un-Marxist stress on the role of individuals in making history (both in the 
positive sense of great revolutionaries and reformers, and philosophical geniuses, and in the 
negative sense of imperialist agents and kulaks In 1956, Stalin himself was subjected to this 
pattern he was treated as individually as before, but his status had changed from that of a 
leader and a genius to that of a tyrant A destalinization m the sense of "a correction of what 
Stalin had successfully dogmatized as «Leninizm»"130 did not take place, and Leninism 
retained its status as the only true heir of Marxism But the "destalinization" of the 20th (1956), 
and esp the 22nd (1961) CPSU-Congress, leading to a relaxation of political control and of 
cultural freedom, generally referred to as "thaw [ottepeiy, did mean a profound change in 
Soviet philosophy 
"A new stage in the spiritual life of our society, and in philosophy in particular, began after the 20th Congress 
of the CPSU ( ) Philosophers turned straightly to the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, rediscovering in them 
the wealth of ideas, that had been hidden during the supremacy of the primitive Stahn-7hdanovian version of 
Marxism"331 
A first effect of "destalinization" were a few personnel changes Aleksandrov, director 
of the IF since 1947, was accused of "nihilism" with respect to the history of philosophy 
[Ch 10 и d], and of one-sidedly supporting formal logic 3 3 2 He was made Minister of Culture in 
1954, dismissed in disgrace a year later for having "played dominoes on the naked belly of a 
Soviet film star of that time,"333 and reappeared at the AN of the White Russian republic m 
1955 3 3 4 Konstantinov was replaced as editor-in-chief of VF. a post he had held since 1952, 
by Michail Davidovic Kámman (1898-1965) 335 But in general philosophical establishment 
stayed in place 
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Secondly, oftepe/'meant the beginning of cautious internationalization In 1954, a large 
Soviet delegation appeared at a congress of the UIPS [ Union Internationale de Philosophie des 
Sciences] in Zurich,336 apparently the first Soviet delegation to a philosophical congress at 
all337 Soviet philosophers became regular visitors of the international philosophical scene, 
while a few Western philosophers were invited to the USSR 338 In the third place, beginning 
in the mid-1950s, texts began to be published that had been hidden from the Soviet scientific 
community, eg older works by Losev, and works of Michail Michajlovic Bachtin (1895-
1975), who had considerable influence and authority among the younger mtelhgencija in the 
late 1950s and the 1960s "9 
The Soviet intelligentsia of these years not only differed from pre-revolutionary 
Russian intelligentsia, but also from the "primitive" intelligentsia that replaced the Bolshevik 
intelligentsia in the 1930s Karl Schlogel is probably right when he argues that, in the Soviet 
period, "the «educational dictatorship» of Enlightenment gains the victory over the autonomy 
of the enhghtened,"340 and that the USSR was in need not of an independent and critical, but 
of a loyal state intelligentsia [staatstragendelntelhgenz] 341 But it is equally true that, when 
Soviet education had reached a certain level, a more sophisticated Soviet intelligentsia came to 
the fore, aptly depicted by Kamenka 
m Ihe fortv years since Ihe re\olution a new So\iet intelligentsia has arisen It is not the old Intel 
• [genista it consists not so much ot critical intellectuals with universal interests as of specialists' acquiring 
competence and confidence in their iields The merits ot such an intelligentsia are more easily displayed in 
physics biology mathematics and engineering than they are in philosophy hut they exist in philosophy loo 
the present Russian philosopher especially the younger philosopher is a deadly serious professional 342 
It was among these 'deadly serious professionals" that, as soon as the political situation 
allowed for it, a return to the ideals of the old, Russian mtelhgencija began to take shape 341 it 
was this more sophisticated and independently thinking mtelhgencija, too, that began to protest 
against violations of human rights, or, like Asmus or Vjaceslav Ivánov, against the persecution 
of writers like Boris Pasternak 344 This was a new batch of philosophers, educated at Soviet 
institutions of higher learning like MIFLI, MGU, and IF,345 that began to populate Soviet 
philosophical culture, and engaged in renewed discussion Discussion that was less free than it 
may have appeared to some independently-minded philosophers Thus one of the newcomers, 
Il'enkov, who had started to teach at MGU before 1953, was framed into presenting a 
number of innovative theses with respect to the subject-matter of philosophy, only to see 
himself criticized as a 'Hegelian , and subjected to a campaign which forced him to move from 
MGU to the IF (which meant his virtual isolation from students of philosophy other than the 
dspiranty of IF) 346 
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Continuous Growth 
The growth of Soviet philosophy continued in an impressive manner. The number of 
professional philosophers grew from some 1,500 in 1955 to some 7,000 in 1967, and doubled 
to 14,000 over the following 8 years, while the number of workers at the IF more than doubled 
from 79 in 1951 to 183 in 1961.347 Also, the general level of qualification improved. The 
trend, noted by Bocheriski, in the output of candidate's dissertations from 66 in 1947 to 234 
over 1953/4 continue: 277 a year in 1964/5, 303 in 1965/6, 388 in 1967/8.348 The output of 
doctoral dissertations showed an even greater increase: from 14 in 1953 and the first half of 
1954 together,349 and a total number of 50 over 1945-1955,350 to 55 in 1964/5, 37 in 1965/6, 
and 53 in 1966/7.351 
The process of decentralization continued more slowly. The percentage of candidate's 
dissertations defended outside Moscow, which had grown from zero to 36% over 1947-1954, 
grew to 39% in 1964/5 (108 out of 277), and 46% in 1965/6 (124 out of 303); as to doctoral 
dissertations, 25% (14 out of 55) were "peripheral" in 1964/5, 27% (8 out of 37) in 1965/6.352 
Decentralization often meant the development of local centers within Soviet Russia: the non-
Russian republics had a longer way to go.353 in the years after Stalin's degradation, several 
local centers were established,354
 o r enlarged, 355 while in a number of republics journals 
appeared that offered room for professional work in philosophy. 356 As significant centers 
Kiev, Alma-Ata,357 and esp. Tbilisi358 and Erevan are mentioned, all of them places with 
ancient (more ancient than Russia)359 and rich philosophic traditions.360 
New textbooks of philosophy were prepared for the obligatory philosophical instruc-
tion in higher education. The books that had appeared shortly after Stalin's death were severely 
criticized.361 This new generation of ucebniki, widely studied and commented upon by 
Western sovietologists, appeared in 1958. The most important (and lasting) one was Osnovy 
Marksistkoj Filosofa [The Fundamentals of Marxist Philosophy], renamed Osnovy 
Marksistsko-LeninskojFilosofii in later years.362 
Rebirth of Philosophical Thought in the Soviet Union 
The year 1958 was not only the year of a new ucebnik, but also of the actual revival of Soviet 
philosophy. According to Bernard Jeu, it was in 1958 that "the decision to do philosophy" was 
made at a joint conference of the AN SSSR and the Ministry of Higher Education, and a 
number of measures was taken.363 These included the founding, in 1958, of a second 
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philosophical journal, Filosofskie Nauki [Philosophical Sciences, FNU 6 4 issued by the 
ministry ,36s a decentralization of publishing and research, the establishment of philosophical 
centers in other towns and republics, the edition of a philosophical encyclopedia, which started 
to appear in 1960, a greater output of qualified cadres, a return to the original texts of Marx, 
Engels and Lenin instead of to official interpretations, translations of classical texts in 
philosophy, and information on contemporary non-Soviet philosophy VF started to appear in 
12 instead of 6 issues,3<>6 book publication increased,367 and a different atmosphere began to 
be felt Even a leading party-philosopher like Fedosecv, at a conference on philosophical 
problems of science in 1958, reportedly "emphasized the importance ot concrete analysis in 
philosophy and the impropriety of importing methods appropriate to the struggle against hostile 
ideology into scientific discussions "1f>8 
Discussions, Bochcnski wrote 1960, started, their level improved, and they became 
more professional 369 One of these was the next round of the discussion about the status of 
mathematical logic, lasting from 1957 to roughly 1965 This discussion reemerged because the 
actual blooming of mathematical logic since 1950,370 complicated the dual 'staged unity' 
arrived at as a compromise earlier The solution found from the end of the 1950s, celebrated 
with translations of classical texts by R Carnap, A Church, J Lukasiewicz, and others,171 
was the full emancipation of symbolic logic into a mathematical, rather than a philosophical 
discipline 1 7 2 
The advent of ottcpel in philosophy meant the acceptance, at least in some cases, of 
difference of opinion Commentators like Bochenski, discussing the 1950s, pointed to rivalling 
"tendencies" ('orthodox', Hegelian and Aristotelian),™ and, however limited the variety of 
opinions, it meant a rupture with orthodoxy, and a rehabilitation of the philosopher as a 
thinking individual Soviet philosophers were no longer automatically supposed to comply to 
politically motivated orders An early example is to be found in logic, where Kondakov and 
Bakradze were allowed to publish their reply to the official criticism they had received on their 
unorthodox view of the relation between logic and dialectic 3 7 4 
These changes were accompanied by a new period of kntikd ι samokntika, this time more 
fundamental, and more ' from below" 
"La denunciation des méfaits de la reduction de la science et de la philosophie à une ideologie dogmatique se fait 
donc véhémente et s exprime avec d autant plus de vehemence que certains ont reparation a exiger alors que 
d autres ont beaucoup à se taire pardonner que d autres encore regrettent le temps du manichéisme idéologique 
que d autres enfin veulent faire entendre clairement qu on a mis un terme a ce genre de choses en dépit de certaines 
survivances tenaces 37"> 
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We may assume that Soviet philosophers in the beginning were serious in their 
criticism, but condemnation of the Stalin-era quickly became a standardized affair The need to 
avert the danger of real criticism of Marxist-Leninist philosophy by means of "ritual incan­
tations" is manifest in, e g , a Soviet source of 1965 quoted by Jeu 
" le développement de la philosophic marxiste soviétique à été tortemenl deine pendant les années du culte de 
la personnalité Ses tâches étaient alors dans I ensemble réduites auc commentaires des travaux staliniens Dans 
une atmosphere d autorite de subjectivisme, s implantèrent la rupture de la theorie d avec la pratique la manie de 
la citation, de dogmatisme ' 376 
The tension between dogmatic ideology and professional philosophy, which lies at the 
heart of Soviet philosophy, was settled in favor of the latter, but it was made very clear that 
there was no questioning of Marxism(-Lemnism) as such A new, "sophisticated" or "en-
lightened" type of party-philosopher came to the foie People who were, unlike Mitin or 
Konstantmov, professional philosophers, formed within an already established Soviet 
philosophy, who were aware of the inevitable compromise contained in Soviet philosophy 
[Ch 9 ml, and who did not automatically identify with Party interests, but occupied an 
intermediary position They displayed what is contained in the Russian word chitrost' 
[deftness, cunning, shrewdness], which, if anything, was a first requirement in the Soviet 
Union to both survive and achieve something on the institutional level To this group belong 
Chrusccv's philosophical right arm,177 Leonid Fedoroviê Ilicev (1906-1990), Aleksandr 
Georgievic Spirkin (b 1918), Vladimir Spindonovic Gott (1912-1991),378 Ivan Timofeevic 
Frolóv (b 1929), and Ojzerman 
The final philosophical authority of the CPSU was never questioned^7? "Stalin's 
generals" in philosophy were criticized, but not dismissed,380 and the vicious habit of citat-
niöestvo was not eradicated Chruscev himself nearly became a klassik 3R1 Still, this first 
"spring", however chilly, had effects that lasted until the second spring, that ot 1985, and 
partly were its cause 
'The spring of 1956 and the spring of 1985 — those arc the basic landmarks on the road to deslalinization of 
our society and our culture "3S2 
The historic decision ' to do philosophy", was accompanied by the formation of a 
generation of philosophers, predestined to play a crucial role in the development of Soviet 
philosophy the generation of "people of the sixties" [sestidesjdtmki] 383 This partly coincided 
with the appearance of "real philosophers ' people formed by the Soviet system of education, 
but acting as independent thinkers They were loyal not to the Party or "the system", but to 
philosophy itself These people were not ' heretics", but rather "secularists To this category 
belong U'enkov,184 Merab Konstantmovic Mamardasvili ( 1930-1990), 18<> Gennch StepanoviC 
BatßCev ( 1932-1990),386 Michail Aleksandrovic I ifsic (1905-1983), and Vladimir Solomono-
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vie Bibler (b 1918) The point is not whether they were Marxists or not They started as 
"young-Marxists", like many of their contemporaries in other Communist countries and 
parties 387 II enkov continued to conceive of himself as a Marxist(-Lemnist) philosopher,388 
and Mamardasvih asserted the positive influence of Marx on his thought as late as 1988 389 
The point is that whatever point of departure is taken, philosophy has to include the possibility 
of radical divergence from that initial point Philosophical orthodoxy ¡s a contradiction m 
terms, and these philosophers personified the recognition of this fact 
Hence the reemergence of the tension within dialectical materialism The discussion 
between "ontologist" and "epistemologist" tendencies meant "a reemeigence of the mechanist-
Debonnist controversy without the old labels"190 This discussion started out in 1962 as a 
dispute about the object of Marxist philosophy between A J Ayer, the first Western 
philosopher to be invited to publish an article in VF.191 and two Soviet philosophers, Ivan 
Vasil evie Kuznecóv (1911-1970) and Kedrov, defending philosophy as a science of the most 
general laws of development of nature, society, and thought (the so-called "general laws 
formula') 392 The discussion reemerged in the late 1960s, with Il'enkov and Kedrov as 
defendants of a cautiously proposed "epistemologital" interpretation of dialectical materialism, 
opposing its "ontologization 393 At a famous conferente in 1970 a vehement discussion broke 
out between, on the one hand, an ' epistemologica!' interpretation, defended by Il'enkov, and 
by Engel's Matveevic Cudinov (1930- 1980), 394 which treated dialectical materialism as a 
theory of knowledge, and, on the other hand, an "ontological" interpretation which stressed the 
"basic question" and drew a radical line between materialism and idealism, defended by 
Gngonj Markovic Straks, Serafini Timofeeviö Meljúchin (b 1927), Michail Nikolaevic 
Rutkevic (b 1917), and Igor' Sergeevit Nárskij (b 1920) з ^ The controversy was decided in 
favoi of the latter 396 Once again the "epistemologist" position was rejected, and II enkov, "the 
staunch Hegelian dialectician and a defender of Kedrov's general laws formula, was criticized 
for 'sometimes almost erasing the border between materialism and objective idealism' "397 
This discussion, like that of the 1920s, partly evolved into a political discussion 
between those who cared to abolish dialectical materialism as an overall philosophical system, 
and those who wanted to retain it It was, once again, a struggle between philosophers and 
"ideologists' 398 However, this discussion at least showed the capacity of some Soviet 
philosophers to develop their thought freely As a result, the limits of free development of 
philosophical thought in the USSR were, to at least some of the active philosophers, a matter 
of political pressure and disciplinary measures, not of an inner conflict between "subjective" 
ideas and 'objective' Marxist-Leninist truth Ever since, the possibility of politically and 
ideologically unimpeded philosophy was an actual possibility in the minds of part of the 
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philosophical community Henceforth, the dominant feature of Soviet philosophy was to be the 
containment of the possibilities of further development yielded by Soviet philosophy itself 
[Ch 9 in] 
The period of ' thaw further saw the establishment of such fields of research as cybernetics, 
information theory,1^ and sociology (usually associated with the name of Jury AleksandroviS 
Levada (b 1930), who started teaching sociology in the 1960s) 4(Ю Bocheiíski has aptly 
labelled these disciplines "declassified doctrines" released from direct political control ["de-
classified'], "exempted from the doctrinal authority of the classics of Marxism-Leninism" ["de-
klassik-iñed"] and "politically neutralized," ι e exempted from class-nature [ 'de-class-
lfied '] 4 0 1 As Kline stressed, these were not, strictly speaking, philosophical, but technical or 
para-philosophical disciplines, and their "declassification" should be ascribed to pragmatic 
considerations rather than to some kind of 'liberalization" 4 0 2 
Still, the significance of this development is great, like that of the emergence, in the 
same period, of (relatively) independent philosophical disciplines (formal logic, philosophy of 
natural science [fílosoñkie voprosy estestvoznanija], aesthetics, ethics, history of philosophy) 
within the overall framework of Marxist-Leninist philosophy 403 These developments were 
materialized in the establishment of new departments 
"At the faculty [the philosophical faculty ol MGU EvdZ] there always has been support lor the development of 
new directions of philosophical thought which often obtained further organizational development in the form of 
independent chairs Thus in the 1960s chairs of ethics, aesthetics and history of religion and atheism were 
created 404 
The more Soviet philosophy became institutionalized and professionalized, and the 
more discussions became disputes among specialists, the more it became immune against direct 
Party intervention 
Of particular importance, finally, was the return to the original texts of the klassiki Lenin, 
Engels, and most of all Marx, instead of the selective interpretation of their works by party-
philosophers According to Blakeley it was "only since the early 1960s that the whole of Marx' 
literary production has become the object of research in the Soviet Union "405 This applies in 
particular to the so-called Fruhschnften In 1956, the first complete Russian edition of Marx' 
Ökonomisch-philosophische Manuskripte (1844) appeared 406 This applied to Marx in 
particular 
'From the outside one could get the impression that the powers that be in the Soviet Union have done their 
best to keep Marxist philosophers away from Marx except as sanitized by Lenin Until quite recently, the 
woks ol the early Marx were oft limits in the Soviet Union and even CjpiUl was discussed only in terms of 
carefully selected passages passages which of course had been treated by Lenin 407 
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One of the effects of this return to the full Marxist heritage was the emergence in the 
USSR of young-Marxism' 408 As one of the sestideyatniki, Erich Jurevic Solov'ev (b 
1934) looked back upon this episode 
Aboul a quarter of a century ago our philosophers (including myself) experienced the inspiring effect ot Marx s 
Pari1; Manuscripts These were manuscripts of a living personality whose image was in sharp contrast with 
the barracks standard ot the perfect human being advanced in Soviel literature in the 1950s Wc were fascinated 
by them They gave us added inspiration in our aesthetic psychological and pedagogical research effort 4 0 9 
The Soviet philosophers who received their training at the time of offepe/'thus saw that 
the writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin did not constitute the unified Marxist-Leninist doctrine 
Stalin s philosophical henchmen had reduced it to [Ch 4 n] And still active pre-Stahnist 
philosophers like as Asmus or Losev could inform their students about the forging of 
orthodoxy410 Henceforth, the "orthodox" version of Marxist-Leninist philosophy was 
fundamentally in danger It is hardly accidental, from this perspective, that 1958 was the year 
of the establishment of a separate department for the history of Marxist-Leninist philosophy at 
the philosophical faculty of MGU, with the explicit task of arguing against the ' bourgeois 
philosophers and revisionists" who either sought for contradictions between the young and 
the mature Marx, or between Marxism and Leninism 4I ' 
The Golden Age of "Philosophical Sovietology " 
Soviet philosophy has been, in its subsequent phases, the object of interest of Western 
philosophers and "sovietologists" Caught between Cold War rhetoric and "fellow travelling", 
this Western academic activity has pointed to different aspects of Soviet philosophy in its 
different approaches and valuations, and as the object of study developed It would be an 
exaggeration to say that Soviet philosophy and its investigation by Western scholars developed 
in interaction, but this endeavour was closely followed by the Soviet counterpart 4'2 In 
Western work on Soviet philosophy, two basic tendencies can be discerned On the one hand a 
tendency, in line with Berdjaev's earlier characterization of Soviet philosophy as an atheist 
theology", to concentrate on official philosophy, and to regard Soviet philosophy as a 
philosophical faith, marked by the same opposition of faith and reason as Medieval 
philosophy On the other hand, a tendential separation of official dogma, subservient to the 
Party, and professional philosophy, that tries to live up to scientific standards 
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The first tendency is manifest in Wetter, who, himself a Jesuit, compared Berdjaev's "soldiers 
of a filosofìamihtans" with Roman-Catholic theologians,411 and in Bochenski, who categon-
callydeclared: 
"Es ist keine Philosophie — eher eine Art atheistischer Katechismus tur glaubige Mitglieder der Partei " 4 · 4 
As for Bocheríski, the "theological nature" of Soviet philosophy is beyond question: 
'Alle nicht kommunistische Philosophen, welche von dieser Philosophie Kenntnis genommen haben, sind 
geradezu frappiert von ihrem theologischen Charakter, allerdings in einem verkehrten Sinne Das sagen ζ В В 
Russell W Gunan, G Miche, G A Wetter und vor allem Berdjajev, der diesem Problem besonders liefgehend 
nachspurt In der Tat, man findet hier alle charakteristischen Zuge einer Theologie eine Schritt ', als Basis der 
Doktrin, eine Kirche", die deren Interpretation überwacht, man kennt die Begriffe "Orthodoxie" und ' Häresie", 
es gibt offizielle Entscheidungen gegen die Irrlehrer" und schließlich eine "Inquisition ', die die Ketzer 
zuchtigt"415 
The "Scholastic interpretation"4^ of Soviet philosophy was most explicitly elaborated 
by Thomas J Blakeley in his Soviet Scholasticism 
"We witness in contemporary Soviet philosophy a recurrence of the pattern of thought once known as 
Scholasticism Contemporary Soviet philosophy is a scholasticism ' in a rather strict acceptance of that 
term"417 
" the term "Soviet Scholasticism' is not only more than a convenient metaphor, it gives adequate expression 
to the most fundamental and essential characteristics of contemporary Soviet philosophy " 4 1 8 
The problem with this interpretation lies in the fact that, if official Soviet ideology was a 
pseudo-religion, adherence to it was, or became, indeed pseudo-faith. Therefore, there may 
well be formal similarities between Medieval Scholastic philosophy and Soviet philosophy, but 
there is a profound difference in the commitment of its subjects [Ch 7 n]. The crucial difference 
between Medieval Scholasticism and Soviet philosophy is that while a Scholastic philosopher 
might disagree with Aristotle of Avcrroes, he would still regard them as great philosophers, 
whereas a Soviet philosopher would not regard Stalin or Lenin as great philosophers, but still 
publicly agree with them, and he might consider Marx a great philosopher, but his actual 
agreement with Marx would not depend on that consideration, but on Marx' status as a klassik. 
The Medieval distinction between religion and theology on the one hand, and philosophy on 
the other, was not repeated, as Wetter rightly noted, in Soviet philosophy. 
One can blame this on Soviet philosophers themselves, as Wetter and Blakeley do, 
reproaching them of "refusing" to state the problem of faith and bclief,4|y but one can also see 
it as a suggestion that the relation between ideology and philosophy in the USSR was not that 
similar to the relation between religion and philosophy in the West European Middle Ages For 
a Scholastic philosopher, religious truth was truth of a higher order, but philosophical truth had 
its own criteria For a Soviet philosopher, by contrast, "ideological truth" was a political fact of 
a lower order, upon which philosophical truth did depend through the concept of partijnost' 
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Divergence from orthodoxy simply meant an act of political disobedience, not a conflict 
between different levels of theory, or between faith and reason. 
The second tendency became predominant during the 1960s, as Soviet philosophy underwent a 
process of professionalization and of differentiation into more or less separate philosophical 
disciplines.420 This development was met with the appearance, on the Western side, of 
specialist studies into these different fields of Soviet philosophy. The essence of this tendency 
is the application to Soviet philosophy of the criteria it professed to adhere to itself, i.e. 
general, formal criteria of understandability, logical consistency, terminological clarity etc., and 
also to seek collaboration instead of confrontation. This last element turned philosophical 
sovietology partly into a kind of development aid: 
"I wish to suggest here that, if Sovietology is truly to advance the cause of contemporary thought, it has 
another and equally important task: that of obtaining and passing on information about contemporary non-
Communist philosophy in Soviet philosophic circles. I shall call this type of endeavor 'second Sovietology' in 
distinction to the standard kind delineated by Bochenski, lo which I shall refer as 'first Sovietology'."421 
The development, of professionalism and the reemergence of discussion led Western 
scholars to a moderately optimistic expectation with regard to the coming period.422 The main 
barrier on this road was neither lack of capacity on the side of Soviet philosophers, nor a 
confident commitment to official dogma, but the lasting predominant function of philosophy as 
a whole, i.e. as a "system", as the alleged theoretical foundation of official ideology [Ch.9.iii]. 
This aspect put Soviet philosophy in an "in-between" created by irreconcilable demands: 
"So ist also "Sowjetphilosophie" heute weder "reine" Ideologie noch "reine" Philosophie. (...) "Sowjcl-
philosophic" kann daher als eine Mischform des Denkens zwischen Philosophie und Ideologie definiert werden, 
die man als "Ideophilie" bezeichnen könnlc."42^ 
In Soviet philosophy, the 1960s were a period of bloom, and. Soviet philosophical literature 
acquiring a more positive reputation abroad.424 "Philosophical sovietology" bloomed as well, 
as is aptly demonstrated by the large number of monographs and dissertations on themes in 
Soviet philosophy.42-5 Before 1956, "hardly any philosophers paid serious attention to Soviet 
and East European philosophy... only a handful started studying this philosophy after 
1956."42<> Until the early 1960s, Wetter's Der dialektische Materialismus was "the bible for 
those in the West interested in Soviet philosophy,"427 but the 1960s themselves where the 
"Golden Age" of philosophical sovietology as conceived by Bochenski and the school founded 
by him.42« 
The main innovation was that Soviet philosophy was no longer judged from a specific 
philosophical position -Thomism, in Wetter's case- but from a supposedly general standard of 
"philosophical decency."429 The enormous advantage of this approach was that professional 
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philosophers who shared the same standards stood out against a background of dogmatic 
official philosophy, which was rejected on "technical" and "moral" rather than philosophical 
grounds As a result, a clear distinction could be made between proper and improper 
philosophers, serious and non-serious texts The disadvantage was that the specific situation in 
which Soviet philosophy existed appeared as an entirely negative hindrance, and, moreover, as 
an internal barrier of Soviet philosophy, as something the 'better ' Soviet philosophers, the 
"men with whom the philosopher would like to work,"430 were 'emancipating ' trom Official 
Soviet philosophy was treated as primitive 
' Das endgültige Urteil lauiel also kulturfremd primitiv und im wesentlichen falsch 431 
Bocherlski's distinction between reactionaries, Hegelians, and Aristotelians as "genuine 
philosophical schools" in post-war Soviet philosophy*^ reflects this misconception The ' reac-
tionaries' did not represent a "school of thought ' their position in philosophy was political, 
whereas the "Hegelians" and "Aristotelians" represented both a political and a philosophical 
position The same is true of the distinction made by Zubaty between a dogmatic, a ' scientific-
technocratic" and a "humane" style of thought in Soviet philosophy 411 All three are recog-
nizable, but their contrast is not a matter of different 'styles of thought", but of different types 
of text production, and of different political positions It reflects the increasing complexity of 
the relationship between politics and philosophical culture 
The point is not that talented Soviet philosophers were trying to get over their initial 
dogmatism, or to counterbalance the pnmitivism of their less talented colleagues, but that what 
was required of Soviet philosophy went in opposite and irreconcilable directions creativity and 
"orthodoxy" And the question is not whether Mitin or Konstantinov were primitive or vulgar 
thinkers, but why their "type" occupied key positions in Soviet philosophy In concentrating 
on what happened in Soviet philosophy in spite of official Marxism-Leninism, Bocheriski and 
his school did an invaluable job, not in the least for the Soviet philosophers, who found 
themselves to some extent recognized,414 but by the same token the fact that Soviet 
philosophy, in becoming more philosophical, was not becoming less Soviet, was blurred 
At about the same time, in 1962, Somerville founded the Society tor the Philosophical 
Study of Dialectical Materialism,w as well as ajournai, Soviet Studies in Philosophy, 
offering to the Western reader a selection of Soviet philosophical texts in English 
translation 416 However courageous Somerville may have been, he was as naive as he was in 
the 1930s in not distinguishing between party-philosophers like Fedoseev, and professional 
philosophers, ι с in ignoring the specific relation of philosophy to politics 4 1 7 
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From both the Bocheriskian, the Zubatyan, and the Somervilhan perspective, the fact that both 
professional and official philosophy were integral parts of the "ideological superstructure" of 
the Soviet system, is insufficiently shed light upon This fact received proper attention in 
Bernard Jeu's La philosophie soviétique et l'Occident, a book that stands alone in sovietologi-
cai liteiature as an attempt to understand "the Soviet philosophical phenomenon" (Blakeley) as 
a philosophical and a Soviet phenomenon, demonstrating "that Soviet philosophy can be 
understood only in its ideological-political context."43·* Jeu showed that official Marxism-
Leninism was neither a mere external impediment to the development of professional 
philosophy in the USSR, nor a mere internal barrier, a "philosophical creed" of Soviet 
philosophers, but its objective point of departure and its condition of existence 439 
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5.iii Soviet Pbiiosophy Between "Thaw" and "Stagnation" f 1968-1975) 
The limits ot cultural and intellectual freedom began to show around 1965/6, when Daniel' and 
Sinjavskij were sentenced to 5-7 years of labor camp for publishing "anti-Soviet works" 
abroad 440 The message from the new regime (Chruscev had been dismissed in 1964) was 
clear the Party was not ready to let "thaw" have its natural course towards "spring" 
Philosophers also were involved in these and other happenings For example, the philosopher 
(former labor-camp prisoner and tamizdaf-author)44! Aleksandr Sergeevic Esenin-Vol'pin (b 
1924) was one of the initiators of the 'liberal human-rights movement in the USSR, which 
urged the Soviet government to observe its own constitution U2 On 5 December I 'Constitution-
Day"] 1965, Esemn-Vol pin organized a demonstration in support of Daniel' and Sinjavskij, 
and he was put in a psychiatric hospital [" puchuska"] in 1968 (as a result of a protest-letter by 
99 leading Soviet scientists he was released, and emigrated in 1972) 443 And in 1968 a number 
of philosophers working at the Institut ¡stoni Iskus<>tv [Institute of the History of Arts], 
including familiar names like Boris Iosifovic Srágin (b 1926) and Jurij Nikolaevic Davydov 
(b 1929), were punished for their vocal support of Ginzburg and Galanskov (who had 
supported Sinjavskij and Daniel'), lost their position or Party membership, or, in the case of 
Davydov, received "severe Party reprimands '444 Particularly tragic is the story of Aleksej 
Dobrovól skij (b 1938), related by Goerdt a story of labor camp, release, and psithuska, first 
for his protest against the invasion in Hungary 1956, then tor publishing an article on the 
relationship of knowledge and belief in the samizdat journal Feniks [Phoenix], when his spirit 
was finally broken, he spoke out against Galanskov, and was sentenced to two more years in 
GULagW 
According to De George, "the year 1968 marked the high point and the beginning of the end of 
originality m both Soviet and East European Marxism "^б From 1968 until 1977, Frolov was 
editor-in-chief of VF, starting "the healthiest period in Soviet philosophy of science during the 
last twenty years," if we may believe Graham 447 During this period VF "developed an 
exceptional activity to revive philosophical research in the USSR, and to raise its level "448 In 
1967 and 1970 the concluding 4th and 5th volumes of the highlight of this period, the 
FilosofskajdEnciklopedijd [Philosophical Encyclopedia, FE],44? appeared, regarded by many 
"Like sdmi/ddt [from sani = self and i/dat = to publish] timi/ddt [from Um = (over) there ι e in the West and 
i7ÓM'\ points to illegal acts of publication the word чаті7аа( seems to have come into existence in 1966 i e 
at the turning point ot ottcpel (cf Goerdt 1984 ρ 94 η 119) 
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as its most successful ones This encyclopedia was proudly presented by Soviet sources as 
'the first Marxist-Leninist philosophical encyclopedia," with contributions by 768 Soviet 
philosophers,4^ both those politically leading, like editor-in-chief Konstantinov, as well as 
those intellectually leading (Ilenkov, Batiscev, Bibler, Losev, Mamardasvih) It was praised 
for its generally high level and "fair and reasonably accurate account of the work of contem-
porary Western philosophers "4''i 
An example of independent development in philosophy is the attempt by Batiscev and 
others,45? in the late 1960s, to revive the critical potential of Marxism by returning to central 
notions in Marx Das Kapital, neglected" in Soviet Marxism-Leninism, like "reification [ oprcd-
mecivame] and "alienation [otcuzdeme]" 453 After vehement discussion in the philosophical 
journals, this endeavor by Batiscev was condemned with reference to the Yugoslav revisionist 
around Praxis-group.454 and attempts were undertaken to incorporate the theory of alienation 
in historical materialism 455 However, the proponents of this view "did not renounce their 
views, and continue to develop them in one form or another to this day,"456 and Lev 
Nikolaeviò Mitrochin (b 1930) reported 1975 that works by Batiscev and by his teacher 
II enkov, "quickly found both admirers and antagonists, stirring up disputes and sometimes 
contradictory judgments "457 
But in spite of signs of freely developing philosophical theory,458 the penod of relative 
freedom was over In the 1970s, the fate of divergent positions was depressing Those who 
were not willing to compromise faced public rebuke (Davydov),459 removal to 'harmless' 
posts (Bibler, BatiSCev), exclusion from the academic world (Pomeranc),460 a marginal 
position (Mamardasvih, removed first from MGU to IF, and in 1980 to Georgia),461 or 
difficulties to have their work published (II enkov) 462 In a number of cases, Soviet 
philosophers were forced to emigrate Sragin (emigrated 1974),463 Esenin-Vol pin (b 1925, in 
exile since 1972),464 Aleksandr Aleksandrovic Zinóv'ev (b 1922, exiled 1978), 465 Petr 
Markoviò Egides (arrested 1970,466 exiled 1980)467 and his wife Tamara Samsónova (b 
1927, emigrated 1980),46« IegoSua Jachot (b 1919, emigrated to Israel after 1977),469 ρ A 
Sanja,470 the philosophical defector' Ernst Kól man [Amost Kolman] (1892-1979, emigrated 
to Sweden in 1976),47i Valenj NikolaeviC Cahdze (b 1938, m exile since 1972) «2 Michail 
Méerson-Aksenov (b 1944, emigrated 1972),473 and Aleksandr Mojseeviò Pjatigórskij 
(emigrated mid-1970s)474 
Likewise, the emancipation of empirical sociology from istmat, beginning in the 1960s 
and stimulated by the 22nd Party Congress,47'' was limited when, at the Institut Sociologiöes-
kich Issledovdmj [Institute for Sociological Investigations (founded 1969)] of the AN, it 
threatened to become ideologically neutral, ι с fully independent of historical materialism 4 7 6 
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This points to an important new element, viz. to a clash of interests. Both the ideological 
legitimization of the Soviet system and adequate knowledge of the actual development of Soviet 
society were objective interests of Party and state. The tension between an official istmat, 
required to demonstrate the continuous and irreversible perfection of socialist society on its 
way to communism, and an ideologically unimpeded sociology, telling that Soviet society was 
not perfect, is quite obvious: 
"I.oslösung von der Ideologie und die Untersuchung der sozialistischen Wirklichkeit mit den Methoden der 
empirischen Soziologie ist eine in der ganzen kommunistischen Hemisphäre vorhandene Tendenz, die jedoch 
Gefahr läuft, daß sie als revisionistisch bezeichnet und diskreditiert wird."477 
As a result Western interest in Soviet philosophy decreased in the course of the 1970s.478 The 
optimism of the 1960s gave way to disappointment, skepticism and pessimism.479 Emigrated 
dissidents like Zinov'ev were highly critical of their former colleagues, and overtly hostile to 
Western attempts to deal with Soviet philosophy in any objective or scholarly way: 
"Im Westen werden die sowjetischen Philosophen schon jetzt mit offenen Armen aufgenommen, und in naher 
Zukunft werden sie sich hier ganz wie zu Hause fühlen. Ihrerseits wiederum bieten die sowjetischen Philosophen 
ein reiches Feld zur Befriedigung der Eilelkeil alternder und schon überholter westlicher Philosophen, die allein 
für die Erwähnung ihrer Namen in der sowjetischen philosophischen Literatur (selbst als Dummköpfe und 
Diener der Kapitalisten !) bereit sind, alle Werte der westlichen Demokratie zu opfern."48" 
The Soviet attitude towards these attempts became more hostile again, too. For 
example, Bocheriski's Contemporary European Philosophy fi*ι which contains a highly critical 
discussion of Soviet diamat, appeared in a Russian translation in I960,482 but in 1975 he was 
reestablished to the rank of an anti-Communist by one of the leading critics of sovietology, 
Igor' Titovic Jakusévskij. Referring to Bochetiski and "his" institute as "one of the leading anti-
communist centers in Western Europe,"483 Jakusevskij rejected Bocheriski's claim that 
sovietology as conceived by him is a scientific discipline that has nothing to do with anti-
communism: 
"In reality «sovietology» has nothing to do with science. Its social function is not just that of refined science-
like anti-communism and anti-Sovictism: the idea of its founders was that it should surmount the crisis, fortify 
the positions, and raise the prestige of bourgeois ideology, and its general line is the falsification of the theory, 
the incrimination of the practice of Communism, and, naturally, an apologetic of capitalism as a system."484 
In 1983, Bocheiiski still was treated as "one of the leading theoreticians of anti-
communism", and the translation of 1960 was not mentioned.485 It would of course be utterly 
naive to regard sovietology, including "philosophical sovietology" as just a scientific dis-
cipline. Evidently, there would have been no sovietology if there had not been a Cold War, as 
much as it is evident that sovietology played an important ideological role in the West. Still, 
Bocheiiski and his school did take the work of Soviet philosophers seriously, criticized it 
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competently and fairly, thus substantializing the distinction between official dogma and 
(attempts at) creative development 
Most silencing affairs took place in the first half of the 1970s, along with the emergence of 
sdimzdat Theretore, the end of ottcpel' in philosophy is best situated around 1975 486 At the 
same time, a new feature in Soviet philosophical culture had come to the fore Due to increased 
institutionalization and professionalization, it was less susceptible to the immediate effects of 
political change This process of gaining self-sufficiency has been progressive, as more recent 
developments show4*" 
*** 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Mature Soviet Philosophy (1975-1991) 
"The creative impulse of the 20th Congress of the CPSU did not weaken 
even in the 1970s and the early 1980s, and it allowed to create the 
philosophical preconditions of perestrojka."4^ 
Vvcdcnic vt'ilosotiju, 1989 
This chapter deals with the period from the running-down of ottepel' to the end of the Soviet 
era, and is divided into two sections: the first discusses Soviet philosophy during the period of 
"stagnation [zastoj ]" (1975-1985 |6.¡1), the second the reform, decomposition, and disap-
pearance of Soviet philosophy during the period of perestrojka and glasnost' (1986-1991 
[6.Ü]). The first section is short since the remaining two parts of this study aim at an understand-
ing of Soviet philosophy during that period [Part III and Part IV, with the exception of Ch.lO.i, lO.ii, 
li.iv, and I2.iv]. As to the second section, this period is the subject of other sections, too 
[Ch.U.iv and 12.iv]. 
6.І Philosophy and "Stagnation" (1975-1985) 
The running-down of ottepel' meant a transition to a new period of and growing discrepancy 
between the still predominant ideological function and the professional standards of Soviet 
professional philosophy. This period can be properly labelled "stagnant philosophy" (1975-
1985). Any philosophical position can serve as a point of departure for new creative develop­
ment. Such development will, if let free, lead to new positions, not necessarily reconcilable 
with the initial position. Given the fact that Soviet Marxism(-Leninism), as created by Stalin 
es., was an artificially forged unity, creative development of Marxian, Engelsian or Leninist 
positions would inevitably lead to its dissolution. 
Marxism-Leninism was an indispensable part of the ideological legitimation of the 
Soviet system. Party-philosophers like Mitin and Judin, Fedoseev and Konstantinov continued 
to dominate philosophical culture.4^ The obligatory philosophy-courses for students 
underwent hardly any change, unlike the instruction of future professional philosophers. The 
establishment of relatively autonomous philosophical disciplines continued. There was room 
for discussion within these disciplines, and even in some instances for unorthodox positions 
fCh.8]. 
1 3 5 
Chapter 6 Mature Soviet Philosophy from Than through Perestwjka (1975-1991 ) 
In this respect, all work in Soviet philosophy during this period entailed some kind of 
compromise The crucial difference of this situation with that before ottepel was that it was 
-from the perspective of the authorities- no longer a matter of struggle against ' bourgeois 
idealists ', or of domestication of deviant Marxists reluctant to adopt the "general line", but of 
limiting developments that were a result a of the Soviet system itself The resulting "mature 
Soviet philosophy" was "stagnant", because it had reached the limits of inner development 
along lines allowed for by its position in the Soviet system Soviet philosophers, even if they 
were convinced Marxists, could not fail to notice this Loyalty to the system had become a 
largely pragmatic affair, not a matter ot conviction 
In 1977, Huber was optimistic about the prospects of Soviet philosophy 
I cs conditions pour un essor ultérieur soni données Cel essor dépendra pour beaucoup de la formation de la 
culture des capacites de ceux qui s occupent de reflexion philosophique mais aussi de leur courage et de leur 
valeur Γι non seulement du courage des philosophes mais bien plus encore du courage de ceux qui détiennent le 
pouvoir 490 
Ten years later, Western scholars like Copleston, De George, and Scanlan were 
disappointed 
'It is understandable that the party Ines to maintain the dominant position of the ideologv even if cynical 
attitudes to it are on ihe increase But this is likely to become progressively more dilficult ( ) Emphasis has 
been laid on the deleterious effect produced by imposition of an of licial ideology It should not be concluded 
however that restrictions on freedom of expression necessarily produces uniformity of thought ( ) the 
prophecy that if there were real freedom of expression a variety of non Marxist lines of thought would at once 
show themselves is obviously not simply an example of wishful thinking by a bourgeois historian of 
philosophy 491 
In 1980 Blakeley mentioned six ' developments to watch over the next decade" 492 
• investigations into the "scientific-technological revolution [nduëno-techniceskajarevoljuciia, 
NTR], 
• detailed studies of philosophical categories, implying a potential threat to received dogma, 
• an institutionalization ol philosophical discussion, immunizing it against direct Party 
intervention, 
• natural wastage oí the older, ' Stalinist' generation, 
• decentralization away from Moscow to places like Tbilisi and Kiev, 
• the emergence ol samizddt (and tamizdat) and emigration 
These developments indeed took place, and two further points can be added In the first 
place, a growing discrepancy between academic philosophy [dkddcmiceskdjdlilosofijd] and the 
official doctrine elaborated in the ucebniki for philosophical instruction in higher education 
[VUZy, hence the name vuzovsAa/a fílowfíjd] Secondly, a growing acquaintance with, and 
appreciation of non-Marxist philosophy, due to the flourishing of one specialist branch of 
Soviet philosophy, history of philosophy [Part IV] 
All this contributed to the exposure ot "official philosophy" as a dead letter, and of the 
"system of Marxist-Leninist philosophy" as a phantom Yet, this dead letter phantom 
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eifectively prevented a real emancipation of philosophical thought in the USSR The valuable 
work done in various specialisms (aesthetics,491 philosophy of science,494 history of 
philosophy) could never be more than promising, showing the capacity and willingness of 
Soviet philosophers to do philosophy and the impediments to such development 
The closer a subject was to diamat or istmat, the less room there was for discussion 
[Ch9n] This meant that fundamental philosophical issues, as well as issues in social and 
political philosophy were not addressed, or resulted in repetition of earlier discussions 495 
Thus, e g, there was virtually no philosophy of law,49<> as it fell under the competence of 
istmat, and was a politically sensitive subject By contrast, in a "remote" subject like history of 
philosophy there was considerable freedom , and it served as a place where fundamental issues 
could be addressed indirectly [Ch 10 π e, Ch I hi ш, and Ch 121 ш] 
Another way to escape official dogma was tilosofskic voprosy esfesrvoznanya 
[philosophical questions of natural science] 4 9 7 Though formally an "application ' of diamat, 
this branch was well established as an independent discipline, having, for example, its own 
section in VF, while research was done at the Institut Istoru Estestvoznamja ι Techniki 
[Institute for the History of Natural Science and Technology] of the AN Here also lay a basis 
of the post-positivism and scientism of many Soviet philosophers Scientism was very strong 
anyway, the NTR being a focus of philosophical discussions Still, in the 1980s attempts were 
made, e g by Frolov, to modify the "optimistic Promethean scientism that characterized so 
much earlier Soviet writings on science " 4 9 8 
The transition to "mature" Soviet philosophy that took place around the middle the 1970s also 
led to a different position of philosophical sovietology During Chruscevian ottepel' -coin­
ciding with "peaceful coexistence"- it had seemed that Marxism-Leninism could move away 
from dogmatism in a natural manner, giving way to a plurality of positions within a shared 
Marxist paradigm The end of ottepel', however, put an end to this development, Soviet 
philosophy became an unfulfilled promise While Soviet philosophers were exploring the limits 
of their possibilities, Western onlookers could do little more than point out that although further 
development did not take place, the potential still was there and growing Like Soviet 
philosophy itself, scholarly work on it, however competently and adequately done, could only 
disappoint 
It is certainly true, as Chernyak and Bakhurst stress, that Western studies of Soviet 
philosophy often paid more attention to official doctrine than to the "more inventive Soviet 
philosophers,"4" but it is equally true that "such remarkable contemporary philosophers as 
A F Losev, V S Bibler and Μ К MamardasVili"500 were marginal in Soviet philosophical 
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culture in the 1970s and 1980s, even if they occupied central places in philosophical "counter-
culture". They were not in a position to fully develop and express their ideas, and to see them 
freely discussed and criticized. 
No student of Soviet philosophy could possibly have predicted the rapid transformation 
that took place after 1986. In the first half of the 1980s, the general feeling among "philosophi-
cal sovietologists" was one of tiredness.501 Scanlan's Marxism in the USSR, in its claim that 
"the intellectual culture of the USSR is somewhat richer and more vital today than is often 
supposed,"502 demonstrated the need to defend one's occupation with Soviet philosophy 
against the lack of interest of the majority of Western philosophers. 
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6.1І The End of Soviet Philosophy (1986-1991) 
Soviet philosophy began and ended with the fundamental subordination of philosophy to a 
primarily ideological function Blakeley fixed the birth-date of Soviet philosophy on 24 June 
1947, but there are arguments for other dates, too One could argue, that philosophy revived 
only after Stalin's death, or one might consider 18 November 1938, when the Central 
Committee recognized the Kratkij kurs as the official interpretation of Marxism-Leninism And 
if we stick to our definition of Soviet philosophy as marked by a fundamental subordination to 
a ideological function, 25 January 1931 is the proper date of birth 
Likewise, there are several (candi)dates for the end of Soviet philosophy One is 21 
August 1991, not only because the coup by Janaev с s utterly failed, but also because they did 
not even aspire at a defence of the Soviet system 5 0 3 Keeping strictly to our definition, a 
serious candidate is the last week of August 1991, when the partkom of the Philosophical 
Faculty of MGU was closed 5 0 4 But in 1991 Soviet philosophical culture had already lost 
much of its Soviet character 5 0 5 Therefore, it is more logical to point to 1989 as the last hour of 
Soviet philosophy, when the CPSU traded "Marxism Leninism, the unified revolutionary 
doctrine,"506 and its "resolute fight against any manifestations of revisionism and dogma­
tism,"507 for a "creative development of the ideas of Marx, Engels, Lenin, employing the 
achievements of progressive social thought"5 0 8 In that year, too, the new philosophical 
uöebmk, Vvedenie ν fílosofíju [Introduction to Philosophy], despite its advantage over its 
predecessors, fell almost dead from the press It was in 1988/9, that the first frontal attack on 
Marxism itself, rather than on its Leninist or Stalinist distortions, was launched by Aleksandr 
Sergeeviö Cipkó (b 1941)509 And it was in 1989 that FN organized a ZaoönajaTeoretiöeskaja 
Konterencijd [Theoretical Conference by Correspondence] on the question 'Is Philosophy a 
Science9", a question that struck at the roots of the allegedly scientific philosophy of Marxism-
Leninism [Ch 8 u] 
The period since the beginning of perestrojka in 1986 can be divided into three stages an 
attempt to reform Soviet philosophy from above', and to make it perform a positive role in the 
perestrojka of society (1986-1988), a period in which this attempt failed, and impulses 'from 
below gained the upper hand, while perestrojka turned into a katastrojka' (1989-1991), anda 
post-Soviet period, which, however, is marked in many respects by its Soviet past (since 
1991) The particular place of philosophy in the Soviet system required a peiestrojka of 
philosophy, which has three aspects reform of philosophical industry, transformation of form 
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and function of philosophy, and shift in content. In what follows, I shall concentrate on these 
three aspects, observing the chronology just indicated. 
Perestrojka, Crisis, and Recovery of Philosophical Industry: 
The deplorable state of "stagnated" Soviet philosophical culture, appeared in full when, in 
1986, the CPSU attempted to reconstruct Soviet society in order to preserve its dominion. This 
led first to the uskorenie [acceleration] program, and in 1987 to the more radical program of 
perestrojka [reconstruction, rebuilding] and, as a means to this end,510 glasnost' 
[publicity].5' •. While perestrojka was a laborious process, glasnost' was a success from the 
outset, and meant immediate change in the situation of philosophy in the USSR. 
Although philosophical establishment, due to the position of philosophy as scientific-
philosophical foundation of Marxist-Leninist ideology, did not walk in front,512 this changing 
situation had some immediate effects. The first was a flood of hitherto forbidden fruit, made 
possible by glasnost', stimulated by perestrojka, as it became profitable to meet public demand, 
and meeting the requirements of philosophical culture. Texts appeared of both Russian (in 
Russian philosophy alone over 400) 5'3 and Western origin, that had previously been 
accessible only for specialist.-5'4 In 1989 VF began its series of classical texts from Russia's 
philosophical past — some 30 volumes have appeared so far.-515 Texts by Russian 
philosophers like B.A. Kistjakovskij (1868-1920) and S.N. Trubeckoj (1862-1905) appeared 
in popular journals like Nase nasledie [Our Heritage] and Rodina [The Native Land].516 The 
same presumably applies to non-Russian traditions in other ex-Soviet republics. 
Perestrojka ti loso fi i 
Once elected gensek, Gorbacëv made clear that a successful perestrojka presupposed a reform 
of social science, including philosophy.5'7 As in earlier crises in Soviet philosophy (1930, 
1947, 1955), a phase of intensive kritika i sarnokritika began. As Konstantin Nikolaevic 
Ljubutin (b. 1935) and D.V. Pivovarov indicated, there had been two opposed trends in Soviet 
philosophy for a long time: 
"One of them was the tendency towards free-thinking, sincere scientific quest for truth, glasnost' and the 
permission of alternative points of view. The other tendency consisted in the attempt to turn philosophy into 
the ancillary of politics [sluzanka poHtiki]. (...) The task of philosophical perestrojka consists first of all in the 
struggle for the victory of the first tendency,...."5"5 
In 1987 VF organized an anketa [survey] that yielded sharp criticism of the situation in 
philosophy.519 Part of the criticism was familiar from the past (dogmatism, schematism, 
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scholasticism), but more concrete issues were raised, too: the self-inflicted international 
isolation, the small number of journals. The notorious policy of sending Soviet "delegations" 
to international congresses was adapted,520 the Filosofskoe Obsâestvo SSSR [Philosophical 
Association of the USSR, FO, successor of the OVMD] was accepted as member of FISP 
[Fédération Internationale des Sociétés de Philosophie],521 and, finally, the delegation-policy 
was abolished. The call for "more philosophical journals"522 was answered a few years later, 
and in 1988 und 1989 new philosophical journals appeared in samizdat^ 
In addition to a predictable flood of texts with titles like "The Tasks of Philosophy With 
Respect To Perestrojka",524 there were substantial changes in the editorial policy of VF with its 
new editor-in-chief, the Sestidesjatnik Vladislav Aleksandrovic Lektórskij (b. 1932).525. One 
of these was the reappearance in 1988 of a phenomenon of the 1960s and 1970s (when Frolov 
led VF), the kruglyjstol ["round table discussion"] on a variety of themes.526 Another was an 
extensive and revealing discussion on "Filosofija i zizn' [Philosophy and Life]" that led to the 
aniefajust mentioned.527 Its main focus was philosophy's "remoteness from life [otdalënnost' 
otzizni]". Finally, from 1989 onwards VF regularly printed contributions by Western authors, 
a rare occasion until then. 
Of particular importance was the reform of vuzovskaja filosofija, the unpopular 
instruction in the "red subjects" that consumed one eighth of a student's time, and employed 
some 80% of the 25,000 professional Soviet philosophers.528 The thirty year old textbook 
Osnovy marksistsko-leninskoj filosofii was still in use.52^ In 1983 a prize-competition for a 
new ucebnik in philosophy had been organized, but it remained without result.530 In 1988 the 
philosophical journals discussed the project for a new book, which appeared in 1989, 
displaying a compromise between revised dogma and a call to think independently,531 
Vvedenie ν rïïoso/T/'u.532 
Finally, a settlement with the recent past became manifest in sharply critical articles 
about Mitin533 and other party-philosophers,534 about how Stalin had been made a philosophi-
cal genius,535 and about false academic degrees,536 as well as in the reappearance of authors 
like BatiScev, Bibler, and Pomeranc,537 and in the "cult" of figures like MamardaSvili, 
Florenskij, or Losev. 
The Crisis of Soviet Philosophical Culture 
1989 was a decisive year for the development of Soviet philosophical culture. The victory of 
the humanist-Marxist peresrrq/'ira-philosophy led to the foundation of a new All-Union Inter-
Departmental Center of the Sciences of Man [ Vsesojuznyj mezvedomstvennyj Centr nauk о 
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celoveke], to the appearance of a new popular philosophical journal, Celovek [Man],538 and to 
the replacement of the conservative party-philosopher Viktor Grigor'evic Afanás'ev (b. 1922) 
by the "philosopher of perestrojka" Frolov as editor-in-chief of Pravda. The edition of VF was 
raised from 25,000 in 1988 to 52,000 in 1989, 85,400 in 1990 (in 1993 it was back at 
16,000), and philosophers appeared live on Soviet television in the Filosofskie besedy 
[Philosophical Conversations].539 
At the same time, at the philosophical faculty of MGU, a "culturological" department 
Teorija i Istoríja Mirovoj Kul'tury [Theory and History of World Culture] was founded with 
former (half)dissidents like the historian Aron Jakovlevic Gurévic (b. 1924), the specialist in 
literature and religion Sergej Sergeevic Avérincev (b. 1937),54° and the semiotician Vjaceslav 
VsevolodoviC Ivánov, on the initiative of the historian of philosophy Aleksandr L'vovic 
Dobrochótov (b. 1950). Similar departments were founded at well-known VUZy like MFTI 
[Moskovskij Fiziko-Teclmiceskij Institut] and MVTU [Moskovskij Vyssij Techniceskij 
Universitet im. Baumana]. This was part of a general trend that gained momentum after 1989, 
viz. the restoration of the Russian intellectual and philosophical tradition, independently from 
-though not necessarily against- official Soviet perestrojka.^ 
Katastrojka and the Renaissance of Philosophical Culture 
The years since 1991 have shown the collapse of Soviet philosophical culture, philosophy 
having lost the place it occupied in Soviet times. Philosophy is never an obvious part of 
society, and it is less than clear how and why Russia should afford itself an IF where some 
400 Philosophers engage primarily in research, unless philosophy obtains a new task and 
legitimacy.542 This problem is directly related to the painful question what must happen with 
the "thousands of instructors and theoreticians in scientific communism (who) know nothing 
but the dogmas of mythologized Marxism, and (who) are only capable of propagating these 
dogmas."543 Will philosophy-teaching be reduced or even abolished, or will another doctrine, 
e.g. based on the philosophy of Berdjaev,544 take the place of Marxism-Leninism? 
Surely, "party-philosophy" is a thing of the past. August 1991 meant the end of CPSU-
rule, as well as of the leading role Pravda. But the last party-philosopher, Frolov, retained a 
central position in philosophical establishment. In 1992, the FO SSSR was formally abolished, 
and, in the same breath, a Rossijskoe Filosofskoe Obscestvo [RFO] was founded, and until its 
first regular congress, the old prezidiurn, chaired by Frolov, continued to function.545 The 
RFO has, "in its right of legal successor of the Philosophical Association of the USSR within 
the International Federation of Philosophical Associations... taken active part in the preparation 
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of the 19th World Congress of Philosophy,",46 and at the closing session of that congress 
(Moscow, August 1993) vehement protest was voiced against the politically motivated 
exclusion of many Russian philosophers 547 After the unsuccessful coup, philosophical 
departments at MGU changed labels overnight diamat became "theoretical philosophy", istmat 
"social philosophy" 
Other problems, such as the national status of MGU and AN (the Russian Federation, 
as opposed to the other Soviet republics, did not have a separate AN),54* the closing down of 
AON, IML and VPS (all pn CK KPSS), all important places of work lor philosophers, and the 
threatening staff-reduction at the IF and the filfdk of MGU served to distract philosophers from 
their professional work Still, 1991 also meant the start of a period of new initiatives 
Philosophical faculties were founded at other, partly new universities549 And no less than 
eight philosophical journals have come into existence 550 
Libera ti on from Marxi sm-Lenimsm 
To those who regard Soviet philosophy as a type of Marxism, the process of disintegration 
may appear as a crisis and abolition of Marxist(-Leninist) philosophy The real situation is 
quite more complicated, because "Marxism-Leninism" did not primarily point to a philosophi-
cal theory, but to the form of legitimacy oí my philosophical activity in the USSR [Ch7 ш and 
8 HI] This serves to explain the smooth transition of most Soviet philosophers to non-Marxist 
positions It also explains why the discussion about Marxism graded into a meta-philosophical 
discussion It was not so much a discussion about philosophical content as one about form, 
place and function of philosophy 
The discussion that unfolded between 1986 and 1989 turned around the subordination 
of philosophy to an ideological legitimization of "real socialism",551 ie around its very 
"Sovietness" in our definition In this respect, the discussion of the late 1980s was an attempt 
at a second, real destahmzation as distinct from the fake one of "thaw' Other negative features 
of Soviet philosophical culture (scholasticism,552 estrangement from life, dogmatism, 
ideologization) could be traced back to this subordination as to their cause Part of "des­
tahmzation" also was the rehabilitation of the "darling of the party", Buchann, who was elected 
akademikm 1988, 100 years after his birth and 50 since his execution , 553 and of a "revisio­
nist" like E Bernstein 554 
The discussion at first focused on a reform of "deformed" Marxism, but became more 
radical when Cipko raised the issue whether it should not be extended to a critical discussion of 
Marxism as such 
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"If we dream of a democratic, humane socialism, wc must start our analysis of the past at the beginning: the 
word, the project, our theoretical starting-point."555 
This discussion is marked by two opposed tendencies. One is the trend to regard Soviet 
reality as the necessary consequence of Marxist theory, and reject the latter together with the 
first. This trend is aptly expressed in Cipko's "in the beginning was the Word."-''-'56 The other is 
a trend to dissociate Marxist theory and (neo-)stalinist practice as much as possible, not only to 
"save" the first, but also in order to apply it as a critical theory of society to the present 
situation. This trend is represented by, e.g., Anatolij Pavlovic Buténko (b. 1923),557
 w n 0 
countered Cipko's biblical reference with a forceful "but nobody will, if a Bible is found on a 
murder after he committed his crime, make God himself responsible for it!".55** The search for 
other than Marxist roots for the faults of the Soviet system easily leads to apologetic, but the 
identification of Marxism and Leninism in fact means to fall victim to the ideological self-image 
of the Soviet system.5-''9 
In subsequent years, discussions like "Perezivët li marksizm pcrestrojku [Will Marxism 
Survive Perestrojka]?" and "Umer li marksizm [Has Marxism Died]?" (both 1990) addressed 
the very existence of Marxism in Russia.560 Here, the question about the fate of Marxism as a 
social experiment and a ruling ideology must be well distinguished from the question about the 
viability of Marxism as a theoretical position among others.-561 The first question could be 
answered unequivocally, the second was more difficult to answer, but also less painful: if a 
situation of theoretical pluralism exists in philosophical faculties and research institutes, it will 
become clear whether Marxism belongs to the past, as Nikiforov held, or continues to be a 
source of inspiration of Russian philosophers. 
Tn this connection, it is slightly naive to think, like Valentin Ivanovic Tolstych (b. 
1929), that the time has come "to evaluate in a quiet, well-balanced, and critical manner, the 
state of Marxist doctrine in the light of historical experience."562 Vjaceslav Semènovic Stèpin 
(b. 1934), director of IF, showed more sense of reality when he added "as far as that is 
possible under our unquiet conditions,"5^ and realism appeared in full in Feliks Trofimovic 
Michájlov(b. 1930): 
"But we should relate in a reflexive-theoretical way to the theory itself, too. Perhaps it may then become 
possible that it [Marxist theory, EvdZl, like any other elevated culture of thought and perception, will not die. 
Just like, for us, Plato and Thomas Aquinas, Descartes and Kant, Hegel... have not died. With respect to Marx, 
however, actual history still is so close to the tendency of social development discovered by him, that a serious 
approach of the question that is the subject of our discussion, is impossible."564 
One of the effects of Marxism-Leninism losing its official position was a plea in favor 
of ideological and philosophical pluralism,5^ in which Marxism, as one current next to many 
others, would have to show its strength. This was the position of, e.g., Aleksandr 
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Vladimirovic Pánin (b. 1936), the dean of the philosophical faculty of MGU.566 whose task 
after 1991 was to transform a Soviet into a Russian faculty.567 Here, the main opposition is 
not one between Marxists(-Leninists) and Anti-Marxists, but between Monists and Pluraliste 
(with a fair measure of opportunism in both camps). An opposition also between those who 
support a national philosophy "for Russia", and those who advocate an independent place "for 
philosophy" in Russia. This position was expressed, e.g., in a polemical article by Aleksandr 
Sergeevic Panárin (b. 1940) in 1990,568 and can be found in many other authors. 569 Clearly, a 
"civil independence" (Panarin) of philosophy presupposes a development of Russian society as 
a whole in the direction of a "civil society". From this perspective, the ideal future for Russian 
religious philosophy, for liberated Marxism, and for any other current within the Russian 
philosophical landscape is the same: full access to sources, presence of a different approaches 
to past philosophy, participation in the international philosophical community, and the 
coexistence of a multitude of philosophical currents and position. This is, in the words of 
Vladimir Sergeevic avyrëv (b. 1934) and Vladimir PetroviC Filatov (b. 1948), the "natural exis-
tence" of philosophy anyway.570 
As in economy and politics, this points to the need not only to reform, from above, 
philosophical industry, but first and foremost to let new, local initiatives emerge and develop 
'from below'. Philosophy, like any intellectual and creative activity, can not be planned, 
developed, or caused, but is something for which conditions can be realized and preserved 
-and also destroyed-, within which, to borrow Mamardasvili's expression, the "miracle of 
thought" can make its appearance.571 
Philosophy and Meta-philosophy: the Renewal of Philosophical Culture 
The discussion around Marxism thus was not primarily a discussion about Marxist theory, but 
a meta-philosophical discussion about the way in which philosophy is done, its place in 
relation to society and politics, its predominantly ideological function, and the way it was 
organized (planning572 etc.).573 Criticism was pointed mainly at "professional" Soviet 
philosophical culture, but also at the "philosophical subculture" that was its antithesis: 
philosophy as an uncontrolled dedication, as philosophical "kaif',5™ or as pseudo-
philosophical kitsch.575 The positions that were developed represent a variety of answers to the 
theoretical question "What is Philosophy?", and point to a search for a new form of 
legitimacy.576 
From this perspective, the "theoretical conference" about the question "Is Philosophy a 
Science?",577 was not an theoretical discussion at all, but a very practical, and it hit Soviet 
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philosophy at a sensible spot 5 7 8 As initiator Nikiforov explained later, the discussion was 
directed against the dominance and ldeologizalion of Marxism 5 7 9 In his perception, an 
essential part in solving the problems of Soviet philosophy would be played by a denial of its 
scientific status 58° With the categoric statement that "Philosophy never was, is not, and will, I 
hope, never be a science (this relates to Marxist philosophy as well),'"581 Nikiforov hit twice, 
as he not only rejected the official view that Marxist(-Leninist) philosophy was a science, but 
also presented the dilemma that philosophy should be regarded either as a science, or as a Welt­
anschauung, thus excluding the possibility of a 'scientific world-view' [Ch8u] Although most 
participants in the discussion rejected Nikiforov's thesis as too radical,582 and expressed a 
desire to return to the origins of Marxism-Leninism manifested itself,581 the discussion cleared 
the way for alternative conceptions of philosophy philosophy as personal world-view (Niki­
forov), as 'capacity to perceive Ideas' (Davydov),584 or as the event of thought (Mamar-
dasvih) 5 8 5 
Development Set Free Some Trends m Late Soviet Philosophy 
The first peresfio/Aa-years saw an attempt, headed by Frolov (Gorbacev's philosophical 
advisor over 1987-1989),586 to reform official Marxist-Leninist philosophy in the direction of 
a humanist Marxism in order to adapt it to new circumstances 5 8 7 With its stress on universal, 
ι e not class-bound, human values, and ' global problems' that transcend class struggle 
(nuclear arms race, environment, hunger) this position was strongly fostered politically, since 
it was expected to play a positive role in international detente and in the national mobilization of 
the "human factor" Frolov's position fitted perfectly to the official program of those years, as 
appears from a comparison with Gorbacev's Perestrojka ι novoe myïlenie (1987) and the 
CPSU-program of 1986 588 There was an explicit need for a philosophy of perestrojka,5^ and 
philosophers were summoned to take their task seriously 590 
But it would be inappropriate to regard this trend as merely a product of communist 
propaganda Frolov could go back to work in the 1970s 591 In that respect, the period until 
1991 was most of all a period of manifestation of tendencies that already existed m Soviet 
philosophical culture a critical appreciation of scientism,592 of politically motivated inter-
ference in science,593 and of systematic neglect of 'existential" questions 594 Frolov did not 
hesitate to invoke L N Tolstoj and F M Dostoevskij in his attempt at a humanization of Marx-
ism [see also Ch 11 ш c] 5 9 5 
By contrast, the period after 1991 is one of differentiation, that has resulted in a 
multitude of positions, tendencies, and orientations, all of them rooted in Soviet philosophical 
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culture This applies not only to Marxism and Russian religious philosophy, but also to 
contemporary Western "post-positivism",596 German idealism,597 analytical philosophy, 598 
phenomenology [Ch 9 и], or French post-structuralism [Ch 11 iv] 599 
Thus the inner logic of development of Soviet philosophy started to unfold as soon as the 
situation allowed and stimulated this This is exemplified by a field like ethics 60° Ever since 
the 1960s, there had been vain attempts to overcome the traditional reduction of morality to the 
obligation to build communism 6°' It is not surprising, therefore, to see stress, by 
Davydov,602 and the once liberal Arsenij Vladimirovic Gulyga (b 1921) , 6 0 3 on the absolute 
character of moral claims and obligations (as opposed to their ultimate relativization via the 
principle of partijnost' [Ch 8 и]) and on the personal nature of morality (as opposed to Marxist-
Leninist collectivism), esp by Solov'ev, closely linked in his case to the theme of personality 
[hänosf], equally neglected in Soviet times 604 
Partly connected to ethics, and also taboo m Soviet philosophical culture -other than 
purely negatively- was the relationship of philosophy to religion, as possible partners in a 
dialogue and as a possible source of inspiration Naturally, it was easier to lift taboos in the 
first respect, and dialogue soon took place 605 As to the second, a call for the renaissance of 
Russian religious philosophy was expressed very loudly, e g by Gulyga in NaS sovre-
mennik б06 A philosophical position from the past is only revived to the extent to which it is 
actually represented, not simply when it is called for 6°7 In post-Soviet Russian philosophical 
culture, it is represented by such thinkers as Sergej Sergeevi6 Chonizij and Nikolaj Konstan-
tinovic GavrjuSin 6°8 
The importance of this trend will only become clear when this tradition is properly 
investigated by historians of philosophy, when contemporary philosophers pass on to critical 
appropriation, and when conditions of intellectual freedom prevail 6 Q 9 But when, e g , 
Chonizij claims that "we should acknowledge that for the problems of Russia, for a reflection 
upon its experience, these truths are even more necessary and actual than for an answer to 
the questions of the West,"6io something very peculiar happens the future development of a 
particular philosophical position is expected to yield a solution to the problems of entire 
continents It may be seriously questioned whether a saving function belongs to the functions 
of philosophy 
A main objection of many Russian thinker against Western philosophy is its alleged 
formalism Much in contemporary discussions in post-Soviet Russian philosophical culture can 
thus be related to the opposition material (what) — formal {how) This applies to the question 
about instruction m philosophy, to the meta-philosophical discussion about philosophical 
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culture, and to ethics It also applies to the discussion about legality and human rights, that 
took place since 1988, culminated around 1990, and continues to the present day.611 This 
discussion also displays the three features mentioned earlier a manifestation of themes inherent 
to the inner logic of Soviet philosophy, the favoring of certain philosophical positions by a 
changing situation, and a varied orientation on other philosophical positions and traditions. 
With the advantage of retrospective, developments since 1986 show that Soviet philosophical 
culture was indeed much less monolithic than it appeared. 
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Conclusion to Part Two 
The period of transition from Soviet to post-Soviet philosophical culture displays many 
features of a crisis. And it was a crisis in many respect: a crisis of philosophical industry, a 
crisis of philosophical education, a crisis of the place and function of philosophy in society. 
But is was not a crisis of philosophical thought. Amidst all kritikaisamokritika it is difficult to 
find cases of intellectual despair: philosophers would collectively come to the conclusion that 
Soviet philosophy was wrongly organized, unjustly supervised, ideologized, etc, not that they 
themselves had been thinking the wrong things. With very few exceptions, the philosophers 
who dominate the post-Soviet philosophical scene, were active as philosophers in Soviet times, 
too, sometimes in "sub-dominant" positions. The party-philosophers of the old, pre-thaw 
generation have gone, but they would have anyway. This leaves us with some puzzling 
questions. Tolstych wondered, "where did all the specialists in Marxism go,that were so 
numerous only yesterday?"612 Put more strongly: where did all Soviet philosophers go? 
Weren't they all Marxists-Leninists? In other words: if Soviet philosophical culture was what it 
appeared to be, i.e. a collective effort to develop a Marxist-Leninist philosophy -diamat, 
istmat, and a handful of separate disciplines-, then how to explain the quick and relatively easy 
transition to post-Soviet philosophical culture? The simple answer to this question is that Soviet 
philosophical culture was not what it appeared to be. The presentation of the broad lines of its 
historical development during the entire Soviet period (1917-1991) provides the basis for an 
analysis of the "Soviet philosophical phenomenon", which will be the subject of the next part. 
*** 
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NOTES TO PART Π 
1 "Ot redakcn," introduction to Kcdrov 1988, VF 1988, ρ 92 
2 Cf, for example, the editorials in two new philosophical journals Jakovlev 1992, ρ 4, and, warning against 
this tendency. Traut &c 1991, ρ 5 "Entgegen einer auch jetzt in der ehemaligen Sowjetunion verbreiteten 
Meinung sind die vergangenen 70 Jahre keineswegs ein unbeschriebenes Blatt in der russischen Geist­
esgeschichte " 
3Bakhurst 1991, ρ 16, η 8 
4 Hedeler, e g, estimates the number of memoirs published in emigration during the Soviet period at some 
12,000 — of course these are not all philosophers' memoirs (Hedeler 1992, ρ 55), on the ex-Soviet side, these 
materials range from Pjatigorskij 1992 to Kedrov 1988 and Kogan 1993 
5 There is little dispute among specialists as to the penodization of Soviet philosophy 1917, 1922, 1930/1, 
1938, 1947, 1955/6 are generally referred to an important landmarks, and they are all related to important 
political events and/or political interventions into the field of philosophy itself 
61 take tor granted that the "system of dialectical materialism", subsequently elaborated by Engels, Plechanov, 
Lenin, Deborin, and generations of Soviet ' party-philosophers ' is, as a whole, untenable, and inescapably 
results in an opposition of dialectical philosophy and materialism A materialist philosophy has to choose 
between being a philosophical position (not a system), merely clearing the way for concrete science [the 
direction into which Althusser developed Lenins position], or a systematic account, a global synthesis of the 
actual results of (natural) science, thus stopping to be a philosophy, and becoming principally dependent upon 
the actual results of science [as actually is the case in much of contemporary materialism, с g , Prigogine, and 
as was the case with the ' mechanicists"] In the first case, it will have to reject any 'dialectic" as being a form 
of idealism, in the second case it can only be dialectical as a matter of fací, ι e to the extent to which the global 
picture offered by actual science can be called 'dialectical" in some significant way For philosophical critiques 
of dialectical materialism, sec, e g , Hollak 1961, Kline 1955, Losev 1991, or Wetter 1964 
7Nikiforov 1990a, ρ 15 
8 Cf Kotakowski 1981,11, ρ 584 
9 Cf, e g , Kotakowski 1981, II, ρ 399 "Von Beginn seiner politischen Tätigkeit an hat Lenin sich 
ausschließlich und mit bewundernswerter Konsequenz auf eine Aufgabe konzentriert und nur an eine Sache 
gedacht ( ) Alle Fragen einschließlich der erkenntnistheorctischen waren fur ihn Mittel zur Vorbereitung der 
Revolution, und alle Antworten waren politische Handlungen", and ibid , ρ 4291 "Fur Lenin haben, wie schon 
gesagt, alle theoretischen Fragen ausschließlich instrumentellc Bedeutung im Hinblick auf eine Aufgabe die 
Revolution ( ) Fur Lenin haben philosophische Fragen im Grunde keine eigenstandige Bedeutung, sondern 
sind ausschließlich Instrumente des politischen Kampfes, als solche Instrumente betrachtet er ebenfalls die 
Kunst, die Literatur, das Recht, die gesellschaftlichen Institutionen, die demokratischen Werte und die religiösen 
Ideen " 
IOWith theoreticians like Nikolaj GavnloviC Cernysévskij (1828 1889) (cf, eg , Goerdt 1992, ρ 42) and Petr 
NikmCTkaaev(1844 1886) (cf Besançon 1977, Kline 1952, ρ 124, Carrere dEncausse 1988, ρ 258Г, and also 
Kotakowski 1981, Π, ρ 364 "Tkatschev ist jedoch in erster Linie dafür verantwortlich, daß in Rußland die Idee 
einer zentralisierten und disziplinierten Partei als des wichtigsten Organs der Revolution entwickelt wurde Von 
Historikern wird sehr häufig betont, daß Tkatschcw gerade in diesem Punkte ein Vorlaufer des Leninismus war 
Im Grunde gingen die Organisations\orstellungen, wenn auch nicht die soziale Ideologie der 1876 gegründeten 
konspirativen Volkslumlerpartei Zcmlja ι Wolja [Zemljd ι Voljä - "Land and Freedom", EvdZ] auf Tkalschew 
zurück Und wenn Lenin auch von den Volkstumlern insbesondere in ihrer Spatphase mit der größten 
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Verachtung spricht, so schat/te er doch die organisatorischen Traditionen der volkstumlenschen Konspiration 
sehr hoch"), and practicians like Sergej Gcnnadievií NcCaev(1847-1882) (on necaevítinj, see Ominen 1989, ρ 
351, and Michajlov 1993, ρ 84), or, to go farther back in histor), the dckabnsrPavel Ivanovic Pestel' (1793-
I826)(cf Carrcre d hncausse 1988 ρ 242,258) 
11 In a letter to Maksim Gorkij of 07/02/1908 he qualified himself as a 'dilettante in philosophy' (cf Schaefer 
1986, ρ 38, and Althusser 1969 ρ 16) 
l2Cnpleslon 1986, ρ 310 
13 As Althusser has rightly stressed, lenin's position was a position on rather than in philosophy, but any 
meta philosophical position either is a philosophical position or presupposes one (cf Althusser 1969 ρ 11) 
14 Toi the only quality ' of matter, with the recognition whereof a philosophical materialism is connected, is 
the quality to be objective reality, to exist outside our consciousness (Lenin, PSS XVIII, ρ 275) " In recent 
limes Louis Althusser has stressed the originality of Lenins distinction between the philosophical category of 
matter and various scientific concepts ol matter "Le contenu du concept scientifique de matière change avec le 
développement с esta-dire [approfondissement de la connaissance scientifique Le sens de la categorie 
philosophique de matière ne change pas puisqu il ne porte sur aucun objet de science mais affirme I oh/ect/v/te 
de toute connaissance scientifique d un objet ( ) Disons que cet ignorant en philosophie qu était Lénine avait 
pour le moins du jugement (Althusser 1969 ρ 35f) fcvidently Lenin, in making this clear-cut distinction, 
turns dialectical materialism basically into epistemologica! realism, as he himself in fact recognized " the 
concept of matter as we have already said, signifies epistcmologically nothing еіче but objective reality 
existing independently of human consciousness and reflected by it (Lenin, PSS XVIII ρ 276) As Schacter has 
pointed out Lenin in fact returned to a pre-Kanlian position (Schaefer 1986) 
15 Cf, e g , Die deutsche Ideologie [MEW ІЩ, ρ 47 "Die Gedanken der herrschenden Klasse sind in jeder 
Epoche die herrschenden Gedanken d h die Klasse, welche die herrschende materielle Macht der Gesellschaft ist, 
ist zugleich ihre herrschende geistige Macht ( ) Die herrschenden Gedanken sind weiter Nichts als der ideelle 
Ausdruck der herrschenden materiellen Verhaltnisse die als Gedanken gefaßten herrschenden materiellen 
Verhallnisse, also der Verhaltnisse, die eben die eine Klasse zur herrschenden machen, also die Gedanken ihrer 
Herrschaft', or the preface to К Marx, Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie [MbW XIII], ρ 8f "Die 
Gesamtheit dieser Produktionsverhältnisse bildet die ökonomische Struktur der Gesellschaft die reale Basis, 
woraul sich ein juristischer und politischer Überbau erhebt und welcher bestimmte gesellschaftliche Bewußt 
seinstormen entsprechen Die Produktionsweise des materiellen Lebens bedingt den sozialen, politischen und 
geistigen Lebensprozeß überhaupt Es ist nicht das Bewußtsein der Menschen, das ihr Sein, sondern umgekehrt 
ihr gesellschaftliches Sein, das ihr Bewußtsein bestimmt" 
16Nikiforov 1990b, ρ 119 
17 But it may be argued, as does Kolakowski, lhat Lenin ivas a more consequent historical materialist than 
Marx and Engels, who were too 'bourgeois ' to accept the consequences of their own position (cf Kolakowskt 
1981,11, ρ 430) 
18 Such as the predominant tendency in Russian thought to seek an elaborated philosophical (or other) doctrine 
in order to resolve practical problems, ι e a strong tendency towards ideologi/alion and politicization, which 
was typical of all Russian intclligencija around the turn of the century the absence of a political culture in 
which political theories could be checked and balanced, tested and adapted, and, finally, the urgent nature of 
Russia s problems, crying, in the eyes of virtually all intellectuals, for a radical solution revolution 
19 De George 1966, ρ 179 and idem 1967, ρ 50, cf also Kolakowski 1981 III, ρ 181 
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20 On Plechanov and his importance for Lenin see Kolakowski 1981, II, ch 14 and 15, and Besançon 1977, pp 
228ff 
21 As is sometimes done, esp in the post-Soviet period, for example by Nikiforov (Nikiforov 1990b, ρ 118f) 
22 Cf Lenin, PSS XVIII ρ 138, ρ 146, Copleston 1986, ρ 310, Kolakowski, II, ρ 509f 
23 Lenin, PSS ХХШ, ρ 43 
24 Cf Nikiforov 1990b, ρ 117 
25 Marx, "2 These über Feuerbach" [JVffiWIII], ρ 5 
26 As a matter of fact, philosophy was flourishing during this period the famous "silver era [screbrjanyj vek]" 
of Russian philosophy lasted until 1921/2, see, eg , Hdgemeister 1990, Goerdt 1984, ρ 71f, Nethercotl 1991, 
Pascal 1981, pp 82-95 
27 KoSarnyj 1981, ρ 6, cf also Kolakowski 1981, III, ρ 60f 
28 Many new universities were founded in the early years of Soviet government, as the Great Soviet 
Encyclopedia proudly remarks — though most of them not on Soviet territory, as the same source gently omits 
Cf Prochorov &c 197P, V, entry "VysSie uCebnyc zavcdenija," ρ 561 "In 1918 universities were opened in 
N Novgorod [1931-1990 Gor'kij], Dnepropetrovsk [Ekalennoslav until 1926], Voroncz, Irkutsk, Tbilisi, 
Taikent, Baku, Erevan, Sverdlovsk [Ekaterinburg until 1924 and since 1991], Minsk, and others" Of these 
cities, only Niznij Novgorod and Voronez were under stable Soviet authority in 1918 (cf Slier, Η -E &c (eds ) 
Westermann Großer Atlas zur Weltgeschichte (Braunschweig Georg Weslermann Verlag, (1956 (19769), and 
Milner Gulland, R , N Dejevsky, Atlas van Rusland (Amsterdam Agon, 1989) [ong Cultural Atlas of Russia 
and the Soviet Union (Oxford Equinox, 1989)], on the renamings of Russian cities cf Pospelov, E M ¡mena 
gorodov viera ι segodnjaf1917-1992), toponomiCeskij slovar' (Moskva izd Russkie slovan, 1993)) 
29 Cf Goerdt 1984, ρ 7If, and Utechin 1961, ρ 579 
30 Cf Ballestrem 1968, ρ 107, Kamenka 1972, ρ 163 
31 Cf Kolakowski 1981, ΠΙ, ρ 57, Nethercott 1991, ρ 207, and Nikiforov 1990b, ρ 116 "In a word, in the 
heat of the civil war there nevertheless survived interesting, original thinkers, who where on the level of 
international philosophical thought, and who prcsened philosophical culture", for the Soviet point of view, cf 
Kosarnyj 1981, pp 14^2 
32 In C7drist Russia, there were no separate philosophical faculties, it was taught at the departments of 
philosophy of a number of universities, and in the Theological Academies (Prochorov &c 19773, XXVII, entry 
"Filosofskoe obrazovame," ρ 426) 
33Tacho-Godi 1991, ρ 8 
34 Cf Bocheriski 1967\p 36, De George 1966, ρ 7, Blakeley 1980. ρ 317 
35 No member of the intelligencija was, on Losskij's account, expecting this move, initiated by G E Zinov'ev 
[Radomysl'skij] (cf Losskij 1991, ρ 125) 
36 Cf Goerdt 1984, ρ 73, and Alckseev 1990, ρ 15 
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37 AIckseev 1990, ρ 14, among them were Berdjaev, Losskij, Semen Ljudvigovii Frank (1877-1950), Dmitry 
I Ci/evskij (1895-1977). Ivan AleksandroviC ll'in (1882 1954), Sergej Nikolacvic Bulgakov (1871-1944), l.cv 
Platonovi£ Karsávin (1882-1952), Boris PetroviC Vyscslavcev [Petrov) (1877 1954), Karsavin, after having been 
expelled in 1922 took part in Berdjaev's Russian Academy ot Religion and Philosophy, but soon became 
professor of history at the university of Kaunas in Lithuania, in 1948 he became victim of the 'anti-
cosinopolitanism campaign, and died in a concentration camp (cf Utechin 1961 ρ 259)], Vasilij Vasil'cvii 
Zenkovskij (1881-1962), Pavel Ivanovic Novgorodccv (1866-1924), Petr Berngardovic Slruve (1870-1944), 
ban Ivanovo LapSin (1870 1955) Ct also Kamenka 1972, ρ 163, Goerdt 1984, pp 73ft, Kolakowski 1981, 
III ρ 58, Bochenski 1967s, ρ 36. and, very recently, Kogan 1993, which contains a lot ot historical detail 
38 Lenin, PSS XXXXV, ρ 25 and passim 
39 Losev could escape exile because of his musical formation in 1922 he became professor at the Moscow 
conservatory, and subsequently moved to the State Academy ot Liberal Arts \Gosudarst\ennaja Akademija 
ChudoZcstvcnnychNauk GAChN], led by Ρ S Kogan, where he headed the department of aesthetics until the 
Academy was closed in 1929 (cf Tacho-Godi 1991, ρ 8) His philosophical works Losev managed to publish 
on his own, although he had to take censorship into account (ibid , and Hagemeister 1989, ρ 362, η 92) Spet 
was vice-president of the same GAChN from 1924 until 1929 (cf Il'iccv &c 1983, entry 'Spet", ρ 784) 
Florenskij, finally, concentrated on his work in physics and aesthetics after the October Revolution (cf 
Avenncev &c I9892, entry ' Florenskij, ' ρ 710) 
40 Cf Bochenski 1967s, ρ 36, inci η 2, where he refers to some titles in Kline 1952, ρ 128 
41 Cf Goerdt 1984, pp 72ff, Kolakowski 1981, III, ρ 57 
42 On the influence oi Bogdanov on later Soviet thought see D Lecourt, "Bogdanov, Mirror of the Soviet 
Intelligentsia,' in Lecourt 1977 
43 Cf Kolakowski 1981, III, pp 36ff6 
44 Cf Fetschcr 1974, ρ lOt, and Kolakowski 1981, II, pp 538-548 
45 "Alter the victory in the Great October Revolution a start was made with the creation of a system of 
philosophical education, based upon the principles of Marxist-Leninist philosophy" (Prochorov &c 19771, 
XXVII, entry "Filosofskoe obra/ovanie, ' ρ 426), it should be noted, that there was no such thing as Marxism-
Leninism until after Lenin's death - a fine example of rewriting history On the establishment of Bolshevik 
alternatives to 'bourgeois' institutions, and on the ' ideological defeat of mysticism and idealism ', c t , for the 
Soviet point of view, KoSamyj 1981, pp 43 71 
46 Founded as a counterpart to "bourgeois" institutes of higher learning, the main purpose of the IKP was to 
qualify Communist philosophers, economists, historians etc, who could in due time take over higher education 
During the 30ies the IKP lost its importance and was closed, for the obvious reason that higher education was 
by that lime fully controlled b) the Soviet authorities, which made the IKP superfluous (cf Prochorov 19721, 
X, entry 'Institut Krasnoj Profcssury," ρ 293, and Zapata 1983, ρ 325f) 
47 Named SocialistiCeskaja Akademija OK£est\ennychNauk until 1924, the " Komakadcmija" was founded as a 
counterpart to the "bourgeois" Akademija Nauk, in 1936 the two were united into the AN SSSR, because the 
latter had lost its bourgeois nature (Cf Prochorov &c 19701, I, entry "Akademija kommunisticeskaja," ρ 313, 
and Zapata 1983, ρ 323Г) 
48 Both 1928 and 1929 are mentioned as the year when the department ot philosophy, that existed since 1927, 
was transformed into an institute (ct Wetter 19563, ρ 208, Zapata 1983, ρ 324) 
154 
Part Two: A Concise History of Soviet Philosophy 
49 Cf Jachot 1981, ρ 9ff, and Prochorov &c 19713, v , entry "VysSaja Partijnaja Skola pn CK KPSS," ρ 
553 
50Frolov&c 1989,1, ρ 260 
51 The OVM was founded in 1924, but since 1928, when the "mechanist materialists" left it, it was called 
Association of Militant Materialists-Dialecticians [OVMD] (cf Jachot 1981, ρ 51) 
52 Cf Jachot 1981, pp 19-21 
53 For a survey see Alekseev 1990, Zapata 1983, pp 25ff, and Kamenka 1972, ρ 163 
54 Cf Zapata 1983, ρ 39 
55 Cf Kotakowski 1981, III, ρ 85, and Chandruev 1990, ρ 123 
56 Both were pupils of Plechanov, and both political opponents of Lenin both joined the Menshevik faction of 
the Social-Democratic Party in 1903, Deborin left it tor the Bolsheviks in 1917 (cf Alekseev 1990, ρ 517, and 
Avenncev &c 19892, entry "Akselrod', ρ 17), Aksel'rod was a philosophical opponent as well in 1909, she 
published a sharply critical review of Lenin's Matenahzm ι empinokritiLizm in Sovremennyj Mir. №7 (cf 
Jachot 1981, ρ 10) [English translation L Akselrod (Ortodoks), "Review of Lenins Materialism and 
Empinocnticism," in Edie &c 19762, III, pp 457-463] 
57 Jachot 1981, ρ 11 
58 Minin [1922] 1990 
59 EnCmcn's biography seems is uncertain, but he seems to have survived both the Great Terror and the Great 
Patriotic War, since he reportedly worked somewhere in the AN SSSR after it (cf Alekseev &c 1993, ρ 65) 
60 See En£men [1920] 1990, and Bucharin [1924] 1988 
61 Cf Zapata 1983, ρ 27 
62Frolov &c 1989, I, ρ 260 
63 Cf Ballestrem 1968, ρ 108 
64 Kotakowski 1981, III, ρ 82 
65 The title was an invention of the ' debonnist editor, David В Rjazanov, and the translation was, as Alekseev 
shows, at places deliberately inadequate for example, Engels "Whatever pose the natural scientists may adopt, 
philosophy holds sway over them [K<ikuju by posu m pnnimali c4testvoi7pytatcli, nad nimi vlastuct l'ilosofìjd ]" 
was rendered as "However the natural scientists may grumble, the philosophers govern them [Как by m upirahs' 
estestvoispytateli, no imi upra\ljajut ñlosofy]" [italics mine, EvdZ] (Alekseev 1990, ρ 21, the German original 
reading "Die Naturforscher mogen sich stellen, wie sie wollen, sie werden von der Philosophie beherrscht" 
(Engels, Dialektik der Natur [MEWXX], ρ 480) This 'mistake" should not be regarded as coincidental 
Rjazanov fell victim to the repression ol the 1930s (cf Kotakowski 1981, III, ρ 61) 
66 Cf Jachot 1981, pp 40fl, Losskij 1991, ρ 402, Zapata 1983, idem 1988, ρ 97, ρ 35f, and Ballestrem 
1968, ρ 108 
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67 It reached its culmination in 1928, when the OVM was transformed into the OVMD, the mechamcists 
leaving and Debonn taking control One of the members of the OVMD was Μ В Mitin, others were D M 
Gessen, M I Gubanov, A M Debonn, N A Karev, S G Levit, L A Man kovskij, VI Nevskij, I Ρ 
Podvolockij, Ja E Sten, Ι Ρ Razumovskij IG TaSüilm, G S Fndljand (cf Jachot 1981, ρ 51) 
68 Cited from Resolution de la Ile Conference panuniomste des Institutions marxistes léninistes de Recherche 
scientifique (8 13 avril 1929) in Zapata 1983, pp 236 244, ρ 238, cf also Goerdt 1984, ρ 85, and Jachot 
1981 pp 51-55 
69 Jachot 1981, ρ 55, quoting Е Ж 1929, №5 ρ 165 
70 Cf Graham I9872 ρ 25 "The term dialectical materialism' was first used in 1891 by GV Plekhanov, a 
man frequently called the father of Russian Marxism Marx and Fngels utilized terms such as 'modern 
materialism or the new materialism to distinguish their philosophical orientation from that of classical 
materialists such as Dcmocritus or thinkers of the Trench Enlightenment such as La Mettne or Holbach Engels 
did speak however, of the dialeuiLdl nature of modern materialism I cnin adopted the phrase adopted by 
Plekhanov dialectical materialism ' In tootnotes 1 and 2 (p 443) Graham gives references to the texts of 
Plcchanov and Engels where the terms occur first, cf also Kolakowski 1981, II ρ 381 "Im Unterschied zur 
Mehrheit der westeuropäischen Marxisten die der Auffassung waren daß der Marxismus als eine Theorie der 
gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung logisch nicht von einem bestimmten Standpunkt m erkenntnistheoretischen und 
metaphysischen Fragen abhangig sei (auch Kautsky teilte mit der Zeil diese Ansicht) wiederholte Plechanow 
mit großer Entschiedenheit, daß die marxistische Doktrin einen integralen und vollständigen Theonekorpus 
darstelle, der gleichfalls sämtliche grundlegenden philosophischen Fragen umfasse, und daß man den »dialekti-
schen Materialismus« (er war wohl der erste, der sich dieses Namens bediente, um die Gesamtheit der marxisti 
sehen Philosophie zu bezeichnen) »nicht trennen darf« vom »historischen Materialismus« der gewissermaßen 
eine Anwendung der gleichen Prinzipien und Denkregeln in der Erforschung der gesellschaftlichen Phänomene 
ist Diese nachdrückliche Betonung des integralen Charakters der Lehre übernahm Lenin und nach ihm die 
sow|Clische Staatsideologie von Plechanow 
71 Ct Kolakowski 1981, III ρ 82 
72 "The period of the I920's in Russia was one of philosophical discussion and controversy ( ) A basic 
disagreement arose which, though ultimately settled by a political decree, was rooted in the heart of dialectical 
materialism it continues to divide Soviet philosophers today just as truly though not as obvious as before" (De 
George 1966 ρ 180) As a matter of fact, the discussion was about a central problem in Marxism Those who 
held, like Aksel'rod and Buchann, that there could be no such thing as a dialectical materialist philosophy ' in 
the traditional sense of a system of ontology and epistcmology, could certainly find support in Marx and Fngels 
(cf, e g Engels Ludwig heuerbach und der Aufgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie [MEWXXl], ρ 
306 ' Diese Autfassung [= the Marxian conception of history FvdZ] macht aber der Philosophie auf dem Gebiet 
der Geschichte ebenso ein Ende, wie die dialektische Auffassung der Natur alle Naturphilosophie ebenso unnötig 
wie unmöglich macht Fur die aus Natur und Geschichte vertriebene Philosophie bleibt dann nur noch das 
Reich des reinen Gedankens, soweit es noch übrig die I ehre von den Gesel/en des Denkprozesses selbst, die 
Logik und Dialektik", and idem, Anti Duhring [MEW XX] ρ 24 'Was von der ganzen bisherigen Philosophie 
dann noch selbständig bleibt ist die Lehre vom Denken und seinen Gesetzen - die formelle Logik und die 
Dialektik Alles andere geht auf in die positive Wissenschalt von Natur und Geschichte' ) Their position, 
however, was irreconciliable with the line of thought that ran from Plechanov to Debonn, and which consisted 
precisely in the creation of a system of dialectical and historical materialism which would assimilate all present 
and future results of positive science (natural and social) without being replaced by it (as the mechamcists held) 
Since for both an objeclivislic, tendetially scicnlistic materialism, and a dialectical tendentially idealistic 
materialism support can be found in Marx, and esp Engels and Lenin, we may say that this discussion, as well 
as its later revivals, points to a lundamenlal tension within the Marxist conception of philosophy Soviet 
intellectual history has been marked by the tension between two tendencies one to accept the results ot science 
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without interference from the side of philosophers, the other to submit science to the competence -or 
incompetence- of dialectical materialists The objective need for reliable scientific knowledge leads to the first 
tendency, the equally objective need to give an ideological legitimization to Soviet power through, among 
others, a claim on superior scientific knowledge fosters the second, as does the need to account for the actual 
submission of scientists to the construction of socialism The controversies over genetics, cybernetics, relativity 
theory, quantum theory are cases of this basic problem, the first manifestation of which was the discussion 
between "mechanicists" and "dialecticians" 
73 For a concise rendering sec Jachot 1981, pp 59-94 
74Mitin [19301 1983 
75 Personal data on Rai ceviï arc very hard to find According to Jachot, he 'afterwards [after his participation in 
the anti-Debonnist campaign, that is, EvdZ] was arrested and died" (Jachot 1981. ρ 74), according to Ahlberg it 
was esp Ralcevif who formulated the call to subordinate philosophy to the practical demands of the 
construction of socialism in an even more ponderous way than the Party was ready to accept later on (cf 
Ahlberg 1960, ρ 102), Wetter reports him as the author of the entry on dialectical materialism in the first 
edition (1925) of the GreJf Soviet ЕпсусУореЛа (cf Wetter ^бО^.р 356, η 96) 
76 Cf Jachot 1981, ρ 72, Zapata 1983, ρ 276, and Ahlberg 1960, ρ 89f 
77Debonn&c [19301 1983 
78 Jachot 1981, ρ 73 
79C1 Jachot 1981,ρ 91, adetailed version of the accusations is Mitin [1931] 1974 
80 "Décret '11931)1983 
81 Cf Zapata 1983, ρ 27, Pascal 1974, ρ 1165 Important texts relating to this termination of philosophical 
discussion are 'Aus der Resolution ' [1931] 1974, Mitin [1931] 1974, and 'Decrei ' , [1931] 1983, pp 318-
320 Subsequently, Sten, Karev, Zonin, V Reznik were excluded from the OVMD, Deborm retained his 
position, together with TaiCilin and Razumovskij, but the new leadership of the OVMD was firmly in the hands 
of Mitin and Judin As to PZM. Debonn, Maksimov, Timirja/ev, and Michail NikolaeviC Pokrovski| (1868-
1932), the latter two being leading mechanicists, stayed as editors, but editorial policy was dominated by the 
"orthodox newcomers Mitin, Judin, and Adoralskij (cf Ahlberg 1960, ρ 103) 
82 See Negt 19742, which contains texts by Debonn, Buchann, Mitin and Stalin in German translation, Zapata 
1983, which offers a highly instructive introduction by D Lccourt, 'Avant le deluge', an equally valuable 
analysis by /apata, and French translations of the main texts of this period, and Gocrdt 1967, where some of the 
relevant texts are translated into German The classical monograph on this discussion is Ahlberg 1960, which 
contains an extensive bibliography (pp 130-135) Comprehensive renderings can be found in Dc George 1966, 
pp 180 183, Wetter 1960\ pp 161-204, Bochenski 1967% ρ 38f, and Jeu 1969, pp 44-54 Invaluable sources 
of information are Jachot 1981 and Alekseev 1990 
83 Cf Kotakowski 1981, III, ρ 601, and Graham 19873,
 p 7f 
84 D Lecourt, "Avant le déluge," preface to Zapata 1983, ρ I5f 
85 De George 1966, ρ 183 
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86 Zapata lists the following persons in the categories of "liquidationists" Minin, En£men, Adoratskij, 
"mechaniusts ' Timirjazev, Aksel'rod, Stcpanov, "dialecticians" Debonn, Sten, Karev, and "bolshevizators" 
Mitin, Judin, Ral'cevií, Maksimov, Kolman (et Zapata 1983, ρ 260 
87Goerdl 1984, ρ 84, η 81, according to Bochciíski, Mitin was "the main philosophical representant of 
contemporary dialectical materialism" in the 1930ies and I940ies, because he "participated in all condemnations 
of his over-indepcndcntly thinking colleagues" (Bochcnski 1951-, ρ 77) 
88 Cf "Beseda s akademikom Μ В Mitinym", on Mitin cf esp Korolcv 1988, who recounts that Mitin, who 
became ükddcmik in 1949 without having defended either a candidate's or a doctor's dissertation, pursued his 
career in spite of the fact that he was exposed as a plagiarist already in 1970 — he even was awarded the order of 
the Friendship of the Peoples | orden druiby narodov] shortly before his death in 1986, in spite of the fact that a 
Party commission was investigating the many scandals related to his name 
89 Cf Jachot 1981, ρ 15 
90 Lenin, PSS XXXXV, ρ 30 "The group of editors and collaborators of Pod ¿namenem marksizma should, in 
my opinion, be a sort of 'association of materialist friends of Hegelian dialectics " 
91 Cf Jachot 1981, ρ 10 
92 Cf Jachot 1981, ρ 73 f 
93 Cf Zapata 1983, ρ 328, and Bocheiíski 1967s, ρ 40 
94 Cf Volkov 1988, ρ 3, 3rd col 
95 "Einen besonderen "Stalinismus" hat es im sowjetischen Dogma nie gegeben" (Bochenski \96T>, ρ 7) 
There was only one fundamental change, vi7 the elimination of the "law of the negation of negation" from the 
canons of materialist dialectics for obvious political reasons if negation of negation was to be a law, the newly 
established Soviet state (a negation of the bourgeois state) was likely to be "negated" during the development 
towards stateless communism (cf Kotakowski 1981, III, ρ 122f) Similarly, the Marxian notion of the "asían 
mode of production" was cancelled, because it did not fit actual Soviet development policy in Central Asia 
(ibid ) 
96 Cf Dc George 1966, ρ 184 " the Parly is the arbiter of disputes and the ultimate judge of orthodoxy " 
97 IDc George 1966, ρ 183 One ot the last discussions, already totally dominated by politics, was held in 
October 1930 at the Presidium of the Communist Academy, preceding the intervention by the CK VKP(b) on 
25 January 1931, the stenographic accounts of which were only recently published in the USSR "Iz istom " 
1991, with addresses by V Ρ Miljutin and Debonn, Jachot quotes from Rjznoglasie ла fìlowislcom fronte (M -
L 1931, Jachot 1981, ρ 82ff), which apparently contained the same text, interesting details about the 
preparation of this episode -a visit by Mum, Judin, and Ral'cevio to Debonn, proposing him to denounce his 
pupils and to declare Stalin a great philosopher- are related by Volkov (Volkov 1988, ρ 3, 3rd col ) 
98 The idea of Marxism as a philosophical and ideological "doctrine" [ uCenie] was present in earlier Russian 
Marxism as well, but there never was one dominant and obligatory doctrine — this only became urgent when a 
government was established that regarded itself as Marxist (cf Goerdt 1980a) 
99 Cf Goerdt 1980b, ρ 235f 
100 It was not until the late 80ics that Lenin could be overtly deprived of this status as an important 
philosopher (cf, for example, Nikiforov I990b.p 119) 
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lOlDebonn 1924, ρ 81 
102 Cf Zapata 1983, ρ 78, η 1 
103 "Lenin is, in his person, the synthesis of a revolutionary thinker and a transformer of life" (Debonn 1924, 
ρ 81, cf also ρ 78) 
104 Debonn 1924, ρ 81, cf Volkov 1988, ρ 3, 2nd col "It is precisely Debonn to whom belongs the idea, 
that «leninism is the revolutionary Marxism of the epoch of disintegration of capitalism», — an idea, borrowed 
by Stalin and expressed by him in a slightly altered formulation " 
105 In his lectures at the Svcrdlov-univcrsity in 1924, On the Foundations ol Leninism, Stalin defined 
Leninism as follows "Leninism is Marxism in the era of imperialism and ol proletarian revolution More 
precisely Leninism is the theory and tactics of proletarian revolution in general, and the theory and tactics of 
dictatorship of the proletariat in particular" (Stalin, PSS VI, ρ 71) It should be stressed that this was not a 
theoretical excursion by Stalin, but an attempt to usurp Lenin's heritage by the already most powerful man in 
the Communist Party at that time Stalin was elected general secretary in April 1922 
106 In Soviet terminology "Marxism" and "Leninism" occur only in inseparable unity the Philosophical 
Encyclopedic Dictionary of 1983 defines "Leninism" briefly as " Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and 
proletarian revolutions, the epoch of the collapse of colonialism and of the victory of national liberation 
movements, the epoch of humanity's transition from capitalism to socialism and of the construction ot a 
communist society" (Il'iccv &c 1983, ρ 309), otherwise referring to "marksi/m-leninizm", which is defined as 
the scientific ideology of the working class, an integral and developing system of philosophical, economic 
and socio-political conceptions ( ) The scientific ideology of the working class was created by К Marx and F 
Engels, and further enriched and developed by V I Lenin In the present epoch the development of Marxism-
Lcninism is brought about by the collective theoretical effort of the communist brother-parties" (ibid , ρ 344) 
107 N A Karev in PZM 1924, №4-5, ρ 241, quoted after Jeu 1969, ρ 54 
108 A M Debonn, Z-enjn как myshtel' (Moskva - Leningrad 1929), quoted after Jeu 1969, ρ 54 
109 As appears also, e g , from Lev Davidovif Tróckij's [BronStcjn] (1879-1940) salutation to the first meeting 
of the OVM in June 1924 "You have in view three mutually connected tasks the propaganda of dialectical 
materialism, the struggle with idealism, and the struggle with the distortions ol dialectical materialism [italics 
mine, EvdZ] It seems to me that the last task is no less important than the first two — if only because in our 
country, ruled by a materialist party, idealism acts mainly in a devious manner, trying to tum materialist 
dialectics into a sophism, and to falsify it" (I D Trockij, "Pnvctstvic obsCemu sobraniju £lcno\-u£rcditelej 
«Obscestva voinstvujus6ch matenalislov»," PZM 1924, N"6-7, quoted from Jachot 1981, ρ 20f) 
110 "Both sides in the controversy being Marxist, both quoted Marx, Engels, and Lenin in their own behalf, and 
both insisted that their interpretation was the only correct interpretation of Marxism This much of the pattern 
of Soviet philosophy was already firmly established The method by which the controversy was resolved set the 
precedent for another and henceforth central aspect of the developing pattern" (De George 1966, ρ 180) 
l l lDonoso 1979, ρ 116f, quoting from Eiaydüof 21/12/1929 
112 Cf Ahlberg 1960, ρ 93f, Wetter I9604, ρ 208, and I ange 1955, p i l l 
113 Volkov 1988, ρ 3, 3rd col , cf also Korolev 1988, ρ 6, 3rd and 5th cols 
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114 As does, for example, Blakcley 1980, ρ 317, or Bochcnski 1967">, ρ 38t 
115 Ahlberg 1960, ρ 102, cf also Kotakowski 1981, III, ρ 90 "Es ging nicht um den Inhalt irgendwelcher 
Doktrinen — eigentlich unterschied sich der spatere, offiziell kanonisierte dialektische Materialismus nur 
minimal von dem Dcbonnschen —, sondern es ging —und das wurde übrigens in den Anschuldigungen immer 
wieder betont— um das sogenannte Prin/ip der Parteilichkeit oder vielmehr (denn die Dcborinistcn akzeptierten 
selbstverständlich dieses Prinzip) um dessen praktische Anwendung Die Debonnislen interessierten sich 
—gleichgültig, wie armselig ihre Produktion in intellektueller Hinsicht war— ernsthaft tur die Philosophie und 
bemühten sich auf ihre Weise, die Richtigkeil bestimmter Grundsätze des Marxismus und Leninismus zu 
beweisen Sic glaubten, ihre Philosophie habe den Aufbau des Sozialismus zu unterstützen, doch gerade deshalb 
bemühten sie sich, sie (ihre Philosophie) als Philosophie auszubauen Das Prinzip der Parteilichkeit" im 
slalinislischen Sinn verlangte von der Philosophie etwas anderes Es ging —obwohl das unablässig versichert 
wurde— überhaupt nicht darum, daß die Philosophie selbst irgendwelche Grundsal/c ausarbeitete oder zu 
irgendwelchen Wahrheiten gelangte, die sich in politischer Absicht anwenden oder benutzen ließen Daß die 
Philosophie der Partei zu dienen habe, bedeutete nur soviel, daß sie sich mit der Glonfi/icrung der jeweiligen 
Parteibeschlüsse /u befassen hatte und mit nichts anderem Die Philosophie sollte überhaupt kein Denkprozeß 
sein, sondern ein Mittel zur Verbreitung und Rechtfertigung der Staatsideologie in ihren jeweiligen, veränder-
lichen Formen ( ) Die Erfüllung untergeordneter Aulgaben wurde praktisch zur einzigen Daseinsberechtigung 
der Philosophie Genau darin und nicht in dem Inhalt der kanonisierten Lehrsatze bestand der Stalinismus auf 
dem Gebiet der Philosophie ' 
116 "Le travail de la revue a été separe aussi bien des tâches de la construction du socialisme en URSS, que des 
tâches du mouvement révolutionnaire international ( ) Séparant la philosophie de la politique, ne montrant pas 
dans tout son travail la prise de parti en philosophie et dans les sciences, ce groupe a ressuscite une des traditions 
et un des dogmes les plus nocifs de la IIe Internationale, celui du divorce de la theorie et de la pratique, tombant 
dans la position de I idealisme menchevisant sur toute une serie de questions des plus importantes" ( 'Décret du 
Cornue central du PCUS concernant le périodique Sous la bannière du marxisme, du janvier 1931," in Zapata 
1983, ρ 318f) 
117 Prochorov &c 19751, XXII, entry "Rossijskaja federacija,' ρ 255 
118 The title of a main publication from this episode, consisting of the materials of the meeting of the 
presidium of the Communist Academy on 18 and 20 October 1930 was О raznoglasii na filosofskom fronte," 
Vestnik kommunisticeskoi akamedn 40-1, pp 12-165, and 42, pp 20-89, and also the title ol a collection of 
key texts of this period (ct Jachot 1981, ρ 82ff, and η 43) 
119 "The condemnation of 1931 issued in the so-called dead period -a time of increasing polarization of Soviet 
philosophy toward ever greater adulation ol Stalin as (ne philosopher which lasted through World War II and 
ended in the 'discussion ' of 1947" (Blakcley 1980, ρ 317) , according to De George, the expression was coined 
by Bochcnski (cf R Τ De George, "Pretace," in Dahm &e 1988. ρ 1, and Bochcnski 1967% ρ 43) 
120 'Die sowjetische Philosophie ist 1931 domestiziert worden und funktioniert nunmehr als Instrument der 
kommunistischen Herrschaft" (Lange 1955, ρ 111), and "Mit seiner Kodifizierung der grundlegenden Fragen 
des Leninismus verwandelt er [Stalin, Evd7] die Philosophie endgültig in ein Herrschaftsinslrumenl der 
fuhrenden Gremien der Kommunistischen Partei, der Inhaber der absoluten Gewalt in der Sowjet-Union" (ibid , 
ρ 114), "Henceforth, philosophy in the Soviet Union was an arm of the Party and subservient to it" (De 
George 1966, ρ 183) 
121 Berdjaev 1953, ρ 78 "Die jungen Sowjet-Philosophen protestieren energisch gegen die Vermengung der 
Philosophie mit der Naturwissenschaft Dies aber nicht im Namen der Freiheit und Unabhängigkeit des 
philosophischen Denkens Die 'Naturalisierung' der Philosophie widerspricht der aktuahslischen Haltung der 
kommunistischen Partei " 
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122 Cf Hollak 1961, ρ 240f, Kamcnka 1972, ρ 165, and Zapata 1988, ρ 98, it may well be argued, as does 
Kolakowski, that this Stalinist version of partijnost' was nothing but (he logical consequence of Lenin's notion 
"Es ist ganz, und gar unmöglich, den stahnistischcn Marxismus durch eine Menge bestimmter Satze, Ideen oder 
Begriffe 7U charakterisieren Sein Unterscheidungsmerkmal sind nicht irgendwelche Satze, sondern allein die 
Tatsache, daß es eine perfekt ausgebildete absolute Instanz gab, die darüber urteilte, was im jeweiligen 
Augenblick Marxismus ist und was nicht Der Marxismus laßt sich nur als das aktuelle Urteil jener Instanz (d h 
Stalin persönlich) definieren ( ) Die Gleichung Wahrheit = Weltanschauung des Proletariats = Marxismus = 
Weltanschauung der Partei = Urteile der Parteiführung = Urteile des Fuhrers ist in der Leninschen Version des 
Marxismus vollkommen korrekt" (Kolakowski 1981, III, ρ I4f, cf also op cit, ρ 88f, ρ 104Γ, and ρ 116) 
123 "The exalted lone, the immense epithets, the attribution to Stalin of merits that he did not possess, —all 
this gained strength in the first half of the Wies and became standard thought in the second half' (Frolov &c 
1989, Ι, ρ 265), for an anthology of Stalin-glorification by Soviet philosophers, see Bocheriski 19675, ρ 154f 
124 Cf. Wetter 1960\ ρ 209 
125 Cf esp Nethercott 1993, on the significance of MIFL1 also Dakhurst 1991, ρ 5f, according to Goerdt, 
Pomcranc was bom in 1918 (cf Goerdt 1984, ρ 106) 
126 Cf Nethercott 1993, ρ 215, and SCipanov &c 1982, ρ 74f, some sources speak of Moskovskij Institut 
hilosotu, Literatury, ¡stoni (IovCuk 1967, ρ 69, Gulyga 1984, ρ 301) or Minkovsky Institut ¡stoni Filosofi! 
ι Literatury (SCipanov &c 1982, ρ 75) 
127 Cf Nethercott 1993, ρ 215 
128 Cf Nethercott 1993, ρ 219 
129 To Central Asia (ASchabad, the capital of Turkmenia, according to Novochat'ko (Novochat'ko 1991, ρ 8), 
TaSkent, capital of Uzbekistan, according to Nethercott 1993, ρ 223), where they were reunited into MGU, and 
then to Sverdlovsk [Ekaterinburg] (Cf SCipanov &c 1982, ρ 75, and Novochalko 1991, ρ 8f) 
130 Novochat'ko 1991, ρ 9 
131 Ci Goerdt 1980b, ρ 236 
132 Hollak 1961, ρ 240 
133СГ Kolakowski 1981, Ι, ρ 151 
134 Cf Planty-Bonjour 1974, ρ 281, who quotes R Garaudy, Ыпте (Pans, 1968), ρ 40 
135 "Décret " [1931] 1983, ρ 319, Zapata's "la ligne générale du Parti", as well as Welter's "die Generallinie 
der Partei ' (19561, ρ 593), both refer to Russian "gcncral'naja linija parili" 
136 "Particular mention should be made of the official textbook on philosophy, written, it is true, a little later, 
and edited by M Mitin It came to replace the aforementioned and other textbooks on philosophy after the 
"condemnation" and discharge from active scientific work of many dcbonnist authors" (Jachot 1981, ρ 26) On 
the earlier textbooks, see Jachot 1981, pp 21-26 Jachot stresses the fact that there were not only several -he 
mentions 11- uiicbniki, but also that they were considerably different trom each other One of his apparent 
favorites, .Kurs teorn istoriöcskogo matcnalizma by Ι Ρ Razumovskij (Moskva (1924) I9291), with such 
"unorthodox" tenets as the division of philosophy into ontology and epistemology ("gnoseology", as the 
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Russians say), saw a third edition as late as 1929, and displayed, according to Jachot, "the independent thought 
of the author, his attempt to investigate many difficult philosophical problems" (p 24), as did another uuebnik, 
Vvedenw ν dmlckti£c4kij matcnalizm by the "debonnist" G Tymjanskij, issued for the second time in 1930 
(ibid ) 
137 Zapata 1988, ρ 105, et also Jachot 1981, ρ 26 
138 Μ В Mitin (red ), Dialcktiícskij ι istoníeskij matenalizm (Moskva. 1933) 
139 Cl Jachot 1981, ρ 27 
140 Cf Donoso 1979, ρ 117, Kamcnka 1972, ρ 165, Wetter 1960 s, ρ 2 ЮГ "Die Angriffe gegen die 
philosophische Tätigkeit Mitins und seiner Mitarbeiter bedeuteten aber wiederum nicht, daß eine grundlegende 
Veränderung im philosophischen Lehrgchalt des Bolschewismus stattgefunden halte Wenn wir die spateren 
Veröffentlichungen mit denen der Jahre 1931-1936 vergleichen, so finden wir keinen Unterschied in der 
vcrtochlenen Lehre Die Unterschiede betreffen hauptsachlich die formelle Seite die Anordnung des Materials, 
die Ausrichtung der Philosophie auf die politische Tätigkeit der Partei ( ), das Bestehen auf der Parteimaßigkcit 
der Philosophie, die Hervorhebung Stalins fur die Philosophie u dgl , mit einem Wort, die Verschärfung der 
'Diktatur des Proletariats" auch auf dem Gebiet der Philosophie" (p 211) 
141 Over the years 1929-1932 the Academy of Sciences was gradually brought under control, but even then 
influence was largely limited to ' ideologically sensitive" areas such as philosophy, social science, history, and 
law, even though the theory of proletarian as opposed to bourgeois science was developed during this period, it 
look until the late 40ics before this theory began to have its disastrous elfects on Soviet science (ct Graham 
19871, pp 9tl, and Koiakowski 1981,111, ρ 106) 
142 "In 1936 the Philosophical Institute of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR was founded" (Prochorov &c 
19751, XXII, entry "Rossijskaja federacija, ρ 255), director ol the Institut ПІочоГи from 1936 to 1939 was 
V V Adoratskij, from 1939 to 1944 Ρ F Judin (cf Welter 1960s, ρ 213) 
143 Welter I9605, ρ 209 "Die ersten Jahre der neuen philosophischen Leitung waren verhältnismäßig sehr 
fruchtbar an philosophischem Ertrag ( ) Mitin gab 1936 in der Zeitschrift "Unter dem Banner des Marxismus" 
einen Überblick über die philosophische Tätigkeit seit der "Säuberung" von 1931 wohl keine Periode der 
Sowjctphilosophie sei so fruchtbar gewesen an philosophischer Literatur wie die Jahre 1931-1936 ", and 211 
"Zudem laßt sich in den unmittelbar folgenden Jahren ein Sinken der philosophischen Publikationen auch der 
Zahl nach feststellen" 
144 Frolov &c 1989, Ι, ρ 265. or "Stalinist terror destro>ed the bigger part of Marxist philosophers In ihose 
years V A Vaganjan, I К Luppol, Ja L Sten, N К Karev.SJu Semkovskjj and many others perished The 
first groups of graduates from the Institute ot Red Professors, that had prepared teachers and social scientists, 
were almost totally wiped out" (Alekseev 1990, ρ 19), "Nearly all philosophical cadres were debonnists 
And they were all annihilated" (Jachot 1981, ρ 117) The story of one of the many Marxist philosophers who 
were arrested as "enemies ot the people" in 1937, a certain Fedor Matveevic Vasjaev, was recently published (cf 
Zclenov &c 1990) he was accused of being the ideologist of a group that planned an attack on Stalin personally 
(op cit, ρ 322), spent his lime in the Extreme North (Kolyma, Igarka), where he was philosophically saved by 
a copy of Hegel's Collected Works in the local library (ibid , ρ 325), rehabilitated in 1954, and allowed to 
return to Gor'kij in 1955 
145 Ct Hagcmeister 1989, ρ 362, η 92. and Losev 1991, ρ 514 
146ScanIan 1985, ρ 12 
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147LOSCV, Dialcktika mifa, in Losev 1991, ρ 112, cf Hagemeistcr 1989, ρ 162, η 92, Scanlan 1984, ρ 
225, and idem 1985, ρ 12, η 2 As a matter of fact, Losev's position is more subtle than is suggested by this 
isolated quotation dialectical materialism, according to him, is a crying absurdity from a purely dialectical point 
of view because there is no necessity to absolutize precisely this concept matter is an abstract, general concept 
like any other, not a gi\cn object Dialectical materialism has to recognize the fact that it is based on a 
revelation, as such forms a religious myth and, insofar as this myth is presented as absolute truth, a dogma 
' But liberate dialectical materialism of the need to prove the primacy of belief dialectical materialism 
becomes a well balanced theory, and, moreover, a purely dialectical theory (no longer abstract, metaphysical), 
like classical and medieval plalonism was dialectical, absolutely consequent and non-contradictory, like any 
dogmatic theology is non-contradictory, as long as the question is not put raised about the foundation of Us 
ultimate object, only to be grasped by faith, in myth, as a highest revelation" (Losev 1991, ρ I I2f) In other 
words, dialectical materialists should recognize that their pretended philosophy in fact was a religious 
dogmatism, and there would be no problem at all, that this was unacceptable to Soviet philosophical authorities 
is not hard to guess 
148 Cf Haardt 1993, ρ 190 
149 The project of digging a canal to the White Sea [Bcloe wore in Russian, hence the name ВсІотогкапаІ] was 
one among many so-called 'Corrective Labor Camps' that were established in the 1920s and 1930s, and 
performed a major role not only in suppression and terror, but also in the ' construction of socialism in one 
country they were punishment and slavery at the same lime, thus reviving an old Russian tradition 
150 Cf Avenncev &c 1989-, entry "Losev," ρ 324 and Tacho-Godi 1991, ρ 15, cf on the campaign against 
Losev in 1930 Scanlan 1984, ρ 224f, Gocrdt 1984, ρ 596, η 290, Hagemeistcr 1985, ρ 23 and ρ 50f, η 145-
149, and Haardt 1993, ρ 188ff As late as 1984 the facts about Losev s (ate after 1930 were, it seems, not 
known Scanlan presumes that Losev "did not, apparently, suflcr imprisonment or professional ostracism (op 
cit, ρ 225) ', and reports his leaching activity at the Moscow Krupskaja Regional Pedagogical Institute from 
1931 onwards, Goerdt also reports him as teaching there as early as 1931, and mentions that he "may have been 
imprisoned for 10 months in 1930 (ibid )", today we know that he was in jail for 17 months in the I jubjanka 
after his arrest on 18/04/1930, and freed from the camp autumn 1933 (
c
f Haardt 1993, ρ 191) 
151 Florenskij's exact date of death was uncertain for a long lime (cf Hagemeister 1985, ρ 53, η 169, and 
Goerdt 1989, ρ 705) according to some sources, he died in 1943 (Zapata 1988 ρ 70, Gocrdt 1984, ρ 83) or 
even 1949 (cf Hagemcister 1985, ρ 53, η 169), others, however, give 1937 (e g , Avenncev &c 19892, entry 
"Florenskij," ρ 710, Zcnkovskij 1989, Π, ρ 415) Until the end of 1989 15 December 1943 was the official 
date, bul it was changed, on request of his relatives, to 8 December 1937 (cf Ρ Florenskij, An den Was­
serscheiden des Denkens, ein Lesebuch (Berlin Kontext Verlag, 1991), ρ 258) 
As to Spet, he died, according to a recent Soviet source, died on 17 November 1937 alter having been 
"unjustly repressed (Avenncev &c 19892 entry Spel, ρ 75If), Goerdt reports thai Spet was arrested in 
October 1937 and, according to the protocol of his rehabilitation died on 23 March 1940 (Goerdt 1984, ρ 594, 
and Haardt 1993, ρ 70, cf also Zcnkovskij who reports that he died in a concentration camp in 1940 
(Zen kovskij 1989, II, ρ 369)), more recent sources give 1938 as his -uncertain- date of death, but also state 
that he was arrested on 27 October 1937 and executed 19 days later, ι e on 14 November 1937 (Alckseev 1990, 
ρ 525, and Alckseev &c 1993, ρ 207) 
According to Haardt, Florenskij was executed on 16 November 1937, and Spet arrested for the first time 
in 1935, and exiled to first Enisejsk, then Tomsk where he translated a Russian translation of Hegel's 
Phänomenologie des Geistes (which appeared 1959 shorlly afler his rehabilitation in 1956, as part of ihe Soviet 
edition ot Hegel's Works), to be arrested again in 1937, and executed as well (cl Haardt 1993, ρ 70) 
152Somerville 1943, ρ 475 
153 Kline 1952, ρ 127 
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154 Cf Zapata 1983, ρ 329, А еппсе\ &с 19892, entry ' Dcborin," ρ 149, and Alekseev &c 1993, ρ 59 
155 Cf Wetter 19605, ρ 210 
156 Cf also Bochcnski 1967">, ρ 51 
157 De George 1966, ρ 186 
158 Bochcnski 1967s, ρ 7, and, more specifically, Zapata "Pour aborder 1 étude de cette periode [ 1931 -1956, 
EvdZ] il faut d abord se défaire de certains stereotypes qui maigre leur allure «critique», ne font en réalité que 
reproduire limage que voulait donner le stalinisme de lui-même En philosophie, ces stéréotypes concernent 
surtout le mythe dune philosophie stalinienne monolithique simple reflet d autres monohtismes mythiques 
comme ceux du Parti ou de la société soviétique dans son ensemble" (Zapata 1988, ρ 100) 
159 De George 1966, ρ 183, or, as Wetter put it, " in der ganzen Epoche des Slalinismus [war Stalin] der 
einzige Mann in der Sowjetunion, des es wagen durfte, etwas neues zu sagen' (Wetter I9605, ρ 245), a 
judgement that was almost literally repeated, in 1962, b> the Soviet philosopher Aleksandr Tedorovic Okulov 
(1908-1993) " le culte de la personnalité plaçait au premier plan dans le travail philosophique lart du 
commentateur Une seule personne était en droit de creer quelque chose de nouveau, d'original" (A F Okulov 
in VF 1962, №1, quoted from Jeu 1969 ρ 64) 
160 Cf Bochenski ХЭЬТ1, ρ 37f "Man kann schwerlich Stalin einen Philosophen nennen, seine operaomma 
philowphica bestehen lediglich aus einem halben Kapitel der Parteigcschichtc (28 Seiten in der russischen 
Ausgabe von 1947) |= Stalin 1938 EvdZl welches selbst nur ein Resume der Hauptthesen von Marx und 
Engels, im Spiegel Lenins gesehen, ist - und aus etwa 40 Seiten Betrachtungen über die Linguistik aus dem 
Jahre 1950 (note Als ein weiteres philosophisches Werk Stalins wird oft Probleme des Leninismus [Ob 
osnovac/ileninizma] genannt Das ist ein Mißverständnis, denn dieses Buch handelt nicht von der Philosophie, 
abgesehen von einigen Randbemerkungen) , cf also Kamenka 1972, ρ 165 " to the professional philosopher 
there is not one sentence of Stalins work that displays any philosophical competence or insight", and Dc 
George 1966, ρ 184 "Unlike Marx and I enin, Stalin was neither philosophically inclined nor trained" On 
Slahn as a philosopher cf further Lange 1955, pp 104ff and Wetter 1960s, pp 245-268 
161 Blakeley 1980, ρ 317 A typical example can be found in Aleksandrov 19462, ρ 475, where he enumerates 
a "series of supreme works , and mentions 4 titles by Marx, 4 by Engels, 1 by Marx and Engels jointly [the 
Communist Manifesto], 6 by Lenin, and then manages to give no less than 7 titles by Stalin (Anarchi/m ill 
soLializm >, Korotko o partijnytb ra/noglasijath, Marku/m ι naaonal'nyj vopros, Ob osnovach leninizma, К 
voprosam leninizma, Istorija VKP(b), kratkij kurs, and О Vehkoj Otcöcstvcnnoj Vojnc Sovctskogo Sojuza)' 
162 Mitm 1950, ρ 15 for the deification of Stalin as a philosopher, see Wetter I9605, pp 245-250, and esp 
19561, pp 237 247), on his renovations in Marxist-Leninist philosophy, see De George 1966 pp 189-194, 
and Wetter 1960S,
 p p 248-268 
163 Cf Jachot 1981 pp 196-220, although Bakhursl is right to criticize Jachot for overstating the "eclipse" of 
Lenin by Stalin (Bakhurst 1991, ρ 95, η 2), this does not disprove the main point the establishment of a cult 
of the person of the leader(s) of the Party 
164 Cf Berdjaev 19532, ρ 9f " i ) l c christliche Wahrheit hat sich in der Fülle des Lebens nicht zu verwirklichen 
vermocht — also unternehmen die bosen Machte die Realisierung der christlichen Wahrheit " 
165 Ct Volkov 1988, ρ 3, 4th col 
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166 Cf Volkov 1988, ρ 3, 5th col 
167 The text, which appeared first in Pravda of 12/09/1938, can be found in Stalin, PSS, XIV, pp 279-326, cf 
for a brief rendering of us contents Donoso 1979, pp 117ff, Kotakowski 1981, III, ρ 108, 112f, Kamcnka 
1972, ρ 165f, or Wetter 1964, pp 43ΓΓ, and idem 1960\ pp 246ff, for a fundamental critique of Stalin's 
version of diamal by a Russian philosopher, see Kline 19">6 (review of Hlosofskaja muleta marksizma 
(Frankfurt am Main Posev, 1952) by Boris PetroviC Vyseslavcev (1877-1954), one of the idealists exiled 
1922) 
168 Cf Scanlan 1985, ρ 107, according to a recent Soviet source, "its author, though it is until the present day 
not really clear, whether that indeed was Stalin, was deified" (Frolov &t 1989 I ρ 265), Zapata suggests that 
M B Minn "edited the text (Zapata 1988, ρ 105), according to Wetter, it was mainly after 1948 that Stalin 
was presented as the author — the original Russian edition and the German translation were attributed to "a 
committee of the Central Committee of the VKP(b) , and the Italian translation of 1944 mentioned Stalin, 
Kalinin Molotov, Voroíilov, Kaganovif, Mikojan, Zdanov, and Berija [ι с all full members of the Politburo 
as of 1944 with the exception of A A Andreev and N S ChrusCev, EvdZ (cf I owenhardl, J , Het Russische 
Politburo (Assen van Gorcum, 1978), pp 162ff], adding that the work was produced sotte la reda7ione di 
Stalin", but Wetter mentions Ε M Jaroslavskij as the actual editor (cf Wetter 19605, ρ 212) 
169 Cf Wetter 19561, ρ 242 
170 Cf Bochcriski 1967s, ρ 48, and Wetter 19563
 p 242 
171 Cf Wetter 1960\ ρ 248 
172 Frolov &c 1989,1, ρ 265f, quoting KPSS ν re¿oljuujach ι retemjach s'ezdov, kontcrcncij ι plcnumov CK 
(Moskva, 1954), HI, ρ 316, also in Ogurcov 1987, ρ 177 (Ogurcov appears to be the author of this section in 
Frolov &c 1989) 
173 CI Lange 1955, ρ 114, De George 1966, ρ 183 
174 For example, the "law' of materialist dialectics, which tells us that "everything is in permanent movement, 
change, and dc\elopment" ["Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics regards nature not as a state of rest and 
immobility, stagnation and immutability, but as a state of permanent movement and change, continuous 
renewal and development, ", Stalin tells us (Stalin, PSS XIV, ρ 282)] turns every scientific observation of 
movement, change, or development into a confirmation ol diamat 
175 Esp in the field of historical materialism, Stalin turned Marxism into an absolutely flexible and uncritical 
instrument ' Emphasis on the potent force ot ideas -De George wrote- is contrary to the spirit of Marx and 
Engels, but coincides well both will the aclivistic interpretation of Marxism espoused by Lenin and with 
Stalin s own action in changing Soviet society from above In addition, it emphasi/cs the importance ot theory 
and increases the necessity for indoctrination ot the masses by propaganda in order to mobilize and organize 
them to act according lo the plans set up by the Parly leader or leaders ( ) For classical Marxism the only 
motive forces were economic Stalins reinterpretation not only justified his practice, let to further changes in 
policy, and increased efforts at moral persuasion and propaganda, but it took the teeth and sting out of the 
classical Marxist doctrine of historical materialism' (De George 1966, ρ 194) 
176 Volkov 1988. ρ 3, 5th col 
177 Cf Frolov &c 1989, Ι, ρ 266, and Prochorov &c I9751, XXII, entry ' Rossijskaja federacija," ρ 256f 
"At the end of the 1930ies, beginning ot the 1940ies, the number of studies into the history of philosophy 
increased " 
1 6 5 
Notes 
178 Frolov &c 1989, Ι, ρ 265 Of decisive importance for the further development of Soviel philosophy is 
Stalin's "explanation" ot the concept of 'dialectical materialism' "It is called dialectical materialism, because its 
approach of natural phenomena, its method of investigation into natural phenomena, its epistemology is 
dialectical, and its interpretation of natural phenomena, its understanding of natural phenomena, its theory 
materialist" (Stalin, PSS XIV, ρ 279) The importance of this text should not be underestimated "It is 
important primarily because it was slavishly followed and quoted in works of Soviet philosophers from its 
appearance until Stalin's death, and because the History was used as a basic text in Soviet and Party schools and 
became familiar to a generation of Soviet people still alive today" (De George 1966, ρ 187) 
179 Mitin 1944, ρ 77 
180 Ct Wetter 1960s, ρ 214 
181 Cf De George 1966, ρ 187, the last issues were nos 4 and 5 of 1944 
182 Arzakanjan 1987, ρ 133, cf also Gocrdt 1984, ρ 117 
183Kcdrov 1988, ρ 92 
184 Bakhursl 1991, ρ 5, or, as Arsenij VladimiroviC Gulyga (b 1921) describes this period "When in 1938 it 
became once again possible to learn "to be a philosopher' [uCitya "na filosofa"], it appeared that there was 
nobody left to leach At the entire faculty in Moscow there was only one professor who mastered the subject, В 
Cernysev [= Boris Stcpanovic Cernysev (1896-1944), one of Il'enkov's teachers at MIFLI, EvdZ, cf SCipanov 
1982, ρ 244] ( ) During the war he was accused of "mistakes in the illumination ol German philosophy", and 
he died comparatively young" (Gulyga 1990, ρ 18")), if Cernysev died "comparatively young", this was, 
according to a recent source (naming him Boris Sergeevic instead of Boris Stcpanoviî), due to political pressure 
Boris SergeeviC died already in 1944, driven to an infarct by the first generation of philosophical "hacks" at 
MGU, which had firmly seized the philosophical faculty during the war" (Novochat'ko 1991, ρ 9) 
185 Cf Tacho-Godi 1991, ρ 16, and Avenncev &c 19892,
 e n l r y "Losev," ρ 324 
186Cf Kosiccv 1986, ρ 12, who mentions 1943, and Siipanov &c 1982, ρ 176 
187 Cf Tacho-Godi 1991, ρ 16 
188 Ρ S Popov, Logika Amtotelja ι logikd formal'naja (1945), V F Asmus, Logika (1947) (cf KosiCev 1986, 
ρ 12), also a revised edition of a lexlbook by G I Celpanov, UCehmk logiki ((1897) 194610), is mentioned (cf 
Siipanov &c 1982, ρ 176), this Gcorgij IvanoviS Celpanov (1862-1936) was a idealist philosopher, and a 
professor of logic at Moscow university, who chose the side of the new, Bolshevik government after 1917, but 
nevertheless was dismissed from the Psychological Institute that he had founded at MGU, and could publish very 
little until his death (cr Zen'kovskij 19892, Η, ρ 235f), the 1946 edition of his UCcbmklogiki was the tenth 
edition, issued in 100,000 copies (cf Kondakov 1983, ρ 477), according to Kotakowski, these textbooks were 
"old-fashioned renderings, hardly going beyond Aristotle's syllogistic" (Kotakowski 1981, III, ρ 145) 
189Cf SCipanov &c 1982, ρ 249f, on Janovskaja, the "pioneer" of mathematical logic, about as suspect of 
being "bourgeois" as formal logic was, in the USSR sec Kondakov 1983, ρ 230, and esp Hanggi 1971, pp 
33tf 
190 Kamen ka 1963, ρ I 
191 Berdjaev (1932) 1953 The German edition ot 1953 reportedly was printed in millions of copies for illegal 
distribution in the GDR (cf ν Gelre 1964, ρ 152) 
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192 Cf Wetter I960 s, ρ ν, and Η Dahm, Seid nüchtern und wachsam, Gustav A Wetter und die Philosophis-
che Sowjetologtc (München Erich Wewcl Verlag, 1991), ρ 9 
193 "Die Sowjet-Philosophie ist eigentlich keine Philosophie aber vielmehr eine Art gottloser "Theologie" 
( ) Die philosophische Diskussion ist hier Entlarvung der Häresien und Exkommunikation der überführten 
Ketzer" (Berdjaev 19532, ρ 79) 
194 Somerville 1974, ρ xii, reference is to Somerville 1946 
195 ΓΙΊίεν &c 1983, entry "Somervill," ρ 626, and Avennccv &c 19892, entry "SomerviH," ρ 600 "As a 
result of a two-year stay in the USSR (1935-37) S wrote the first American book on Soviet philosophical 
science ("Soviet Philosophy", 1946)", Somerville himself spoke about his work as " the first Western book 
on Soviet philosophy from an examination of original sources " (Somerville 1974, ρ xii), and in 1946 he 
stated "So far as I know, no other scholar has ever gone to the U S S R with this kind of mission in the field 
of philosophy, in spite of the vast importance of the subject " (Somerville 1946, ρ ix) 
196 Somerville 1943, ρ 472, and idem 1946, ρ ιχ 
197 Somerville 1943, p. 471 
198 Somerville 1946, ρ 256 
199 Somerville 1946, ρ îxf "Some people will probably read this book, not to find out how much accurate or 
useful information there may be in it, but how much "sympathy" for the Soviet Union They will undoubtedly 
find what they are looking for I have tried to make the book true to the content and meaning of a living 
philosophy as it is found among those who live by it It that sort of thing is not done with a certain amount of 
"sympathy", it cannot be done at all " 
200 Somerville 1943, ρ 473f 
201 Luppol, however, was "groundlessly suppressed", reportedly died in 1943 in prison in Saratov, and was post­
humously rehabilitated (cf Avenncev&c 19892, entry "Luppol," ρ 326, Alekseev 1990, ρ 520, Alekseev &c 
1993, ρ 113, and Frolov 1989, ρ 56, η 2) 
202 Cf Somerville 1943, ρ 472, cf also Bocheriski 1967·\ ρ 40 "Es ist allerdings nicht wahr, daß er 
[Deborin, EvdZ] auf andere Weise noch bestraft wurde außer seiner Entlassung aus dem Posten als Chefredakteur 
der Zeitschrift IPZM. bvdZ] " 
203 "Probably the reason why the impression has arisen that people considered guilty of philosophical 
"deviations" arc arrested or executed in the Soviet Union is that some persons, like Bukhann, who were shot in 
the "treason trials" were philosophers and writers The popular mind then jumped to the conclusion that it 
must have been because of their philosophical opinions that they were executed However, there is no evidence, 
apart from rumors, for such a conclusion in that instance or any other instance The fact ot the matter is that 
Bukhann and the others were accused of overt acts of conspiracy with foreign powers to bring about armed 
invasion and military defeat of the U S S R They admitted being guilty of a sufficient number of these acts to 
have warranted severe punishment under the criminal code of any country in the world" (Somerville 1946, ρ 
245), cf also Pirkcr &c 1963 
204 Somerville 1946, ρ 245 
205 "Mil der Appropriation dieser ideologischen Plattform auf dem Gebiet der Philosophie hatte die Partei einen 
neuen, spezifischen Standpunkt in allen philosophischen Fragen gewonnen Mit ihr waren die ideologischen 
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Denkschemata in den Bereich der sowjetischen Philosophie eingeführt, die voll und ganz den Intentionen der 
Partei entsprachen die Philosophie ging in die Verfügungsgewalt der Partei über und konnte mit Hilfe der 
Prinzipien der "Parteilichkeit und ' Aktualität zur Rechtfertigung ihrer ökonomischen, sozialen und politischen 
Maßnahmen benutzt werden Im selben Maße aber, wie sich die neue Konzeption in den nächsten Monaten im 
Kampf gegen die dialektische Philosophie durchsetzte, verlor die sowjetische Philosophie ihre immanenten 
Wdhrheitskntcncn und verwandelte sich in einen Teil der bolschewistischen Ideologie der Slalin-Ara" (Ahlberg 
I960, ρ 94) 
206 2dano\ 1947, ρ 272 
207Blakeley 1980, ρ 317 
208 CI Kamenka 1972, ρ 166 and idem 1965, ρ 93f 
209 Ct Wetter I956"1, ρ 303 who refers to S Kaftanov, "Vsememo uluCSat' prepodavanie osnov marksizma-
lenim/ma ν \ysscj slolc, Bolscvik 1949.ΝΊ2.ρρ 22-33 
210 The discussion was held in two stages in March 1947, a discussion at the IF with 15 participants, and in 
lune 1947 a large congress with some 100 Soviet philosophers participating — ¿danov reports that 98 people 
had registered for the discussion, producing 55 speeches ( Г 1947, №1, ρ 288), cf also Bochenski 1967'\ ρ 
42, cl Ліапо 1947, ρ 256, Ballestrem 1963а, ρ 116, and Kotakowski 1981, III, pp 141ff 
211 Cf Bochenski 1967s, ρ 42, Wetter 1960s. pp 216-218, Blakcley 1964 ρ 76 and Kamenka 1965, ρ 94 
212 2danov 1947, ρ 268 
213 A broad ideological offensive, mililantly anti-Western, named after A A ¿danov, whose son, Ju A ¿danov 
was married from 1948 to 1953 with Stalin's daughter Svetlana This MdnovSHina was not primarily a struggle 
for the purity of Marxist Leninist ideology what was at stake was the direct utility of science and philosophy 
lor the reconstruction of the country (csp of agriculture and industry), and the consolidation of the Parly's 
authority (cl Graham 19872,
 p цг, Kotakowski 1981, III, ρ 137, and Bochenski 1967s, ρ 42, cf also 
¿xlanov 1947, ρ 256 and ρ 27If) 
214 ' Since Alexandrov s previous work on the history of Western Philosophy [G F Alcksandrov, OSerk ¡stoni 
fílosofíi na Zdpddc (Moskva izd Sovetskoj Nauki, 1939)] caused no such storm, since the book under 
discussion had been awarded a Stalin Pn/e and been adopted by the Minislrj of Education as a university 
textbook and since Alexandrov was himself made head of the ΙΓ a few years after [as early as 1947 according to 
other sources (et Jeu 1969, ρ 445 and Il'icev &c 1983, entry "Alcksandrov," ρ 19] the conference, it seems 
that Alexandrov's book was merely the pretext for calling a conference of philosophers" (Dc George 1966, ρ 
188) 
215 2danov 1947, ρ 267 
216 "О polozcnii na nasem filosofskom fronte," in ¿danov 1947, pp 267-272 
217 2danov 1947, ρ 267 
218¿danov 1947, ρ 268 ' Actual problems of the present day arc hardly being elaborated ( ) In philosophical 
work neither a militant spirit, nor Bolshevik speed can be felt " 
219 2danov 1947, ρ 268 'The Philosophical Institute presents, in my opinion, a rather cheerless picture, it 
does not unite the workers from the periphery, has no link to them, and therefore is in fact not a Soviet 
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institution The provincial philosophers are left to their own devices, and they represent, as you can see, a great 
force that is, unfortunately, not made use of" 
220Zdanov 1947, ρ 268 "The subject matter of philosophical texts, including those which aim at a scientific 
grade, is directed towards the past, to quiet and not very responsible themes, such as, for example "Copermcan 
heresy past and present" (Animation in the audience) This leads to a certain revival of scholasticism " 
221 Bocheriski 1967s, ρ 49, η * "Wahrend der Diskussion im Juni 1947 haben sich scharfe Proteste gegen 
diese «Zilatologie» (citatohgija, citdtnyjpodehod) erhoben, so besonders seitens V A Cagin (VF 1, 200b) und 
M M Baskin (160d) Zdanov hat sich dann (256a) entschuldigt, daß er trotzdem zitieren musse, und das tut nicht 
nur er, sondern tun fast alle anderen Schriftsteller, auch nach der «Diskussion» [Bochenski reters to VF. 1947, 
№1, the figures indicating page and column] " 
222 "This [June 24, 1947] was the day that A Zhdanov, passed down the word from on high that Soviet 
philosophers were to stop their scholastic discussions on "safe" topics, to emulate the "Leninist style' of 
philosophizing, and in general to be "more creative'" (Blakeley 1980, ρ 317), and "Im Jahre 1947 hielt es 
die kommunistische Parteiführung in der UdSSR fur erforderlich, die Folgen des Kriegsbundmsses mit den 
westlichen Demokratien an der "philosophischen Front ' auszumerzen Schdanow benutzte -in Übereinstim-
mung mit dem Politburo- die Diskussion über ein von dem damals fuhrenden sowjetischen Philosophen 
Alcxandrow verfaßtes Werk über die Geschichte der westeuropaischen Philosophie, um den Philosophen die 
"Leviten" zu lesen In seinem "Diskussionsbeitrag" stachelte er die Philosophen zu erhöhter Agressivitat gegen 
die "bürgerliche" Philosophie auf, stellte ihnen Aufgaben und kritisierte die von Alexandrow unwidersprochen 
vertretene Auffassung von der Stellung der marxistischen Philosophie im Rahmen der abendlandischen 
Philosophie ( ) Er [der Marxismus] soll eine Revolution in der Philosophie bedeuten, wodurch der 
Marxismus weil über alle anderen philosophischen Systeme herausgehoben wird" (Lange 1955, ρ 20If), cf 
also Wetter 1960^, pp 215-222 en Bochenski 19675, pp42f 
223 Μ Ρ Baskin, m VF 1947, №1, ρ 161, quoted from Bochenski 19675, ρ 41 
224 Aleksandrov 1947, ρ 299 
225 Jüdin was director of the IF AN from 1938 until 1944 (cf Avermcev &СІ9892, entry "Judin," ρ 780), 
Mitin was director of the Institut fìlosofìi of the Communist Academy until the fusion in 1936, when he 
became vice-director ot the IF AN until 1944 (cf Avennccv &c 19892, entry Mitin," ρ 368, and Zapata 1983, 
ρ 329), Svetlov was director of the IF AN from 1944 until 1946 (cf Jeu 1969, ρ 539), Vascckij, finally, from 
1946 until 1947 (cf Jcu 1969, ρ 546) 
226 Kamenskij in VE 1947, №1, ρ 377 quoted from Bocheriski 1967'', ρ 50, π * "Nennen Sie mir bitte auch 
nur eine einzige ihrer Arbeiten, die eine neue Seite in der philosophischen Wissenschaft darstellt, die ein 
origineller Beitrag zur Philosophie ware " 
227 Cf Graham 19873, ρ 14 
228 Cf Graham 19871, ρ 15, on Lysenko and "lysenkoism", quite a few scholarly studies have appeared, 
classical studies arc Ζ A Medvedev, The Rise and Fall ofTD Lysenko (New York & London Columbia UP, 
1969), a book that circulated secretly in the USSR in the early I960ics and reportedly precipitated Lysenko's 
downfall, D Joravsky, The Lysenko Atfair (Cambridge (Mass ) Harvard UP, 1970), Lccourl 1976, D Buican, 
Lyssenko et le lysscnkisme (Paris PUF, 1988), and, on the Soviet side, I T Frolov, Fiìosotìja ι istorija 
gcnetiki poiski ι diskussn [Philosophy and the History of Genetics, Searches and Discussions] (Moskva 
Nauka, 1988) For a comprehensive rendering see Graham 19871, chapter 4, lor Lysenko s peers in other 
sciences, see ibid , ρ 17f 
1 6 9 
Notes 
229 Mitin was editor-in-chief of PZM from 1930 until 1944 (cf Avenncev &c 19892,
 c n t r y "Mitin," ρ 368), 
and director of IML (cf Zapata &c 1983, ρ 329), as well as vice-director of the IF AN, of which Judin was 
director 
230 In 1944, the Central Committee of the VKP(b) issued a decree "O ncdostatkach ν nauEnoj rabote ν oblasti 
filosofii" (cf Prochorov &c 1975\ XXII, entry "Rossijskaja federacija," ρ 256) 
231 Cf Zapata 1988, ρ 107 
232 Cl Zapata 1988, ρ 108 
233 Cl Graham !987\ ρ I5f, and Zapata 1988, ρ 108, both reter lo WG Hahn, Postwar Soviet Politics 
The Fallot Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946 1953 (Ithaca Cornell UP, 1982) 
234 Cf Zapata 1988, ρ 108 
235 Extreme cases like Lysenkoism can be seen as a combination of two mechanisms not only should the 
right, partisan philosophy link itself to science, and science and technology be brought under political control, 
but the notion of partijnost was transplanled to science itself, which led to the notorious distinction of 
bourgeois and proletarian science, this combination, insofar as it proved to be counterproductive, was remedied 
236 M A Markov, "O pnrode fiziceskogo znanija," VF 1947, №2, pp 140-176, discussion about this text 
"Diskussija о pnrode fiziceskogo znanija, obsuzdenie stall M A Markova," YE 1948, №1, pp 203-232, and 
№3, pp 222-235, ct also Bochenski 19675, ρ 44 
237 11 Smal'gauzen, 'Predstavlenija о celom ν sovrcmennoj biologn," VF 1947, №2, pp 177-183, cf also 
Zapata 1988, ρ 109 
238 Ct Acton 1955 
239 Bochenski \96T<, preface to the first edition (1950), ρ 6 
240 Bochenski 1961b, ρ 11 
241 Wetter 1960S, ρ
 v 
242 Wetter 1962, ρ 11 
243 As did in fact virtually all Western commentators, e g , Acton "Marxism, it seems to me, is a mixture of 
two philosophies which cannol consistently go along together, positivism on the one hand and Hegelianism on 
the other" (Acton 1955, ρ 251) 
244 Bocheriski labelled them "people who arc thinking, and, apparently, longing for a philosophical attitude, 
and trying to work in a way that resembles ours "Wir wollen zuerst ganz ausdrücklich feststellen, daß es im 
heutigen Rußland denkende Menschen gibt, die sich, allem Anschein nach, nach einer philosophischen 
Einstellung sehnen und in einer Weise, die an die unsrige erinnert, zu arbeiten versuchen ( ) Die Tatsache, daß 
es solche Manner im heutigen Rußland gibt, ist ein gewichtiger Beweis fur unsere Behauptung, daß in der 
Philosophie allgcmcinmenschliche Prinzipien gelten, die über jeden Kulturkrcis erhaben sind Mit solchen 
Mannern mochte der Philosoph gerne zusammenarbeiten, sie über ihr Denken und Torsenen befragen und sich 
mit ihnen auseinandersetzen Man muß aber dabei auch die tragische Talsache feststellen, daß diese Manner bis 
jetzt in Rußland nur eine Minderheit bilden, die dazu in barbarischer Weise systematisch angegriffen und 
liquidiert wird" (Bochenski 1967s, ρ 126f) 
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245 In his review of Wctter's main sludy on Soviel philosophy, Kline gave л concise summary of positive 
features perceived by Welter " Us defense of the autonomy of philosophy (versus positivism), its epis­
temologica! realism (versus idealism), its intellecluahsm (versus 'sense datum' positivism). Us recognition of 
qualitative differences in nature (versus reductionism), and its essentially sound theory of concept formation as 
abstraction (versus conventionalism)" (G L Kline, "(review of) Wetter 1952 , Erasmus 7 (1954), cols 201-205, 
quoted from Kline 1955, ρ 90, η 2, reference is to Wetter 1960% pp 628f) 
246 Kamenka 1972, ρ 166, et also Bochenski 1967s, ρ 45 "Auch äußerlich gesehen isl das philosophische 
Leben jetzt viel intensiver als vor 1947 " 
247 Ct Bochenski 19675, ρ 45f 
248 Cf Bochenski 19675, ρ 44, Zapata 1988, ρ 109, and Wetter "Es scheint aber, daß die von Kedrov 
geleitete Redaktion die Stalinsche Devise vom Weiterentwickeln der marxistisch-leninistischen Theorie zu ernst 
genommen hat Schon nach der vierten Nummer wurde Kedrov seines Amtes enthoben und die Zeitschrift 
umorganisiert Im Leitartikel der ersten von der neuen Redaktion [under Mitin, EvdZ] herausgegebenen Nummer 
wird der früheren Redaktion zur Last gelegt, eine Reihe von fehlerhaften Artikeln veröffentlicht /u haben den 
Artikel von Markov, den Artikel von Smal'gauzen , den Artikel von Kamenskij " (Wetter 1960s, ρ 
22If, referring lo "Za bol sevistskuju partanosi' ν filosofii," VE 1948, №3, ρ 110 
249 Bochenski 1967s, ρ ПО, quoting В M Kedrov in Kul'tura ι ?i7n' of 22/03/1949, where his mea culpa was 
reproduced "Ich halle es fur meine Pflicht als Parteimitglied zu erklaren, daß ich mit dieser Kritik (von M 
Mitin) völlig einverstanden bin und daß ich einen feindlichen Kosmopohtismus, den ich vertreten habe, 
entschiedenverurteile " 
250Goerdt 1984, ρ 118 
251 As Wetter reports, Alcksandrov was awarded, apart from the two Stalin-prizes, the Lenin-order, the Order of 
the Red Banner of Labor [Orden Trudovogo KrasnogoZnameni], the First-class Order of the Great Patriotic War, 
as well as medals for the defence of the city of Moscow, and for heroic work during the Great Patriotic War 
1941-1945" (Wetter 1960s, ρ 216) From 1947 to 1954, he was director of the IF (by demonstrating his 
readiness to change his views at an order from on high, he had proved himsell to be the perfect manager of the 
main institution of philosophical research), thus becoming, next to Mitin and Judin, an important "party-
philosopher 
252 Cf Bochenski 1967s, ρ 52, and Kline 1956, ρ 127, who offer impressive lists of publications related to 
this subject 
253 A full table of contents of V£ over the years 1947-1956, as well as translations into German of many 
fragments is Goerdt 1960 
254 "Contemporary Soviet philosophy is unique in many respects, not the least of which is ihe fact that it can 
give an exact date of birth to itself - June 24, 1947" (Blakeley 1980, ρ 317) 
255 Graham 19874, ρ
 ί 4 
256 Cf Wetter 19605, pp 471-491, and esp Graham 19871, chapter 10 and II 
257 Ct Goerdt 1984, ρ 117f, Bochenski 1967s, ρ 44f, and Wetter 1960s, ρ 221 f 
258 "Nevertheless, during the final years of Stalin s rule the party continued as an active arbiter of philosophical 
and scientific questions"(Kamenka 1972, ρ 166), "The journal [V£, EvdZ] is still the leading philosophical 
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organ in the Soviet Union Thus, discussion and controversy were reintroduced into professional philosophical 
writing But there was actually less essential divergence ot opinion and scarcely any creative development As 
in the 1920s a debate broke out over the relation ot science to philosophy and another over the status of logic 
Other disputes, for instance, concerned the relation of psychology and philosophy, but there was no questioning 
ot the bases of Marxism-I cninism, and deviations from the party line were quickly criticized either in the pages 
of the journal itself or in the pages of Kommunist (called Bol'shevik until September 1952) or Pravda Stalin 
and the classics were still quoted ad nauseam ( ) Criticism and self-criticism increased, and there were more 
combined efforts in writing books'XDc George 1966, ρ 1881) 
259 CI Bochenski 1967^, pp 44fl 
260 Frolov &c 1989, Ι, ρ 268, et also Goerdt 1984, ρ 106 
261 Ct De George 1966, ρ 187, Bochenski ^б?1*, ρ 66f, Cavaliere 1988, ρ 537, and Síipanov &c 1982. ρ 
176 "The creation in 1947 at Moscow university of a department of logic lay the foundation for the teaching ot 
this discipline at all humanity-faculties, and also served as the basis tor the preparation of highly qualified cadres 
and the development ot scientific investigations in the field ot logic within the system of higher education and 
the AN SSSR The department was organized by way of execution ot the resolution of the Central Committee 
of the VKP(b) of December 3rd 1946 «On the teaching ot logic and psychology in secondary education» " 
262 CI Cavaliere 1988, ρ 535 "A tal fine, appare indispensabile sottolineare che in Unione Sovietica, in 
particolare tino agli anni '50, con il termine logica formale si intende la sillogistica tradizionale, mentre la 
logica matematica comprende ι nuovi e radicale sviluppi che hanno significativamente trasformato tale ambito 
disciplinare a partire dalla seconda metà del secolo scorso", on Soviet logic see further esp Hanggi 1971, 
Bochenski 196le, Kung 1961, and N Lobkowicz, Das Widerspruchspnnnp in der neueren sowjetischen 
Philosophie, Dordrecht, Rcidcl, 1959 [Sovietica 4]. as well as Wetter 19Ь0^ , pp 593-623, Blakeley 1961, ρ 
30f, De George 1966, pp 213-216, Scanlan 1985, pp 149-160, Goerdt 1984, pp 116ff, and Kline 1956, ρ 
I30f, where he relers to three articles ot his hand in Journal of Symbolic Logic. 17 (1952), pp 124-128, 18 
(1953). pp 83-86, and 19(1954), ρ 149 
263 Cf Grujic 1969. pp 71-78 
264 Cf Kolakowski 1981, III, ρ 145 
265 Edwards 19722, V, entry "Logic, Modern," ρ 33 
266 D Gil'bert, V Akkerman, Osnovy tcoretiieskoj /oc;A; (Moskva 1947) [ong D Hilbert, W Ackermann, 
Grundzuge der theoretischen iMgik (Berlin 1938), English translation Principies of Mathematical Logic (New 
York 1950)], and A Tarskij, Vvcdenie ν logiku ι metodologiju deduktivnych nauk (Moskva 1948) long A 
Tarski, Einfuhrung in die mathematische Logik und die Methodologie der Mathematik (1937) (Polish ong 
1936), English translation Introduction to Logic and the Methodology of the Deductive Sciences (New York 
19462)1 
267 Ct Kolakowski 1981,111, ρ 145 
268 Cf Cavaliere 1988, ρ 542, the quotation is translated from Cavaliere, who quotes from V P Tugannov, 
L E Majstrov, "Protiv idealizma ν matematiCeskoj logike," YE 1950. №3, ρ 333 
269 Cavaliere 1988, ρ 539 " che cercarono di risolvere in modo sostanzialmente nuovo il problema, 
riconoscendo la logica formale come unica logica, e accettando di operare una delicata e poco ortodossa 
ridefinizionc del ruolo e del significato della logica dialettica", cf also Kondakov 1983, entry "Bakradze," ρ 67, 
Kolakowski 1981,111, ρ I45f, and Grujic 1969. ρ 77, who distinguishes three positions "Die Bestimmung der 
binheit der formalen und dialektischen Logik ist in der sowjelrussischcn Philosophie erst in der neuesten Zeit 
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endgültig formuliert und systematisch ausgebaut worden Im Zuge des, Diskussion (1946 1956) über die Stellung 
und Auffassung der Logik erschien eine große Anzahl von Arbeiten die ausdrücklich das Problem der formalen 
Logik zum Thema halten In dieser Auseinandersetzung ging es hauptsächlich darum, das genaue Verhalntnis der 
formalen Logik zur dialektischen zu bestimmen 
In der philosophischen Diskussion über diesen Problemkreis lassen sich drei Gruppen unterscheiden 
Die erste Gruppe um M StrogoviC, V Cerkesov und A Aleksandrov vertrat den Standpunkt zweier Logiken 
Jede Logik sei fur sich ausreichend und könne ohne die andere als Wissenschaft durchaus bestehen Der Kreis um 
К Bakaradze [= Bakradze, EvdZ] war der Auffassung, daß es nur eine Logik geben könne, und zwar die formale 
Logik Die dialektische Logik musse hingegen dem übergreifenden Komplex der materialistischen Dialektik 
eingegliedert werden Die anderen russischen Philosophen wie Ρ Popov und В Kcdrov vertraten einen 
Standpunkt des Vermitteins und der Synthese zwischen den oben erwähnten Konzeptionen " 
270 Cf Cavaliere 1988, ρ 540 
271 Grujic 1969, ρ 77 "Aus der Auffassung der ersten Gruppe hat sich die gegenwartige sowjetrussischc Lehre 
der materialistischen Logik als eine gestufte Einheit von formaler und dialektischer Logik entwickelt " 
272 Asmus reportedly did not yield to criticism of his "formalist position in logic (cf Bochenski 1967 5, ρ 
157 and 163), on Asmus importance for the rehabilitation of (formal) logic in the USSR see Scanlan 1985, ρ 
149f, and SCipanov 1982, ρ 247f "When it became an obvious necessity to overcome the negative attitude to 
formal logic, Prof Asmus became one of the most active philosophers to write about logical questions 
Traditional formal logic was expounded in his Logic (1947) " 
273 Cf Bochenski 19675, ρ 44 
274 "It is worth noticing that the worst threats to Soviet science in the late forties and early fifties did not come, 
as is otten thought, from professional philosophers, but from third rate scientists who tried to win Stalin's 
favor ( ) These persons where criticized by both scientists and philosophers whenever political conditions 
permitted" (Graham 1987% ρ 17f) 
275 Bochenski 19675, ρ 164 
276 Chemyak 1987, ρ 85 
277 Shlapentokh 1990, ρ 246 
278 Cf entries on these philosophers in Ili'cev &c 1983 
279 For this reason, some Western scholars, e g De George (cf De George, 'Preface," in Dahm &c 1988, ρ 1 
and 9), date the revival of Soviet philosophy not from 1947, but only after Stalin's death "There is some 
disagreement among Western writers whether the revival ot Soviet philosophical discussion is best dated from 
1947 or from the death of Stalin in March 1953 A number of factors making for philosophical improvement 
had begun to build up in the latter part of Stalin s regime but could not make themselves fully evident till his 
death and the comparative loosening of dogmatic control" (Kamenka 1972, ρ 166) 
280 In Stalin, PSS, XVI, pp 114-159 
281 "Question Is it true, that language forms a superstructure upon the basis7 Answer No, that is not true" 
(Stalin, PSS XVI, ρ 114), and "In this respect language, while principally differing from the superstructure, 
does not differ from the means of production, say, of machines, which also may equally well serve a capitalist 
and a socialist system" (ibid , ρ 118) 
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282 Cf Goerdl 1984, ρ 119, De George 1966, ρ 197, and Bocheriski 1967s, ρ 43, ρ 137, and ρ 154f, where 
he gives a sampling of reactions by Soviet philosophers to Stalin's innovation of Marxist linguistics 
283 CI Bocheriski 1967s, ρ 137, and Goerdt 1984, ρ 116, on Soviet philosophy of science see esp Graham 
19872, which covers 25 years of development in this field 
284 Initially published in Pravda. 03/10/1952, and in Bol'sevik fthe forerunner of Kommunistl 1952, №18, pp 
1-50, later in Stalin, PSS, XVI, pp 188-245 
285 Cf Donoso 1979, ρ 120, Kotakowski 1981, III, ρ 160 en Kamcnka 1965, ρ 93 
286 Cf Blakclcy 1960, ρ χι 
287 "For the contempoiary Soviet philosopher, the 'Party line' must be directive tor the posing of the 
problems (we have seen that certain questions arc not even to be asked), tor the guidance of the discussion (the 
Party decides when a 'discussion" is ended) and tor the corroboration of the conclusions" (Blakeley 1961, ρ 84), 
"Je mehr die zu entscheidende Frage politische Bedeutung besitzt um so weniger treffen die Gelehrten selbst die 
letzte Entscheidung Hier genügt auch nicht die Rückversicherung bei den Parteistcllen, sondern hier sind in 
letzter Instanz die obersten politischen Gremien zustandig Das ist eine logische Folge der durchgangigen 
Politisierung der Wissenschaft Mit dem Eingreifen der Partciinstanzen "schlagt" die anonyme und individuelle 
Steuerung bzw Lenkung durch die Verpflichtung auf den Marxismus-Leninismus in die direkte Steuerung bzw 
Lenkung des Wissenschaftsbetricbcs durch die politischen Manager "um" Sie bedient sich verschiedener 
Formen Beschlüsse und Entschließungen der obersten Parteigremicn über bestimmte Probleme und Verur-
teilungen von "Abweichungen" stehen neben direkten Äußerungen der obersten Machthaber bzw des Diktators 
selbst" (Lange 1955, ρ 200Г) 
288 Cf Kotakowski 1981,111, ρ 157 
289 As to the qualification of Soviet philosophers, Welter gives some shocking examples ol lack of "Bildung", 
in an official philosophy textbook of 1948 (MA Leonov, OCerk dmlektiSeskogo matenalizma (Moskva izd 
AN SSSR, 1948)), he found an etymological explanation of the word ' philosophy" from Greek "fllow" = love 
and 'sofow" = wisdom, and in another source he came across vitalism" explained out of Latin "vita" = life and 
"hs" = force (Wetter I956\ ρ 303) 
290 Moscow, Leningrad and Kaunas, cf Kamcnka 1972, ρ 166 
291 The university of Kaunas, where this faculty was housed, was closed in 1951 (cf Utechin 1961, ρ 260) 
292Kamenka 1972, ρ 166 
293 The number of 1,150 tor 1951 apparently is a hard figure (cf Bocheriski 1967\ ρ 140) In 1950/1 MGU 
had 489 students in philosophy, and in 1951/52 at this University 60 candidate's dissertations in philosophy 
were defended, a proportion of 8 I In the country as a whole, 203 such dissertations were defended, ι e one in 
every three came from MGU In 1947, 11 out of 66 candidates' dissertations were defended at MGU, ι e 1 in 
every 6 Since the philosophical faculty ot MGU was only reopened in 1941, this difference is not surprising a 
relatively high proportion ot the dissertations was defended at the IF AN and the AON, as the figures given by 
Bochenski confirm (cf Bochenski 1967s, ρ 143 out of 66 dissertations in 1947, 32 were defended at AON, 10 
at the ΙΓ AN, together nearly two-third) Bochenski, who is miscalculating here (on ρ 143, he subtracts from 
the 489 the 169 students in the psychology department already subtracted on ρ 140), argues that if one in every 
three dissertations was defended at MGU, the total number of students tor the USSR also will be about three 
times the number of philosophy students at MGU, ι e some 1,000 If we take the real number of 489, and 
multipl) it by 3, the result is some 1,400 (it must be taken into account that the relative number of 
dissertations at MGU will be high in relation to other philosophical faculties tor the simple reason that a 
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dissertation at MGU is valued higher than one at a provincial university, this, however, does affect the absolute 
numbers, not the relative growth) Since the annual output of dissertations doubled from 1950/1 to 1953/4, 
Bochenski concludes that in 1954 the USSR will have counted some 2,000 philosophy students As to the past, 
the proportion of the number of students to the annua/ number of candidates dissertations over 1951/2 (101) is 
14 1 Applying these proportions to the situation in 1947, when 66 dissertations in philosophy were defended, 
a number of students of 925 results But if we take into account the smaller proportion of dissertations coming 
from MGU in 1947 I in every 6 instead of 1 in every 3 (which, as we may safely presume, reflects a generally 
lower proportion of "university-dissertations", MGU housing the leading philosophical faculty), this figure of 
925 should be halved Therefore, 400 to 450 seems to be a fair estimation 
294 These figures, again, are somewhat hypothetical The number of professional philosophers in 1947 is not 
easy to retrace, but an estimation can be made The IF AN (the main institution in philosophical research, 
founded 1936 as a continuation of the IF of the Communist Academy, which merged with the AN that year (cf 
Prothorov &c 19751, XXII, entry "Rossijskaja fedcracija, ' ρ 255, and Zapata 1983, ρ 3230) counted, as 
Somerville reported in 1946, "twenty or thirty members of the permanent staff' (Somerville 1946, ρ 246) The 
same IF is reported to have counted 79 stalf members in 1951, 183 in 1961 (cf /ubaty 1975, ρ 223) In later 
years, 20% of all professional philosophers were working in akadcmi£cskaja lllosotija —which covers not only 
the IF, but also other institutes of the AN, as well as the AON—, ι e some 2,400 - 2,800 in 1975, some 3,000 
in 1977 (cf Zubaty 1975, ρ 226, and Huber 1977, ρ 60) Knowing that in 1975, some 400 philosophers were 
employed at the IF AN, which is roughly 3%, the total number might have been some 6,100 in 1961, some 
2,600 in 1951, and 660 - 1,000 in the year Somerville reports on We know from other sources that in 1955 
there were, in the USSR, a little over 1,000 graduated philosophers (ct Kline 1956, ρ 137) It the proportion of 
graduates to undergraduates was the same in 1955 as in 1976, viz 60% (see Appendix 2, §1), a total number of 
1,700 in 1955 would result As the general level of qualification has been steadily improving, this figure is an 
over-, rather than an underestimation If we take 1,500 to be a lair but maximum estimation for 1955, the 
number will certainly not have been over 1,000 in 1951 (in 1950/1 there were 1,150 students in philosophy — 
see above, a philosophy study in the USSR comprises 5 years, so at least 500 of these 1,150 students will have 
become professional philosophers by 1955), which means that at that lime some 8% of all professional 
philosophers were working at the IF This would point to an estimation of 250 to 375 for the year Somerville 
wrote about, which was shortly before World War II Given the losses of that war, a number of 400 seems to be 
a maximum estimation for 1947 The estimated number of philosophers in 1947, 400, may seem large in 
proportion to the equally estimated number of philosophy students It should be realized, however, that the 
people who taught philosophy in those years were only partly trained at universities (the two philosophical 
faculties, at MGU and LGU, had only opened again in 1938, and only (relatively) flourished after their fusions 
with MIFLI and LIFLI), but at the IKP and the Communist Academy 
295 Cf Bocheiiski 19675,
 p но 
296 Cf Kamenka 1972, ρ 166 
297 All figures are taken from Bocheriski 1967s, ρ 142, except those for 1945 and 1948, which are given by 
Wetter (Wetter 19563, ρ адЗ) 
298 Kamenka 1972, ρ 166 In 1947 YE announced a mere 9 books in philosophy, but over 1955 41 titles were 
given (cf Bochenski 19675, ρ 46) Kamenka calculated (on the basis of data provided by Bocheriski) an annual 
average ot 33 over 1947-1956 the total number was 329 titles This points lo a steady growth over this period 
299 As Bocheriski notes, pages in VF are not ordinary pages they correspond to roughly 2 '/2 pages of the 
octavo size usual in Western philosophical journals (cf Bocheriski 19675, ρ 145, and Kamenka 1963, ρ 9) 
300 Cf Bochenski 19675, ρ I44f 
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301 According to Jeu, the "slow and complex" process of decentralization started in the 50ies (Jeu 1982, ρ 
285) 
102 V S Iovcuk, in YE 1947, №9, ρ 221a, quoted from Bochcnski 1967s, ρ 45, η ** 
303 The 6 institutions where candidate s dissertations were defended in 1947 were all located in Moscow out of 
the 30 institutions in 1953/4 11 were located in Moscow (36%) (1948 5 out of 10 = 50%, 1951/2 11 out of 
28 = 39%) (cf Bochenski 1967s, ρ 140) Ot the dissertations themselves, the "provincial proportion' grew 
from 0% in 1947 through 69Í over 1947 1951 (15 out ot 225), and 27% over 1951/1 (54 out of 149) to 36% 
(169 out ot 300) in 1953/4 (ct Bochenski 1967s, ρ 142) 
304 Cf Prochorov &c I97T* XI, entry Kazachskaja SSR, ρ 164 
305 Гог example, in the postwar period departments ot (Marxist-Leninist) philosophy were established in newly 
recovered territory such as Moldavia (cf Prochorov &c 19743, XVI, entry Moldavskaja SSR ρ 439), sections 
of philosophy were established at the Academy of Sciences of Soviet Latvia (cf Prochorov &c 1973', XIV, 
entry I atvijskaja SSR, ρ 194), of Armenia -in 1944— (cf Prochorov &c 19701, II, entry Armjanskaja 
SSR, ρ 236), and ot Tadjikistan and Turkmenistan -both in 1951- (cf Jeu 1969, ρ 29, and Prochorov &c 
19771, XXVI, entry Turkmenskaja SSR, ρ 358), in 1946 Institutes ot Philosophy were founded at the 
Academy of Sciences of Georgia (cf Prochorov &c 19721, VII entry 'Gruzmskaja SSR, ρ 379), and of the 
Ukraine (ct Prochorov &c 1977\ XXVI, entry Ukrainskaja SSR, ρ 569), the university of Baku (Azcrbaid 
?an) was enlarged with a department of philosophy at the historical faculty in 1945, a department of logic and 
psychology at the philological faculty in 1947 (cf Prochorov &c I9701 I entry ' A/erbajdzanskaja SSR ρ 
266) that of Dusanbc, in Tadjikistan, with a department of Marxism Leninism in 1948 (cf Jeu 1969, ibid ), in 
Soviet Kirgizia an Institut Marksizma Lcninizma was founded in 1948 (cf Jeu 1969, ibid ) 
ЗОбКагпепка 1963, ρ 9 
307" in 195I the editors of Voprosy Filosofii complained that such outlying philosophical institutes as 
those in the Ukraine, While Russia, and Georgia confine themselves exclusively to the history ol philosophy 
in their respective countries and are content to leave the working out of contemporary problems of Marxist 
philosophy as a monopoly to the Philosophical Institute of the Academy ot Sciences of the U S S R (in 
Moscow) Since then philosophical work outside Moscow and Leningrad has been greatly intensified, and in 
the University of Tiflis in Georgia, an extremely active philosophical center has emerged under the leadership of 
Professor К S Bakradzc" (Kamcnka 1972 ρ 166) 
308 Hanak 1976, ρ 243 [' daß die ideologische Linhcit nicht sosehr als Wirklichkeit, sondern als ein Postulat zu 
betrachten ist"] 
309 Ibid 
310 Cf Kline 1956, ρ 127, and Bochenski 1967s, ρ 44 According to Blakeley the relatively liberal climate 
of Soviet philosophy alter World War II was a result of the discussion of 1947, and that on linguistics in 1950, 
and not of some sort of "destahni/ation" they were on the contrary the work ot Stalin himself (cf Blakeley 
1961, ρ χι) 
311 Kline 1956, ρ 127 
312 Kamcnka 1972, ρ 166 ' Within a year references to Stalin as a great philosophical genius disappeared from 
the journals, and demands for a certain respect for professional competence and integrity began to be heard", ct 
also Bochenski 1967s ρ 153, and esp Donoso 1970 pp 121 124 
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313 De George 1966, ρ 199f, cf also Wetter ^бО 5 , ρ 282 "Immer noch ist die Partei, wie zu Lebzeiten 
Stalins, höchste Autorität auch auf wissenschaftlichem und philosophischem Gebiet Man kann vielleicht sagen, 
daß dies fur die Zeit nach Stalins Tod in noch größerem Maße gilt, da nach dem Abblasen des Stahnkultcs das 
Zentralkomitee der Partei in die von Stalin hinlerlasscne Leere eintrat " The destahnized" Kratkij fci/rsappeared 
in an English translation in 1960 History ot the Communist Party ot the Soviet Union (Moskva Foreign 
Languages Publishing House, I960) 
314 Alcksandrov, G F &c, Dialektiícskij matcnali/m (Moskva, 1954), and Konstantinov, F V , &c, 
¡stonicskij matenahzm (Moskva, (1951) 19542) 
315 "Die vorliegende Neubearbeitung des Werkes [ι e of Welter's own book, EvdZ| unterscheidet sich von den 
vorhergehenden Auflagen zunächst dadurch, daß der geschichtliche Teil bis /um XX Parteitag der KPdSU 
(Februar 1956) tortgesetzt wurde Im systematischen Teil war es notwendig, besonders den durch die 
hntstalmisierung bedingten Veränderungen gebührende Aufmerksamkeit zu schenken, so vor allem der Ruckkehr 
von der Stalinschen zur Engels'schcn Formulierung der Lehre von der Dialektik und der damit verbundenen 
Rehabilitierung des Gesetzes der Negation der Negation, ferner den Änderungen in der Katcgorienlehre und 
gewissen durch die modernen Naturwissenschaften aufgeworfenen Fragen" (Wetter 1960^, ρ vf ) 
316 "Losing Stalin, contemporary Soviet philosophy not only lost a "classic" but, what is more important, it 
lost the orientation which Stalin's "On Dialectical and Historical Materialism" had previously provided, 
especially as to the "principal characteristics of the Marxist dialectical method" Nevertheless, the basic 
conception among contemporary Soviet philosophers had not undergone significant modifications" (Blakeley 
1961, ρ 11), cl also Wetter 1960s, ρ 323 "Das eben entworfene Bild vom philosophischen "Klima" in der 
Sowjetunion tand wohl seine vollcndcste Ausprägung in der Ara des Stalinismus, insbesondere wahrend der 
Periode der sog " Ыапо Ъота" Nach Stalins Tod ist wohl eine gewisse Abschwachung der Partcidiklatur auf 
dem Gebiete der Theorie zu vermerken Fntscheidend |edoch ist lur uns die Tatsache, daß sich gmndsatzlichdaran 
nichts geändert hat," and Bocheiiski I9675, ρ 10 "Die russische Philosophie ist in keinem wesentlichen Punkt 
über diese zwei Arbeiten [Stalin's О dialektiicskom ι istonöcskom materializme as of 1938, and Kratkij 
niosoftkij slovar' by Ρ F Judin and M M Ro/ental' (Moskva (1939) 19544), EvdZ] hinausgegangen Dies 
wurde einerseits ausdrücklich von Μ Ρ Baskin am Philosophenkongrcß (1947, und zwar vor der Rede Zdanovs, 
am 19 Juni) behauptet, und keiner der Anwesenden hat es bestritten — im Gegenteil, viele Redner haben 
Baskins Urteil unterstützt Andererseits konnte G A Wetter, der unlängst eine eingehende Erforschung der 
russischen philosophischen Literatur vornahm, keinen einzigen Satz von irgendeiner grundlegenden Bedeutung 
finden, der nicht schon im genannten Wörterbuch enthalten ware Fur die letzten Jahre hat G I Kline (1956) 
nichts wesentlich Neues gefunden Und die eigenen Untersuchungen des Verfassers diese Buches haben diese 
Talsache vollständig bestätigt " 
317 But it did in science in 1955 the question as to the acceptability of relativity theory was decided favorably 
(cf Bochenski 1967^, ρ 139, and Graham 19871, pp 354-363), the only important exception to this 
liberalization ot natural science was biology and esp agronomy Lyscnko's star fell in 1956 —overt criticism of 
his theories had started before Stalin's death— but when he became a personal counselor to ChruiCcv, he could 
start a new career that lasted until the downfall of ChruSEev himself (Graham I9871, pp 138-150) 
318 Cf Hanak 1976, ρ 245 
319 "Nicht weniger treffend und offenherzig ist die Kritik, die die Dozentin A F Fedorova auf der oben 
erwähnten Beratung am Dogmatismus" vieler Philosophen übt ' Im Bewußtsein mancher Philosophen ist der 
Dogmatismus derart tief verwurzelt, daß es ihnen bis heute nicht gelungen ist, sich davon freizumachen, und sie 
eine neue Losung dieser oder jener Frage wie das Feuer furchten, aus Angst sie konnten etwa gegen einen 
feststehenden Kanon verstoßen" (Wetter 1960">, ρ 280, Wetter quotes Α Τ Fedorova, in VF 1955, №2, ρ 231) 
320 "As for philosophic discussion, it is said to be at a low theoretical level, often merely verbal, scholastic, 
incoherent, and a general waste of time There is too much labeling of one's opponents, without grounds, as 
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'metaphysicians", "idealists', or "objectivists ' ( ) Voprosv filosofii, in a spasm of self-criticism, deplores the 
low theoretical level of its articles its secretary, M I Sidorov, reports, rather lamely, that a large number of 
even worse articles were not printed" (Kline 1956, ρ 137, quoting "K itogam koordinacionnogo sovescanija po 
filosofskim problemam, ' V£ 1955, №2, ρ 233) 
321 Cf Kline 1956, ρ 137, quoting from "Nasuscnye voprosy filosofskoj nauki," Kommunist 1955. №5, ρ 
22 
322 Cf Kline 1956 ρ 126, who refers to К itogam diskussii po teorii otnositel nosti," VF 1955, №1, ρ 
138, and "О diskussijach ν nauínych /urnalach, ' Kommunist 1955, №7, ρ 117 118 
323 Cf Kline 1956, ρ 128 " the'substitution of questions of current politics for philosophical questions" 
is highly typical of Soviet practice An authoritative critique of Soviet philosophy dissertations includes the 
(perlcclly just) charge that many such dissertations exhibit 'an extremely remote connection with philosophy"" 
(Kline quotes S Ρ Dudel', in a review in VF 1955, №3, ρ 178, and from VE 1955, №3, ρ 194) 
324 "The low quality ot philosophy teaching, research, dissertation writing, and general publication has recently 
been the object of searching criticism by official Soviet organs Ot (he thousand odd philosophy dissertations 
defended during the decade 1945-1955 (fifty being doctoral dissertations and nine hundred and fifty 'candidate's" 
dissertations), only about one hundred were good enough to publish There is much duplication of subjects, 
many dissertations are unoriginal compilations, marred by "quotalology" ( 'tsitalniLhestvo"), schematism, and 
dogmatism" And 'Of the thousand-odd graduate philosophers in the Soviet Union, only about one hundred 
publish regularly, the other nine hundred arc resting on their laurels' Many philosophers do not work very 
hard, they prêter a quiet life " (Kline 1956, ρ 137, in a footnote, Kline refers to Kommunist and VF "These 
charges, originally made in Kommunist. 1955, №5, ρ 24, were later expanded in YE, 1955, №3, pp 12 and 
193-196) 
325 Kline 1956, ρ 126, quoting "O diskussijach ν naucnych ?urnalach," Kommunist 1955. №7, ρ 119, 
Iov2uks 'suggestion was done in VF 1955. №1. ρ 8 
326 Kline 1956, ρ 138 
327 Stalin was not totally rejected at all, Chruicev qualifying him, for example, as a dedicated revolutionary and 
Marxist-Leninist (cf Donoso 1979, ρ 121, and 123) 
328 De George 1966, ρ 199 
329 CI Kotakowski 1981, III, ρ 490, as well as Althusser 1977, pp 7ft, who labels this "destalim/ation" 
/jumanis/, cf esp Bctlelheim 1978, ρ 292 
330 Fclscher 1974, ρ 4 " eine Korrektur dessen, was Stalin erfolgreich als 'Leninismus' dogmatisiert hatte " 
331 Frolov &c 1989, Ι, ρ 268, cf also De George, "Preface", in Dahm &c 1988, ρ 1 "On February 24-25, 
1956, in a closed session of the 20lh Congress of the Communist Party ol the Soviet Union, Nikita S 
Khrushchev made his now famous speech in the crimes of the Stalin era That speech marked a break with the 
past had it marked the end of what J M Bochenski dubbed the "dead period" of Soviet philosophy Soviet 
philosophy changed abruptly after 1956, especially in the area of dialectical materialism " 
332 Ct Kline 1956, ρ 131 
333Gla¿ov 1985, ρ 63 
178 
Part Two· A Concise History of Soviet Philosophy 
334 Cf Avenncev &c 19892,
 e n
try "Aleksandrov," ρ 21, and Kline 1956, ρ 136, η 56 
335 Cf Averintcv &c 19892, entry "Voprosy Filosofii," ρ 98 
336 Cf Wetter 1960S,
 p 281 
337 Cf Bocheiiski 19675, ρ ізд 
338 Cf Wetter 19605, ρ 281 
339 Cf Motrosïlova &c 1986, ρ 14f, and Scanlan 1985, ρ 298, on Bachtin s influence on the Soviet 
intelligencija after World War II see К Clark &c 1984, esp th 15, "Saransk to Moscow 1945-1975," it is 
interesting to note that Bachtin was encouraged to try to get his works published by Stalin's Marxism and the 
Problems of Linguistics he vainly tried to get an article published by writing a preface in which Stalin was 
quoted (cf op cit, ρ 328, on the significance of Bachtin for the revival of the intelligencija cf also Frank 
1983), as to Losev, "he began to be published alter Stalin's death in 1953, and \cry intensively so" (Tacho-Godi 
1991, ρ 16) 
340 Schlogel 1990, ρ 25 "In der Sowjetmacht kommt die ' brziehungsdiktatur" der Aufklarung zum Sieg über 
die Autonomie des Aufgeklarten " 
341 Ibid 
342 Kamenka 1963, ρ 14 
343 Cf Schlogel 1990, pp 32-36 
344 Cf Shlapcntokh 1990a, ρ 132 
345 Which, to give an idea, housed 82 aspiranty [graduate students] already in 1948 (cf Bochcriski I9675, ρ 
45) 
346 Cf Friedrich 1993, ρ 55, η 4, and Alekseev &c 1993, ρ 74 
347 Cf Zubaly 1975, ρ 225 
348 Cf Jeu 1969, ρ 28f, whose figures are based on reports in VF_ 
349 Cf Bochenski 19675, ρ 142 
350 Cf Kline 1956, ρ 137 
351 Cf Jeu 1969, ρ 28f 
352 Cf Jeu 1969, ρ 28f 
353 If we add to the Muscovite dissertations the ones defended in other cities in the Russian Federation, 
proportions are as follows out of 277 candidates dissertations in 1964/5 78 (28%) were not defended in the 
Russian Federation, in 1965/6 26%· (79 out of 303) In 1982, Jeu reported on the growing importance of both 
the Russian and the non Russian periphery, giving the numbers of candidate's theses defended (Jeu 1982, ρ 29, 
π 47) 
1 7 9 
Notes 
I 9 W ; 1965/6 1966/7 І222 
Tota) 320 
Russian Federation 44 23 24 
Moscow 41 21 20 
Province (mostly Leningrad) 3 2 4* 
Non-Russian republics 11 6 18 16** 
Armenia 2 5 
Georgia 6 1 4 5 
Azerbajdzan 1 2 
Ukraine 4 2 4 
White Russia 1 1 3 
Kazachstan 1 1 
Tad/lki stan 1 
Uzbekistan 1 2 1 
Kirgizia 3 
* Leningrad and Sverdlovsk, ** plus Ukraine, White Russia, and the Baltic republics 
As to publications, Jeu quotes a report by Ε M Mirskij (VE. 1968, №6, ρ 152), giving the following 
distribution of contributions to VF. not coming from Moscow over the years 1952-1967 (Jeu 1969, ρ 29) 
Russian Federation 317 (Leningrad - 175, Sverdlovsk - 71, Rostov-na-Donu - 27, 
Novosibirsk - 16, Tomsk - 15, Ivanovo - 13) 
Other Soviet Republics 228 
of which Ukraine 92 (Kiev - 73, Char'kov - 19) 
Georgia (Tbilisi) 39 
Kazachstan(Alma-Ala) 26 
Armenia(Erevan) 22 
Azerbajdzar(Baku) 20 
Fstonia (Tartu) 15 
White Russia (Minsk) 14 
354 In Kirgizia, a department [otdel] of philosophy and law at the local Academy ot Sciences was founded in 
1958 (cf Prochorov &c 19731, ΧΓΙ, entry "Kirgizskaja SSR," ρ 170), an Institut filosofa ι prava was 
established at the Academy of Sciences of Kazachstan in 1958 (cf Prochorov &c 19733, XI, entry "Kazachskaja 
SSR," ρ 164) in the 1950s, departments of philosophy came into existence at the universities of TaSkent 
(University of Central Asia) and Samarkand (Uzbek University), and in 1958 an Institut filowfu ι prava was 
founded at the Uzbek Academy of Sciences (cf Prochorov &c 19771, XXVI, entry "Uzbekskaja SSR," ρ 505), 
in the 1960s, a sector of philosophy was established at the Academy of Sciences of Estonia (cf Prochorov &c 
1978\ XXX, entry "Estonskaja SSR," ρ 274) 
355 In Azerbajdzan, the sektor of philosophy of the local Academy of Sciences was transformed into an Institut 
filosofa ι prava (cf Prochorov &c 19701,1, entry "Azerbajdzanskaja SSR," ρ 266], the Academy of Sciences of 
Kirgizia saw the establishment of an Institut filosofa ι рга\а in 1964 (cf Prochorov &c 19733, XII, entry 
"Kirgizskaja SSR," ρ 170), in Turkmenia, the sektor of philosophy of the Academy ot Sciences became an 
Otdel filosofi! ι prava AN Turkm SSR in 1959 (cf Prochorov &c 19773, χ χ ν ί , entry "Turkmenskaja SSR," 
ρ 358, and Jeu 1969, ρ 29), in Soviet Armenia, finally, the sector of philosophy and law of the Armenian 
Academy of Sciences was transformed into a full Institut fìlosofii ι prava AN Arm SSR in 1969 (cf Prochorov 
&c 1970\ II, entry "Armjanskaja SSR," ρ 236) 
356 In Lithuania, since 1955 Trudy AN Litovskoj SSR (senja A ObSticstvcnnve nauki. Filosofila), and since 
1968 Prohlcmos (cf Prochorov &c 1973\ XIV, entry "Litovskaja SSR." ρ 547), in Kirgizia there regularly 
appeared since 1955 an Izvestija AN Kirpizskoj SSR (since 1959 in separate series) (cf Prochorov &c 19731, 
XII, entry 'Kirgizskaja SSR," ρ 171), in Kazakhstan since 1963 a series of Izvestija Akademu naukKazachskoi 
SSR (cf Prochorov &c 1973 3, XI, entry "Kazachskaja SSR," ρ 165), in Tad2ikistan the Izvestija Akademu 
nauk Tadzikskoi SSR since 1954 (cf Prochorov &c 19763, XXV, entry 'Tadzikskaja SSR,' ρ 189), in 
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Uzbekistan since 1969 ObScestvennve nauki ν Uzbekistane (cf Prochorov &c 19771, XXVI, entry "Uzbekskaja 
SSR," ρ 505), in Armenia, finally, since 1966 the Vestnik obScestvennvch nauk (cf Prochorov &c 19703, II, 
entry ' Armjanskaja SSR, ' ρ 218) 
357 Cf Mitrochin 1975, ρ xv, who reports on a group of philosophers formed in Alma-Ata to study theory of 
knowledge and dialectical logic m the wake of U'enkov 
358 Cf Bochenski 1967\ ρ 142, and Kamenka 1972, ρ 166 
359 Until the late Middle Ages, Russian 'philosophy" (it was rather patristic theology) was Kievan philosophy, 
and Gngqrij Savvic Skovoroda (1722 1794) regarded by many as the first Russian philosopher, was a Ukrainian 
(according to most authors [Zen'kovskij, Gocrdt, Coplcston, Walicki] it was only in the 18th century that one 
can really speak of philosophy in Russia), in the Middle Ages, Central Asia (Samarkand, Buchara) was one of 
the centers of Islamic culture, including science and philosophy two leading Islamic philosophers, Al Farabi 
(870-950) and Ibn-Sina [Avicenna] (980-1037), lived and worked there, as to Georgia, its first important 
philosopher was, according to Gobar, Petr Iver [Peter the Iberian|, 4th century AD (cf Gobar 1978, ρ 182), 
and Jeu also dates Georgian philosophy back to the 4th century (Jeu 1982, ρ 286), as regards, finally, Armenia, 
its philosophical history is counted back until the 1st century В С, its first university dating back to the 12th 
century (cf Jeu 1973, ρ 2510 [Ю compare, Moscow university was founded in 1755, that ot Kiev in 1834 
(there is a university in the now Ukrainian city of L'vov, but Lvov was not part of either Ukraine or Russia 
from 1152 until 1939) (cf Utechin 1961, entries Universities and "L'vov )] 
360 See on Soviet Armenia Jeu 1973, on Georgia Gobar 1978, and on Central Asia Jcu 1982 
361 Cf Wetter ^бО^, ρ 285, and Hanak 1976, ρ 243, who both report on the prolonged criticism of 
Aleksandrov's DialcktiCeskij màtenali/m 
362 = Konstantinov &c 1958, cf Wetter 1962, ρ 9 'Bis Stalins Tod lag in Gestalt seiner kurzen Schnfl ' Über 
den dialektischen und historischen Materialismus" eine kurze und leicht faßliche Darstellung der wel-
tanschaulichen Grundlage der Sowjelideologie vor Durch die bnlstalinisierung verlor diese Schritt jedoch ihre 
Autorität Nach einem fünfjährigen ideologischen Vakuum erschien endlich 1958 das Lehrbuch'Grundlagen 
der marxistischen Philosophie" und im folgenden Jahre ein weiteres Grundlagen des Marxismus Leninismus" 
Damit liegt nun eine Neufassung der sowjetischen Lehre vor, die wesentlich ausführlicher ist als Stalins kleine 
Schrift und entsprechend der Abschaffung des ' Personenkults' ihre Autorität nicht mehr aus dem Namen eines 
einzelnen Verfassers herleitet, sondern aus der Zusammenarbeit eines Kollektivs führender Sowjetideologen ( ) 
Das erste der genannten Lehrbücher wurde von einer Gruppe der namhaftesten Fachphilosophen und unter der 
Leitung des korrespondierenden Mitgliedes der sowjetischen Akademie der Wissenschaften F W Konstantinov 
verfaßt An der Abfassung des zweiten Lehrbuches beteiligten sich nicht nur Fachphilosophen, sondern auch 
Parteifunktionare und Publizisten unter der Leitung von О W Kuusinen ( ) Beide Lehrbücher liegen seit I960 
auch in deutscher Übersetzung vor, " 
363 Cf Jeu 1969, ρ 62 
364 Appearing in 4 issues a year 1958 1961, 6 issues a year I962-I986, editors-in-chief 1958-1970 M T 
Iovcuk, 1971-1991 VS Gott (cf Avenncev &t 1989^, entry Tilosofskie Nauki," ρ 705) 
365 Bochenski 19675, ρ 139 "Juni 1956 ' Beschluß des ZK über die Einfuhrung eines Kurses des Diahistomat 
in allen Hochschulen" " 
366 Cf Avenncev &c 19892, entry "«Voprosy filosofii»," ρ 98 The total size was over 2,300 pages a year, 
the edition of 50,000 in 1956 was reduced to 32,500 in 1957 (cf Bochenski 1967% ρ 145) 
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367 Ct Kamenka 1963, ρ 9 "The bibliography of Soviel philosophy compiled by Professor Bochenski and his 
colleagues lists 329 philosophical books of more than ninety-nine pages published in the ten years 1947-1956 
and 225 such books for the years 1957-58 alone a rise trom roughly thirty-three books a year to over 112 a 
year" 
368 Kamenka 1972. ρ 166, cf also Kamenka 1963, ρ 11 
369 Cf Bochenski ХЧбІ'* ρ 150, who wrote about the period until I960 "Das Niveau der Diskussion hat sich 
wahrend dei hier in Frage stehenden 12 Jahre bedeutend erhöht es wird weniger geschimpft dafür sachlicher 
argumentiert Die Konferenzen scheinen sich zu entwickeln, indem sie immer weniger der Mitteilung und 
Ausarbeitung von Parleiweisungen, immer mehr der echten philosophischen Diskussion dienen " 
370 Ct Cavaliere 1988, pp 543-546, and Andreev 1985, ρ 4 "An esp strong development has taken place, in 
the recent past, in mathematical (symbolic) logic " 
371 CI Cavaliere 1988, ρ 544, no 19 R Karnap, Znaiemc ι ncobthodimost (Moskva 1959) [ong R 
Carnap, Meaning and Necessity (Chicago (1947) 19562)], А Cer£\ Vvcdeme ν mateniatiSeskuju logiku 
(Mosva I960) [ong A Church, Introduction to Mathematical Logic (Princeton (N J ) 1956)], J Lukasevic, 
Anstotclcvskaja sillogistika ь toCki 7remja sovrcmennoj formal'noj logiki (Moskva 1959) [ong J 
Lukasiewicz, Aristotle s Syllogistic (Oxford (1951) 19572)] 
372 On this liberation ot mathematical logic, and the role ot Janovskaja, see Cavaliere 1988, ρ 542tf, and 
Hanggi 1971, both containing further references 
373 Bochenski 1967^, ρ 162f 
374 Cf esp Hanggi, 1971, ρ 13f, also Bochenski 1967^, ρ 158, and Kamenka 1963, ρ 11, According to 
Hanggi, from 1956 onwards, and in spite ot the fact that Kondakov and Bakrad/e were effectively silenced (cf 
op cit, ρ 32), all Soviet philosophers agreed on one thing, viz that "dialectical logic" is not a clearly defined 
science, but a general postulate (cf op cit, ρ 176), which in the Soviet context meant an unavoidable dogma 
375 Jeu 1969, ρ 62f 
376 Jeu 1969, ρ 65, quoting Culture, Science, Art de IV R S S (Moskva Politizdat, 1965), ρ 129)] 
377 Ct De George 1967, ρ 66, and Jachot 1979, ρ 48 
378 Cf on Gott Chernyak 1987, and the nekrolog in FN after his death ( Ш 1991, №9, ρ 190) 
379 Kamenka 1963, ρ lOf 
380 Mitin, for example, was appointed editor-in-chief of VE in 1960, a post that he held until 1965, when he 
was removed because ot plagiarism with his article in the BSE in 1936 (see Ch 4 u ) (cf Korolev 1988, ρ 6, 
3rd col ) 
381 Cf Kline 1964a, pp I77ff 
382 0gurcov 1989, ρ 182f 
383 This process of course was not limited to philosophy, leading politicians of the era of perestrojka, including 
M S Gorbacev, received their formation in the same period In an interview taken on 04/12/1991, for example, 
Gorbacev showed his pride of having been a classmate ot Μ К Mamardasvili, a leading sestidesjatmk in 
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philosophy (cf 'Zelfs Christus kan deze knopen niet ontwarren,' De Volkskrant. 12/12/1991 [interview by Ju 
SCekoiichin, originally appeared in Literaturnaja gazetalï 
384 On II enkov, probably the most important of this generation of philosophers, a monograph appeared 
recently Bakhurst 1991, cf also Novochat ko 1991, and Friedrich 1993, ρ 54f, η 4 
385 On Mamardaävili, see Delokarov 1992 and the introduction by Ju Ρ Senokosov, "Prizvanie filosofa," in 
MamardaSvili 1990, pp 5-13, bibliography in op cit, pp 357-359 
386 On Batiäcev, see, e g , Mitrochin 1975, ρ xv 
387 Cf, e g , Mitrochin's introduction of U'cnkov and Batiaîev in Mitrochin 1975, ρ xv 
388 Cf Malachov 1993, ρ 106 
389 "Fenomenologija " 1988, ρ 56 (ρ 102 in Mamardasvili 1990), cf also MolroSilova 1993, ρ 11 
390 Scanlan 1985, ρ 107 
391 It appeared 1962 in the first issue of VF of that year, cf Jeu 1969, ρ 38, and Scanlan 1985, ρ 26f 
392 Cf Zapata 1988, ρ 113f, Scanlan 1985, pp 27-29, and Jeu 1969, pp 38-44 
393 Ct Scanlan 1985, ρ 30f, and Graham 1987*>, ρ 58f 
394 Cf Graham 19873, ρ 58, and Jeu 1969, ρ 542. according to Graham, Cudinov was "a leading member of 
the epistemologists " 
395 Cf Graham 19873, ρ 59, and Scanlan 1985, ρ 32 
396 On this discussion see esp Graham 19873, pp 58-61 and Scanlan 1985, pp 106-111 
397 Scanlan 1985, ρ 32, quoting S Ρ Dudcl, G M Straks, Zükon edinstva ι Ьог'Ьу protivopoloïnostej [The 
Law of the Unity and Straggle ot Opposites] (Moskva 1967), ρ 170 
398 Cr Chernyak 1987, ρ 84 
399 On cybernetics and information theory see Graham I987\ pp 299-293 
400 On the development of sociology see Hanak 1976, pp 246-250, Smith 1991, pp 99-101, and Scanlan 
1985, ρ 190, who discusses the beginnings of this movement in 1963 with the establishment, at the IF, of a 
Seminar on Philosophical Problems of the Study of Society, on Levada see Shlapentokh 1990, and Smith 
1991 
401 Cf Bochenski 1962, ρ 9f 
402 Kline 1972, ρ 267 
403 ' An impulse to the development of creative investigations in the field of philosophy was given by the 
20icth CPSU congress The mid-fifties saw the formation ot a whole scries ot new directions of research 
(philosophical questions of natural science, logic and methodology of sciente, ethics, aesthetics, sociology et 
al ), but as a whole philosophy did not succeed in surmounting the deforming influence of the administrative 
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command-system, which quite often put up sharp resistance to new approaches and ideas springing from 
philosophical science" (Avenncev &c 19892, entry "Filosofia," ρ 698, et also Ucmov 1990, ρ 19f) 
404 Spravoönik dlja postupajusCich ν moskovskij univemtet 1992, ρ 54, these departments of Marxist-
Leninist aesthetics, ethics, and history of religion and atheism were founded in 1960 (cf Scipanov &c 1982, ρ 
183), I 9 6 9 ( o p c i t , p 191), and 1959(opcit,p 196) respectively, and headed by, in the same order, M F 
Ovsjannikov, A I Titarenko and I D Pancchava (1959-1969) and Μ N Nowkov 
405Bldkele> 1980, ρ 319 
406 К Marks & F Engel's, Iz rannich proi7vedemj (Moskva Politizdat, 1956) (cf Scanlan 1985, ρ 299), as 
Solov cv reports, this Russian translation appeared first in issues ol the Students' Research Society, Moscow 
University s Philosophical Department, were prepared for publication by E V Il'enko\ and G Seidel, professor 
at I-eip/ig, and later published by the IML (cf fcJu Solov'ev in the English translation of the "Umcr li 
marksizm '" discussion in S EET, ρ 39) 
407BlakeIey 1980, ρ 319 
408 Cf on these Hanak 1976, ρ 250-252, Scanlan 1985, ρ 176, and ρ 189ft, and Vranicki 1974, ρ 727 
409 E Ju Solov'ev, in the selected materials from the "Umer h marksizm9" discussion in SEET. ρ 39f 
410Smith also mentions courses in history of political doctrine, attended by, among many others, M S 
GorbaSev, by a pre revolutionary protessor, Stcpan F Ketsekian (Smith 1991, ρ 65, Ketsekian is also 
mentioned in Jeu 1969, ρ 487 ) 
411 Cf Síipanov &c 1982, ρ 161 
412 In the sense that some Soviet philosophers had it as their particular task to study and criticize Western, 
usually 'bourgeois-reactionary" commentaries on Soviet philosophy A characteristic Soviet reaction is 
Jakuscvskij 1975, for example on ρ 6 "It [i e , JakuSevskij s book, EvdZ] is written on the basis of a critical 
analysis ot the "works' ol a number of leading sovietologists The present work is an attempt at a critical 
analysis of "sovielological" interpretations ol materialist dialectics representations of its history and its 
essence, treatments of the problem of its development, ol its basic laws, and also anti-Communist versions of 
the actual dialectics of scientific theory and revolutionary practice " It is not so evident, however, what was the 
exact (unction of this kind of refutation of sovietology On the principle, taken from Lenin, that "it is 
impossible to criticize a certain author, to answer him, if one docs not wholly cite at least the main of his text 
(p 7)," lengthy quotations arc indeed given, and often answered in a most perfunctory manner For example. 
Jakusevskij quotes the article "Leninismus" by С Kernig and Ρ Scheiben in Soiv/etsysfcm und demokratische 
Gesellschaft Eine vergleichendebn/yklopadie [6 Bändel (Freiburg/Basel/Wien, 1966-1972) — the main target 
of his attacks anyway "In their article ' Leninism", К Kernig and Ρ Scheibert also maintain that "Marxism, 
which is a theory , was, thanks to Leninism, turned into "an instrument of the leadership" But against all these 
accusations, Leninism has nothing in common with pragmatism, and radically differs from the latter not only in 
its philosophical foundations, but also in its goals, and trough ;f> very essence " This kind of mere assurance, 
without any real argument, against texts that were no way accessible to Soviet philosophers, not to mention the 
general reader, do suggest that the effect of this kind of book —issued in 10,000 copies'— had, at least partly, 
and irrespective of the intentions of the author, the exact opposite of its purported goal (the book, by the way, 
fits perfectly well into the Russian tradition to be neurotically curious about what "they", ι e the West, might 
have to say about "us ') 
413 Cf Berdjaev 19532, ρ 78, and Wetter 1960"5, ρ 320 "Der Ausdruck 'gottlose Theologie" ist sehr 
zutreffend tur die Sowjetphilosphie Denn trol/ der Leugnung von Gott und Offenbarung ist die sowjet-
philosophische Methode eine typisch theologische Methode Grundvoraussetzung des "Sowjet-Philosophicrens ' 
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ist, ganz wie bei der theologischen Arbeit, das Vorhandensein und die standig fühlbare Gegenwart eines 
"unfehlbaren" Lehramtes "Organisator und Leiter im Kampfe der Werktätigen fur den Kommunismus, 
Organisator der gesamten ideologisch-politischen Arbeit des Sowjetstaates ist die bolschewistische Partei Das 
Zentralkomitee der bolschewistischen Partei stellt nicht nur das politische, sondern auch das theoretische 
Zentrum des Landes dar" (Wetter quotes from "Za bol'sevistskuju parlijnost' ν filosofii," YE 1948, № 3, ρ 7 
[pp 3-17]) 
4I4Bocheiíski 1967s, ρ 115 
415 Bochen'ski 1967% ρ 56 
416 The predominance of this interpretation of Soviet philosophy as a quasi-theology (and of Marxism-
Lenmism as a pseudo-religion) doubtless is related to the Roman-Catholic background and (Neo-)Scholastic 
training of many Western specialists in Soviet philosophy " it is interesting to note that very many of the 
men who have made valuable contributions to the study of this same contemporary Soviet philosophy 
(Bochenski, Dahm, Lobkowicz, Muller-Markus, Ogicnnan, Wetter, etc) arc men trained in Scholastic 
philosophy" (Blakeley 1961, ρ 84f), Karel van het Revé pointed to the same affinity when he described Soviet 
ideology as a "catholic" as opposed to a "protestant" system "In a "protestant" system, the believer can appeal 
to the Scripture as the highest authority In a "catholic" system this Scripture is authoritative if and insofar as it 
is interpreted by ecclesiastical authorities The latter is the case in the communist world" (van het Revé 19896, 
ρ 8) It even shows a certain affinity among these scholars with Soviet philosophy, a theme that was explicitly 
touched upon by Wetter, although he did reproach Soviet philosophers to apply theological methods to 
philosophical questions reacting on a review of the first, Italian version of his book (G A Wetter, II 
materialismo dialettico sovietico (Tonno, 1948)) in a social-democrat newspaper, which stated that Wetter, 
because of his Jesuit " forma mentis' " vielleicht am besten ausgerüstet ist, um die Nuancen einer Philosophie, 
ja einer ganzen Lebensanschauung zu erfassen, die im wesentlichen auf die klassischen Äußerungen eines 
religiösen Mystizismus zurückgeht" ("L'Umanità. 30/04/1948, quoted trom Wetter 1960 *>, ρ 634), Wetter 
remarks " noch bemerkenswerter sind die weiteren Ausführungen des sozialistischen Rezensenten, in denen er 
dem katholischen Philosophen, besonders dem Jesuiten als dem 'militanten Katholiken', wegen seiner 'forma 
mentis' eine gewisses Kongeniahtat, eine gewisse innere Verwandschatt mit der torma mentis des bolschewist-
ischen Philosophen zuspricht, die ihn zu einem adäquaten Verslehen der Sowjetphilosophie in hohem Maße 
befähigt ( ) Die Verwandschaft in der ' torma mentis' kommt daher, daß die sowjetischen Philosophen -zum 
mindesten galt dies fur die Fpoche des Stalinismus- ihrer Forschung oft nicht eine philosophische, sondern eine 
ausgesprochen theologische Methode zugrunde legen, eine Methode, die nicht Iragt, ob ein Salz an sich richtig 
oder falsch ist, sondern ob er in dem Offcnbarungsbestand einer als unfehlbar erwiesenen Lehrautomat enthalten 
ist" (Wetter 1960\ ρ 635) Although he does not deny this congeniality, Wetter rejects a precipitate 
comparison of catholic and Roman philosophy "Es ist aber festzuhalten, daß diese Methode im christlichen 
Denken nur in der Theologie, nicht aber in der Philosophie angewandt wird Aut philosophischem Gebiet gilt 
auch fur den christlichen Denker eine Autorität grundsätzlich soviel wie ihre Argumente beweisen Der 
sowjetische Ideologe wendet jedoch diese Methode auch aut philosophischem Gebiete an, wenn er auf dem 
Standpunkt steht, gewisse Salze des Marxismus-Leninismus waren unanfechtbar' (ibid ) Nevertheless, Wetter 
acknowledges a "far-reaching correspondence" between Ihc two "Eine der überraschendsten Einsichten, die uns 
die Darstellung des Systems der Sowjetphilosophie venmittcllc, isl die einer sehr weitgehenden Entsprechung 
[italics mine, EvdZ] zwischen gewissen grundlegenden Dcnkkategorien und Fragestellungen der Sowjet-
philosophie aut der einen und der Scholastik, ja des Thomismus auf der andern Seile Wir glauben nichl zu 
übertreiben, wenn wir behaupten, daß der dialektische Materialismus in seiner heutigen offiziellen sowjetischen 
Fassung viel mehr Ähnlichkeit mit der scholastischen 'forma mentis' hat als mit der hegelianisch-dialektischen, 
trotz gewisser hegelianischer Ausdrucke und Begriffe, die man zwar beibehalt, aber durch "materialistische 
Umkehrung' ihres idealistischen Sinnes beraubt und mit einem einfach dem gesunden Menschenverstand 
gemäßen Sinn erfüllt" (op cit, ρ 636) 
417 Blakeley 1961, ρ 72 
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418Bldkeley 1961, ρ 84 
419 Cf Wetter 1960s, ρ 636f, and Blakcley 1961, ρ 86f 
420 Until then, most Western commentators would probably have shared Kamenka's harsh judgment, passed in 
1963 "It is not my aim in this paper to show that the contempt in which most Western philosophers hold 
Soviet philosophy is already unjustified By and large, Soviet philosophical work in the last forty years [= 1922-
1962 LvdZ] does deserve this contempt At no stage, in the course ot reasonably wide reading in the field of 
Soviet philosophical work, can I recall meeting a single sound or interesting philosophical argument that was 
not taken directly from Western philosophers or from the work ot Marx himself ( ) Particularly striking, in 
this connection, has been the complete failure ot Soviet philosophers to make any contribution that might be 
called an advance of Marxist philosophy, even within its own tcrms"(Kamenka 1963, ρ 2f) 
421 Laszlo 1967, ρ 194, and ρ 199 "Since Soviet and Western philosophies arc mutually relevant, if Soviet 
philosophy becomes more expert, the work of Soviet thinkers becomes of greater interest for Western 
philosophers ( ) This comes down to affirming that whoe\er contributes to the technical level of Soviet 
philosophy ipso tacto contributes to contemporary philosophy itself," cf also Bochcnski 1967a and 1967b 
422 Cf Kamenka 1963, ρ 19 "Today, the conditions of increasing specialization, progress and ìnternationaliza 
tion ot knowledge and comparative social relaxation and material security have given the Soviet philosopher a 
certain independence of status and work ( ) a position from which Soviet philosophy can make future 
advancements has in my opinion been reached Such advances are not likely to he in the direction of creating a 
systematic Marxist philosophy, but in the direction of specific and no doubt mostly humble contributions to 
logical theory, philosophy of science, ontology, the development of a realistic theory of knowledge and of an 
empiricist theory of mind and to discussion of the empirical content of ethical and aesthetic judgments " 
423 Goerdt 1967, ρ 7, and ibid "Sowjelphilosophie" ist nicht "Philosophie" im Sinne einer idealen 'freien 
Suche nach Wahrheit" gewesen ( ) Jetzt [italics mine, LvdZl befindet sie sich in dem Zustand des "Zwischen", 
in dem sie sich von der 'Subjektivität" der Philosophen wie der "Objektivität" der Partei zur Rationalität 
gedrangt sieht, ohne letzt 'Glaubenshypothesen aufgeben zu können oder gar zu wollen " 
424 "Puis vinrent les années 60 au cours desquelles la littérature philosophique soviétique acquit une rénommée 
mondiale " (Huber 1977, ρ 351) 
425 The explosion —in the quantitative sense— of Soviet philosophy evoked a remarkable increase in Western 
attention In the USA (Richard Τ De George, George L Kline, Herbert Marcuse, Eugene Kamenka), West-
Germany (Wilhelm Goerdt, René Ahlberg, Helmut Dahm), France (Bernard Jeu), and the Vatican (Gustav A 
Wetter), Western philosophers ot difieren! backgrounds studied in different ways this burgeoning field Beyond 
doubt, the most influential figure was Josct M Bochenski His success was due to his great philosophical, 
didactical, and organizational qualities, as well as to financial support of the Swiss government, and the 
Rockefeller Foundation " whose generous grant made the studies of about half of the present writers possible" 
(Bochenski 1961a, ρ vin) 
426 De George 1984, ρ 9 
427 De George 1988, ρ 3 " in 1959 and in the early 1960s the bible for those in the West interested in 
Soviet philosophy was still Gustav Wetter's Dialectical Materialism It was first published in 1952 and was 
translated into English in a revised version that appeared in 1958", cf also Bochenski 1975', ρ 14 "Als 
grundlegendes Werk der Philosophie gilt das Buch Der dialektische Materialismus von Welter, ich selbst habe 
ein -glücklicherweise- viel kürzeres Buch verfaßt Der sowjetrussische dialektische Materialismus " 
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428 Bochenski starled teaching on Soviet philosophy in 1949 at the University of Fribourg (Switzerland), his 
Der sowjetrussische Dialektische Materialismus [= Bochenski 1967 ч] appeared tor the first time in 19*50, and in 
the late 50ies he started, at the Institute of Fast-fcuropean Studies, an intensive programme of research and of 
training in 'philosophical sovietology , thus creating " the Fribourg team, which seems to have been the first 
and as yet the only group devoted to research in recent Soviet philosophy" (Bochenski 1961a, ρ vin) The 
Sov/efica-sencs was started in 1959, the 50lh volume of which appeared in 1988 [= Dahm &c 1988] In this 
series a total of 18 research projects, started in 1958, was published (Bochenski, opcit, ρ vu), the first 
dissertation on Soviet philosophy under his guidance was defended in 1960 (Thomas J Blakeley's Soviet 
Scholasticism [= Blakeley 19611), and by 1972 the number of dissertations, dedicated to various aspects and 
branches of Soviet philosophy had grown to 8 (cf "Doctoral dissertations directed by J M Bochenski," in 
ORourke &c 1984, ρ 255 256) The 7lh volume of Sovietica was ihe first issue of Sludics in Soviet Thought, 
the only journal on Soviet thought in the West, to last as long as the Soviet system itself Also, numerous 
practical devices were created, ranging from running bibliography {Bibliographie der sowjetischen Philosophie in 
Sovietica vols 1, 2, 9, 10, 17, 28, 29, later included in SST), through a quadnlingual philosophical dictionary 
[= Ballestrem 19641, to translations from the Russian, synopses of Ihe subsequent versions of Soviet 
philosophical orthodoxy (cf esp Dahm &c 1988) 
429 Blakeley 1973, ρ 139 "It was not Bochenski but Wetter who judged Soviet philosophy from a Thomist 
viewpoint Bochcnski's critique is based on the Soviet refusal to observe the rules of the game - meaning simple 
logic of science and gentlemanly demeanor even in the face of the enemy", for Bochenski s own formulation of 
his approach to Soviet philosophy, cf Bochenski 1961b, and Bochenski 1975, pp 22t 
430 Bochenski 19675, ρ 127 "Mit solchen Mannern mochte der Philosoph gerne zusammenarbeiten " 
431 Bochenski \9ЬТ*, ρ 122 "Somit dürfen wir die Ergebnisse unserer kritischen Bemerkungen in folgenden 
drei Sat/en zusammenfassen 
(1) Der heutige sowjetrussische dialektische Materialismus, obwohl er auch aus westeuropäischen 
Quellen geschöpft hat, ist in seinen wesentlichen /ugen ein Produkt eines dem Westeuropäer fremden 
Kulturkreises Es ist ein Mißverständnis, ihn zu den philosophischen Systemen, wenn man das Wort 
«philosophisch» im westeuropäischen Sinne versteht, /u rechnen 
(2) Wenn man diesen Materialismus mit dem, was verwandte westeuropaische Systeme bieten, 
vergleicht, so ist es evident, daß er inhaltlich viel armer und formal unvergleichlich primitiver ist 
(3) Lr verstoßt nicht nur gegen die konventionellen westeuropäischen Regeln der philosophischen 
Forschung, sondern auch gegen solche inhaltlichen und methodischen Prinzipien, die zweifellos als 
objektiv bindend und allgemeinmenschlich anzusehen sind 
Das endgültige Urteil lautet also kullurfremd, primitiv und im wesentlichen falsch " 
432 Bochenski \96T^, ρ 162t "Eine neue Erscheinung in der sowjetischen Philosophie ist das starke 
Hervortreten verschiedener Tendenzen, die sich oft scharf bckamplcn, so daß man von wahren philosophischen 
Schulen sprechen kann Solcher Tendenzen sind im wesentlichen drei, die wir «Reaktionare», «Hegelianische» 
und «Aristotelische» nennen wollen " 
433 Cf Zubaty 1975, ρ 24f 
434 This recognition has always remained very limited, though "The sore fact is that Sovietologists who try to 
persuade their non-Communist colleagues that there is something valuable in Communist philosophy have had 
as yet very little success (Bochenski 1967b, ρ 189) " 
435 Renamed Society tor the Philosophical Study of Marxism in 1977 (cf Avermcev &c 19892, entry 
"Somervill,' ρ 600) 
436 See on the history of this initiative 'Preface" and "Introduction' in Somerville &c 1974, the journal now 
exists as Russian Studies in Philosophy 
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437 Somerville 1974, ρ xif "I well remember, m 1957 in Moscow, sitting in the office of the director of the 
Institute of Philosophy, Professor Ρ N Fedoseev (later vice-president of the U S S R Academy of Science) 
discussing the possibility of future cultural exchanges between our two countries, there were none whatsoever at 
the time I myself had no official status, or even encouragement of any kind from our government agencies 
Quite the contrary my philosophic researches in hastern Europe (begun as far back as 1935) were viewed with 
suspicion and hostility ( ) These conditions were characteristic of the intellectual climate generated nationally 
by McCarthyism and internationally by the Cold War In the face of them, Professor Fedoseev and I agreed that 
there was not much that could be hoped for at the time in regard to cultural exchanges in general or philosophi­
cal dialogues in particular " 
438Blakele> 1973, ρ 139 
439 Opposing Western and Soviet philosophy as two different realizations ol the relation between philosophy 
and ideology, Jeu perhaps was simplifying, but it is important to note that in this way he reintroduced the 
notions of hast and West, Russia and Europe, into a field where Bochcriski and others simply identified 
philosophy and Western philosophy The extent to which Soviet philosophy reproduces a "typically Russun" 
conception of philosophy is a captivating question, and will have to be, I believe, one of the central issues of 
future research into Russian philosophy, including its Soviet period 
440 Ct Wacgemans 1986, ρ 389 
441 Cf Kamcnka 1963, ρ 13, η 1 
442 Cf Shlapenlokh 1990, ρ 87, and ρ 143 
443 Cf Goerdt 1984, ρ I42f, and Shlapcntokh 1990, ρ 137 
444Scanlan 1985, ρ 313 
445 Cf Goerdt 1984, ρ 107f, and Shlapentokh 1990, ρ 144, Dobrovol'skij's article, "Vzaimoolnosenie znanija 
ι very," appeared in Feniks 1966, №2, and in Grani 1967, №64, pp 194-201 
446 De George 1984, ρ 16 
447 Graham 19871, ρ 20 
448Zubaly' 1975, ρ 288 
449 = Konstantinov &c, 1960-1970, a selection of entries in English translation is Blakeley (ed ) 1975 
450 Cf Zubaty 1975, ρ 227 (quoting Soviet sources) 
451 Kamcnka 1972, ρ 167, in 1977, Huber reports, to buy the FE in the USSR was "about as difficult as 
purchasing the Bible in Russian" ("C'est alors ainsi que fut créée l'Encyclopédie philosophique Les cinq tomes 
de cette œuvre, à travers l'évolution du style et de la qualité de l'information donnée, reflètent l'essor brillant de la 
philosophie en URSS pendant cette décade Maintenant, en URSS, l'acheter est presque aussi difficile que se 
procurer la Bible en langue russe" (Huber, ρ 351)), this, to be sure, is no longer the case in the Russia of the 
1990s, the Bible can be bought on every streetcorner, whereas the FE is still a bukinistiöeskaja redkost' 
452 Eg , the later dissident Egides, Іл KonstantinoviC Naúmenko (b 1933), the latter a member of a group 
founded by II enkov in Alma-Ata (cf Mitrochin 1975, ρ xv) 
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453 Cf Katvan 1978, pp 101-107, Scanlan 1985, ρ 176f, and pp 269ff, and, on Egides (and Ζ M Kakabadzc) 
about alienation, Vranicki 1974, ρ 728, η 27, who also mentions BatiScev, I S Kon, Ν V MotroSilova as 
'"young-Marxists ' on alienation in Soviet society, cf Marx, Dai Kapital [MEW XXXII], pp 85-96 
454 Cf Katvan 1978, ρ 106 
455 Cf Il'icev &c 1983, A Ρ Ogurcov, entry ' Otcuzdenie, ' ρ 472f, and Overman 19863,
 p p 200ff 
456 Katvan 1978, ρ 107 
457 Mitrochin 1975, ρ xv 
458 Cf Mitrochin 1975, ρ xiv " I regard this special edition represented b> a number of articles written by 
Soviet philosophers as an extremely useful and symptomatic matter Soviel philosophy has greatly changed 
during the past decade New talented scholars have appeared introducing their individual style, problems and way 
of thinking The range of problems under discussion has considerably widened and the ways of handling them 
has become incomparably more interesting and meaningful " 
459 Cf Scanlan 1985, ρ 313, and Shlapentokh 1990, ρ 103 
460 Cf Goerdl 1984, ρ 106f, Shlapentokh 1990, ρ 120, 134, 190, and Kline 1975, pp 180-188, who 
discusses one of Pomeranc' tamizdal publications, Pomeranc stayed in the USSR, and an article by him appeared 
in УЕ 1990, №11 
461 Cf Delokarov 1992, ρ 151 
462 Cf Bakhursl 1991, ρ 9, mei η 6 
463 Cf Jeu 1969, ρ 462 [Chraguine], Scanlan 1985, ρ 310, 313, mei η 52, Goerdt 1984, ρ 109, and 
Shlapentokh 1990, ρ 134 
464 Goerdt 1984, pp 141-144. and ρ 147, Kline 1975, 160-168, and Kamenka 1963, ρ 13, η ι 
465 Cf Goerdl 1984, pp 144-147, and Shlapentokh 1990 
466 Krancberg 1981, ρ 108, η 19 mentions 1979 as the year when hgides became a dissident 
467 Cf Samsonova 1988, ρ 63, Scanlan 1985, ρ 283, on Egides' views, sec Scanlan, op cit, ρ 269ff, and 
Katvan 1978, ρ 96f 
468 Cf Samsonova 1988, ρ 63 
469 Cf Jachot 1981, back cover, and editorial in VF 1991, №9, ρ 44 
470 According to Kline and Kamenka, Sanja published an unorthodox work in ethical theory in 1951, О 
nckotorych \oprosach kommumsitCeskoj morali (Moskva 1951), but did not publish anything since (cf 
Kamenka 1963, ρ 16, η 1, Kline 1955, ρ 100 mei η 16, and Kline 1956, ρ 1340, m a Soviet source, 
Sanja is mentioned as coming from Tbilisi (Edgerton 1950, ρ 1) 
471 The C/cch communist ArnoSt Kolman [Russian Ernst Kol'man] was a 'zealous servant of the Stalin 
regime' (Shlapentokh 1990, ρ 18), and one of the people who attacked Losev in the 1930s (cf Hagcmcister 
1985, ρ 23 and 50f, η 148) who later became deeply disappointed in 'real existing socialism' (ct Goerdt 
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1984, pp 138ff, and ρ 148, as well as N Lobkowicz, "A Kolman," SST 3 (1963), ρ 159f, where further 
references are given, in exile, Kolman wrote his memoir as a member of the 'generation gone astray" A 
Kolman, Die verirrte Generation (Frankfurt am Main, 1979)) 
472 CI Kline 1975, pp 168-180, and Shlapcnlokh 1990, ρ 160andl9lf 
473Goerdt 1984, ρ 109 
474 Π Pjatigorskij 1990 ρ 93 (editorial) 
475 De George 1967, ρ 65 "One result [of the need for empirical sociological, psychological and economic 
research, EvdZ] has been increased emphasis on sociology as an empirical discipline, which is now breaking 
away from historical materialism in the Soviet Union as an independent branch of study", cf also H'i£cv &c 
1983, IS Kon, entry 'Sociologia,' ρ 641 "A quick progress of sociology in the USSR and the other 
socialist countries started in the 1960s This was furthered by the increasing needs ot planning and management, 
the necessity to base political decisions on scientific information and on a prognosis of social processes, but 
also by the progress of socialist society itself, the increasing activity of the masses and the role of the «human 
I actor» in all social processes ' 
476 Cf Hanak 1976, ρ 247, and Henry 1977, ρ 62 
477 Hanak 1976, ρ 247 
478 "II est très significatif de constater que, ces cinq dernières années [1970-1975, E\dZ], cette revue Γ SST. 
Evd7] a publice de moins en moins d'articles touchant a la philosophie soviétique" (Hubcr 1977, ρ 351), in 
1975, the last dissertation under Bochen ski s guidance on Soviet philosophy was defended, and remained 
unpublished (Rybarczyk 1975), and if we look at the distribution over the years ot monographs from the 
BochenskHSchool ot philosophical Sovietology, the decline in interest is manifest 
year 
1960/1 
1962/3 
1964/5 
1966/7 
1968/9 
1970/1 
1972/3 
1974/5 
1976/7 
1978/9 
1980-91 
(source 
dissertations 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
O'Rourkc &c 1984, ρ 
monographs 
3 
2 
5 
3 
I 
2 
4 
total 
4 
2 
6 
5 
-
2 
2 
1 
-
3 
4 
255f, and McNally &c, 
averagepervear 
2 
1 
3 
2 5 
-
1 
1 
0 5 
-
1 5 
0 3 
Philosophical Works ot Peter Chaadaev [Sovietica 56] 
(Dordrecht Reidel, 1991),319ff) 
479 The optimism of the 60ies is perhaps best of all illustrated by Laszlo, who qualified Soviet philosophy as 
"an impressive field of philosophical endeavour which, awakened from dogmatic slumbers, rapidly gains in 
interest and encourages hopes of becoming a valuable component in the vast complex of contemporary 
philosophy" (Laszló &c 1967, ρ ν) 
480Zinov'ev 1989, ρ 814 
481 = Bocheiíski 195I2, on Soviel philosophy pp 67 75 
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482 Ju M Bochen'skij, Sovremennaja evropejskaja Tilosofija (Moskva, I960), translated by VV Msvemeradze 
and M К Mamardasvili (et Mamardasvili 1990, ρ 359) 
483 JakuSevskij 1975, ρ 21 
484 JakuSevskij 1975, ρ 21 f 
485 Il'icev &c 1983, entry "Bochen'skij, ' ρ 60, the 1989 republication ot this work has no entry on Bocherlski, 
but a profoundly changed appreciation can be found in the first "post-Soviet" standard work on Western 
philosophy, Leklorskij &c 1991, entry "Bochen'skij, 'p 47 "In the works of Bochenski, Marxism is regarded as 
a faith without scientific foundation While recognizing the humanist trend of the Marxist world-outlook, 
Bochenski blames it for its consequently advancing of atheism At the same time in the works of Bochenski and 
his many apprentices certain achievements of Marxist philosophers are mentioned, and a call to dialogue with 
them is present " 
486 This observation is confirmed by Bakhurst, who discusses the Soviet "critical Marxists", who did their 
"most challenging work in the early 1960'ь," but who, as a generation, "lost momentum when the "thaw" of 
those years began to refreeze" (Bakhurst 1991, ρ 3) 
487 Scanlan, for example, in 1985 was able, "in most fields", to distinguish systematically between an official, 
"orthodox" level, and a "more specialized, professional level of Soviet philosophy - the level at which probing 
questions arc raised and basic disagreements revealed "(Scanlan 1985, ρ 10) 
488Frolov&c 1989, I, ρ 271 
489 As Bakhurst notes "The reforms of the Khrushchev era, which had promised so much, failed to remove the 
old guard of philosophers" (Bakhurst 1991, ρ 6), and Vramcki wrote 1974 "Bis in unsere Tage hinein befinden 
sich die höchsten Stellen in den Institutionen in den Handen der alten stalinistischcn Kader," and these cadres 
were the names we encounter until the very end of Soviet philosophy Mitin, Judin, Fedoseev, Konstantinov 
(Vramcki 1974, ρ 727) 
490 Huber 1977, ρ 356 
491 Coplcston 1986, ρ 409, cf also De George 1984, ρ 18 "With the optimism that those of us who engage 
in Soviet philosophical studies necessarily have, we must look forward to the field possibly becoming 
interesting once again at some time in the future We can be consoled that at least the quality of what we read is 
unlikely to get worse", and Scanlan 1985, ρ 9 
492Blakeley 1980, ρ 323 
493 See on Soviet aesthetics Scanlan 1985, ch 8, and csp Swiderski 1979 
494 On Soviet philosophy of science see Graham 19871, and Scanlan 1985, ch 3 
495 E g , Graham reports that "the year 1982 saw a new outbreak of the controversy [between an "epis-
temologist" and an "ontologist" interpretation of dialectical materialism, EvdZ], with over seventy authors 
speaking out on the subject in philosophical journals "(Graham 19871, ρ 61) 
496 See ν d Zweerde 1991, pp 179ff 
497 Béatrice Henry reported on the favorable reception in the West of translated Soviet work in this field, 
mentioning a special issue of Foundations of Physics ot 1972. publications in 1973 by the AcadcmieRoyalede 
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Belgique, and in 1973 an Italian translation of works by Omel'janovskij, Fok, and others, entitled L'in-
terpretazionc della mecánica quantistica (Henry 1977, ρ 61 ) 
498 See Graham 1987"·, pp 260ff 
499Bakhurst 1991, ρ 2 
500Chernyak 1987, ρ 85 
501 Sec, с g , De George 1984 
502Scanlan 1985, ρ 9 
503 Cf Lilschcv &c 1992, ρ 10 "Merkwürdigerweise wirkte sich diese allgemeine Stimmung der Menschen 
sogar aul das Verhalten der Fuhrer des gescheiterten konservativ-kommunistischen Putsches vom August 1991 
aus, denn diese erwähnten in ihren öffentlichen Verlautbarungen die Sthlagworte Sozialismus, Kommunismus 
oder Marxismus-Leninismus mit keinem Wort " 
504 Cf McCIellan &c 1991, ρ 257, referring to a telephone conversation with the dean ot the faculty, 
AlcksandrPanin 
505 Cf Litschev &c 1992, ρ 11 "Als geschlossene, staatlich und parteiamtlich gesicherte und einheitliche 
Philosophie gab es die «Sowjetische Philosophie» spätestens seil 1988 nicht mehr " 
506 "Programma Kommunisticcskoj Partii Sovetskogo Sojuza — Novaja Rcdakcija," in Matcnaly XXVJI , 
ρ 122 
507 "Ustav KommunistiCeskoj Partii Sovetskogo Sojuza," in opcit, ρ 189 
508 "Ustav Kommunisticcskoj Partii Sovetskogo Sojuza," in Matenaly XXVHI , ρ 108 
509 Cf Shlapcntokh 1990, ρ 236f, and esp ρ 242 
510 Cf Gorbafev 1987, ρ 72ГГ 
511 Contrary to what is sometimes thought, perestrojka and glasnost' were not neologisms G/asnosf'had a 
long history as a demand from the government by intellectuals, including Soviet dissidents like Soliemcyn, and 
it occurs 40 times in Lenin's works (cf Laqucur 1990, ρ 66f, cf also Gocrdt 1992, ρ 40 "'Glasnost'" war mir 
bekannt als die Forderung eines Slawophilen, Konstantin Axakow [Aksakov) (1817 1860) 1855/56 hat er ein 
Memorandum an Alexander II geschrieben -es wurde erst 1881 in der Presse veröffentlicht , wo er sagt daß 
gelordert werden musse die ' Kundgebung der öffentlichen Meinung" "Kundgebung heißt "glasnost"', das 
kommt von "gólos" oder glas" (Stimme), "glasnost"' heißt eigentlich wörtlich "Verlautbarung" Daß die 
gesellschaftliche oder die öffentliche Meinung verlautbart werden konnte das heißt im ursprunglichen Sinne 
"glasnost", also nicht "Offenheit" oder "Öffentlichkeit' — das hat es erst nachher angenommen"), as to 
perestrojka, it is a rather 'normal" Russian word, and in fact less controversial than reform, since "retormizm" 
had been one of the main charges against non-Leninist Marxists — by the same token, it is nol coincidential 
that the El'cyn government speaks ot rc/ormy (cf Laqueur 1990, ρ 67f) 
512 Cf Dlugac 1991, ρ 207 "Die Perestrojka berührte die Philosophie in größerem Maße als die anderen 
Bereiche des geistigen Lebens, denn die Ablehnung des Dogmatismus betrifft die tiefsten Wurzeln des 
philosophischen Denkens " 
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513 Cf Hedeler 1992, ρ 54 "Eine unvollständige Bibliographie der in russischen Buchern, Zeitschriften und 
Zeitungen von 1986-1991 publizierten Texte aus dem Nachlaß russischer Philosophen weist ca 400 Titel auf" 
514 Some early examples are G G Spet, "Teair как îskusstvo," VF 1988, №11, pp 77-92, P A Florenskij, 
"Avtoreferat, ' VF 1988, №12, pp 113-119, S L Frank, "Puîkin ob otnoScnn mc2du Rossiej ι Evropoj," VF 
1988, №10, pp 146-155, VIS Solov'ev, Solinemjd ν 2-ch tornarti [Filosofskoe naslcdie] (Moskva Mysl', 
1988), idem, ' Istonceskie delà filosofii," VF 1988, №8, pp 118-125 
515 In this senes, called "I/ istorii oteceslvennoj filosofskoj mysli [From the History of National Philosophical 
Thought]," editions appeared, in 1989, by N A Berdjaev, K D Kavelin, Ρ Ja Caadaev, G G Spet, BS 
Solov'ev (2 vols), AA Potcbnja, M A Bdkunin, DI Pisarcv, in 1990, by Ρ D Jurkcvic, A F Losev, P N 
Tkaicv, S L Frank, Ρ A Florenskij (3 vols ),VV Rozanov (2 vols ), Ρ A Kropolkin, in 1991, by V F Em, 
P I Novgorodcev, N O Losskij, and the two famous sbormki Vec/iiandIzglubiny, in 1993, by I A Il'in (2 
vols ), A S Chomjakov (2 vols ), Ε N Trubcckoj (2 vols ), L I Sestov (2 vols ), S N Bulgakov (2 vols ), 
Β Ρ VySeslavcev, and V I Ivanov 
516 В A Kisljakovskij, "V zaicitu prava, intelligencija ι pravosoznanie," Nasc nasledie 1990, №4, pp 3-10, 
S N Trubcckoj, "Ja verju ν silu razumnogo celovcêcskogo slova," Rodina 1989, №6, pp 45-48 (with a preface 
by A L Dobrochotov) 
517 Cf Gorbacev 1987b 
518 Κ N Ljubutin, DV Pivovarov, "Problema nauínosti filosofii ι «konlrfilosofija»," in ZTK, EN. 1989, 
№6, ρ 72 
519See"Anketa " 
520 The Soviet "delegation" to the 18lh World Congress in Brighton (1988) represented the new philosophical 
line of the USSR (cf esp Frolov 1989a), but it was composed in a broader and more open way (cf "Vsemimyj 
filosofskij kongress," VE 1989, №2, ρ 1 7 " unlike former delegations, the delegation to the 18th congress 
included representatives of all generations of Soviet philosophers, working in various fields of knowledge"), and 
it was appreciated differently by the Soviet philosophers themselves (cf Mitrochin 1989, ρ 71f) 
521 Cf "Vsemimyj filosofskij kongress," YE 1989, №2, ρ 17 
522Glincikov 1989, ρ 159f 
523 One of the immediate effects of glasnost' was a spectacular growth of samizdat The material conditions of 
publishers that were independent from stale and party were of course harsh, but they could operate more or less 
freely The "boom" in samizdat took shape in early 1988 (cf SpravoCnik 1990, ρ 0, information obtained 
thanks to Mr Η M Leich, Russian / Soviet specialist at the Library of Congress, Washington D С ) The total 
number ot samizdat periodicals was, according to this source, 750 800 b) the beginning of 1990, some 500 of 
them in Russian The majority of these periodicals had a socio-political profile, and the number of philosophical 
journals was relatively small (op cit, ρ 1) the religious-philosophical journals Amin' [Amen] (Leningrad, 4 
issues in 1988, 12 copies per issue), IstoCnik IThe Source] (Leningrad. 1 issue in 1988), Ohsceedelo [The 
Common Cause] (Moscow, 1 issue in 1988), a journal that propagated the social philosophy of Nikolaj 
Fedorov (1828-1903), a propaganda that, in spite of Soviet interest in Fedorovs ideas (cf Goerdl 1984, ρ 475, 
η 17) was counteracted by official philosophy until 1987, but apparently obtained an accepted status later (cf 
SpravoCnik 1990, ρ 106, note, and Hagemeister 1989, csp the introduction), Rutenija (Archangelsk. 1 
issue in 1989, 5 copies), the "literary-philosophical almanac of the adherents to the doctrine of Ruthcnia, the 
country that will arise on the ruins of Russia" (LÌ SpravoCnik 1990, ρ 109), and Jasnaia Poljana [Jasnaja 
Poljana was LN Tolstoj 's residence] (Riga, 5 issues in 1988, I in 1989), ajournai that propagated the 
philosophical and religious views of Tolstoj, and Vybor [The Choice] (Moscow, issued quarterly over 1987 -
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1990 in up lo 500 copies), ihe only big and well-known journal in this category, a "literary-philosophical 
journal of Russian Christian culture" (cf SpravoCmk 1990, ρ 105), as to philosophical journals in the more 
strict sense of the term, the same source divides them -following the basic question of philosophy"1- into 
marxism ' and idealism ' two journals issued by the SOFI [Sumskoc OMicstvo F;/oso/ov-/dea/içfov 
Association of Idealist Philosophers from the city of Sumy in the Ukraine], viz j£[edj> (to appear every two 
months) and Mysl [Thought |, a philosophical weekly ('] — both apparently came out only once in 1989, and 
lurthcr KritiCeskau mvsl [Critical Thought], the journal of a Muscovite Independent Young-Marxist 
Philosophical Association' that is commented upon rather favorably (cf Spravoönik 1990, ρ 44), which 
however appeared only once in 1989, and Speklr [Spectrum I a more regularly appearing journal of the 
Novosibirsk branch of political clubs in Siberia and the Ural (cf SpravoCmk 1990, ρ 87), 3 issues in 1988, 
a fourth in 1989 
524 Such as "Problemy perestrojki ι zadaii filosofii na sovrcmennom étape,' VF 1987, №1, pp Iff, V V 
Msvcnieradzc, Perestrojka ι poliliccskaja nauka," YE 1988, №2, pp 3-15, or D M Gvisiani, "Sistemnaja 
pnroda perestrojki, ' VF 1988, №7, pp 3-15 
525 Cf alsoBakhurst 1992 
526 Examples arc the kruglye stoly on currents within Western philosophy that had only recently been 
disqualified as bourgeois' (on analytical philosophy [VF 1988, №8, pp 48-94] and on phenomenology [VF 
1988, №12, pp 43-84],as well as on sensitive subjects such as the investigation ot the history of Russian 
philosophy [VE 1988, №9, pp 92 161, cl Goerdt 1989b)] or relationships between nationalities within the 
USSR [ Filosotskie problemy teorn ι praktiki nacional n\ch otnosenij pn sociahzme, VF 1988, №9, pp 28-
91] 
527 Tilosofija ι ζιζη' , VF 1987-1988, on this discussion see esp Fleischer 1988, which contains a useful 
survey of the contributions as well as a discussion, and -critically with respect to Fleischer- Oittincn 1989, pp 
345П 
528 According to Anatohj Τ Kalinkin, chairman ot the department Istonja mirovoj kul'tury of the IPK [Institut 
PovyScmja Kvalifikacn Prcpodavatelej po ObSCeMvennym naukam], an institute tor training and retraining of 
teachers of philosophy, and A L Dobrocholov, lecturer at that department 
529 Konstantinov &c 1982« 
530 Cf VF 1981, №9, ρ 168, and 1987 №3, ρ 170, as well as Ж 1987, №5, ρ 112 "Twenty-two 
manuscripts were submitted for the prize competition for text-books on Marxist-Leninist philosophy The jury 
ot the competition has decided not to award the first and the second prize " 
531 Cf Frolov &c 1989, II, ρ 620Г. as well as DlugaC 1991, ρ 209, and ν d Zweerde 1990a, ρ 31 
532 Cf Frolov &c 1989, ' Vvcdewe ν filosofiju ", reactions in VF 1989, №3, pp 155-159, Golobokov 1990, 
' Obsuzdenie , ' 1990, see further Buchholz 1988a and 1990 
533Korolev 1988 
534 E g , M N Rutkevic and Ρ Ν Fedoseev (cf Shlapcntokh 1990, ρ 99, on Rutkevic cf also ibid , ρ 226) 
535Volko\ 1988 
536 Baskov &c 1989 
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537 E g, G S Batiäcev, "Filosofskaja koncepcija celovcka ι kreativnosti ν nasledii S L Rubinitejna [The 
Philosophical Conception ot Man and Creativity m the Heritage of S L Rubinstein|," YE 1989, №4, pp 96-
109, and G S Pomeranc, Istonja ν soslagatelnom naklonenn [History in the Subjective Mood],' V£ 1990, 
№11, pp 55-66 
538 Cf "Sozdan Centr nauk о беіо екс," YE 1989, №4, ρ 172 
539 Cf DlugaC 1991, ρ 209 "Zur philosophischen Erneuerung der letzten Jahre gehören "Philosophische 
Ferngespräche' Fur die Gestaltung eines antidogmatischen Denkens sind sie von großer Bedeutung, denn ihre 
Teilnehmer (zu ihnen gehören Philosophen wie Ρ Gajdcnko, N Motrosilova, V Stepin, V Lektorski, E 
Solov'ev u a ) demonstrieren vor den Fernsehzuschauern den Prozeß des philosophischen Denkens Ihr Anliegen 
ist es, die Unvollendetheit und Problemhafligkeit des philosophischen Denkens zu zeigen, bei dem es nicht so 
sehr auf das Ergebnis, sondern auf den Weg der Erkenntnis ankommt Die Wahrheit wird im Disput, in einer 
freundschaftlichen Auseinandersetzung erkannt und hat keinen endgültigen oder absoluten Charakter " 
540 Cf also Shlapcntokh 1990, ρ 198 
541 Cf, e g , Vladimir N Akulinin "Under the circumstances of a pointed interest in the entire cultural 
heritage ot pre-revolulionary Russia the rcestabhshment of the status quo ante is the command of the day" (V N 
Akulinin, Fiiosofija vsccdmstva, ot VS Soloveva к PA Florenskomu (Novosibirsk "Nauka" (sib old) 
1990), ρ 5) 
542 The extent to which this legitimacy was lost was made clear by MotroSilova "There is one conversation, 
that took place as we were waiting for a plane at the airport, that I cannot forget I was speaking with a 
physicist and a biologist, who worked at the Academy of Sciences I invited the physicist to the institute where 
I work (the IF AN), saying that there were some interesting philosophers there He replied politely that he 
would drop by But the biologist, a well-known scientist, protested you philosophers, you have nothing to be 
proud of -such were his words- you have lost the struggle for the minds of the people I tried those 
philosophers, those talents, whose education and moral stance had assisted them in claiming their place in 
culture ( ) However, I could not and I can not deny, that the biologist was, in historical perspective, basically 
right" (N V MotroSilova, ' Proliv ballasta dogmaticcskoj apologetiki," in "Filosofija ι Zizn' " 1988, ρ 97) 
543Nikiforov 1990b, ρ 127 
544 As Τ В DlugaC warned during a symposium in the IF AN, in which I took part in December 1993 
545 Cf tumakov 1993, pp 189-190 
546 0 p c i t , ρ 189 
547 Ct Scherrer 1993, and Wouters 1993 
548 Cf Safronova &c 1990, the AN SSSR has become RAN [Rosvjskaja Akademija Nauk] in the meantime, 
as its prczidmm decided in secret ballot on 21/09/1991 (cf Die Zeit 1991, №47 (15 II 1991), ρ 4), after 
attempts to save the Soviet system of scientific cooperation had failed 
549 At the Russian Humanities State University [Rossijskij Gosudarstvennyj Gumamtarnyj Univcrvtct, RGGU 
('Afanas'ev'-university)], the Lumumba-University ot Friendship between the Peoples [Univcrsitet DruZby 
Narodov imeni РаШча I umumby], and the Orthodox University [Pravoslavnyj Universitet] 
550 In 1989, the Ukrainian journal Filosofska dumka had made a new start as rilosofskaia ι Sociologiceskaia 
Mysl', and since 1991 new Russian journals appeared Nacala.(re/;¿'io7no fìlowtskij zumai) f 19911. Logos 
(fílosol'чко-litcraturnyj [fenomenoìogi£e\kij\ zumal, a continuation ot the journal with the same name that 
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existed 1910-1914 and 1925) [19911, ÏüSL(mezdunarodnyj fìlosoHkij fumai continuation of the journal of the 
same name that was published 1925-1940 in Pans by N Berdjaev) [1992], Mirovoe Drcvo / Arbor Mundi 
(me/dunarodnyj zumal po teorti ι istont mirovoj kultury) [1992], Russkajd Ide)a / Der russische Gedanke 
(surveys from Russian journals, in Russian and German) [1992], Novvi Kruy (chudozestvenno-tilosofskijι 
kul turologiCcskij Zumai) [1992], Zdes ι Teper' (literatura fìlosofìja kul'tura) [1992], and Filosofskie 
Issledovamja [19931 
551 Cf vd Zweerde 1992b 
552On the discussion about 'Soviet scholasticism' cf esp Ivm 1989a and 1989b, as well as Swiderski 1994, 
the concept of scholasticism employed by post So\iet philosophers is remarkably close to the purely negative 
Sov iel concept 
553 CF Aleksecv &c 1991, ρ 35 
554 Ct Dlugaí 1991, ρ 213F 
555 Cf Cipko 1988 / 1989, Butenko 1989, and Dluga6 1991, ρ 211 
556Cipko, 1988/1, ρ 48 
557 Cf, e g , A P Butenko, "O social'no-klassovoj pnrode stalinskoj vlasti [About the Class Character of 
Stalins Power],' VF 1989, № 3, pp 65-78, and V P Makarenko, Anali? socialnoj pnrody bjurokratn ν 
rdboljch К Marksa 1844-1851 gg [The Analysis of the Social Nature ot Bureaucracy in the Works of Karl 
Marx 1844-1851]," in IFE 88, pp 5-21 
558 Butenko 1989, ρ 24 
559 Cf the contribution by Valéry Aleksandroviä Podoroga (b 1946) to the discussion "Umer li marksizm''" in 
the English translation in SEET. ρ 69 "And it I intend, for instance, to study the Stalinist epoch, I must not 
look for a way out ot the deadlock formed by the two great words — "Stalinism' and "Marxism-Leninism", but 
refuse to use these and allied less meaningful notions I must first and foremost, de ideologize the subject of 
research and test my own vocabulary, ι e accomplish what Husserl called putting in brackets' Only then will I 
work up my way to the Stalinist epoch, but perceived with the aid of a language foreign to it And we must not 
create this other language today, whether we want it or not, to understand our own history " 
560 See Nikiforov 1990, and Panarin 1990, other contributions to the same discussion by В Altuchov and Τ 
Panfilova in ObScestvennye nauki 1990, №5, pp 84 98 and pp 98-110 
561 For example, Nikiforov carefully distinguished between Marxism-leninism as a dogmatic "state religion" 
and Marxism as a philosophical theory (cf Nikiforov 1990a, ρ 15) the first was entirely dependent upon the 
CPSU and the Soviet system, whereas the other was a respectable position, but already part of history 
(Nikiforov 1990b, ρ 127f) 
562 V I Tolstych, in "Umcr h marksizm''," ρ 22 
563 Ibid , ρ 23 
564 F T Michajlov, in 'Umer li marksizm9," ρ 42, cf also Michajlov 1993, and Nikiforov 1990b, ρ 126 
565 There was a discussion about pluralism early in the perestrojka period already in 1987, Gorbaîev advocated 
a 'socialist pluralism,' and was attacked bv the conservative philosophical establishment (led by the AON pn 
CK KPSS) tor it (in a collection ot articles, edited by Β N Bcssonov and I S Narskij, IdcologiCakij 
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pljuralizm vidimosl' ι susínost' [Ideological Pluralism Appearance and Essence] (Moskva Mysl', 1987), cf 
also I Pogrebov, ' Kritika nuzna, no kakaja1? [We do need Criticism, but what Kind o f ] , ' Now; mir 1988, №2, 
pp 255-257, and V Pugacev, 'Cerez pljuralizm к obnovlcniju socializma [Through Pluralism to a Renewal ot 
Socialism], Kommunist 1990. №8, pp 68-75), it is indeed questionable whether a concept like "socialist 
pluralism" makes sense at all, ι e whether a pluralism that is a prion "socialist" can exist at all 
566 Panin was elected dean in 1987, when his predecessor, Kosieev, was asked to resign (Kosieev was, since 
1970, chairman of the kafedra of the history of Marxism-Leninism, a stronghold of orthodoxy, founded 1958, 
first headed by Iovcuk (1958-1963), then by Vaseckij (1963-1970), and the highest-ranking CPSU-member at 
the faculty) (cf McClellan &c 1991, ρ 247, and Siipanov &c 1982, ρ 165) 
567 See esp McClellan &c 1991, and ν d Zweerde 1992a 
568 Cf Panann 1990, ρ 129fand 134 
569 Ct, e g , Dlugaí 1991, ρ 219f, and passim in Lapin &c 1991 
570Cf V P Filatov, in Lapin &c 1991, ρ 232, and VS Svyrev, ibid , pp 198-223 
571 Cf Mamardasvili, "Mysl' ν kul'ture," in Mamardaävili 1990, ρ 143 
572 See Michajlov 1991 
573 The clearest example is Lapin &c 1991, the result of a series of discussion, in which many philosophers 
from the IF AN took part apart from NI Lapin himself EJu Solov'ev, AL Nikiforov, VA Lektorskij, 
G S BatisXev, VM Me?uev, N V MotroSilova, VG Fcdotova, L P Bueva, VS Svyrev, F T Michajlov, 
T I Ojzerman, VA Podoroga, the seminar itself was started in 1987, but the results were published only in 
1991, cf also Oitunen 1989, and Fleischer 1988 
574 See Davydov 1988, more or less equivalent to "kaif in English are 'hip" or 'cool", and it was translated by 
Litschev and Kegler into German with 'echt stark" or tctzig ' 
575 Cf Barabanov 1990, ρ 73 
576 See Lapin &c 1991, pp 40-70 
577 The ZTK "Javljaetsja h filosofija naukojV 1989/ 1990, cf alsovd Zweerde 1992c, pp 218-221 
578 Cf V S Chazicv, in 'ZaoCnaja " in FN 1990, №2, ρ 67, who refers to the "cry of a worn out soul, that 
is very likely to be supported by all Soviet philosophers," "a cry of protest against the incompetent interference 
in the business of philosophy from the side of managers (of party and state) that we are all quite bored with " 
579 Cf A L Nikiforov, in 'ZaoCnaja ," EN 1989, №6, pp 52-62 
580 Nikiforov, op cit, ρ 60f " every philosopher must see it as his fundamental task to express clearly his 
own personal Weltanschauung, and the organization of philosophical investigations should be subordinate to the 
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PHILOSOPHY AND IDEOLOGY — THE SOVIET CASE 
" il faut d abord se défaire de certains stéréotypes qui, maigre leur allure 
«critique», ne font en réalité que reproduire 1 image que voulait donner le 
stalinisme de lui-même "' 
R Zapata, 1988 
Introduction 
Western and Russian commentators have compared Soviet philosophy to various other forms 
of intellectual life to a secular belief or a "philosophical creed" (Wetter, Acton, van het Revé), 
to scholastic philosophy (Blakeley), to a state religion (Kolakowski), to a global scientific 
theory (Graham), and even to gnostic wisdom (Besançon, Grays) I suspect that most people 
personally or professionally involved in Soviet philosophy will find that these comparisons all 
contain an element of truth, even if they seem to exclude each other I also suspect that many 
people dealing with Soviet philosophy have found it difficult to give precise answers to 
questions like "What is Soviet philosophy17", or "Isn't it pure ideology9" 
In the preceding part [Part II], I have defined Soviet philosophy as a philosophy that was 
fundamentally subordinated to its ideological function [Ch 4 m], and I have argued that m this 
respect it was the result of the reduction of Soviet Marxism to a single and official doctrine, 
Marxism-Leninism, immediately and explicitly related to established political power In spite of 
later vicissitudes and periods of relative freedom, this basic determination was there to stay 
until the very end of Soviet philosophy [Ch 6 u] This implies that the key to understanding the 
phenomenon of Soviet philosophy lies in its relation to ideology Therefore, now that the 
historical material has been presented, the aim of the present part is to provide an analysis of 
Soviet philosophical culture, departing from that definition 
To this end, I shall, in the first chapter of this part [Ch 7], attempt at an analysis of the 
phenomenon of Soviet ideology, since it determined the situation in which philosophy existed 
in the USSR In doing so, I shall employ the conception of ideology as developed in Chapter 
3 The core of that conception is the idea that ideology is a possible function of theory This 
function is to organize the commitment and action of social groups through motivation and 
legitimization In order to 'work' an ideological move entails three elements — a truth-claim, 
an exclusion of alternatives, and a transition from 'theory' to practice, at least one of which 
must be concealed Ideology further is complementary to other forms of exercise of power, and 
is not so much 'false', but presupposes the suspension (or exclusion) of the question as to the 
truth of the 'theory' involved Likewise, ideology is not necessarily 'believed in' by its 
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producers or addressees, but works relatively independently of 'belief Further, it is not an 
'evil', but an inevitable fact of any non-utopian society, and finally it can be judged differently 
according to a number of parameters, and depending on the judge's position 
Our analysis of Soviet ideology will point out that in the Soviet system one theory, so-
called "Marxism-Leninism", served as a universal medium of legitimacy, backed by political 
power This theory was 'tailored' to this end, and rounded off with a 'meta-ideology' about 
Marxism-Leninism Philosophy never is an evident part of society and culture, and therelore 
always has to be legitimized ideologically [Pari I, Conclusioni This requirement, in combination 
with the position of Marxism-Leninism as a universal medium of legitimacy, implies that 
anything philosophical that actually existed in the USSR, had to be accounted for, in order to 
be legitimate, in terms of dominant ideology Hence, the production and sophistication of a 
theory about (Soviet) philosophy that could serve as its ideological legitimization was an 
indispensable clement of Soviet philosophical culture This 'ideology of Soviet philosophy' is 
the subject of Chapter 8 
This 'ideology of philosophy', in force from the very beginning to the very end of the 
period of existence of Soviet philosophical culture, not only warranted the subordination of 
philosophy to its primary, ideological function, but it also made possible the legitimate 
existence of philosophy in the USSR This situation is complicated by the fact that large 
sections of Marxist-Leninist theory, its 'meta-ideology', and the ideology of Soviet 
philosophy, were yielded by philosophers At the same time, this points to a need for 
philosophy philosophy was a necessary element of the Soviet system If something is 
necessary and possible, it will become real Therefore, Chaptei 9 offers an analysis of the 
reality ol philosophy m the USSR, employing the notion of philosophical culture as developed 
in Chapter 1 
In this analysis, I will try to "de-diabohcize" our perception of Soviet philosophical 
culture, and analyze it in terms of "normal ' particular interests and ideological mechanisms As 
N Vasil'ev remarked 
' The real state of the branch that was called in the USSR critique of contemporary philosophy and sociology, is 
the result of Ihe combination of the demands of power and the interests of the very people who work in that 
branch By the way everything in Soviet society is the result of that kind of combination, the result of the 
interaction of these two levels " 2 
This statement reflects the intuition behind the present part of this study, too However, 
these "two levels" can not be used manichaeically as referring to two groups of people (the 
wicked who hold power and the noble who don't) or layers of society, but as levels of one 
system Part of the efficacy of the Soviet system resided in the fact that people, m order to be 
' good" at one point, had to be "bad" at another, thus permanently compromising themselves 
202 
Part Three: Philosophy and Ideology — The Soviet Case 
and each other. This should be borne in mind whenever I speak of "from above" and "from 
below". It is difficult, but essential to refrain from any kind of "conspiracy theory". 
By "philosophy in the USSR" I mean anything philosophical (from Stalin's Odialekticeskomi 
istoriceskommaterializme to underground meetings of people interested in the thought of 
Nikolaj Fëdorov), that existed, legitimately or illegitimately, somewhere on the territory of the 
USSR between 1917 (1922) and 1991. "Soviet philosophy", by contrast, means any legitimate 
philosophical activity in the USSR between 1930 and 1991. Thus it is distinct from Marxist 
thought between 1917 and 1930. We should rather regard that period as a "pre-history", the 
result of which was the creation of dialectical and historical materialism. Finally, "Soviet 
philosophy" is distinct, upon this definition, from "official philosophy", the "system" of 
dialectical and historical materialism as expounded in, e.g. the notorious ucebniki, even if 
during the "dead period" ( 1938-1946) the two nearly coincided. 
Schematically, these distinctions yield the following picture: 
Philosophy in the USSR 
It is tempting to say that any philosophical activity in the USSR can only have existed in spite 
of or outside of or in opposition to Soviet philosophy, for example in samizdat, tamizdat, or 
the catacombs.3 This, however, is misleading: first of all, the border between legitimate and 
illegitimate was crossed by individual philosophers, and some were, so to speak, on both sides 
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of the border at the same time. Secondly, what is illegitimate is determined by what is 
legitimate, is its negative, and this regards both content and form of philosophy: MamardaSvili 
would have developed his philosophical activity differently in a different situation -he actually 
said so himself4-, and he would not have become the kind of cult-Figure he became. And 
thirdly, if we agree that official Soviet philosophy was intellectually sterile, this does not 
exclude the possibility that relevant philosophical work was done in areas not immediately 
dominated by official philosophy, i.e in history of philosophy, aesthetics, system theory, etc. 
It is evident to me, that the official "system" of dialectical and historical materialism can 
not be regarded as a "living philosophy" (Somerville).5 Its 'life', i.e. its development into a 
plurality of attempted solutions to the problems it contained, was precisely what was precluded 
in the USSR. But this system, inasmuch as it was claimed to be the reality of philosophy in the 
USSR, also was an essential part of the ideology of Soviet philosophy. Evidently, both the 
system of diamat and istmat, and the ideology of Soviet philosophy were facts of Soviet 
society. The first was taught, adjusted, and refined, the second repeated, adapted, and 
sophisticated. Therefore, the question to be answered in this part is how 'genuine philosophy', 
stipulatively defined as "self-determining attempt to understand reality by rational means", was 
possible given these realities. It is tempting, yet misleading, to use spatial metaphors here. It is 
tempting because if we assume that there was no place for true philosophical thought within 
official philosophy (system + ideology), it would have to have taken place -if at all- 'outside' 
and in spite of official philosophy. But it is misleading because the 'niche' left for 'genuine 
philosophy' was not untouched by official philosophy: not only was the former defined and 
confined by the latter, it was also required by it, and in that sense it was its niche. 
The Rock Bottom of Soviet Philosophy 
The limit of the subordination of philosophy to an ideological function is its reduction to a 
single theory, in combination with a union of theoretical (philosophical) authority and practical 
(political) power. Thus the establishment of "only one authority in ideology, philosophy, 
politics''^ lies at the heart of the "Soviet philosophical phenomenon". Let us therefore turn our 
attention to the rock-bottom of Soviet philosophy: the philosophical chapter of the Kratkij kurs, 
attributed to Stalin: 
"Dialectics is fundamentally opposed to metaphysics. 
I) Marxist dialectical method is characterized by the following traits: 
a) Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard nature as an accidental accumulation of objects, 
phenomena, cut off from one another, isolated from one another, and not mutually dependent, - but as a 
connected, united whole, in which objects, phenomena, arc organically connected with each other, depend upon 
each other, and are each other's condition. 
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Therefore the dialectical method holds, that not a single natural phenomenon can be understood, if it is taken in 
an isolated torm, outside its bond with surrounding phenomena, tor any phenomenon in any realm ot nature can 
be turned into nonsense, if it is regarded outside its bond with surrounding phenomena, in isolation from them, 
and, conversely, any phenomenon can be understood and substantiated, if it is regarded in its indissoluble bond 
with surrounding phenomena, in its dependence upon the phenomena surrounding it "7 
Is this philosophy9 Using the distinctions made earlier [Ch 11], one should say with 
respect to the forni yes, certainly This text has the format of a concise exposition of main 
theses of a philosophical theory The style is apodictic, but that is not unusual in philosophical 
texts Theses are presented, definitions and arguments given As to the content, the categories 
are philosophical categories, the theses give qualifications of the general nature of reality and of 
man's understanding of it, some of them are familiar from other philosophical texts The theory 
in question is a set of propositions, claimed to be true, and with a rather low level of logical 
coherence and argumentation If we, for a minute, suppose this text to be written by a 
professional philosopher or, perhaps, a pretentious student, we would probably judge it 
simplistic, dogmatic, insufficiently argued, historically inadequate, badly written, repetitious 
etc , but not unphilosophical 
The idea that this is not just bad philosophy, but in fact not philosophy at all, can only 
occur when we take into account its function If we suppose that the primary function of 
philosophical texts is to objectivize the author's ideas, and to convince others of the truth of 
these ideas through argument or persuasion, ι e an epistemic function [Ch l ш], we must 
regard this text as unphilosophical Its intended function is not to express ideas, to convince or 
to persuade, but to convey to the reader a theory (a doctrinal function, that is), as well as to 
perform an ideological function These functions, however, are not manifest in the text itself: 
they only become visible when we know under which conditions the text was produced and 
distributed, who the author was, etc Indeed, "we cannot read the ideological character of 
symbolic phenomena off the symbolic phenomena themselves" (Thompson) 
What exactly was the function of Stalin's text9 Its primary function was ideological, but 
it is not the text that performs an ideological function, but the theory explicated in it The 
ideological function of this theory was to exclude the legitimacy of other possible philosophical 
positions (esp rival interpretations of Marxism), to establish a relation of domination within 
the field of philosophical practice, and to establish and confirm the Party and its leader as a 
philosophical authority Particularly illuminating in this respect is the concluding phrase "Such 
are the basic features of dialectical and historical materialism " 8 This sentence reads as the 
conclusion of a paper by a student of philosophy, surveying a particular philosophical school, 
or as the last sentence in a handbook on contemporary philosophical schools 9 "These are the 
basic features of dialectical and historical materialism" is a proposition about a philosophical 
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theory, and it therefore can be true, false, or indeterminate. The propositional content is crystal 
clear. That this is not the whole story becomes apparent only when we take into account who 
wrote these lines, and in which situation. Then we are forced to interpret the sentence, in 
performative terms, not as an assertion or evaluation, but as an instauration. What Stalin 
actually is doing is to iura these features into official dogma. But he is doing this not by saying 
what he is doing. To make an ideological move is to "do something with words", but not by 
saying what one is doing. Stalin could not say: "I, Iosif Vissarionovic, the highest authority of 
the VKP(b), hereby declare these to be the basis features of dialectical and historical 
materialism, which therefore have to be verbally adhered to and propagated by every true 
Communist here and abroad." However, he is not lying: as he is saying that these are the basic 
features etc., they become the basis features of dialectical and historical materialism, given the 
fact that Stalin was the established supreme authority in matters "ecclesiastical and civil". 
*** 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
The Ideological Situation of Soviet Philosophy 
"...there is nothing more practical than a good theory."'0 
L.I. Breznev, 1976 
Soviet philosophy was intimately related to political establishment. Not only in the sense that 
unwelcome, critical philosophical activities were closely watched and eventually suppressed — 
in that respect, the USSR certainly was not a unique phenomenon. But also in the sense that 
Soviet leadership claimed to be founded upon an official ideology, Marxism-Leninism, which, 
as one of its constituent parts, comprised a system of philosophy, dialectical (and historical) 
materialism. Most commentators on Soviet philosophy have stressed the fact that Soviet 
philosophy was (part of) the official ideology of the USSR, and most would probably agree 
with Kamenka that "the politicalization of philosophy by communist parties and governments 
cannot be overstressed."H This is true, but it has to be properly understood. 
The 'problem' with Soviet philosophy was not its Marxist, or even Leninist back-
ground, nor its dialectical or historical materialist nature. Many philosophers and social 
scientists will agree that historical materialism contains valuable elements, and to some 
philosophers dialectical materialism can be a source of inspiration, too.'2 As a matter of fact, 
there can be no a priori reason to reject either dialectical or historical materialism. The problem 
with Soviet philosophy is the subordination of (philosophical) theory to (political) practice, 
effected and controlled by a body that holds political power and intellectual monopoly. In 
Graham's words, "the wedding of centralized political control to a system of philosophy with 
claims to universality."'3 
It is a misunderstanding and an inversion to claim that, in the USSR, "philosophy came 
to power" or "Marxism was realized". '4 History does not work that way: people make history, 
and the fact that they have ideas or theories in their minds while making history does not imply 
that those ideas or theories make history, nor does the fact that people, when they try to 
account for their actions or the results thereof, refer to theories and ideas, too. At this point, 
one should be more materialist than many, esp. Soviet historical materialists, who did not 
apply historical materialism to Marxism itself. 
Soviet philosophy appears as an elusive phenomenon. Part of this elusiveness is explained by 
the fact that it underwent quite profound changes in the course of its existence, as well as by 
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the fact that it never really was a 'one-dimensional' phenomenon, not even during its "dead 
period' [Ch4η-ui, and Ch 10и b] The CPSU, however hierarchically organized, never was a 
totally regimented unity there have always been different tendencies, positions, loyalties and 
factions Party supervision therefore should not be seen as some panoptical "Big Brother" the 
existence of particular interests within the Party prevented Orwell's 1984" Rather, it was a 
matter of orders 'from above', spontaneous developments 'from below', of attempts to evade 
those orders or to contain those developments, of pressure, and of compromise This also 
applies to Soviet philosophy 
Soviet ideology has been the subject of a great variety of studies The aim of this 
chapter is not to present and discuss the various approaches that have existed, but to apply the 
conception of ideology developed m Chapter 3 to the phenomenon of Soviet Marxist-Leninist 
ideology To this end, the present chapter is divided into three sections the first section focuses 
on the main difficulty in understanding Soviet Marxism-Leninism, viz the fact that itexphcitly 
declared itself to be ideology [7 ι], in the second section, part of this problem is resolved by 
regarding Soviet ideology not as a unique species, but as an extreme case of a much more 
general phenomenon [7 u], the third section, finally, tries to solve the initial problem by 
pointing out that Soviet Marxism-Leninism was an ideology, but not the ideology it said it was 
it contained a meta-ideology', a theory about Marxism-Leninism that functioned ideologically 
[7 in) 
7.i The Enigma of Explicit Ideology 
The Soviet system equipped itself with an explicit ideology Although the label of 'ideology" 
had obtained, ever since Napoleon Bonaparte, ' 5 a primarily pejorative connotation, it was 
adopted with great pride in the Soviet context Conceptions of ideology can be roughly divided 
into critical and normative conceptions (ideology as in some sense 'false' or 'concealing') and 
neutral and empirical conceptions (ideology as an inevitable phenomenon in human society) 
The first kind was dominant in the writings of Marx and Engels, though there are hints at the 
second, "latent" conception | 6 In classical Marxist texts ideology is treated as "false conscious­
ness , with philosophy as one of its parts, and opposed to science '7 Soviet Marxism-
Leninism, by contrast, in a typical way combined the negative and the neutral conceptions 
ideology is part of every society, but a distinction must be made between false and true, ι e 
scientific ideology 
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The Idea of a True and Scientific Ideology 
Where does this turn to a positive notion of ideology come from9 Jachot has convincingly 
argued that, although Soviet philosophers -his target is Ojzerman, certainly not the least 
sophisticated author- were at pains to show that the idea of a scientific ideology rooted in Marx 
and Engels,18 they did not succeed to them, ideology and science were simply opposites This 
also was the prevailing view among Soviet Marxists in the 1920s, as Jachot demonstrates, 
referring to philosophers like Adoratskij 
"In order finally to be freed from ideological distortion wc have to overcome ideology and replace it with an 
exact, scientific grasp of reality Science is one thing, ideology is another " " 
And Razumovskij, commenting on Marx' 18th Brumaire 
"From this very specific Marx Engels perspective Marxism will be an ideology' only when it ceases to be 
revolutionary Marxism and becomes dead dogma "20 
This position is in line with the positivism and scientism present esp in Engels 
Ojzerman later revised his position, attributing the idea of scientific ideology to Lenin, but this, 
according to Jachot and Scanlan, will not do either 
"The poverty of the support offered by Ojzerman however, serves to point up Jachot s contention that Lenin 
did not in fact seriously consider the subject " 2 ' 
Other authors22 have suggested that Lenin did at least employ the notion of scientific 
socialism as a true ideology He recognized that some intermediary would be needed between 
the Party -'possessing' scientific socialism- and the proletariat that was to be motivated and to 
be kept away from "bourgeois ideology" and "trade-unionism" But although the notion was 
implied by his position, he "did not contribute anything to the theoretical discussion " 2 3 For 
Lenin, Marxism simply was true Typical is his biting criticism, in Materiahzm ι empmok-
nticizm, of Bogdanov, who dared treat Marx' theory of money circulation as a hypothetical 
truth 
"No future circumstance can alter this theory s correspondence with practice, for the same simple reason that 
made it eternally true that Napoleon died on May 5, 1821 " 2 4 
There is, in fact, a marked difference between the positions of Lenin and Bogdanov, 
which resides, basically, in their epistemology a realist and objectivist versus a relativist and 
empiricist one 2 5 The claims of true ideology and of scientific ideology are identical only if 
science is regarded as 'true' in the strong sense of 'objectively true', as Lenin did, but not 
Bogdanov For Lenin, science is objectively true, and therefore sides with socialism (the 
proletariat representing the objective interests of mankind) Socialism therefore is both 
scientific and true, and radically opposed to bourgeois ideology, which is both false and 
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unscientific (and therefore forced to 'interpret idealistically" the results of science) Proletarian 
ideology is scientific, and it is true because science is true, not because it is proletarian 
'In a word, every ideology is historically conditioned, but it is nol conditional that to every scientific ideology 
(as opposed, for example to religious ideology) corresponds objective truth absolute nature '2 6 
Bogdanov, unlike Lenin, was not an epistemologica! realist Since, in his perception, 
too, bourgeois and socialist ideology are radically opposed, it follows that there must be two 
kinds of science as well, bourgeois science and proletarian science Both thus employed a 
positive concept of ideology socialism is an ideology, and both linked ideology and science, 
socialism and science However, for Lenin science is one and partisan, because it is objectively 
true, while for Bogdanov there are two sciences, both ot them partisan, and neither of them 
objectivelytrue 
According to Jachot, it was Bogdanov who elaborated the notion of 'scientific ideology" 27 
Bogdanov was a leading Bolshevik theoretician, and a political opponent of Lenin 2¡* His 
views were condemned in 1929/30 as "mechamcist' ,29 and as an "idealist falsification of 
Marxism, associating itself [ smykajuSae¡sja\ with reactionary bourgeois science "30 He 
virtually disappeared from Soviet literature 3I His works, though influential in later Soviet 
thought, e g in the development of systems theory and cybernetics m the 1960s, were not 
published in the USSR since the 1920s,32 and his major work reappeared only in 1989 13 
Apparently, it was Bogdanov who elaborated, within the framework of his "universal 
organizational science [teklologija]", the idea of a proletarian ideology, and of ideologists, 
"showing the masses where to go and what to do, and the masses go and do "^4 According to 
Bogdanov -anticipating Gramsci's 'organic intellectuals"^- the organizers of the proletariat 
are ideologists, "armed with certain ideas and the corresponding knowledge," engaging in 
"ideological work," and achieving through their authority the "voluntary submission of the 
masses "16 After the October Revolution, Bogdanov actively participated in the proletkult 
movement, until he was removed from it by Lenin in 1921 π 
It was Bogdanov's positive conception ot ideology, linked to the Leninist notion of 
objectively true science, that became classical m Soviet Marxism-Leninism from the 1930s 
onwards It formed the basis of notions like "ideological front [ïdeologiöeskij front]", 
"ideological conflict", "ideological struggle [ideologiceskaja bor'ba]" and, last but not least, 
' Marxist-Leninist ideology" The introduction of this notion of ideology corresponded rather 
exactly to the rise to power of ' orthodox" Marxism-Leninism 18 
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The aim of this conception of ideology was to revolutionize the consciousness of the proletariat 
through voluntary, as opposed to 'blind" submission 3 9 But Stalin's "orthodox philosophers" 
used it to create an instrument in the hands of the Party leadership to organize the submission 
-voluntary or not- of "the masses ' to the interests of Party and State This instrument was 
baptized "Marxism-Leninism", the scientific ideology of the revolutionary classes and of the 
Bolshevik party Political economy, atheism, socialist theory, and philosophy were submitted 
to their function as part of this ideology Thus, already existing theories were given an 
ideological function, and were adapted to this end The embrace of philosophy by an explicitly 
professed ideology raises two questions 1) what can be left of philosophy in this situation, and 
11) is an explicit ideology not a contradictio in terminisi 
What Remains of Philosophy·"> 
The answer to the first question is simple what is left of philosophy is a set of propositions, 
ι e a philosophical "theory" This theory, as it is present in, e g , the text by Stalin referred to 
above, is not the result of his philosophical thinking, but, just as we cannot "read off the 
symbolic phenomena themselves that they are ideological", we can not read off this theory that 
it is not the expression of some philosopher s thought This means that we can disregard the 
question whether it actually was, and thus act as if it was an expression of philosophical 
thought indeed This is what Wetter did when he subjected official Soviet philosophy to critical 
analysis, as did Petrov [Vyseslavcev], Ζ A Jordan, Graham, or Grujic 4° The very fact that a 
philosophical analysis of this theory, an attempt to demonstrate its "philosophical poverty [ filo-
sofskaja niSëcta]" (Vyseslavcev) is possible, is sufficient proof that ideology is a possible 
function of the theory in question, not identical with it Berdjaev, by contrast, denied the status 
of philosophy to this kind of text precisely because he knew that there was no concrete 
philosophizing subject behind the 'theory' But that is to miss the point that the 'theory' does 
not, for its meaning or truth, depend upon who or what is behind it Strictly speaking, it does 
not matter, as long as we focus on 'theory', where it comes from Therefore, even in this 
extreme example, a possible starting-point for philosophical thought is given 
The reduction of Marxist thought to an official ideology, and the inclusion of a 
dogmatic philosophical theory meant the creation of a theory without a thinking subject The 
'subject of Marxist-Leninist theory no longer was an individual human being, but the 
ideological bodies of the VKP(b) / CPSU, ι e an institution This fact is highlighted in 
Kolakowski's article on the "actual concept" of Marxism,4' where he distinguishes intellectual 
and institutional Marxism, the first meaning the conviction, in Marx, Lenin, and Kolakowski, 
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that Marxist theory contains methodological principles which are i) specifically Marxist, and ii) 
of value in the analysis of social phenomena. Institutional Marxism, by contrast, is a formal 
concept: 
"Das Wort «Marxismus» sollte keinesfalls eine auf ihren Inhalt hin bestimmte Doktrin bedeuten, sondern eine 
Doktrin, die ausschließlich formal, und zwar durch das jeweilige Dekret einer unfehlbaren Institution, bestimmt 
wurde, die in einer gewissen Kpochc von der Well «größtem Sprachforscher, «größtem Historiker», «größtem 
Philosophen», «größtem Wirtschaftsexperten» verkörpert worden ist "42 
"Das Wort «Marxist» bezeichnet nicht einen Menschen, der die eine oder andere inhaltlich umrissenc Auffassung 
von der Welt besitzt, sondern einen Menschen mit einer bestimmten Geisteshaltung, die durch die Bereitschaft 
gekennzeichnet ist, Auffassungen zu akzeptieren, die behördlich bestätigt worden sind "43 
Kolakowski's distinction is adequate, but misses the point that, even in the worst of 
cases, there remains a theory that does not, as far as its meaning is concerned, depend upon 
this distinction. Kolakowski is right to stress the monopoly of Party & State in determining the 
theory of institutional Marxism. As he remarks, referring to Stalin's revision of Marr's 
"proletari anlinguistics": 
" die Theorie von Marr war zwei Tage vor der Veröffentlichung der Arbeit des «größten Sprachforschers» 
wirklich mit dem Marxismus völlig im Einklang und stimmte, als dieses Werk gedruckt war, wirklich nicht 
mehr mit dem Marxismus uberein."1*4 
However, this means that the theory was changed, but still was a theory that could 
serve as the point of departure of "intellectual Marxism". Although Soviet philosophy was 
dominated by "institutional Marxism", this does not rule out the possibility of "intellectual 
Marxism". The current official version of "institutional Marxism" may well be the result of 
"intellectual" thought. As long as there is a theory, accessible in a text, and a thinking 
individual, the possibility of thought, taking its departure from that theory is given. This 
means, by the same token, that "intellectual" historical materialism was an unavoidable danger 
to Soviet society. Official, "institutional" Marxist theory could always become a critical theory 
of Soviet society (as happened in the period of "thaw": Kolakowski himself is an example 
thereof), and it explains why it had to be neutralized. 
Was Soviet Marxism-Leninism an Ideology? 
The answer to the second question is more complicated than to the first. Was Soviet Marxist-
Leninist ideology really ideology? Is an explicit ideology possible at all? Should ideology not 
somehow conceal its ideological nature? Kolakowski and other Marxists,45 have applied the 
critical Marxian notion of ideology to Soviet "institutional Marxism", which leads to sharp 
criticism ofthat self-professed ideology: 
"Die besondere und in der Geschichte einmalige Antinomie der Evolution des Marxismus besteht dann, daß diese 
Doktrin, die entlarvt hat, wie das soziale Bewußtsein unter dem Druck der politischen Bedingungen mystifiziert 
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wird, wahrend sie ihre völlige Befreiung vom Mythos verkündete selbst zum Opfer einer solchen Mystifizierung 
geworden ist " 4 6 
While Marxism indeed became a "victim of mystification", it is not so evident that 
Kolakowski's analysis hits home If ideology is "the sum of convictions that serve a social 
group to organize its аіиеч, which express the mystifiedconsciousness [italics mine, EvdZ] 
of that group and its activity,"4? and it Marxist ideology is identical with institutional Mar­
xism,48 then institutional Marxism would be a "sum of convictions", serving to organize 
values that expiess "mystified consciousness" Now this is to suggest that "institutional 
Marxism" had real subjects as its bearer, which was not the case even if many people were 
convinced of its truth, it was primarily an instrument of established power Thus, official 
Soviet ideology fits badly, if at all, into (Kolakowski's interpretation of) the Marxian concept 
of ideology 
By contrast, Soviet ideology fits very well into Althusser's conception of ideology and 
"ideological state organs", ι e church, educational system, family, jurisdiction, political 
system, trade unions, mass media, culture 4 9 If we add to this list the army, which, according 
to Althusser, is primarily part of the "repressive state organ",5° but also functions as an 
ideological state organ, viz as a school of patriotism and manhood,51 we obtain a full 
catalogue of the "organs" through which Soviet ideology was transmitted to the populace And 
we can repeat one of Althusser's central theses, merely lifting the phrase "in mature capitalist 
formations" 
"Nous pensons que 1 appareil idéologique d État qui a été mis en position dominante [dans les formations 
capitalistes mûres] à 1 issue dune violente lutte de classe politique et idéologique contre I ancien appareil 
idéologique d Etat dominant, est 1 appareil idéologique scolaire "52 
The Bolshevik campaigns against the orthodox church, bourgeois science and culture, 
against the previous educational system, were a "violent political and ideological (class) 
struggle against the old dominant ideological state organ" As a matter of fact, Lenin is 
Althusser's sole example here'53 The enormous stress on mass education and on the produc-
tion of teachers with a proper Marxist (-Leninist) ideological training makes the parallel even 
more striking 54 There are not many countries to which the Althussenan picture applies better 
than to the USSR 
"Elle [the school, EvdZl prend les enfants de toutes les classes sociales dès la Maternelle, et elle leur inculque, 
pendant des années, les années ou 1 enfant est le plus «vulnérable» coince entre I appareil dElat famille et 
1 appareil d État ecole des «savoir faire» enrobés dans I ideologie dominante ou tout simplement 1 idéologie 
dominante a Ictat pur (morale, instruction civique philosophie) Quelque part vers la seizième année une 
enorme masse d enfants tombe «dans la production» Une autre partie de la jeunesse scolansable continue et 
fan un bout de chemin pour tomber en route et pourvoir les postes des petits et moyens cadres Une dernière 
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partie parvient aux sommets, soit pour tomber dans le demi chômage intellectuel, soit pour fournir les agents 
de 1 exploitation , de la répression et les professionels de I ideologie "55 
Finally, the complementary role of the "ideological state organs" and the "repressive 
state organ ', stressed by Althusser,56 combined with the cull of education in the USSR, and 
the importance of philosophy as part of "l'idéologie dominante à l'état pur" is remarkably well 
expressed by Kamenka 
The emphasis on philosophy in the Soviet Union has been combined with an even stronger and more 
pervasive emphasis on education - both on the technical and scientific education necessary for rapid and 
increasing industrialisation and the ideological education in Marxism-Leninism which (the regime seems to 
hope) will gradually come to serve the functions tor which police controls and economic pressure are so far still 
necessary 5 7 
And the 'result' indeed was that "with the exception of the «bad subjects» who 
eventually provoke the intervention of this or that part of the (repressive) State organ the vast 
majority of (good) subjects march «by themselves», that is to say by means of ideology [à 
¡ideologie] "58 So, Soviet official Marxism-Leninism fits perfectly into Althusser's 
conception,59 but for one thing-
" I ideologie ne dit jamais «je suis idéologique» "60 
Now, to declare itself ideology was precisely what "institutional Marxism" did from the 
1930s6i down to 1989 62 The fact that "Soviet ideology simultaneously proclaims itself an 
ideology and declares its veracity" led Boris Groys to qualify Soviet ideology as an "ideology 
of a special type"6^ (analogously with Lenin's notion of the Bolshevik party as a "party of a 
special type", and of socialist law as "law of a special type") 
We might conclude ftom this that Althusser simply was wrong at least one dominant ideology 
does say that it is ideological This is not a very satisfactory solution, because we are left with 
two kinds of ideology, very much akin, but radically different in one respect while some 
ideologies -e g the ideology of the dominant class in mature capitalist society- function by 
virtue of their not saying that they are ideology, another -the ideology of the working class-
says that it is Therefore, in the Soviet case, "ideology" has to mean something else than 
"concealment of social relations" This solution is the one chosen by Soviet ideology itself 
Marxist-Leninist is the only ideology that does not conceal itself, because it is true It does not 
conceal social relations, but represents them as they are, hence there is no concealment to be 
concealed 
Another solution would be to say that Soviet ideology is not ideology in the Althus-
senan (or Thompsoman, Marxian, Kolakowskian) sense, but something else, for example 
objective truth, collective consciousness, or patent lie So, when official Soviet Marxism says 
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that it is ideology, it is using a different concept of ideology. This solution is not palatable 
either, for two reasons. In the first place, we are then left with the remarkable correspondence 
of Soviet reality to Althusser's analysis (but for this one essential feature), and secondly, we 
can not presume that the Soviet use of the term "ideology" was a mistake: it was as deliberate 
as it was consistent. 
This problem is the more pressing since the Soviet concept of ideology not only 
allowed for an 'explicit ideology' under conditions of class struggle, but even included a notion 
of ideology under classless communism, a stage in the development of society without, by 
definition, unequal social relations: 
"At a certain stage of communism the siate, judiciary institutions, political and legal ideology wither 
away ,"64 but " those forms oí ideology, that will be essential to the reinforcement and development of 
harmonious social relations, the education in the spirit of a scientific world-view, high moral and aesthetic 
qualities of people, acquire an all-sided development [poluiat vsestoronnee razvitie] [italics mine, EvdZ] "65 
I believe that Althusser was right, and that the Soviet use of the concept of ideology was not a 
mistake or a different concept, but that the Soviet case was an extreme case of ideology, 
employing the very concept of ideology ideologically. 
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7.Ü Soviet Ideology — Unique or Extreme? 
What makes the Soviet case fit into the Althusserian model is what has made others define the 
USSR as an "ideological state", e.g. Eugene Kamenka,6^ or Alain Besançon: 
" l'originalité absolue de ce régime par rapport à tous les régimes connus tieni à la position occupée par 
l'idéologie Elle est le principe cl la fin du régime, et le totalitarisme s'ordonne à elle comme un moyen ( . ) 
Plutôt que «totalitarisme» conviendrait le mot idéocmiie. Disons simplement avec Soljénitsyne -et Raymond 
Aron, -régimeidéologique"^ 
On this account, there is no problem with the declaration of Marxist-Leninist ideology 
as the theoretical foundation of Soviet society and policy. Besançon presents two alternative 
interpretations of the Soviet ideological phenomenon: 
"Le problème [of Soviet ideology, EvdZ] a intéressé les sociologues et les philosophes contemporains. On peut 
classer les solutions qu'ils ont proposées en deux groupes. Dans le premier, l'idéologie Marxiste-léniniste est 
une lormc particulière d'un phénomène permanent (. ) Dans le second groupe, au contraire, l'idéologie 
soviétique, telle qu'elle fonctionne depuis soixante ans, est une espèce historique nouvelle "68 
This alternative, however, is misleading, because it excludes the possibility that Soviet 
ideology is a case of a more general phenomenon, but an extreme case. In fact, when Besançon 
has it that Soviet ideology is unprecedented in human history, he is following Soviet ideology 
in its own claim.69 From the thesis (adopted by me, rejected by Besançon) that "ideology is 
inseparable from political conflict, existing as long as human beings live in society,"70 it does 
not follow that Soviet ideology is just like any other kind of ideology,71 but it does follow that 
it can be compared to other forms. 
This is important, because otherwise Soviet philosophy becomes incomprehensible. 
Indeed, if Soviet ideology were a 'normal', standard case of ideology, then why should Soviet 
philosophy be so peculiar as to become isolated and generally despised? This isolation 
evidently is related to a predominance of ideology in the utterances of Soviet philosophers, and 
with them being, to a large extent, "orators" instead of "philosophers".72 Besançon's position, 
however, leads to the opposite problem: how can Soviet philosophy be closely related to this 
system, and still be recognizable as philosophy? In other words: if at least something 
philosophical can be found within the Soviet context, the alternative cannot be adequate, and 
Soviet ideology has to be a more complicated phenomenon. 
Soviet philosophy is not a standard case. Even if one takes into account, as does 
Bernard Jeu, that prejudice undoubtedly has played its part in the rejection of Soviet 
philosophy by Western philosophers,73 it is an undeniable fact that much of Soviet philosophy 
is simply unreadable, even to the most sympathetic reader, even to those who dedicated a 
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considerable part of their energy to study Soviet philosophy, and, quite significantly, even to 
Soviet philosophers themselves. De George remarked: 
"I was surprised... to learn that many of the philosophers with whom I spoke in Kiev, in Kharkov, in Odessa, 
and even in Leningrad and Moscow did not know the Soviet literature on ethics as well as I did. In retrospect I 
understand, however, why they did not think it was necessary to read everything in order to keep up in the field. 
They knew that most of it was repetitious and not worth following."^'* 
A remark that was reflected in a piece of samokritika by Michail Aleksandrovtë Rózov 
(b. 1930): 
"As early as the beginning of the 1980s one of our prominent philosophers confessed to me that he bought, for 
a long time already, only translated literature, and that he neither bought nor read the works of our own authors. 
«With some exceptions, of course, -he said-, you, for instance, I do read». He said that clearly out of 
politeness. «I read you too!» -I answered, although, as I honestly confess today that I didn'l."75 
This situation is really not standard. Some Western philosophers will profess their adherence to 
a certain ideology, others will deny such adherence, but they will generally be ready to discuss 
the subject, and, eventually, recognize that they 'fell victim' to ideological mechanisms, for 
example, to eurocentrism or sexism. Of course it is possible, as Soviet "critique of bourgeois 
ideology" did, to situate all different positions within one general "pluralist ideology". But that 
is to deny that people can acknowledge that they have engaged in ideological processes. Ideo-
logy is then seen as an all-embracing phenomenon (which fitted perfectly to the claim of Soviet 
Marxism-Leninism to be such a 'total' ideology). With the advantage of hindsight it is easy to 
show how this interpretation crumbled in the perestrojka years. Nor is it coincidental that Jeu 
illustrated his point by referring to a discussion between the Soviet pftiiosopherOjzerman and 
the American political advisor Arthur Schlesinger Jr., invited to publish, in a Soviet journal, an 
article on the "absence of ideology" in the USA.76 
But Soviet ideology was not a unique case either. Our conception of ideology enables 
us to show how Soviet ideology was an extreme case. If we take the list of parameters 
according to which we (can) judge ideological phenomena [Ch.3.iv], the Soviet case is at the far 
left end of the first three parameters. Soviet society was extremely ideologized: virtually 
everything that took place had to be ideologically accounted for [PI]; a single official doctrine, 
a fixed set of 'theories' performed the ideological function [P2]; and Soviet ideology fully 
served the vested interests of an established social group [P3]. In Soviet society, ideological 
mechanisms were designed and guarded by a specific political organization, the Party, and its 
ideological specialists; it was monopolized, it largely went unchallenged, i.e. was not critically 
followed and checked, it was linked to established (political) power, and it originated in a 
transition from opposition to the establishment of power. 
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A Firmly Believed Con viction 9 
However, things become more complicated when we turn to the other three parameters [P4-6] 
It has often been questioned, by Western and Soviet commentators, to which extent the Soviet 
political establishment actually believed the ideology that it professed [P4] According to 
Besançon, this can be safely excluded 
'Apres Id prise du pouvoir Iideologie cesse dêtre une croyance Elle nest efficace même qua condition de 
nêlrepascruc elle est une croyance non crue 77 
Even if this cynicism is too general, we may suppose that later generations of Soviet 
leaders had become institutional Marxists" in Kolakowski s sense of the term They were 
deeply convinced of the necessity to stick to "orthodox' Marxism-Leninism, and to hold up the 
claim that Marxism-Leninism was the theoretical basis of their policy Kolakowski pointed to 
"the peculiar role of ideology, established by the Stalinist system, and in force until the present 
day Ideology is not merely a complement to the system, or an auxiliary device It is an 
absolute condition of its existence, regardless of whether, or in which way people actually 
adhere to it [italics mine, EvdZ]",7» and also, as he added elsewhere, irrespective to a large 
extent of its content 79 To which extent Soviet ideology was, on the part of the Party elite, a 
matter of belief is hard to tell, but their motivation from sheer interest was sufficient 
Early Western commentaries have often interpreted Soviet ideology as a creed, or a secular 
belief, and Soviet philosophy as the "theology" belonging to it, and this interpretation could be 
substantiated by Soviet sources [Ch 5 n] However, when Besançon stresses that "the main 
confusion that has precluded and still precludes an understanding of Soviet ideology stems 
from the fact that it has been placed in the same category with religions or with philoso-
phies,"80 he is right, and indeed for the îeason he gives, namely that there is no act of faith 81 
Soviet politicians, scientists, and philosophers consistently and ad nauseam claimed to be 
fnmly convinced of the truth of Marxism-Leninism82 Diawdt and istmat were not claimed to 
be the result oí a revelation nor the object of faith, but the result of cognitive activity, of 
understanding reality — the proletariat being in a historically privileged position to know 
objectivereality 
Though Soviet ideology was not a secular religion', Soviet philosophy resembled a 
theology in certain respects 
Der Ausdruck gottlose Theologie ist sehr ¿utreffend fur die Sowjelphilosphic Denn trotz der Leugnung von 
Gott und Offenbarung ist die sowjetphilosophischc Methode eine typisch theologische Methode Grundvorausset 
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zung des "Sowjel-Philosophiercns" ist, ganz wie bei der theologischen Arbeit, das Vorhandensein und die standig 
fühlbare Gegenwart eines ' unfehlbaren' Lehramtes 'Organisator und Leiter im Kampfe der Werktätigen fur den 
Kommunismus, Organisator der gesamten ideologisch politischen Arbeit des Sowjetstaates ist die bolschewis-
tische Partei Das Zentralkomilee der bolschewistischen Partei stellt nicht nur das politische, sondern auch das 
theoretische Zentrum des Landes dar' "8^ 
Soviet official ideology "imitated" Russian-Orthodox state religion. This "external 
(pseudo)-rehgiosity", as it was aptly called by Zubaty,84 ranged from parades with people 
carrying portraits of the Party's leaders in the same way as icons of the saints in Russian-
Orthodox processions, and the presence of a "red corner [krasnyj ugoiok]" in classrooms and 
university corridors (imitation of the "holy corner [krasnyj ugol]" with icons and a candle in 
traditional Russian homes), to the sanctification of Uncle Lenin [djadja Lenin], and the 
establish 
ment of a body of holy scriptures- the collected works of the "founders of Marxism-Leninism 
[osnovopolozmki marksizma-lemmzma]"85 Both doctrine and persons of the klassiki were 
sanctified,86 and their Collected Works were part of the standard design of any study or 
administrativeoffice 87 Concepts with an evident religious connotation like "sacred [svjascen-
nyjY, "salvation [spaseme]", "soul [dusa]" were ubiquitous in Soviet langue de bois 88 But 
even if ritual incantation was 'internalized' in Party apparatöiki, what counts is not the 
conviction 'behind' it, but the socio-political function of the ntual. 
Foundation and Justification 
As to the second of these parameters, that of motivation versus legitimization [P5], Soviet 
Marxism-Leninism claimed to be primarily a motivating force- Party & State, but also 
philosophers, and in fact all (good) Soviet citizens (were) said to be guided in their practice by 
the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology: 
"Marxism Leninism has been proclaimed as the guiding philosophy permeating all Soviet activities and 
necessary as a basis for all Soviet practical and intellectual work [italics mine, EvdZ] "8^ 
In fact, Soviet official Marxism-Leninism performed primarily a legitimizing function-
"If Soviet ideology helps to guide Soviet practice, it more obvious function is to justify practice "90 
Kolakowski has aptly formulated the relation between Soviet ideology and Soviet 
practice 
"Das heißt nicht, daß die tatsächliche Politik des sowjetischen Staates durch ideologische Grunde bestimmt wird 
Die Ideologie muß aber da sein, um diese Politik jeweils zu rechtfertigen Die Ideologie ist m das System 
eingebaut "9' 
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What would it mean for a policy to be "founded upon" or "guided by" a theory7 As 
citizens of Western societies, convinced of the hypothetical nature of science and the piecemeal 
nature of policy-making, we have become skeptical about any alleged "scientific foundation" of 
political decision-making, and we are quick to recognize the powerful ideological function of 
the word "scientific' 
By contrast, Western commentators have tended to believe Soviet sources when these 
claimed that Soviet policy was based on science and ideology, and to ascribe the failures ofthat 
policy to bad, ideologized science However, we should care to distinguish the role of science 
from that of ideology The final failure of, e g , the Lysenkoist agricultural programme was a 
result of techniques that were based upon an unsound agrobiological theory This theory was 
preferred because it yielded immediate practical results, while the Mendelist theory dominant 
among scientists did not These positive results were what the Soviet government "objectively" 
needed, and Marxist-Leninist ideology was invoked to facilitate the coercion of Soviet 
agronomists to work exclusively with a theory that promised quick results Its primary function 
thus was to legitimize a policy, not to motivate scientists Dominique Lecourt has shown that 
there was no theoretical influence of Marxism or diamat on the agricultural practices and 
theories of Trofim Denisoviô Lysénko (1898-1976) and Ivan Vladimirovic Michunn (1855-
1935), and that it was only after several years οι practical success- that diamat was declared the 
theoretical foundation of "Michunnist biology" 9 2 If Lecourt is right, the history of lysenkoism 
was not a case of ideological dazzle of Soviet scientific establishment, but of an ideologically 
legitimized takeover by successful practicians 
Doublespeak or Doublethink the Schizophrenia o f Soviet Ideology 
To raise the claim of Marxism-Leninism as a "guiding ideology" (by the Soviets) and to believe 
it (by Westerners), is to reverse the order of things, and, at least on the Soviet side an 
ideological move itself In fact, what reason do we have to suppose that, from Stalin onwards, 
Soviet leaders themselves "believed" that they were guided by Marxism-Leninism apart from 
their endlessly repeated assertion that they were7 Chru56ev reportedly said that "he and his 
fellow Communists would not abandon the teachings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin "until shrimp 
learn to whistle" " 9 3 Breznev, too, consistently claimed his faith to Marxism-Leninism, which 
led Scanlan to conclude 
No one can observe Ihe care that goes into ine shaping of certain doctrines in the USSR, and the credit that is 
claimed to them, without concluding that the purveyors of these doctrines view them as substantive additions to 
knowledge rather than as propaganda exercises The awarding of the Karl Marx Medal to Breznev for his 
outstanding personal contribution to the development of Marxism Leninism is not for its participants a charade 
celebrating the duping of the public with the latest inventions ot doctrine 94 
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Breznev's theoretical merits presumably were as significant as the literary efforts that 
brought him the State Literary Prize for books that he had never written, but the question about 
faith is serious. As against Scanlan, we have the diagnosis of Junj Glazov of the same year: 
"The present-day leaders appear to believe in Marxist-Leninist teachings no more than the Grand Inquisitor in 
Dostoevsky's novel ( ) Nikita Khrushchev could not spell properly There are many jokes illustrating the poor 
extent to which Soviet leaders, including Khrushchev and Brezhnev, are educated Both second and third 
generation leaders used a system of ghost writers in preparing speeches and articles ( ) 
Lenin knew Marx almost by heart, having read his works in the original, Stalin read Marx in Russian and 
Georgian in his youth, Khrushchev was rather unsophisticated in the theory of Marxism-Leninism on the 
whole, and so far as Brezhnev is concerned, it is highly doubtful that he had ever read Marx in the original or in 
Russian "95 
From this perspective, we might add to Scanlan's statement that "everything Com-
munist party leaders say suggests that they firmly believe in the Marxist-Leninist faith,"96 that 
this was precisely what "everything they said" was meant to suggest It is difficult to say 
whom we should believe here empirical reality seems to be compatible with both versions But 
if that is the case, then it does not really matter whether the leaders actually believed in it or not. 
Soviet official ideology functioned independently of the question of "good or bad faith". 
According to Glazov, the main reason why the Party elite continued to adhere to Marxist-
Leninist ideology, was that the Soviet people could not do without. 
"Soviet leaders are sufficiently pragmatic to understand that the erection of the long-promised Communist edifice 
in their country is nothing but an empty dream 
, but they cannot dispose of this official principle People expect them to continue this line even if they 
themselves no longer believe in Communist doctrines "97 
In that sense we could venture the hypothesis that one of the aspects of "stagnation" 
was that the Soviet people stopped believing, thus making the professed fidelity of their leaders 
to Marxism-Leninism a truly empty ritual. Besançon passed a more general verdict. 
"La force du régime brejnevien est d avoir compris que l'ideologie se passait de croyance Tous les témoins 
s'accordent à nous dire que, là-bas, personne «n'y croit» "98 
But, he added 
"Certes, mais ils la parlent"" 
What does this mean9 Certainly, a transition from "ideocracy " to "logocracy"100 will, 
in the long run, ruin the system What surprises is not the fact that people stopped believing in 
an official ideology that was so obviously contradicted by Soviet reality; what may surprise is 
the fact that it stayed in place for such a long time Even if we suppose that until Breznev 
Soviet leaders were convinced Marxist-Leninists, it continued to dominate their speech, and 
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Soviet public life for another twenty years * The fact of the matter is that while Marxism-
(-Leninism) as a world-view crumbled, it continued to perform its ideological function. This is 
not an uncommon social phenomenon: it happens in any community, where people stop 
believing in the theory that provided the ideology of that community, but the ideological 
mechanisms stay in place People continue to perform the same rituals, and to account for their 
actions m terms of the theory in question What is uncommon in the Soviet case is the scale on 
which this process took place 
On Besançon's "ideological state view", the proclamation of official Marxism-Leninism to be 
an ideology presents no problem at all on the contrary, an ideological state precisely is a state 
in which there is a declared and official ideology. This is to take Soviet ideology at its word: 
when Soviet leaders claim that they are, in their policy, guided by the principles of Marxism-
Leninism, they are telling the truth, and when Soviet citizens assert that they firmly believe in 
the scientific ideology of the proletariat, this is what they do In the Soviet ideological state, 
Besançon believes, reality is replaced by ideology, ι e by an imposed non-reality: 
" l'ideologie impose Id fiction qu'un autre reel existe deja, le sien ( ) Le régime idéologique déploie 
l'essentiel de son activité terroriste à faire croire au monde, à ses sujets, à ses agents, que 1 essence du cosmos 
social est déjà transfigurée, qu'avec le socialisme 1 humanité est actuellemententree dans son etat définitif " ' 0 ' 
Although Besançon recognizes that Soviet ideology, in later years, was no longer 
believed in, this does not change the nature of the ideological state- it only becomes even more 
"unreal".102 The October revolution brought to power a group of fanatical believers -the only 
historical precedent of Leninism, Besançon thinks, is Ancient gnoüs103- who subsequently 
were forced to reshape reality to their ideas, if not "really", then "imaginarily", and if not in 
"sincere belief", then in "verbal ritual" On this account, the ideological state is a state that 
exists in a self-procured pseudo-reality, and its ideology becomes not "merely" false con-
sciousness, but a kind of collective mental illness, one of the "symptoms" of which is so-called 
"langue de bot s". '04 
This, however, is not a pertinent conclusion "Doublespeak" and even "doublethink" 
may be a symptom of schizophrenia, but they are not schizophrenia. They demand the expense 
of an enormous amount of energy, but they can become a quasi-automatic and superficial 
game.'05 To play that game does not necessarily make people "mad", though it does keep them 
"Anyone who has ever lefl the lobby of a Soviet hotel, with its line-up of prostitutes and well-bnbed militia-
men who then has been reading, on ihe bus, an article in I/vestna about the discovery" of a case of 
prostitution, a phenomenon not reallv existing of course in ihe USSR, and, looking up from his paper, looked 
out ol the window to see the run down entrance of a Moscow factory with the slogan "We shall over-fulfil the 
plan1' or ' The decisions of the CPSU arc the will ol the people , needs no further arguments at this point 
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from doing other things (which is part of its function). In my many encounters with Soviet 
citizens at different levels of society, I have never got the idea that they were "collectively mad" 
or had a "false consciousness". On the contrary, I obtained the impression that they were 
mentally sane persons, who suffered from the omnipresence of a prescribed ideology that they 
were practically compelled to adhere to, and from the impossibility to develop any more 
sophisticated and adequate conception of surrounding social reality. 
Doublespeak means for the same "subject" to say different things at the same time: to 
say different things at different times may not be very edifying, but it does not induce madness. 
Doublethink is for the same "subject" to think different things at (virtually) the same time: to 
think different things at different times, again, does not induce mental illness. In fact, different 
Soviet subjects thought and said different things at the same time, and the same Soviet subjects 
thought and said different things at different times, according to their actual situation, but they 
all declared that they were, basically, thinking and saying the same thing at any time. There is a 
word for this: it is to uphold a 'theory', stated in terms of official Marxism-Leninism and an 
integral part of it. There also is a word for the way such a 'theory' works to secure and 
stabilize an order in which both established power and "the good subjects" (Althusser) have 
their place: it is "ideology". 
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7.iii The Ideological Nature of Soviet Ideology 
Soviet Marxism-Leninism thus scores to the far left with respect to the first five parameters [PI­
PS] By contrast, it appears to score to the far right with respect to the last parameter [P6]. it 
was explicitly ideological The explanation of this feature of Soviet Marxism-Leninism is that it 
was a universal medium of legitimacy 
A Universal Medium of Legitimacy 
Having started as a motivating and guiding ideology, l 0 6 Marxism-Leninism became, as we 
have seen, a legitimizing ideology [it moved from right to left along parameter P5] This is a 
familiar phenomenon any ideology will, when its 'bearer' acquires stable political power, shift 
from motivation to legitimization, moving, in that sense, from a revolutionary or progressive 
(or reactionary) to a conservative position The creation of Marxism-Leninism as such, ι e the 
reduction of Marxism to Us "Leninist" interpretation and its elevation to the status of official 
doctrine, coincided with its transformation into a doctrine with a universal and primarily 
legitimizingideological function 
Even if Marxism continued to be a motivating force, too, this was dangerous rather 
than helpful from the perspective of the established Bolshevik regime Hence the objective need 
for Stalin and his allies to neutralize Marxism, to destroy its critical potential, and to silence all 
convinced Marxists, and replace them by apparatöiki [Ch 4 i-n] Stalin was in full control of this 
replacement when, in 1936, Mitin was criticized by Politburo-member KaganoviS, and his 
position as court philosopher in danger, Stalin interfered 
" Stalin himself stood in defence of Milin He was hardly mistaken with respect to the scientific level of the 
works of the luture dkademik Quite widely known in philosophic circles was Stalin s phrase «Milin and Judin 
won'l set the world on fire, hut they do know the trick of the trade [zvezd s neba ne chvatajut, no tcchniku dcld 
7najut thomSo]·» Precisely such a servant of truth was simply what the «leader of the peoples [ voZd'narodov]» 
needed " l 0 7 
Instead of an attempt at the construction of socialism, possibly subject to critical 
examination (as practiced by, e g , Trockij or Bucharin), Soviet society became socialist by 
definition This meant that, henceforth, virtually any social, political, intellectual or economic 
activity or status quo, including Marxism-Leninism itself, depended, in order to be legitimate, 
on its accountability within the terms of the current version of official Marxism-Leninism This 
is not to say that everything that happened in Soviet society was explicitly accounted for in 
terms of Marxism-Leninism As Besançon wrote in 1976, the Soviet regime has varied the 
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extent to which it allowed independent spheres of activity to exist, shifting between two basic 
models, that of NEP and that of War Communism |08 But it must be stressed that any public 
policy that led to some 'emancipation' of civil society, including GorbaCevs policy of 
perestrojka and glasnost', had itself to be legitimized in terms of the ruling ideology (just as 
liberalism provides the ideological legitimization of why the sphere of economics should be left 
to the laws of free-market economy) So, whatever policy was adopted by the Soviet 
government, it was legitimized in terms of Marxism-Leninism 
The predominantly legitimizing function of ideology seems to be an inevitable effect of 
Bolshevik political power Irrespective of the extent to which it actually functioned as a 
motivating or guiding ideology, and irrespective of the extent to which it was sincerely believed 
in by the Party elite or the average Soviet citizen, officiai, institutional' Soviet Marxism-
Lcmnism has functioned, for a period of roughly 60 years (1929-1989) as the universal 
medium of legitimacy in Soviet society This interpretation means, first oí all, that the exact 
extent to which Soviet official ideology did act as a motivating force, as well as the extent to 
which it was sincerely believed in, may have varied in different stages of Soviet history 
without change in its legitimizing efficacy 109 As to the Party elite, the least we can say is that 
is was deeply convinced of the practical inevitability of Marxism-Leninism as official ideology 
The Soviet intelligencijd, finally, was at least convinced of the inevitability of its existence, and 
of the necessity, for itself, to "deal" with it 
So, when Besançon rightly stresses that, although "they" did no longer believe it, "they 
continue to speak it", he points to the fact that Soviet official ideology had acquired a life of its 
own Marxism-Leninism became an objective fact of Soviet society, something nobody could 
escape from without becoming illegitimate (For example, the widespread corruption and 
grabbling of the Party elite, the luxury and privileges they furnished themselves with, were not 
and could not be accounted for in terms of Marxism-Leninism, hence they did not exist, and 
when they became public, they were indeed illegitimate, even though they were nothing 
compared to the legitimate and therefore overt luxury and privileges of the rich and famous in 
Western or Third World countries ) 
When Aleksandr Solzenicyn, in his "Letter to the Leaders of the Soviet Union", said 
that "it is forced and under coercion that we are acting as if," Besançon concluded that "to do as 
if one is believing what one does not believe destroys the spirit and thus accomplishes a 
purpose of ideology," and he criticized Sacharov for holding that Soviet society was charac-
terized by "ideological indifference and the pragmatic utilization of ideology as a convenient 
pretence [ façadecommode] "'10 However, the one does not at all exclude the other Sacharov 
and Solzenicyn themselves were living evidence of the inadequacy of Besançon's conclusion, 
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but that again does not imply that Soviet ideology was a mere "convenient pretence". It may 
have been convenient, and it certainly was a pretence, but it also precluded a discourse that 
might otherwise have been a threat to the Soviet system itself It did not "destroy the spirit", 
but it did annihilate its possibly critical function. 
Besançon's analysis points to a very important feature of Soviet ideology it became an 
ob)ective part of Soviet reality, because it provided, backed by a "repressive state organ", the 
unique set of terms in which any actual policy or activity in the USSR had to be legitimized. 
Two consequences of the position occupied by official Marxism-Leninism, were 1) that it had 
to obtain an m-buih flexibility to the extent to which policies and activities could change, 
whereas m order to retain its position, it had to be an orthodoxy, and a) that it had to differen-
tiate within itself to the extent to which different activities or policies actually existed The 
actually diverging ideological positions among members of the CPSU -nationalism, anti-
Semitism, liberalism- were 'translated' into 'sub-ideologies' of Marxism-Leninism, > ' ' just as 
mass-media (for example, the newspapers Izvestija. Pravda. and Sovetskaja Rossrja. or the 
"thick magazines" Novyj mir. Molodaja gvardija. NaS sovremennikl differed sometimes 
slightly, but significantly — the only explanation for the fact that some of them were im-
mediately sold out, or could only be secured "on the quiet"[po blatu]), whereas others could be 
purchased in any desired quantity •12 
Soviet Marxism-Leninism was the universal medium of legitimization in Soviet society, 
constituting "the principle of legitimacy of the Soviet regime."111 In the first place, it 
legitimized the Bolshevik revolution and its outcome, ι e the very existence of the Soviet 
system l 1 4 Secondly, it provided the justification of the actual home and foreign policy of the 
Soviet Party & State, ι e of whatever actual Soviet policy 45 In the third place, it accounted 
for the legitimate control, ι e authority, of the CPSU over all parts of Soviet society 46 At this 
point, two aspects are of special importance for our subject one is the legitimization of control 
over science, the other is the legitimization of control over "ideology" itself, including 
philosophy 
The Finishing Touches of Soviet Marxism-Lenmism 
In order to suit its purpose as a universal legitimizing ideology, Marxism(-Leninism) was 
'tailored' at several points These were adaptations, introduced under Stalin and not abandoned 
until the late 1980s 
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• First of all, Marxism was sanctified: not only the USSR, the CPSU, and Lenin were 
given the epithets of sanctity, but this was extended to the Soviet doctrine. Not very materialist 
or Marxist, this is also totally non-Leninist. Lenin regarded himself as an instrument of 
revolution,!17 and certainly not as a "brilliant thinker, theoretician of Marxism, organizer and 
leader of the CPSU and of the international communist movement, founder of the Soviet state" 
[ChAii].118 The title of klassik marksizma-leninizma was strictly limited to Marx, Engels, 
Lenin, and for some time Stalin.119 An important consequence of this was the authoritative 
nature of the classical texts of Marxism-Leninism (the reason why the scripture was selective, 
and why certain quotations were ubiquitous, becoming almost ritual incantations). Anyone 
who violated theses or statements by the klassiki could rightly be accused of not being a true 
Marxist-Leninist. By the same token, however, the collected works of the klassiki served as 
sites of incontestible arguments pro et contra: a quotation from Marx, Engels, and esp. Lenin 
simply was an argument.120 The funniest example in this respect is how Losev reportedly 
succeeded in persuading the responsible bureaucrats of publishing a Russian translation of 
Plato's works by quoting Lenin's famous statement that "clever idealism is closer to clever 
materialism than stupid materialism."121 This was a decisive argument in favor of Plato, and 
the new 3-volume edition appeared 1960-1970.122 This way, a clever idealist like Losev could 
outbluff a stupid apparatcik. 
• Further, the combination of orthodoxy and flexibility, already strongly present in 
Lenin, was pushed to the extreme. Soviet Marxism-Leninism showed a peculiar combination 
of inflexible dogma and dogmatic flexibility (the interpretation of peaceful coexistence -a 
temporal and flexible reaction to political reality- as a form of -universal and indisputable-
class struggle is a prime example in this respect): 
"Leninism is Marxism of the present epoch, the one, integral, continuously developing doctrine of the 
international working class [italics mine, EvdZ]."123 
• Linked to this "flexible orthodoxy" is the systematization of Marxism-Leninism as a 
"...developing system [razvivajuSöajasja sistema] of philosophical, economical and social-
political views."124 Marxism-Leninism thus forms an "organic synthesis" of "dialectical 
materialist philosophy, proletarian political economy, and scientific communism." 125 A 
developing system offers the possibility of differences between parts of that system, and 
knowing that "development" in Soviet terminology meant dialectical development, this means 
that there can be contradictions between parts of that system, but these contradictions are not, 
and can not be antagonistic since the organic synthesis warrants their unity. 
• Then, Marxism was unified as Marxism-Leninism. It was highly typical of Soviet 
"institutional Marxism" that it did not leave room for non-Leninist or non-Soviet Marxism. 
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Since the possibility of "intellectual Marxism" could not be ruled out, its legitimacy had to be 
denied There simply was no difterence between Marxism and Marxism-Leninism, philosophi-
cal dictionaries have only an entry "Marksizm-Leninizm" 126 Marxism-Leninism is not a 
version of Marxism, but Marxism as developed and enriched by Lenin-
" Leninism is not one of several possible interpretations" of Marxism, but the only true, consequent further 
development of revolutionary Marxism as applied to the era of imperialism and socialist revolutions, the era of 
the transition ot capitalism to socialism "'27 
• In line with this unification of Marxism, the whole ideological field was polarized In 
class society, ideology is class-bound, and since m history at its present stage (the "era of 
imperialism and socialist revolutions") there are only two classes, there can be only two 
ideologies Since one of these is the scientific ideology ot the proletariat, the other must be 
bourgeois ideology All non-Marxist-Leninist ideology belongs, in the end, to one and the 
same ideology there can be no third As Lenin said 
" the question is only this bourgeois or socialist ideology There is no middle here Therefore any belittling 
[umaleme] ol socialist ideology, any dismissal [otstrancme] of it means co ipso a strengthening of bourgeois 
ideology "128 
Consequently, "bourgeois pluralism" must be mere disguise-
"It goes without saying, that contemporary pluralism, acting as a form of apologetic of the bourgeois social 
system [slroj\ and its ideas, is directed most of all against the Marxist-Leninist world-view [ mirosozercame], 
which defends a materialist monism "'29 
Further, the field of ideology was polemized If history is determined by class struggle, 
and ideology of necessity bears a class character, then one form of class struggle must be 
"ideological struggle [ídeologiceska/ bor'bd]" |3° 
"Marxist Leninist ideology is opposed to bourgeois ideology and wages an uncompromising struggle against it 
There can be no peaceful existence with bourgeois ideology "'31 
• At the same time, Marxism-Leninism was histoncized and eternalized The definition of 
Leninism as "Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution", present in 
Stalin in 1924,132 quickly became standard Clearly, this histonzation (an application of 
historical materialism) constituted a danger ( a new epoch might start, requiring a different 
ideology) This danger was countered by stressing the permanent development of Marxism-
Leninism in combination with the immutability of its "principles" (partijnost' and istonzm), and 
by stretching the epoch of which Marxism-Leninism was the ldeology 
"Lemnism representing the further development and concrctizalion of Marxism under the conditions of 
imperialism and proletarian revolutions, in the epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and of the building ot 
socialism and communism ' Ί 1 1 
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• Further, Marxism-Leninism was absolutized Inflating Lenin's statement about the 
three sources of Marxism (French socialism, German philosophy, and British political 
economy),'34 Marxism-Leninism was presented as the supreme outcome of the entire 
intellectual history of mankind 
"Marxism critically re shaped [pererabotai] and generalised the previous achievements ot philosophy, science, 
and social practice, and, for the first time in the history ot knowledge, made philosophy a consistently scientific 
tool of social progress "'35 
• Finally, Marxism-Leninism was most literally made true Its truth residing in a unique 
combination of theoretical superiority and practical success, following Lenin's famous 
statement that "Marxist doctrine is all-powerful [ vsesil'no], because it is true [italics mme, 
EvdZ],"'36 and finding its philosophical underpinning in the notion of "verification by 
practice"· 
"The decisive advantage of Marxism-Leninism as compared to any other doctrine resides in the fact, that it has 
obtained an all-round confirmation [ vsestoronneepodtverfdenie] in social practice " ' 37 
As shall be pointed out in the next chapter, part of the ideological function of philosophy in the 
USSR was to provide and substantiate this theory about Marxism-Leninism that served as 
ideological legitimization of the latter's status as an explicit and official ideology 
The Hidden Force of Transparency 
So, Marxism-Leninism was a holy, permanently developing, scientific, systematic, singular, 
class-bound, militant, true, and practical ideology Yet, we still have to solve the problem how 
Soviet ideology could be ideology and declare itself to be ideological, if we hold that ideology 
must conceal at least one of its elements. In order to solve this puzzle, we must turn to the last 
parameter mystification <—> clarification [P6] We have seen that on the scales of ritual <—> 
conviction [P4] and legitimization <—> motivation [P5] Soviet ideology can be situated at the 
far left However, on the scale of mystification <—> clarification it appears to be on the far 
right other ideologies conceal their functioning, but Marxism-Leninism overtly professed to be 
an ideology. Upon its own account, this is the case because it has nothing to hide, reflecting 
social relations as they are 
"In a class society, ideology bears a class character ( ) In the ideology that expresses the interests of 
reactionary classes, reality, as a rule, is reflected in a distorted manner In the ideology of progressive classes, 
whose interests coincide with the exigencies of the development ol society, there are, to a greater or lesser 
extent, elements of a correct reflection of reality But only the ideology of the proletariat, whose interests fully 
coincide with the laws and exigencies of objective development, is consistently scientific "'38 
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It seems that we simply have to choose either Soviet Marxism-Leninism is not a form 
of ideology, or it is a special, transparent kind of ideology The second possibility is theoreti-
cally very unsatisfactory, and conflicts with virtually all non-Soviet analyses of Soviet 
ideology, which claim that it was neither scientific nor true It also conflicts with empirical 
observation nobody who has experienced both Soviet social reality and Soviet ideology as it 
appeared in the media and on the streets, can seriously contend that the latter offered an 
adequate reflection ' of the former The first possibility cannot be accepted either if ideology is 
an inevitable phenomenon of any society with particular interests, and Soviet society evidently 
was marked by particular interests, then 'normal ideological phenomena must have had their 
place in it, too 
However, we can now solve this problem The claim of Soviet Marxism-Leninism to be a true 
and scientific ideology, with a philosophical system as its theoretical basis, was itself an 
ideological move Soviet official ideology was ideology, but not the ideology it said it was 
The proposition that purports that Marxism-Leninism is an ideology, linked with propositions 
about the guiding role of that ideology, its scientific status, its philosophical foundation, the 
historical mission of the proletariate, etc , is a theory that performed the ideological function 
of legitimizing Marxism-Leninism as the official doctrine From a different angle, Boris Groys 
arrived at a characterization of Soviet ideology as a ' unity of ideology and criticism of ideology 
(or meta-ideology) ' I 3 9 
At this point, we can discern three mutually reinforcing ideological moves, correspon-
ding to the three parameters [P4-6] just discussed 
• The first is to present Marxism(-Lemnism) as a world-view [mirovozzreme], ι e as a 
conviction and a form of consciousness, not as an institutional, official doctrine If we were 
right to say that world-view is not ideology, but can perform an ideological function, then to 
say that Marxism-Leninism is an ideology and a world-view is itsell a concealing ideological 
move The identification of ideology as part of world-view can be read from the definitions of 
Marxism-Len ι η ι sm in authoritative sources 
' Marxism Leninism the scientific, ideology of the working class '40 
Maixism Leninism is a developing scientific system of views, that make up the world-view o( the working 
class HI 
Equally, if we look at the definitions of ideologijd ' and 'mirovozzreme" themselves, 
we find that Soviet sources have a hard time to distinguish the two other than as treating 
ideology as that part of world-view that is turned to political and social questions [Ch 8 i] This 
identification of official Marxism with the actual world-view of the Soviet working class is not 
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a category-mistake it turns world-view into a public, not a private affair, and thus excludes the 
legitimacy of any other, religious or secular world-view, since it can never coincide with, and 
hence is opposed to Marxist-Leninist ideology (there can be only two ideologies [Lenin]) By 
the same token, Marxism-Leninism is given a real instead of an institutional subject 
"The bearer of the scientific ideology is the progressive and conscious vanguard of the revolutionary working 
class its political party It introduces the scientific ideology into the masses [vnosii ν massy], into the workers 
movement 1 4 2 
• In the second place, to present Soviet Marxism-Leninism as a guiding ideology meant 
that everyone who did not want to appear as being "guided" ("misled") by another ideology 
had to profess his or her being guided by Marxist-Leninist principles in advance This meant 
the replacement, in the majority of cases, of repression by voluntary -however unwilling-
submission (a typical function of ideology, as we have seen) Soviet Marxism-Leninism was a 
legitimizing ideology, but it concealed itself as a motivating ideology, thereby facilitating its 
legitimizingfunction 
• In the third place, finally, to present Marxism-Leninism as an ideology, ι e to act as a 
'transparent ideology' meant to rule out the possibility of 'real', ι e concealed ideology withm 
the same society This immunized Marxism-Leninism against the charge of being an ideology 
in the 'normal' sense, and it neutralized the possibly critical potential of Marxism itself Also, 
and more importantly, it monopolized, in a fully legitimate way, the ideological field itself, and 
facilitated the reduction of Marxism to one interpretation If an ideology is that part of world-
view which reflects, in a concealed or in an overt way, the objective interests of a social class, 
and if, in a society, one social class has assumed political power and expresses its interests in a 
"transparent ideology", then that society holds no legitimate place for alternative interpretations 
of that ideology how could the same, objective interests be reflected in an unconcealed manner 
and in different ways7 
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Conclusion 
So, by claiming transparency, Soviet ideology in fact concealed its own ideological nature In 
other words, it can be situated at the far left with respect to all six parameters, which makes it 
an extreme case ol ideology And it was an extreme case of ideology because it was a universal 
medium of legitimacy Soviet Marxism-Leninism, the declared ideology of the Soviet system, 
was an integral part of the status quo it had to legitimize, and therefore contained a 'meta-
ldeology', or 'ideology ol ideology', legitimizing its dominant role in society This 'meta-
ldcology did not deny the ideological nature of Marxism Leninism, but confirmed and 
manipulated it, thus immunizing it against the charge of being ideological and monopolizing the 
ideological field It did, however, conceal its own ideological nature, being brought to the fore 
as an objective account 
There was a 'concealed ideological mechanism in Soviet society, that can be un­
derstood in Marxist terms to the extent to which Soviet society unjustly claimed to be a socialist 
society The fact of an official ideology that claimed the exclusion of normal -concealmg-
ldeology, could in that case precisely conceal that normal ideology There was no room for this 
at the level of the idea of Soviet society, which is why it is difficult to perceive it at the level of 
Soviet reality 
Before we proceed, in the next chapter, to a discussion of the position of philosophy within the 
'Soviet ideological situation' as here presented, some of its general effects must be mentioned 
First ol all, in any field of intellectual activity due respect had to be paid to Marxism-
Leninism as a guiding ideology This obligation cost a lot of creative energy, and meant a lot of 
betrayal, pain, torment, and guilt of generations ot intellectuals in the USSR However, as we 
"cannot read the ideological character of symbolic phenomena off the symbolic phenomena 
themselves" (Thompson), the possibility of mere ritual and lip-service is given as well This 
induces a tiresome, but not (necessarily) mentally harmful form of 'double-speak' and 'double­
think' 
Secondly, Soviet intellectual life was marked by the obligation to stay in tune with 
Marxist-Leninist theory To develop demonstrably Marxist-Leninist views was legitimate, and 
demonstrable contradiction of main theses of the official version of Marxism-Leninism was 
illegitimate (and liable to be persecuted) As a result, Soviet intellectuals engaged in endless 
repetition and refinement of the same worn-out theses By the same token, however, to state or 
develop something demonstrably Marxist(-Lemnist), ι e backed by authoritative quotations, 
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was to do something invulnerable. This has led Soviet intellectuals to an instrumental use of the 
texts of the klassiki. In practice, the two are hard to distinguish, which is why Soviet texts 
often demand a lot of reading between the lines. 
Finally, intellectuals played an important role in the "development" of Marxism-
Leninism, not accidentally represented as a system of views. This opens the possibility of 
"double truth": on the one hand, there is "truth for the people", viz. the official doctrine in its 
present stage of development. On the other hand, there is "truth for the experts", the "organic 
synthesis" of different disciplines, each of which had to be elaborated, developed, and refined 
in order to match developing reality. At this point, different possible elaborations have to be 
developed at some length at least, before a decision as to the new "popular dogma" can be 
made. This offered a chance for Soviet intellectuals, even within ideological strongholds like 
the AON, to engage in serious work in social or economic or philosophical theory, and to 
publish their work "for official use" [dlja sluzcbnogo pol'zovanija (DPS)]. The prize for this 
kind of endeavour, however, was that Soviet intellectuals working in these fields became, in 
the eyes of a population that saw only the final outcome, not the more sophisticated work that 
preceded it, the "lackeys of ideology".'43 
*** 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
The Ideology of Soviet Philosophy 
"Wer diso Systeme machi, muß die zahllosen Lucken durch eigne Erfindung 
ausfüllen, d h ¡rrationellphantasieren ldeologisicrcn ' l 4 4 
F Engels, 1876 
'After all philosophic works officially published in the USSR should be 
by definition Marxist-Leninist 145 
L Chernyak 1987 
In this chapter, I shall apply the results of the preceding chapter to Soviet philosophy, and 
argue that the ideological situation was the decisive factor in shaping Soviet philosophical 
culture Certainly, the situation of philosophy in the USSR contained more than the ideological 
factor it also comprised the material working conditions of philosophers, the general level ol 
education, the Russian and other national philosophical traditions, the popular image of the 
philosopher, etc My hypothesis is that in the Soviet situation, ideological factors were 
decisive, not that they were the only factors 
If ideology is a phenomenon of every society, then philosophy always exist under 
specific ideological conditions, but the extent to which, and the way(s) in which philosophy is 
'determined' by these conditions may differ, depending on the level of 'ideologization', 
'unification' and 'submission' as indicated before [Ch ivi Philosophy may be based upon a 
variety of traditions, it need not be covered by a single ideology, it may largely exist as a 
private affair or have its legitimate public space, or take place in a relatively isolated academic 
world Therefore if philosophy in the USSR is singled out by the fact that is was determined 
by the Soviet ideological situation, this must be a focus of our investigation 
The key notion of my argument is that of an "ideology of Soviet philosophy", a theory 
('story') about philosophy in general and Soviet philosophy in particular, which, on the one 
hand, formed part of general Soviet ideology, and, on the other hand, could insert philosophy 
as it actually existed and developed in the USSR This "ideology of Soviet philosophy" both 
legitimized and thus made possible, and limited philosophical culture by accounting for its 
subordination [Ch 9] The subject of the present chapter is this ideology of Soviet philosophy, 
mediating between the realms of official ideology and actual philosophical culture To this end, 
the chapter is divided into three sections the first discusses the place and function of Soviet 
philosophy m official Soviet accounts [81], the second penetrates into the conceptual pattern of 
Soviet ideology of philosophy, concentrating on the key notions of partijnost', naucnost' and 
sistemnost' [partisan, scientific, and systematic nature], and focuses on the "flexible or-
thodoxy' of that ideology [8 n], the concluding section shows how this ideology, with its in-
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built flexibility, facilitated ideological legitimization 'from above' and 'from below', and in that 
sense worked effectively to make philosophical culture possible and control it [8 ш] The actual 
philosophical culture that existed given this situation will be the subject of the next chapter 
[Ch9] 
8.i The Official Position. Place, and Functions of Soviet Philosophy 
Not every nation's leaders express their concern about the state of philosophy in their country 
In the USSR, however, it has been a major concern of all subsequent Soviet leaders 
Lenin 1922 
Stalin 1938 
Chruscev 1959 
Breznev 1976 
Andropov 1983 
Ceinenko 1984 
it is our unconditional duty to recruit tor cooperation all advocates of consistent 
and militant materialism in our struggle against philosophical reaction and the 
philosophical prejudices of so called «educated society» 146 
Gorbdcev 1986 
"Dialectical materialism is the world view of the Marxist Leninist party " 1 4 7 
'A people whose ideology is Marxism Leninism is invincible ' 148 
'Tailhfulness to I eninist teaching is the guarantee of our successes "'49 
' Our line is clear it is the line of war for the purity of the ideas ol Marxism-
Leninism, "'50 
'Il is clear, thai the objectives set to our social sciences cannot be achieved, unless 
they remain as closely as possible related to life All scholasticism will only restrain 
our fervor Only the link with practice can enhance Ihe output ot science and this is 
one of the central problems of today "151 
The philosophy that Marx gave to the working class is a revolution in the history 
ot social thought ( ) Marx doctrine, present in an organic whole of dialectical and 
historical materialism political economy and theory of scientific communism, 
proved to be an authentic revolution in world view and at the same time lit the road 
to the profoundest social revolutions ' 1 5 2 
' For the solution of the fundamental problems that stand before us, wc dispose of a 
powerful theoretical weapon This is, most of all, materialist dialectics " ' 54 
The basis of the strategv and tactics of the CPSU under present conditions is 
provided by the Marxist-Leninist conception of developed socialism 
Methodologically the core of the conception of developed socialism, us «living 
soul» is provided by materialist dialectics the theory of development "154 
"Marxism Leninism is the supreme re\olulionary world-view ( ) It shows the way 
to a scientific investigation of social development as a single process, regular in all 
its enormous versatility and conlradictonncss teaches to orientate correctlv in the 
nature and interaction ot economic and political forces to select the reliable trends, 
forms and methods of struggle to teel secure in sudden historical turns '155 
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Why was it so important for the Party to include philosophy as one of the constituent parts of 
its Marxist-Leninist ideology? Why did the line that, in the 1920s, claimed to represent a 
Marxist(-Leninist) philosophy gain the victory over the tendency to do away with philosophy 
altogether, and replace it by science? Why did Deborin succeed at first, and why did Mitin and 
Judin, after Deborin's defeat, adopt his position with regard to philosophy? It was not because 
Mitin and Judin (or Stalin) had such a high opinion of philosophy, not because Stalin had such 
a high opinion of Mitin and Judin, and certainly not because they thought that philosophy 
would actually provide Soviet ideology and policy with a sound scientific foundation. It was 
because to include philosophy in Marxist(-Leninist) ideology meant exclusion of esp. Marxist 
philosophy as a legitimatcindependentactivity. 
The Official Soviet Account of Ideological Superstructure* 
Philosophy has occupied, over the whole period 1930-1990, a stable position as part of official 
ideology, and this position was never seriously challenged. In order to understand this we have 
to get an idea of the "ideological superstructure" of Soviet society as a whole. 
Soviet PHILOSOPHY was not ¡denti fiedv/hh Marxist(-Lcninist) ideology. The official definition 
read: "Dialectical materialism is the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism... [italics mine, 
EvdZ]."156 As such it was treated as its fundamental part: "Dialectical and historical 
materialism are the philosophical foundation of Marxism-Leninism."157 Although Soviet 
sources had difficulties distinguishing ideology and world-view [Ch.7.¡¡¡], world-view is 
broader, coinciding with what Marx, in the "Preface" to Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie 
called "social consciousness" as opposed to "social being".158 Authoritative Soviet sources, 
were quite consistent in their determination of philosophy as a part of ideology, world-view, 
and society. 
The SUPERSTRUCTURE [ nadstrojka] of society comprises everything that is not part of 
the material, economic bazis: "the spiritual forms [duchovnye obrazovanija] (emotions, moods, 
ideas, theories etc.) that reflect the basis, the ideological relations that correspond with these, 
but also organizations and institutions,"159 At this general level there is a fundamental 
difference between class-society and classless society: "...in an antagonistic society the 
superstructure reflects the basis from the positions of different classes. In a socialist society, 
where there are no classes with conflicting interests, the superstructure expresses the interests 
'Based on three authoritative sources of the 1980s: Il'icev &c 1983, Blaubcrg &c I9824, and Konstantinov &c 
19826. 
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of all working masses and serves as an instrument for the perfection of the socialist 
basis "160 
Together with the material basis, the "institutions and organizations" form the sphere of 
SOCIAL BEING as opposed to SOCIAL CONSCIOUSNESS, ι e "the spiritual, ideological life of 
society the views and ideas of people, political, legal, moral, and other theories " , 6 1 It is "not 
the totality ol the individual consciousnesses of the members of society, but an integral spiritual 
phenomenon, possessing a specific inner structure, that includes different levels (theoretical 
and everyday consciousness, ideology, social psychology) and forms of consciousness ," 1 6 2 
"a qualitatively specific spiritual system [kaäestvenno owbdjd duchovnaja sistema], which, 
while generated by, and, in the final analysis [vkonecnom scefe], conditioned by social being, 
lives its own relatively independent life [¿ivet svoej otnositelno sdmostojatel'noj zizn'ju], and 
exerts a powerful influence on every man, compels him to take into account the historically 
arising forms of social consciousness as something real, though immaterial "I6i The notion of 
determination m the final analysis in combination with relative independence is essential 
"Within the limits of its general dependence on social being, the various forms of social 
consciousness possess a certain relative independence "164 This relative independence is 
manifest in the "continuity [preemstvennosf] of its development,"165 and its active influence 
on social development16i> 
The catalogue of forms of social consciousness is constant political ideology, legal 
consciousness, morality, religion, science, art, philosophy |67 How is it related to individual 
consciousness9 The principle of individuation is provided by the concept of WORLD VIEW 
"World-view is the core of social and individual consciousness "168 It is "an integral system ot 
views on the world (1 e on nature, society, and thought), which have a substantial effect on 
the value-orientation and activity of man "169 Every human being has a world-view, a more or 
less coherent system of "scientific, philosophical, socio-political, moral and legal, aesthetic and 
religious views, principles and ideas," that "is formed in the individual in practical life, through 
his assimilation of the accumulated experience of mankind "17° 
There are different modes of formation of a world-view " with some people, it takes 
shape spontaneously (so-called everyday world-view [obydennoe mirovozzreme]), while 
others elaborate theirs consciously, trying to comprehend the life of society and their own life, 
their relation to the world by way of a study of social-histoncal experience, of the concrete 
sciences, and of philosophy,"171 Hence there are three basic types "commonplace [zitejskoe] 
(everyday [obydennoe]), philosophical, and religious"172 The first is natural, and is 
sometimes described as 'social psychology",171 the other two are consciously elaborated, 
taking as their point of departure philosophy or religion Here, two fundamental categories 
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appear: class-bias or partisanship [partijnosf] and (historical) progress. In a society with 
antagonist classes there can not be a single world-view, because "every class (...) has its own 
specific world-view,"'74 reflecting objective reality, but doing so adequately or inadequately. 
A philosophical world-view is superior to a religious one to the extent to which the fundamen-
tal choice between two philosophical positions, idealism and materialism, lies at the basis of all 
world-view |Ch.l2.ii], becoming explicit and manifest in a philosophical world-view.'75 
In the present world, the struggle between conflicting world-views has been reduced to 
the "sharp struggle between two opposed world-views, communist and bourgeois, in the 
course of which there is an increasing influence of Marxism-Leninism, victorious by virtue of 
its truth [pravda], of the trustworthiness of its consistently scientific tenets." '76 A world-view 
is progressive and superior to the extent to which it acknowledges and helps to bring about the 
objective goal of human history, viz. a classless society, and it is reactionary and inferior to the 
extent to which it hinders this progressive development: "Communist society forever liberates 
the people of a religious world-view." 177 
World-view as a whole is related to all objective reality and to man. By contrast, IDEOLOGY 
"encloses only that part of world-view that is oriented towards social phenomena and class 
relations." 178 Ideology, too, is a "system of political, legal, religious, ethical, aesthetic and 
philosophical views, ideas, and theories,"!79 but it focuses upon the realization and valuation 
of the relations of people to reality and to each other, of social problems and conflicts, and 
upon "objectives (programmes) for social activity, directed towards the consolidation or change 
(development) of given social relations."'80 The reason why world-view and ideology seem to 
be almost identical is that, in the Soviet view, the social-political relations are what the whole 
superstructure really is about. To the extent to which social-political ideology moves to the 
center of world-view, the latter becomes explicitly what it is implicitly in other cases.18' It is 
important to note, in this connection, that SCIENCE, though one of the forms of social 
consciousness,182 is ideologically neutral inasmuch as its aim is objective knowledge of 
reality,183 which is why it "changes, in the course of history, into a productive force of 
society."'84 
In class-society ideology has a class-character,185 which is why it can be judged with 
the help of a series of oppositions: "revolutionary or reactionary, progressive or conservative, 
liberal or radical, internationalist or nationalist, etc."186 Since ideology is a spiritual 
phenomenon, it can also "be judged according to epistemological categories: scientific or 
unscientific, true or false etc."187 And, not surprisingly: "The link between these two series of 
appreciations is revealed by the principle of partisanship [partijnosf] of ideology, which links 
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knowledge of social reality to the interests of this or that class." '88 The development of 
ideology is, though "determined in the final analysis by the economic conditions, the social 
relations of people," marked by "a relative independence, which finds its expression in the fact 
that each new ideological system... also appears as the continuation of the preceding develop-
ment of thought... ," and "manifests itself in the specific laws of development of its separate 
forms, as well as in the distinctive character of its inñuence on other social phenomena, 
including the material basis where it has come from to begin with [all italics mine, EvdZ]." '8 9 
Ideology, as opposed to "social psychology" or "everyday world-view", is man-made."'90 
We thus arrive at the following schematic picture: 
In this scheme, representing the official Soviet account, ideology is one among seven forms of 
social consciousness, ' 9 ' philosophy being the most general and fundamental form: "a system 
of most general concepts about the world, about man's place within it, the theoretical 
foundation of world-view," '92 "the doctrine [ucenie] about the general principles of being and 
knowledge, about the relation of man to the world; the science of the universal laws of 
development of nature, society, and thought."193 As such it is the basis of a philosophical 
world-view, which is identical with a scientific world-view: "It must be noted (as against 
positivism), that neither any separate science, nor all sciences together can, without 
philosophy, form a scientific world-view."194 Ideology (political ideology and law) is directly 
related to social being, whereas "the other forms of social consciousness [philosophy, 
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morality, religion, art, and science, EvdZ]... are related to the economic foundations of social 
life not directly, but through political ideas."195 
Philosophy is "indissolubly connected with change on the level of social classes, with 
political and ideological struggle,"196 but "at the same time, the development of philosophy is 
characterized by relative independence. The movement of philosophical knowledge also 
experiences the influence of already emerged and developed theories and traditions, which have 
accumulated theoretical material [idejnyjmaterial]. Philosophy itself exerts an influence on 
social life: progressive philosophy is conducive to social progress, reactionary philosophy 
impedes it [italics mine, EvdZ]."197 Philosophy is related to ideology also because the 
fundamental question of philosophy has direct relevance for political ideology. The thesis that 
social being determines social consciousness is a materialist philosophical thesis, and a 
fundamental tenet in political ideology at the same time. But, of course, philosophy can deny 
its link to ideology, just as it can tum to religion instead of to science. 
The Place of Philosophy in Soviet Ideological Superstructure 
The superstructure of socialist society fits into this general scheme. Marxism-Leninism 
contained a theory of "socialist superstructure" that not only claimed to yield an adequate 
description of that superstructure, but also interpreted it as one in which the various elements 
stand in their proper, non-contradictory relation to one another. Upon this account, one such 
element of Soviet superstructure is "scientific atheism", which not only occupies the place 
occupied by religion in other societies, but also exposes religions as distorted representations 
of (social) reality. The same applies a fortion to philosophy and ideology: they stand in their 
proper relation and yield the proper ideology and world-view. Soviet social consciousness is 
organized around the idea of a Marxist-Leninist scientific-philosophical world-view, the heart 
of which is formed by Marxist-Leninist ideology, because social and economic relations 
determine, "in the final analysis", social consciousness. As we have seen, Marxist-Leninist 
ideology and Marxist-Leninist world-view therefore largely coincide.198 Which means that, 
from an external point of view, Marxist-Leninist world-view is strongly politicized: "Marxism-
Leninism is a developing system of philosophical, economical, and social-political views, 
which form the world-view of the working class."199 
Marxist-Leninist world-view or ideology is scientific and philosophical. It is scientific 
because the interests of the international working class coincide with the objective development 
of history, and therefore objective scientific truth about reality is on the side of the working 
class. Which is why "with the victory of socialism, Marxism-Leninism becomes the ideology 
2 4 1 
Chapter 8: The Ideology of Soviel Philosophy 
of the whole society."200 it is philosophical, because "its philosophical basis is dialectical and 
historical materialism."201 
Being the theoretical foundation of Marxism-Leninism, philosophy (diamat and istmat) 
provides the answer to general questions of human orientation (diamat philosophy is the 
theoretical foundation of scientific atheism,202 (dis)qualifying any kind of religious world-view 
as backward and unscientific) and, being a scientific philosophy, it mediates between ideology 
and science: "Characteristic for Marxist philosophy is the organic conjunction of materialism... 
with a scientific-dialectical conception of development. It does not lay claim to the role of 
"science of sciences"... The place of philosophy in the system of scientific knowledge is 
determined by the fact that it generalizes the results of all other sciences, and arms them with 
the appropriate approaches to the phenomena that they have to study."203 
So, it is the liberation of philosophy from religion, and its union with science, that 
makes it the proper theoretical basis for the ideology of the social class, the interests whereof 
coincide with those of humanity on its road to communism. 
Upon this official account, socialist superstructure looks like this: 
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The Officiai Functions of Soviet Philosophy 
Still on account of official sources, Soviet philosophy performed several functions: 
"Dialectical materialism performs three organically linked functions, i.e. it plays a triple role. To start with, it 
is a world-view, a system of general views on the world. Further, it is a method, a methodology, an instrument 
of cognition. In the third place, dialectical materialism, along with the other constituent parts of Marxism, 
serves as the scientific foundation for the government of society [italics mine, EvdZ]."204 
"As to its functions, Marxist philosophy is a consistently scientific-philosophical world-view, and a general 
methodology for the knowledge of objective reality and revolutionary action. Carrying out these functions, it 
elaborates the means of world-view orientation [ mirovozzrenCeskaja oricntacija] of man, of the theoretical 
foundation of the practical struggle of progressive social forces, and the general methodological principles of 
investigation in the field of all particular sciences [italics mine, EvdZl."2<>5 
These functions can be identified by means of the account of possible functions of 
philosophy given earlier [Ch.l.iii]. In the first place, Soviet philosophy, as the theoretical basis 
of a world-view, is said to provide answers to existential questions [F9]. This included the 
elaboration of socialist morality, of socialist-realist aesthetics, and of an atheist answer to those 
questions that might be answered by religion. In the second place, philosophy not only claimed 
to be self-foundational,20(> but also to provide the theoretical foundation [F3] of the political 
action of the forces of progress, which means, as far as the USSR itself is concerned, the Party 
and its organizations (trade-unions, etc.), and the State. The first two functions are usually 
labelled the ideological function of philosophy,* the first also being referred to as "world-view 
function [mirovozzrenceskaja funkcija]".20Ί In the third place, philosophy performs a 
methodological function, providing the general theoretical and methodological principles of 
science [F6].208 
A further function was taken care of by theoretical philosophy itself, the system of 
diamat and istmat, pretending to be a true "reflection" of both natural, historical, and social 
reality. This function can be called the epistemic (or as Scanlan calls it, the cognitive) function 
of Soviet philosophy [Fl]. 2 0 9 The (alleged) critical function of Soviet philosophy [ F2] had 
two targets: the critique of revisions and distortions of Marxism(-Leninism),210 the most 
important of which was to deny that Leninism was the only consequently Marxist ideology, 
and the critique of bourgeois ideology (sociology and philosophy).211 
The (self-)critical function of philosophy was ritualized in the form of kritika i 
samokritika [criticism and self-criticism], the function whereof was not critical at all, but 
ideological anddisciplinary: 
*I do not employ this label here, since what is meant by it in the Soviet context corresponds to what I have 
labelled foundational and existential function — the ideological function of philosophy as I conceive it does not 
occur in Soviet sources under that or any other term, which is understandable as it was precisely the official 
account that performed an ideological function. 
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"Kritika i samokritika is a method to discover and overcome contradictions in social development; an 
indispensable aspect of material and spiritual activity; one of the fundamental principles of the revolutionary 
transforming activity of Marxist-Leninist parties, and in a socialist society - of the whole people; one of the 
moving forces of the development of socialist society; a principle of moral education, self-education, and 
spiritual development of people [italics mine, EvdZ]."2l2 
At the sessions of kritika i samokritika, philosophers were told by Party-philosophers 
what was the right position in this or that philosophical issue, and what had been their 
mistakes. The point of kritika i samokritika was to show i) that philosophers engaged in free 
and mutually critical discussion, ii) that it was the Party that legitimately corrected the mistaken 
insights of individual philosophers, and iii) that they arrived at a right view as a result of this 
discussion, i.e. as a result of their own thought. 
Finally, we can, with De George, distinguish a sixth, technical function of Soviet 
philosophy [F5]: 
"Within the Marxist-Leninist framework the task of Soviet philosophers is to explicate specific types of 
technical prohlems and to introduce order and clarity as far as is possible and consistent with the functions of 
ideology. "213 
Together this yields the following picture of the functions of Soviet philosophy: 
Official Functions of Soviet Philosophy 
intellectual life (science &c), 
including philosophical culture 
world-view, 
education 
Technical function [F5] 
Methodological function [ F6] Existential function 
[mimvozzr. ƒ] [F9] 
Critical function [F2] 
Existential function 
[mimvozzr. f.] [F9] Foundational function [F3] 
'bourgeois 
ideology and 
revisionist 
Marxism 
private life society / politics 
So far, I have been presenting the outlines of the Soviet perception of philosophy as part of 
Marxist-Leninist ideology. Evidently, this picture is not a description of an objective state of 
affairs, but an authoritative declaration. The central function of Soviet philosophy, upon this 
account, was its ideological function, viz. its function as part of Marxist-Leninist ideology — 
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which is another way of saying that philosophy performed an ideological function with respect 
to social and scientific practice. But we must realize that this ideological function was itself part 
of the self-procured image, i.e. the ideology of Soviet philosophy. 
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8.Ü Three Cornerstones of Soviet Philosophy: Partijnost', NauCnost', 
Sistemnost' 
The best way to come to grips with the 'ideology of Soviet philosophy' is to regard it as the 
interplay ol three basic concepts pdrtijnost' [partisanship], naucnost' [scientific nature], and 
sistemnost' [systematic character], gathered under the umbrella of the by definition Marxist-
Leninist nature of Soviet philosophy As has become clear in the preceding chapter, Marxism-
Leninism itself was primarily a means to secure unity, and to exclude as illegitimate serious 
discussion of what Marxist-Leninist philosophy would (have to) be like And this applied to 
'the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism", too [Ch 7 ш] 
Official Soviet Marxist-Leninist philosophy, however critical it may have been of traditional 
philosophy, presetved essential ieatures of the Hegelian conception of philosophy that 
immediately preceded Marxism the idea of philosophy as a system (of philosophical sciences 
in Hegel's case, of philosophical disciplines in the Soviet case) and a science (the transition 
from "love of wisdom" to knowledge in Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes^ the union of 
philosophy with objectively true science in the case of Soviet philosophy), and the idea of 
partisanship (in Hegel his stress on the obligation to take sides with "developing Reason" itself 
and the rejection of the idea of neutrality in studying the history of philosophy,215 in Soviet 
philosophy the notion of partijnost) 
Soviet philosophy, picking up the "orthodox" line running from Plechanov, stuck to a 
traditional model of philosophy as true, systematic knowledge of reality This also appears 
from the fact that the main 'philosophical enemies' of Marxist-Leninist philosophy were 
irrationalism, positivism,216 relativism, pluralism, and pragmatism Soviet philosophy 
explicitly claimed to resolve all traditional philosophical questions, as well as all possible new 
ones, ι e it claimed absolute superiority^7 In this respect, Soviet philosophy was archaic and 
anachronistic Not a trace of linguistic turns or hermeneutic circles, of the hypothetical, 
conjectural nature of all human knowledge, of Geworfenheit, or of cultural pessimism of any 
kind On the contrary, the absence of these elements was an argument both for the superiority 
of Soviet philosophy, and for the decadence of Western, bourgeois philosophy 
"Rejecting the psjchological focus of the existentialists, and the linguistic focus of the positiviste and their 
successors, Soviet Marxists have continued to philosophize in the grand manner, advancing a general theory of 
reality in all its guises, trom subatomic particles to international politics ' 2 "* 
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The ideology of Soviet philosophy resided upon three, closely related notions, partijnost', 
nauènost', and sistemnost'. It can not be overstressed that we are dealing with a theory about 
Soviet philosophy that performed primarily an ideological function, both inwardly and 
outwardly. Its central claim was that of the theoreticalsupenonty and practical relevance of 
Soviet philosophy 
"The work of Soviet philosophers has led to the enrichment of the ideological-theoretical potential of Marxist 
social science, and to an increase of its role in the construction of communism and in ideological struggle in the 
international arena The foreign influence and the international prestige of Soviet philosophical science have 
erown considerably "219 
This is not a description, but a declaration {"reine Versicherung", as Hegelians would 
say). As such it was an objective fact of Soviet philosophical culture. Soviet philosophy was 
Marxist(-Leninist), scientific, systematic and partisan by definition, not (necessarily) by fact. 
More daringly, its Marxist(-Leninist) nature was its being claimed to be consequently Marxist-
(-Leninist), partisan, scientific, systematic At the same time, this definition did determine 
philosophy in the USSR, it precluded its 'spontaneous' development into anything else, and it 
isolated Soviet philosophers from the outside world. It also (mis)led many Western commen-
tators to approach it as a form of Marxist philosophy in the first place, and then the conclusion 
could only be that it was a corrupt or distorted Marxism. This is to miss an essential point, 
namely the formal character and the ideological function of its 'Marxist-Leninist' nature. 
1 Partijnost'· the Unity of Philosophy and Politics 
The key concept of Soviet ideology of philosophy is the notion of partijnost', usually translated 
as "partisanship", but slightly wider in meaning in Russian [German "Parteilichkeit", or 
English "partyness"220 come closer] It means not only "party spirit" but also simply 
"belonging to the party", as in expressions like "partijnoe ízdatel'stvo [party publishing 
house]".* For the purpose of this discussion, it is useful to distinguish between four distinct 
meanings of partijnost': 
• 1 the objective class-bound nature of all phenomena in the realm of social consciousness; 
• 2 the approach required of all Marxists, including Soviet philosophers, 
• 3 the right (and obligation) of the Party to decide and interfere in questions of ideology; 
• 4 the actual control by the Party over all means ol philosophical production. 
The theoretical basis of the notion of partijnost' can be found in Marx' and Engels' doctrine 
that all forms of social consciousness, part of the superstructure of a specific socio-economic 
'The substantive "partijnost" is formed from the adjective "partijnyf "siding with the party", "of the party", 
and "belonging to the party" 
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formation, are always class-bound 221 Whereas this "Marxian" concept of partijnost' was 
primarily part of historical materialism, ι e of the theory about "social consciousness" 
[theoretical partijnost' (1)], Lenin turned it into the practical maxim to be consciously and 
actively partisan, to apply the principle of partijnost' in all ideological matters [ militant 
partijnost' (2)] This application found its practical realization in the subordination of all other 
values (moral, aesthetic, scientific) and interests (economic, private, intellectual) to the 
objectives of the Party As Ignatow wrote, with respect to philosophy. 
since ihc Parly is the 'vanguard of the working class, expressing its basic interesls, it follows that 
partisanship in philosophy is possible only when the position of the Party is taken, and, of course, only the 
Party can decide when this is the case '222 
With the establishment of Bolshevik Party-rule, this militant, and motivating notion of 
partijnost' changed into "Stalinist" partijnost'·* the reduction of all superstructure phenomena 
to their class-nature, thus lounding the Party's fundamental right to interfere in any realm of 
superstructure [legitimate partijnost' (3)] This meant the ideological legitimization of the actual 
"leading role of the Party" in political and ideological matters, and its control over philosophy 
[mateiia!partijnost'(4)] For example, the decision in 1950 that language no longer was class-
biased, was an important change -clearing the way for 'class-neutral' linguistics, and for 
logic-, lifting partijnost'4 from these fields of intellectual activity, but not in any way limiting 
partijnost'3 In this respect, "stalinism" can be seen as the inversion of the relation between 
ideology and political real ity, turning from motivation for revolutionary change to legitimization 
of established power.22^ 
For a proper understanding of Leninism partijnost' 2 (the application of pañijnost' 1 to 
the party itself) is essential, but in understanding Soviet reality, including philosophy, 
partijnost' 3 and 4 are the central categories. Actual partijnost''[3 + 4] was the heart of the 
Soviet system, warranted by the notorious 6th article of the Soviet Constitution, in force from 
1936 to 1990 224 
'Article б The leading and guiding force of Soviet society, the core of its political system of its governmen­
tal and social organi/alions is the Communist Party of the Soviet Union The CPSU exists for the sake of the 
people, and serves ihc people 
Armed with the Marxist Leninist doctrine, the Communist party determines the general prospect of development 
of society, the line ot domestic and foreign policy of the USSR, directs the great constructive activity of the 
Soviet people, impacts a planned, scientifically founded character to its struggle for the victory ot com-
munism z z > 
Any approach that skips this feature of Soviet reality is liable to take Marxist-Leninist 
ideology at its word, as well as to misinterpret the relation of Soviet philosophy to official 
"The distinction between Leninist'and 'Stalinist" partijnost' does not exclude that Lenin was a Stalinist' or 
thai Stalin also was a Leninist it is not a distinction between persons, nor a way of absolving Lenin 
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Marxist-Leninist ideology.226 Marxist-Leninist ideology was a fact that every philosophical 
activity had to take into account, but not in the sense that the content of that ideology -its 
theory- was the point of departure of philosophical thought. It was its objective limit, not its 
subjective source. Likewise, the Russian word " ¡communist" did not (like "communist" in 
English) mean "person believing or supporting Communism", but "member of the communist 
party."227 Membership of the CPSU meant not adherence to a particular political conviction, 
but i) a determination to make a successful career in Soviet society, ii) loyalty to the Soviet 
system and the leading role of the CPSU, and iii) readiness to display, on the appropriate 
occasion, one's firm belief in Marxism-Leninism.228 This does not exclude a 'true' Com-
munist conviction, but it does not imply it either. What it does imply is that all Marxists-
Leninists in the USSR were actual Marxists in the sense of Kolakowski, whether or not they 
also were intellectual Marxists. 
The material control of the Party over philosophical culture [partijnost' 4] was mediated 
through the notion of partijnost' [ 3]. The explicit recognition by Soviet philosophers of the 
Party's leading role and hence of its right to control, is a classical example of ideology, since 
the actual exercise of power is both justified and concealed. The Party's right to issue directives 
was founded in the Leninist conception oí partijnost' [2]: if the party represents the interests of 
the people, coinciding with the 'objective logic' of history, then every communist must follow 
the Party line. Once that Party is in full control of political power and social development, 
every citizen -whether philosopher or collectivized peasant- who does not stick to the Party 
line eo ipso betrays the cause of the people (which would yield him the title of "enemy of the 
people" or "enemy of the Soviet Union"). 
In the end, the notion of partijnost' resided in theoretical partijnost' [1]. It is il-
luminating to compare two different statements of the notion of partijnost' with respect to 
philosophy, by Blakeley in 1980, and from the FÉS of 1983. While both point to distinct 
meanings of partijnost', Blakeley skips partijnost' 3 whereas the Soviet source omits 
partijnost' 4. Together they show how partijnost'3 ideologically legitimized what Soviet 
philosophy really was about, viz. actual control and subordination to political objectives 
[partijnost' 4]: 
"Soviet philosophy is partisan, and in two senses. First, partisanship means that... everything of importance 
(including, therefore, philosophy) is a matter of class war [partijnost' 1) and consequently has to he viewed from 
the perspective of one's class [partijnost' 2]. Even more concretely, however, partisanship here means direct 
control by the Communist parly over the activity of contemporary Soviet philosophers [parti/nosf'4]."229 
"Philosophy has always acted as one of the main instruments of the ideological struggle of different social 
groups... By its very essence and function, world-view hears a class and thus partisan character [partijnost' 1]. 
(...) The socio-political significance of Marxist-lxninist philosophy is determined by the fact, that it is the 
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theoretical foundation of the world-view of the proletariat and scientifically demonstrates the inevitability of the 
wreck of capitalism and the victory of socialism and communism. Only the Marxist-Leninist world-view, 
turning socialism from utopia into science, showed the proletariat and its party the only true road of struggle for 
the construction of communism [partijnost' 2). (...) Marxist philosophy is the ideological and methodological 
foundation of the programme, strategy, and tactics, the policy of communist and labor parties... [partijnost' 
3,-230 
The philosophical ground for the application of the notion of partijnost' to philosophy 
is to be found in the basic question "about the relation between consciousness [soznanie] and 
being [bytie], between the spiritual and the material [otnosenie duchovnogo к 
materíal'nomu]."2^ To this basic question there are only two possible answers: idealism and 
materialism, which implies a division of all philosophers into two camps.232. Then there is the 
second basic question "whether the world is in an immutable state, or... is permanently 
changing, developing", i.e. the question of the choice between metaphysics and dialectics.23-1 
It is the unity of dialectics and materialism as forged by Marx and Engels, that means a 
revolution in philosophy [Ch. 12ii]. To quote three official sources of the 1980s: 
"Dialectical materialism is the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, organically combining a materialist solution 
of the basic question of philosophy with dialectics, the science of the general laws of development of the 
phenomena of objective reality and the process of knowledge, the revolutionary method of knowledge and of the 
transformation of reality."234 
"The emergence of dialectical and historical materialism is the supreme revolution [ vcliiajSaja rcvoljucija] in the 
development of philosophy, marking the beginning of the history of Marxist philosophy."235 
"Thus, the creation of a dialectical-materialist world-view, the conversion of materialism into dialectical 
materialism, the discovery of the intrinsically dialectical nature of material processes and of the process of 
knowing them, meant a revolution in philosophy, realized by K. Marx and F. Engels."23^ 
The basic question is related to the notion of partijnost', because idealism and 
metaphysics, reconciling social differences in a realm of ideas, and representing reality as 
fundamentally unchanging, are objectively on the side of conservative social groups, whereas 
materialism and dialectics, representing reality as developing, are on the side of progressive 
forces. Since dialectical materialism combines, for the first time in history, the two progressive 
answers to the basic questions of philosophy, it not only means a revolution, but it also is on 
the side of the objective course of history. Because it yields an objectively true picture of 
reality, dialectical materialism sides not only with historical progress, but also with science: 
"The basis of the unity of the partijnost' and the scientific nature [nauinost'] of Marxist-Leninist philosophy is 
the coincidence of the class-interests of the proletariat with the real logic of history, and eo ipso with the 
interests of progressive mankind as a whole."23? 
This brings us to the second cornerstone of the ideology of Soviet philosophy. 
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2. Naucnost' Developing Truth 
The scientific nature of Soviet philosophy received equal stress as its parti/nost', philosophy 
being simply defined as scientific 2 1 8 Still, a tension can be discerned: it is one thing to declare 
philosophy to be scientific [naucnaja filosofija], but it is something else to define it as a science 
[nauka] In the latter case, philosophy as a rule was qualified, following one of Engels' 
statements, as the "science about the universal laws of development of nature, society, and 
thought [nauka о naibolee obKcich zakonach razvitija pnrody, obsccstva ι myslenija] "239 i
n 
later years, the definition of Marxism-Leninism as a "scientific-philosophical world-view" has 
become dominant, which leaves the question open whether or not philosophy itself is a 
science, while taking full advantage of the positive ideological connotations of the epithet 
"scientific". 
Is diamat a philosophical science or a scientific philosophy9 A frequently encountered 
solution is to regard the fundamental part, materialist dialectics, as a universal science that 
yields the right, scientific methodology both foi all concrete fields of science and for other 
fields of philosophy and ideology, thereby rendering the latter scientific. However, the exact 
relation of philosophy to science is, in the official Soviet account, less than clear. This is not 
accidental, it was the best way to deal with the actual situation, a situation in which philosophy 
had to be the theoretical foundation of official ideology, and at the same time the theory that 
served as ideological legitimization of practical control over science andphilosophy. 
In 1981, Viktor Vasil'evic Agúdov (b. 1931) pointed to the inconsistency in authoritative 
definitions* of philosophy as a science and a specific form of social consciousness He stated 
that this definition is not dialectical, but eclectic, pointing out "that the very question, whether 
philosophy is a science or not, is a highly important ideological issue [podopleka] "24° 
Philosophical doctrines have, under the influence of different ideologies, sometimes moved in 
the direction of science, sometimes away from it, and the idea of what would be a scientific 
philosophy has differed, too: 
"In this way, the ideological and scientific nature [ideohgiCnosl' ι паиСпоч!'] of philosophy have always been 
subject to a rather complicated interaction, penetrating each other, but in this the ideological aspect has all the 
same remained the leading part, the scientific aspect indestructible, though lar tiom always stable " 2 4 1 
It was only with Marx and Engels that the long process of turning philosophy into 
genuine science was completed 2 4 2 Rejecting the on-going discussion in Soviet philosophy 
between "ontologists" and "epistcmologists" [Ch 5 n| as an attempt to reduce philosophy either 
*Agudov refers to the kind of encyclopedia-entries that we have been discussing here as well 
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to a world-view 01 to a universal method, Agudov concludes that it is only in "a consistent 
surmounting of the tendencies that one sometimes encounters in scientific work towards 
isolation or even opposition of the world-view and the methodological lunction of philosophy 
that a real solution of the problem to define the subject-matter of philosophy can be found " 2 4 3 
In my view, the real problem is that Soviet philosophy, m relation to ideology and world-view, 
had to be a doc tune, ι e a system of 'truths' about the world, society, man, history, 
knowledge, and science, whereas in relation to science it had to account for the latter's 
autonomy, to legitimize eventual interventions (esp in social science), and to substantiate its 
own truth by means of science As a result, the necessarily vague declarations about the 
scientific status of Soviet philosophy went in two directions-
"Dialectical materialism is internal!) and inseparably linked with the concrcle sciences, it rests firmly on their 
achievements and provides the scientists with a unique scientific method of knowledge adequale to the laws of 
the objective world Dialectical materialism is a complete generalization of the achievements ot all natural and 
social sciences, but, .it the urne time, it is developing as a philosophical science on its own ( ) The subject 
matter ot dialectical materialism are the most general laws ot the motion and development of being and of 
thought It the general laws of the development of the world and ol knowledge and the concrete forms of their 
manifestation can be studied only on the basis of, and in close relation with the study and the generalization of 
the particular laws, then the knowledge ot the general laws in Us turn will provide a basic guide tor the study of 
the particular laws Oncedtscovered, these general laws become a powerful instrument of orientation in the 
complicated labyrinth ol the infinite multitude of variously qualified things and phenomena Every science, 
(here/ore, is based on the results of the knowledge of the general laws ot development as methodological 
principles [italics mine, EvdZl "244 
So, the claim of Soviet philosophy to be scientific meant, on the one hand, that 
philosophy provided the methodology of science,245 which, however, was rather vague Little 
is excluded by the general laws of materialist dialectics, and their explanatory power therefore 
is as small as it is universal On the other hand, it meant that philosophy is scientific because 
science is objectively true, and philosophy, as a generali7ation of scientific truth, depends on 
science for its content 2 4 6 The argument is not conclusive although a successful generalization 
of the laws, 'discovered' by (some) concrete sciences, may be helpful in other fields, would 
that entitle us to call these generalizations a science in their own right9 Indeed, it is only once 
they are discovered in their own right, not induced from concrete sciences, that sciences can 
"therefore" be based upon them as upon their methodology.247 The claim of dialectical 
materialism to be not a, but the scientific philosophy is tantamount with its claim to be true. 
But there is another side to this matter Lenin had claimed Marxist theory to be 'objec­
tively true' 
"The only conclusion from the opinion, shared by Marxists, that Marx' theory is the objective truth, is the 
following following the road of Marxian theory, we will come ever closer to obiettive truth (without ever 
exhausting it), along any other road vie can not arrive at anything but confusion and falsehood " 2 4 8 
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However grotesque this claim may appear today, it is important to note that Lenin did 
not claim Marxism to be absolutely true. Marxist-Leninist philosophy was claimed to be in 
permanent development, because material reality -nature, society, and thought- itself is 
permanently developing, and science, in its ever improving "reflection" of that reality, is 
developing, too: 
"Marxist-Leninist philosophy docs not resi on what is achieved: in union with natural science and the social 
sciences, in close connection with historical experience, and with the practice of constructing communism, it 
pushes forward to new problems and new solutions."249 
So, Marxist-Leninist philosophy is both on the absolutely right path, and yet 'only' on 
its way to objective truth. It has a universal scientific methodology as its basis, and is in 
permanent development at the same time. From a critical point of view, the permanent 
development, and the constant confirmation of Marxist-Leninist by Soviet social practice, if a 
fact, would be happy coincidence. Practical success as such is no warrant for truth. Moreover, 
there is no a priori reason why, one day, concrete science might not come up with "specific 
laws" that are not compatible with the universal laws of materialist dialectics, unless the latter 
are absolutely true. 
But that is not the point of Marxist-Leninist philosophy at all — the point is precisely its 
being dogmatic (absolute) and flexible (relative) at the same time. Theoretical weakness 
coincides with practical force at this point. What more could an authoritarian regime want but a 
system of philosophy that can interpret any result in science or politics as the result of the 
correct application of its methodology and principles, legitimizing, by the same token, the 
exclusion of alternative interpretations, and actual control and intervention by the Party? On the 
basis of the same flexible orthodoxy, almost any negative result in science or politics can be 
interpreted as the result of a violation of that methodology and of those principles. From this 
perspective, Soviet Marxism-Leninism comes close to a perfect ideological instrument, because 
it could account for any policy with regard to science and society. 
A consequence for philosophy of this 'developing truth notion' is that it points to the necessity 
of development in the field of philosophy, such of assimilation of new scientific results, and 
incorporation of social practice. This requires some discussion, which delineates a legitimate 
place for genuine philosophical thinking. Interventions by Party and State were a priori 
legitimate, but a too tight control would harm the objective requirements of Soviet society. This 
goes for the natural sciences to a large extent, and for philosophy to some extent. So, being the 
theoretical foundation of official ideology, philosophy was less liable to direct politicalization: 
there had to be room for theoretical improvement of philosophy within the boundaries of its 
subordination. 
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3 Sistemnost' an Organic Unity of Disciplines 
The thud basic element of the ideological account oí Soviet philosophy is its alleged systematic 
nature Again, there are two sides to this notion One side is that it was presented as a 
philosophical system in the traditional sense of unity of its parts, and in a less traditional sense 
of development 
' Philosophy is nol simply a sum, but a system of ideas, opinions and notions about nature, society, man, and 
his plate in the world '250 
'The philosophy ol Marxism, rejecting the idea of a once and forever concluded philosophical system, at the 
same time is a dialectical-materialist system This means, that the philosophy of Marxism is 
characterized by a fundamental unity [principiai noeedinsno] of its component theses, and, further, that it is in 
motion that it develops that it is on the road to new disco\ erics '251 
Dialectical materialism is a system, because it answers both basic questions of 
philosophy, and because it is a universal theory This leads to a question about the meaning of 
the terms "dialectical materialism", "materialist dialectics", and "dialectical logic" Are they 
synonyms, and if not, how are they related to each other9 A second question concerns the 
relation of historical materialism to diamat At both points, Soviet philosophers have been at 
pains to develop a tenable position 252 
In Soviet sources, "materialist dialectics" and "dialectical materialism" are often 
synonymous, despite the suggestion of a distinction of fundamental philosophy ["Logik"] and 
ontology [" Realphilosophie"] 
'Our philosophy is called dialectical materialism or (which is the same) materialist dialectics ' 254 
This points to a characteristic ambiguity of the term diamat It is both a fundamental 
philosophy -metaphysics cum epistemology-, formulating the " universal laws of development 
of nature, society, and thought",254 and a "philosophy of nature", ι e an application of these 
universal laws to a particular field of reality As such it is distinct from istmat, "the philosophi­
cal theory of society, a general sociological theory,"255 and from dialectical logic, "the science 
of the general laws and forms of movement of thought, the science that investigates the 
interrelation of philosophical categories [italics mine, EvdZ] " 256 τ
η
 this last 'part of the 
system', the circle is closed, because these philosophical categories, once 'discovered', make 
up the general theory of diamat Textbooks like Osnovy marksistsko-Ienmskoj filosofa 
characteristically do not contain a separate section on dialectical logic or materialist dialectics, 
but are divided into diamat and istmat, the first covering "philosophy of nature", "philosophy 
ot subiective spirit", "logic", and "epistemology", the second ' philosophy of objective spirit" 
social and political philosophy, and philosophy of history 257 
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Therefore, Soviet philosophy must be seen as dialectical materialism in the general sense of a 
prima philosophai, plus its applications to different realms of reality, thus distinguishing three 
basic paits-258 
a matenalistiialectics, being not only a method, but also "a theory of development, the 
doctrine of the most general laws of development of nature, society, and knowledge 
[poznanie],"2™ 
b dialecticalmatenahsm in the more restricted sense, viz the "generalization of the natural 
sciences,"260 the doctrine about "the fundamental qualities, the forms ol being, and the 
general laws of development of matter,"261 "matter in motion" being the substance of 
the world,262 
с histoncalmatenalism, "the science of the general and specific laws of functioning and 
development of socio-economic formations, the extension [lasprostraneme] of the 
principles of dialectical materialism to the realm of social phenomena "263 
As dumat and istmat are, in the end, applications of one and the same materialist dialectics, 
Soviet philosophy is a system, residing on a single basic conception of dialectically developing 
material substance 
But there is another side to the notion of sistemnost' philosophy as a system ot disciplines 
Soviet sources consistently treat dialectical-materialist philosophy, political economy, and 
scientific communism as three constituent parts of Marxist-Leninist ideology However, there 
is considerable confusion about the further division of philosophy into disciplines Of course, 
the basic parts are dialectical and historical materialism, or, more precisely, the three elements 
distinguished above, but that is where clarity ends The reason for this confusion is mainly 
practical- the actual establishment, in research and in instruction, of relatively separate fields of 
philosophy, went ahead of the recognition of these fields as relatively independent disciplines 
The emergence of to some extent autonomous disciplines was a threat to the unity of Soviet 
philosophy, and had therefore to be controlled, ι e legitimized and 'contained' within an 
overall "system" 
"The philosophy of Marxism Leninism is dialectical malenalism, and, appearing in unity with it, historical 
materialism Aho part of the philosophy of Marxism-I eninism are philosophical questions of natural science 
[filosofckic оргочу cstcstvomamja], psychology, ethics, aesthetics, scientific atheism [nauinyj ateizm], and 
history of philosophy [istonko-fílowtskiijd, пайка], they arc the result ot the application of dialectical 
materialism to the phenomena of moral consciousness, to the laws of dexelopmcnt of art to the development of 
natural science, to the history of the development of philosophical thought Philosophy is not only the theory 
of objective dialectics and the logic of scientific knowledge but also a general sociological, ethical, and aesthetic 
doctrine [italics mine, EvdZ] " 2 6 4 
So the "application" of dialectical materialism to different phenomena yields a number 
of separate disciplines, "also" forming part of the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism Of these, 
the discipline of "philosophical questions of natural science" is closely related to chamar, the 
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others fall under the jurisdiction of istmat. A less clear position is occupied by formal logic, 
which, in "its present stage of development: mathemuticallogic," is treated rather as part of 
mathematics,2 6 5 and by scientific atheism, "a system of philosophical and scientific views and 
convictions, denying the existence of god, of any supernatural forces or beings, denying 
religion as a whole."266 "Philosophical questions of psychology" and sociology had a difficult 
status. Psychology and neurophysiology, strongly developed in the USSR (L.S. Vygotskij, 
A.R. Lurija) clearly fall within the competence of diamat, but also, as scientific disciplines of 
their own, raise philosophical questions that are not a priori compatible with it. The same is 
true of sociology in relation to istmut, where the 'solution' was found in the definition of istmat 
as a general sociology, as distinct from specific, empirical sociology.267 Nothing would seem 
more natural than the development of "philosophical questions of psychology" and "philosophi­
cal questions of sociology" (or, to make yet another step: "philosophical questions of history") 
into distinct disciplines, but Soviet philosophy ceased to exist before they were established. 
Evidently, they were ideologically much more sensitive than "philosophical questions of 
natural science". 
In sum, Soviet philosophy displayed the following disciplinary structure: 
Ρ h ilosophy of Μα rxism -Lenin ism 
Materialist dialectics 
Thus we have two systems: the "system of basic laws and categories of materialist dialec-
tics,"268 and a system of philosophical disciplines. The first system reflects an apodictic, 
dogmatic philosophical theory, the second points to a flexible differentiation and specialization 
of philosophy. Both are important elements of Soviet ideology of philosophy. The first, the 
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"scientific-theoretical system, expressing the world-view of the working class,"269 facilitates 
and legitimizes the usurpation of the entire field of theory, including science. The second 
creates a built-in flexibility that has proved to be a conditio sine qua non for the existence of 
creative philosophical thinking in the USSR, recognizing and legitimizing the establishment of 
relatively independent disciplines, and of "declassified doctrines" within the overall framework 
of Marxist-Leninist philosophy. In the first case, system means unity, in the second it means 
differentiation 
Taken together, the two notions of "system" show that the unity of Marxist-Leninist 
philosophy, its "integral character [celostnost"]" was part of the theory that served as the 
ideology of Soviet philosophy. The existence within this ideology of both unity and differentia­
tion is a characteristic example of the combination of flexibility and dogma Unity was for 
public use, confirmed during the whole Soviet period until the 27th CPSU-congress in 
1986 27° Differentiation, by contrast, was for professional use, reflecting and legitimizing the 
actual development of philosophical work, but not contradicting unity 
Flexible Dogma the Panacea of Soviet Ideology of Philosophy 
The account of these three cornerstones leads to the conclusion that the combination of 
flexibility and dogma was an essential feature of official Soviet ideology, including the 
ideology of philosophy The notion of parti/nost'linked established political power to a unique 
and objectively true doctrine, and legitimized any extent ot actual control over philosophical 
work The notion of naucnost' warranted the a prion superiority of Soviet philosophy, thus 
legitimizing Party intervention in the field of science, while at the same time the need to 
assimilate the results of permanently developing science, and integrate them into the philosophy 
of Marxism-Leninism created a legitimate place for philosophical work The notion of sistcm-
nost' facilitated the exclusion of other positions -if there is an a prion true system of 
philosophy, there can not be any legitimate alternative-, and allowed for the development of 
relatively independent fields of philosophical work within the framework of a system of 
philosophical disciplines. 
'Orthodoxy', in the context of Soviet and ideology, means its specific adaptability to 
changing circumstances and party-directives, an adaptability which IF-director Nikolaj 
Ivanovic Lapin (b. 1931) heralded as the "capacity to continuous self-development [sposob-
nost' к postojannomu samorazwryu]."27' In fact, the need to develop Marxist-Leninist 
philosophy has been permanently stressed by the Party 
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A Marxist Leninist party can not tarry out its role if it docs not pay sufficient attention to the creative 
development oí Marxist l^cmmst theory Marxist Leninist philosophy, too is called upon to make a vital 
contribution to the comprehension of life s new phenomena 272 
Just as nature and society, arc incessantly 'developing',273 so must Marxist-Leninist 
philosophy, in order to remain the true reflection of objective reality Since its foundations are 
sound, this development is gradual it shows perhaps a dialectics of the already discovered 
eternally true general laws of development and the specific laws discovered in particular fields, 
but not an antagonistic dialectics with contradictions and leaps' At this point, the development 
of Marxist-Leninist theory in the direction of objective truth shows a remarkable parallel with 
the gradual development of socialism towards communism 
This is illustrated by De George's distinction of three levels in Soviet istmat, viz "the 
general laws of social development, the specific laws of the development of socialist 
society, [and] the laws of particular sociological, economic, or psychological levels of 
society " ΐ 7 4 To which he added 
'Philosophers in the Soviet Union today it seems may help reinterpret the world and improve the official 
doctrine on its secondary and tertiary levels Yet in the foreseeable future their efforts will probably not change 
the basic Soviet ideological framework in anv significant way 275 
This tnpartttion corresponds exactly to the functions of historical materialism The first 
level contains claims such as that "the triumph of communism is inevitable", or that "the aims 
of communism coincide with the aims of working mankind "276 These are "future-oriented 
[statements] not open to direct empirical verification or falsification, at least not at the present 
time "277 Naturally, these claims remain unchanged, as they supply the very legitimization ol 
the Soviet regime, and of present Soviet reality as a transitory stage on the road to communism 
At the second level, the laws of development of socialist society have to have some flexibility, 
because they must account for 'real socialism' collectivization or decollectivization, in­
dustrialization or stress on agriculture, world revolution or peaceful coexistence, introduction 
of elements of market economy or their abolition, etc At the third level, the empirical laws of 
social and economic development offer the greatest flexibility, and the largest place for 
"creative development like any government, the Soviet Party-State needed adequate 
knowledge about the actual state of Soviet society and economy in Older to operate effectively, 
knowledge that can be "used in constructive and specific social engineering "278 Blakclcy's 
distinction of "dogmata" (e g the "axiom" of matter in motion as the sole reality), "first-level 
meta-dogmata" (eg the authority of the Party in ideological questions [parfynosf'3], and 
'second-level meta-dogmata (the theses of 'proletarian redemption" and of communist 
destiny ) fits into this scheme, as it means a distinction of three levels within De George's first 
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level 279 The constellation as a whole points to a recognition of the importance of dogma at 
some levels, and flexibility at others 
Another example of 'orthodoxy' ш the sense of a unity of flexibility and dogma, is presented 
by the two closely related notions of determination ' in the final analysis [v konecnom säete]" of 
phenomena in the field of social consciousness, and their "relative independence [otnositel'naja 
sdmosrq/cife/'nosf]" [Ch 81 and Ch 10 η c] Together these concepts are a perfect instrument to 
account for almost any level of reduction andabsolutization on the theoretical level, any degree 
of submission or liberation on the practical level Both notions can be part of a theory of, for 
example, the history of philosophy, but they also are very apt to perform an ideological 
function, ι e to legitimize an actual state of affairs, or an intervention by the philosophical 
authorities If philosophy is determined, in the final analysis, by the general development of 
society, ι e by class struggle, then it is fundamentally partisan and subject to political decisions 
[pdrtijnost' 1-4] But if it is determined in the final analysis only, it can also be granted, on 
account of its relative independence, a life of its own, and be hailed as a motive force m the 
progressive transformation of society Likewise, philosophy can, in some cases, be reduced to 
a mere class position, as happened in the more vulgar cases ol kritikaburzudznojfìlowfìi, but 
it can also be nearly absolutized, as in the case of the sanctification of the klassiki marksizma-
¡enmizma In this manner, philosophy can be presented, depending on actual requirements, as 
either a treasury inherited from great thinkers, or merely reflecting the deepening crisis of 
modem imperialist capitalism, as either a proletarian ideological katjuSa [multiple rocket-
launcher] at the philosophical front, or the supreme creative achievement of Soviet philosophers 
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8.Ü1 Legitimization from Two Sides: the Ideology of Soviet Philosophy 
In the preceding chapter I have analyzed Soviet Marxism-Leninism as a universal medium of 
legitimacy, and in the preceding sections of the present chapter I have presented the official 
Soviet account of "ideological superstructure" and of philosophy as part of it I can now pass 
on to an analysis of the ideology of Soviet philosophy as part of Marxist Leninist ideology and 
as the self-Iegitimization of philosophy in the USSR Philosophy in the USSR was legitimate 
only it it was in some way demonstrably Marxist-Leninist or not demonstrably non-Marxist 
The establishment of, e g, formal logic or cybernetics demonstrates that development was 
possible in Soviet philosophy that was not Marxist at all, but could be fitted into the general 
framework 
Philosophical culture, as an institutional part of society always requires and entails 
some kind of ideological sclf-lcgitimization In this respect, every philosophical culture needs a 
theory that serves, irrespective oí its truth-value, and irrespective of its actually being believed 
in by piolessional philosophers, to secure its place and status Soviet ideology of philosophy 
provides a legitimization 'from below', that meets with a legitimization 'from above', the 
recognition of philosophy as a part of culture, education, and academia This situation is 
complicated, in the first place, by the fact that this ideology of philosophy was produced by the 
very philosophers whose activities are legitimized by it, and, secondly, by the fact that it 
obtained a life of its own, because it sealed "the wedding of centralized political control to a 
system of philosophy with claims to universality "28° 
In the Soviet case, ideology of philosophy 'fiom above' was far more important than 
ideology from below' The ideology of Soviet philosophy did not begin as a search for 
legitimacy by an established philosophical community, but as the insertion into a universal 
ideological framework of a nearly crushed professional group A random example of this 
ideology 'from above is an article by the "party-philosopher" lovCuk on ' Marxist-Leninist 
Philosophical Science in the USSR and its Role in Contemporary Ideological Battle "28i The 
very title stresses both the scientific status and the ideological iunction of Marxist-Leninist 
philosophy both belong to the basic dogmata of official philosophy Rejecting 'neo-Marxist" 
attempts to oppose the humanist Marx and the scientistic naturalist Engels, or to draw a line 
between Marx on the one hand, Engels and Lenin on the other, Iovcuk links the unity of 
Marxism(-Leninism) to its scientific nature 
In the linai analysis attempts to split Marxism up into different readings deprives it of its scientific status for 
there can be no competing lully valuable versions of one and the same science each of them pretending to be 
objectively true This kind of pluralism in Marxism and its philosophy inevitably leads in the theoretical 
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realm, to relativism and subjectivism, and in the political sphere to nationalist narrowmindedness, to 
isolationism and at times e\en to anti Sovietism '282 
So, the scientific status of Marxism-Leninism rules out, according to Іо бик, 
ldeologicalplurahsm 283 The conviction that objective truth is the attainable goal of science is 
the core of Lenin's materialism, and was not disputed by Soviet philosophers If Marxist-
Leninist philosophy is both scientific and ideological, the concept of ideology must allow tor a 
plurality of ideological positions, one of which is true, as it embodies scientific truth all others 
being false, because they do not This is precisely the concept of ideology developed by Soviet 
party-philosophers |Ch 71], attributed by Iovcuk to Marx and Engels 
In the works of Marxist philosophers it is demonstrated that Marx and bngels did not characterize as false and 
illusory just any ideology, but only the ideology of the ruling classes that preceded the proletariat based as they 
were on idealist distortions of truth And even in that case the Marxist critique ot ideological illusions has a 
concrete historical nature allowing to perceive that the ideology of progressive classes always contains tenets 
that are based upon knowledge ot objective reality 284 
Since the laws of the development of reality are objective and knowable, and since there 
can be only one scientific ideology, this ideology must be, at least potentially, the ideology of 
mankind as such 285 Therefore, this scientific ideology is a humanistic ideology, capable of 
grasping and resolving humanity's global problems under the slogan ' Everything in the name 
of man, for man s sake [vse vo lmja öeloveka, dlja blaga celoveka]" 286 
As we see, this differs little from the official account referred to in the beginning of this 
chapter It is especially at this level of the ideology of Soviet philosophy, that we need that 
infinite capacity for dulness and the ability to sustain one s attention in the face of repetition, 
nonsense, distortion, prosaic style, and banality after banality' that Dc George pointed to 287 
Though it displayed a variable level of sophistication, the theory about Soviet philosophy was 
very constant and ubiquitous, bordering on a ritual incantation But rituals are not insignificant 
they are time- and energy-consuming, and they effectively prevent a meta philosophical 
discussion of what philosophy is or should be The objective of this ideology from above' 
was evident it legitimized the subordination of professional philosophy to the interests of State 
and Party 
A clear example of 'ideology from below is the stress on the presence in Soviet philosophy of 
controversy and difference of opinion Faced with an official ideology of Soviet philosophy, 
and with the negative effects of that ideology on the esteem of both home and foreign 
audiences, Soviet philosophers have developed a 'counter-ideology' Whenever they could, 
they tried to act as individual thinkers Thus in 1975 Mitrochin, presenting an anthology of 
recent Soviet philosophical work to the Western audience, wrote 
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Soviet philosophy has greatly changed during the past decade New talented scholars have appeared introducing 
their individuai style, problems and ways of thinking The range of problems under discussion had considerably 
widened and the ways ol handling them have become incomparably more interesting and meaningful [italics 
mine EvdZ] ' 288 
And in the introduction, by Nelli Vasil'evna Motrosilova (b 1934), to a collection of 
texts by Soviet historians of philosophy in German translation, we read 
In diesem Buch bilden die Autoren gewissermaßen eine »unsichtbare Gemeinde« Ich kann aber versichern 
Die hier Vorgestellten begegnen einander /war weitgehend respektvoll doch fehlt es nicht an recht heiliger 
gegenseitiger Kritik Entgegen einer im Westen weitverbreiteten Vorstellung einer gleichsam totalen 
Vcieinheillichung des geistigen Lebens gibt es ganz allgemein in unserem Land und besonders in der 
Philosophie mannigldchc Schattierungen und Unterschiede [italics mine, EvdZ] "289 
An attempt to raise interest among Western philosophers9 Certainly, but also a cry for 
recognition, and an attempt to repair the negative, 'collectivism image of Soviet philosophy 
abroad (no doubt well familiar to Mitrochin, a specialist in contemporary Western philosophy, 
and Motrosilova, one of the leading historians of Western philosophy) As such, it points to a 
peculiar feature of Soviet philosophy, viz to the tension between the ideological requirement to 
piesent Soviet philosophy as "the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism", and the practical 
exigency that if you want to develop philosophy, you need professional philosophers, ι e 
people who think and express their thought, and who can only do so individually [Ch 9 m] 
The picture of (part of) the Soviet philosophical community olfered by Mitrochin and 
Motrosilova is adequate But it must be recognized that it performs an ideological function, too 
It is, regardless of its truth, and regardless of its actually being believed in, effective m 
producing a certain image of Soviet philosophers, fit to counteract the collectivist image 
produced by official ideology of Soviet philosophy and the collaborationist image created by 
emigrated Soviet intellectuals 29° 
The Communicative Vessels ot Ideology and Repression 
The subordination of Soviet philosophy to its place and function as part of Marxist-Leninist 
ideology is a classic example ol the mutually complementary role of repression and ideology, 
as described by Althusser 
'Esl il utile de mentionner que celle determination du double «fonctionnement» a la repression et a I ideologic, 
selon qu il s agit de 1 Appareil (répressif) d htat ou des Appareils idéologiques d'htal, permet de comprendre qu'il 
se lisse constamment de tres subtiles combinaisons explicites ou tacites entre le jeu de 1 Appareil (répressif) 
d Etat et le jeu des Appareils idéologiques d Etat'' 2 9 1 
This is certainly useful, because it helps to understand that the two ways in which the 
subordination of philosophy was effectuated in the USSR can not be separated it was an 
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interplay of repression and ideology. As to the first, Party control over philosophy was firmly 
established: 
"The Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party represents not only the political, but also the theoretical center 
of the country "292 
And although immediate political control over philosophy at times was loosened,29-1 the 
principle was never abandoned: 
"Appointment of officials influential in science and education -ministers of education and agriculture, presidents 
of the All-Union Academy of Sciences and of other specialized academies, rectors ot the universities, editorial 
boards of journals- all were under the control of Parly organs Approval of science textbooks for use in the 
school system and even the awarding ot scientific degrees to individual scholars were also under close political 
supervision."294 
The Party interfered directly during the period of "thaw" -Komniunist's critique of the 
behavior of Soviet philosophers on the occasion of A.J. Ayer's visit in 1961295_t during 
"stagnation" -the publication of Davydov's russophile Étika ljubvi i metafìzika svoevolija 
[Ethics of Love and Metaphysics of Self-will] in 1982 296_ and even as late as 1988, when it 
was the CK KPSS that had to give permission to publish a series of editions of classical 
Russian philosophical texts.297 
As to appointment policy, it is hard to find out which posts in Soviet philosophical 
industry were part of the nomenklatura-system.298 The standard work on Soviet nomenklatura 
by Michael Voslenskij,299 does not give a clue at this point, but we may safely presume that 
posts like that of the Dean of one of the six philosophical faculties, the Director of the IF, or the 
Director of important publishing houses like «Nauka» or «Mysl1» (not to mention «Politizdat» 
or «Progress») were among the 600,000 jobs "throughout the country, to which the party 
holds the monopoly of appointment."300 According to Gla/ov, the nomenklatura-syslcm 
included "professionals in various branches of the Soviet society, in its army, economics, 
technical and humanitarian sciences and arts,"301 but the "party secretaries or... leading 
members of the party committees in large plants, factories, universities, research institutes," 
did not belong to the nomenklatura.™2 
The CPSU was present in Soviet philosophy in other ways, too: nearly all professional 
philosophers were member of the Party,403 philosophical publications were a State-, and thus a 
Party-monopoly,-104 and philosophical work was discussed and planned by Party-committees 
at faculty- [ fakpartkom] and department-level. * "The party, Blakeley wrote, decides when 
'Like in all spheres of Soviet society, the "primary party organi¿ation" [pcrviönaja partijnaja orgam¿ác¡ja\, the 
smallest unit of the Parly's organizational structure-what were called "cells" [yjce/Aa] earlier-coincided with the 
smallest working unit [raboSij kollektiv], in this case the department of a faculty I have had the occasion to 
attend a number ol these Party-committee meetings al one ol the departments ot the philosophical faculty of 
MGU. and although they were marked by a giggly atmosphere and a general lack of seriousness, it was equally 
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meetings will be held and where, what will be discussed and for how long, and what the final 
outcome will be,"''0'5 which explains why, to quote Zapata, "philosophical works, in an 
overwhelming majority, do little but elaborate, in a pseudo-theoretical manner, the instructions 
proclaimed by the apparatus "106 At this point, however, one should not jump to simple conclu-
sions too quickly: if nearly all philosophers were CPSU-members, this also means that the 
more influential among them -people like Mitin and Konstantinov, but also Frolov, Ojzerman, 
Il'icev- were engaged in sanctioning the orders they gave to their own professional com-
munity One can not recogni/e the identity of the Party with Soviet establishment tout court 
and, at the same time, treat it as something external to society and intellectual life. 
In most areas, membership of the CPSU simply was a condition for a successful 
career: 
"The obligations of membership need not be onerous A monthly party meeting, two or three Saturdays a year 
ol volunteer work, a few evenings of canvassing at election times, attendance at the occasional lecture not a 
high price to pa> lor a party card that is always useful in one's career, and probably essential for the ambilious-
"107 
From the Party's perspective, however, philosophy was not a part of 'civil society' that 
had to be somehow ruled, but connected with the Party's very right of dominance The Party, 
far from being an association of people with a shared political conviction, or a political party in 
the Western sense of the term, simply was Soviet establishment 308 We may safely regard 
Zinov'ev's account of Party-control over academic philosophy as adequate: 
"Die sowjetische Philosophic befindet sich voll und ganz unter der Kontrolle der Partei Mehr noch — die 
Parteiorgane dirigieren über die philosophische Elite die gesamte Masse der übrigen Philosophen, und die ganze 
Masse der Philosophen ist wiederum ein wirkungsvolles Instrument der Partei in der ideologischen Fr/ichung der 
Gesellschaft und in der ideologischen Kontrolle über diese Die überwiegende Mehrheit der sowjetischen 
Philosophen sind Mitglieder der Partei und aktive Parteifunktionare " ^ 
But to be a Party member did not forcibly mean to be a Communist. It merely meant to 
be a loyal Soviet citizen, and it meant access to privileges and possibilities. It is instructive to 
listen to Mamardasvih. 
"I was a Party-member, loo That was not relevant either I was a philosopher, I did not have to administrate 
anything and hence could not steal Since the end of the 1960s I no longer was allowed to travel I became an 
untouchable and landed m cxtra-temlonalily I was deprived of privileges, not allowed to travel abroad, nor could 
I come by caviar, as that also was distributed by the central committee " 3 l l ) 
The Party was a controlling, repressive State organ, and the State was a repressive 
Party organ, supplemented by a legitimizing ideology, that presented itself as a motivating 
clear that they were part of a system by which the Party knew exactly what was going on, and could, eventually, 
intervene 
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ideology The mutual supplementation of ideological and repressive control is manifest in the 
following statements from VF and FE * 
"Guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism and by the directions ot the party, our journal seeks the 
continuous search for new problems and questions, formed in the rapid process of the development of our 
society, and gaming crucial importance at the present stage of our progress in communist society [italics mine, 
EvdZ] '311 
' Die richtungweisende und führende Rolle in der Entwicklung der philosophischen Wissenschaft in de UdSSR in 
allen Etappen ihrer Geschichte verwirklicht die KPdSU und ihr ZK '3 ' 2 
The principle of Party authority in philosophical affairs was, as fai as I know, never 
overtly challenged, but it is evident that total repression ot philosophy would have meant the 
end of philosophical culture altogether, as was demonstrated by the "dead period" in Soviet 
philosophy After this period, direct repression has played a minor role in Soviet philosophy, 
though more subtle forms of repression (censorship, publication policy, presence of KGB-
informants in all major institutions**) continued to play their part Apparently, it was more 
effective to control philosophy by means of a theory about philosophy that presented it as an 
integral part of official ideology, and that was (re)produced by the philosophers themselves 
It is evident, that this ideology of philosophy might, but need not, or might only 
partially give an adequate image of Soviet philosophy A good example is the 'collectivism' of 
Soviet philosophy In Soviet sources, Soviet philosophy appears as the creative collective 
developmentofMarxism-Lemnism 
'In the contemporary period Marxism Leninism is being creatively developed by the collective forces of the 
CPSU and other communist and labor parties "313 
'In the contemporary period the development ot Marxism Leninism is realized by the collective theoretical 
activity of the fraternal communist parties "314 
"The problems of Marxist Leninist philosophy were developed in the documents of the CPSU-congresses and of 
plena of the Central Committee of the CPSU, as well as of fraternal communist and labor parties, and in the 
works of Marxist philosophers '315 
And this image was reflected in Western comments on Soviet philosophy 
"So fai as philosophy as such is concerned, however, in the Soviet Union it is, like other activities, a collective 
effort and to that extent anonymous '316 
"So\iet thought is being developed by some 3,000 active philosophers in the U S S R and by perhaps as 
many others in the Communist World ' 3 ' 7 
This collectivist image correctly reflects the command-structure of Soviet philosophical 
industry, but at the same time it eclipses the attempts of more daring Soviet philosophers to do 
'For abbreviations, see List of Abbreviations ' 
**For example, the long-time chairman of the department of history of philosophy at MGU, Ju К Mel'vil', 
reportedly was a major of the KGB If he was, he certainly was known to be precaution is better than repression 
even trom the KGB perspective, and in this respect the presence of KGB officers at philosophical departments, 
however absurd it may seem to be in our perception, served as protection, too 
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the exact opposite of "collectively developing", and it ideologically legitimizes the suppression 
of these attempts, and their condemnation as "otsebjatma [literally: something of one's own 
devising]" 
Inward and Outward Efficacy of Soviet Ideology of Philosophy 
The official image of Soviet philosophy was effective both inwardly and outwardly Inwardly, 
the fact that the extensive, compulsory and unified philosophical instruction, vuzovskaja 
filosofila, was limited to the official version of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, has successfully 
convinced generations of Soviet intellectuals of both the theoreticalmelevance and the practical 
mescjpability of Soviet philosophy. Secondly, the existence of an official version of dialectical 
and historical materialism as a philosophical system, and as the theoretical foundation of 
Marxist-Leninist ideology excluded and prevented the emergence of explicitly non-dialectical, 
non-materialist, or non- Marxist(-Leninist) position. Thirdly, the ideology of Soviet 
philosophy, through its notions of parti/nost', naucnosf', and sistemnost', endowed the Party 
with a single, true, and flexible system of scientific and partisan philosophy, which entitled the 
Party to be the legitimate final authority in philosophical questions, but also enabled it to 
account tor any desired extent of actual control over science and philosophy, including absence 
of control or the emergence of "declassified doctrines" and relatively independent fields of 
philosophy. In this respect, the ideology of Soviet philosophy was both the limit and the 
possibility of philosophy in the USSR, and thus a main determining factor of Soviet 
philosophical culture 
Outwardly, the way Soviet philosophers acted on the international scene, viz as 
representatives of a single unified philosophy, and the policy of Soviet publishing houses 
oriented towards the international market (e g , «Progress»), have succeeded in establishing 
this ideological image of Soviet philosophy. The fact that those few Western scholars who did 
seriously study Soviet philosophy did so at a time when it was largely justified to identify 
Soviet philosophy with its official version, because there was little space for professional 
philosophers to do anything but repeat it, has profoundly influenced the image of Soviet 
philosophy abroad. The initial and most widespread publications by Wetter and Bocheiiski 
appeared between 1945 and 1960, and could therefore hardly incorporate the revival of Soviet 
philosophy after 1955/6 3i8 As Rybarczyk remarked in 1975 about Western interest in the 
development of Soviet philosophy. 
"Hier herrschen im allgemeinen Vorstellungen aus der Zeit der ersten Ausgaben des "Diamat" von Bochcnski und 
Wetter vor Nur wenige Spezialisten haben die Entwicklung der sowjetischen Philosophie weiterverfolgl "319 
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The mechanisms at work here are easy to exemplify For instance, Wetter's intention to 
serve "all those who feel themselves provoked to take a personal stance in the present 
confrontation between East and West" with an analysis of the "spiritual world and way of 
thinking of their discussion partner, '120 is precisely to treat official Soviet Marxist-Leninist 
philosophy the way it was meant to be treated, viz as a firmly believed world-view But even 
if it also was a widely believed world-view, it was an ideology of philosophy in the first place 
It can not be overstressed that statements like "the fundamental interests of the working class 
are expressed by the collectivist and internationalist communist world-view — Marxism-
Leninism," or "all over the world the number of adherents to Marxism-Leninism is quickly 
growing," and "its [of Marxism-Leninism, EvdZ] philosophical foundation is dialectical and 
historical nutendlism," come from the same source (of 1984),121 and belong to the same 
category of 'ideological moves' Their effectiveness does not necessarily depend upon their 
being true or false, nor upon their being 'sincerely believed' We have no reason to believe the 
one more than the other However, while the first would be generally doubted, and the second 
could only be laughed at, the thud became part of the received view on Soviet philosophy in 
the West 
Hardly anybody in the West, even among those sympathetic to communism, has ever 
believed Marxist-Leninist ideology 'at its word' it was generally recognized at least since 
"thaw ' that its main function was the legitimization of Soviet status quo and actual policy In 
the 1970s and 1980s ever fewer people would actually believe that Marxism-Leninism was 
permanently confirmed by Soviet social practice even by its own standards However, Soviet 
ideology was generally taken for granted when it came to philosophy The general opinion 
among Western philosophers was (and is) that Soviet philosophers were "ideologists", people 
who subordinated their theoretical work to the standards of their Marxist-Leninist world-view 
Part of an explanation can be found in the fact that the Soviet philosophers themselves were the 
producers of official ideology, and were identified with that part of their job But it is hard to 
believe, e g , that the 768 Soviet philosophers who contributed to the FE failed to notice the 
tangible contrast between the professional' entries about past philosophers or more technical 
and conceptual subjects, and the quasi-descriptive 'ideological' entries on various aspects of 
Soviet philosophy 322 
Further, the historical circumstance that the most widespread works on Soviet 
philosophy were written in the period when "philosophy in the USSR" was almost identical 
with "official Soviet philosophy", has determined the climate in which later work on Soviet 
philosophy was received, forcing a specialist like James Scanlan to claim in defense of his 
work "that the intellectual culture of the USSR is somewhat richer and more vital today than is 
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often supposed and that, behind its facade of dogmatic unanimity, Soviet Marxism-Leninism is 
marked by fundamental searching and dispute "i2i In fact, the persistently negative image of 
Soviet philosophy was not so much due to Western prejudice as to this "facade" put up by 
Soviet philosophy, which is precisely the ideology of Soviet philosophy 
Scanlan himself departed, in each chapter of his work, from the official position, and 
then went on to show the dispute behind it, the attempts by Soviet philosophers to escape from 
it, or give it another turn Although this yields a sometimes impressive panorama of diverging 
positions, it also gives too much credit to the official positions as philosophical positions As to 
their theoretical content, they weie of course philosophical positions, but their function was 
different they did not serve as the theoretical starting-point of philosophical work, nor as the 
sub|ective conviction of philosophers, but were an ideologically legitimized politicülfdct in the 
field of possible philosophical thought In this respect, the official position in any branch of 
Soviet philosophy was closely linked to the ideology of Soviet philosophy The best way to 
understand them is as a compromise between the ideological function of philosophy as a 
whole, and the actual development of philosophical theory in that particular area 
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Conclusion 
So, the self-created image or "facade" of Soviet philosophy can be aptly described as the 
ideology of Soviet philosophy, ι e as a set of definitions and statements about Soviet 
philosophy that elevated the ideological function of Soviet philosophy to the status of its mam 
function, and that organized the activities and production of Soviet philosophers Mediating 
between official ideology and actual philosophical practice, this ideology worked in several 
ways it inserted Soviet philosophy as a whole into the broader ideological framework of 
Marxism-Leninism, it determined the place and role of philosophical research, it taught Soviet 
philosophers how to present their work, it established a number oí theoretical principles (such 
as those of "partisanship" or "histonsm '), it yielded central topics (construction of socialist 
society, creation of a "new man ', ideological class struggle, scientific-technological revolution 
[NTR]. global problems of mankind [Ch 6 n]), and, most importantly, it set practical limits, 
sanctioning whatever was done m accordance with those principles and within those limits 
Soviet philosophical culture was covered by a single official ideology, and in this respect we 
can agree with Kamenka that "the politicahzation of philosophy by communist and 
governments parties can not be overstressed "324 
However, it is important to understand this politicahzation of philosophy properly It 
was absolute, but also ideological The actual control over philosophy [partynost'4] and its 
legitimate subordination to political objectives [partijnost 3] were a fact of Soviet philosophy, 
but it was part of the ideology oí Soviet philosophy that what philosophers were actually doing 
(or trying to do) matched this situation, that they were convinced and militant Marxist-Leninist 
philosophers [partijnost 2] In this sense, the politicahzation can be misunderstood, and serve 
as a pretext not to consider the work of Soviet philosophers at all,125 not only then, but also 
today Those Soviet philosophers who tried to do something philosophically interesting, were 
in a very difficult position What all Soviet philosophers were convinced of was the 
inevitability of official, textbook-philosophy This recognition belonged to the nature of Soviet 
philosophy, reflected by the fact that to the extent to which philosophers did not recognize and 
accept an official position as authoritative and decisive, they ipso facto became anti-Soviet 
philosophers 
I think that nobody with average intellectual capacities, or with some understanding of 
philosophy, can not fail to see that the point of the official Soviet philosophical doctrine was 
not a philosophical point If this is true, then this also means that the numerous 'deviations' 
from the official line, noted by Western scholars from Bochenski to Scanlan, were not 
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emancipations from previously held belief, but attempts to escape from ideologically 
legitimized political, institutional oppression. This is true as much of Mamardasvili in the 
1980s as it was of Il'enkov in the 1960s and 1970s, of Kedrov in the 1940s and 1950s, or of 
Deborin around 1930. At the same time, it does not mean that such a situation did not leave its 
traces in the minds of philosophers, and even determined their attempts to escape. In the next 
chapter, I shall discuss the extent to which, and the ways in which such attempts could be 
successful, i.e. the possibility and the limitations of philosophical thought given the conditions 
of Soviet philosophy. 
*** 
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CHAPTER NINE 
The Reality of Philosophy in the USSR 
"In practice people will invest whatever words the> have with the meaning 
they find necessary in order to make sense of their experience " ^ 2 6 
J Ρ Scanlan, 1985 
" si on a pris la decision de philosopher, il faul aller jusq JU bout On ne 
peut pas prévoir toutes les conséquences qui en résulteront dans le 
développement du contenu de la pensee Problèmes et réponses vont 
inéluctablement s enchaîner "327 
В Jeu, 1969 
The present part as a whole seeks to understand the "Soviet philosophical phenomenon", 
which concretely means an attempt to develop a conception of its nature, in which the historical 
facts of the Soviet episode in Russian philosophy can find a place and interpretation In order 
to obtain such an adequate conception, one must look, in the first place, at Soviet philosophical 
culture as a whole, and not only at the products of that culture (texts and theories) Secondly, 
the key to understanding Soviet philosophy lies in the subordination of philosophy to 
'ideology', ι e its place within the "ideological superstructure" of the Soviet "system" 
Chapter 7 has shown that ' ideology" obtains a special meaning in the Soviet case 
Soviet Marxism-Leninism was a self-professed ideology, which contradicted a basic notion 
taken from Althusser, viz that ideology of necessity conceals its ideological nature The 
solution to this contradiction was found in the thesis that Soviet ideology concealed its 
ideological nature in declaring itself ideological It was ideology, but not the ideology it said it 
was official Marxism-Leninism (was) claimed to be a motivating and "guiding" world-view, 
and a theoretical foundation ot political practice, whereas in fact it was a universal medium of 
legitimacy Being a universal medium of legitimacy, it had to entail a 'meta ideology', a theory 
about Soviet Marxism-Leninism, the function whereof was precisely to legitimize Soviet 
ideology A key notion in this respect has been the notion of flexible orthodoxy 
In the preceding chapter, I have analyzed Soviet 'ideology of philosophy' Official 
Marxism-Leninism being a universal medium of legitimacy, and philosophy being an important 
element of the Soviet "system", the latter had to be legitimized in terms of the former This 
ideology of Soviet philosophy mediated between Marxism-Leninism and actually existing 
philosophical culture 
The present chapter attempts to analyze that actually existing philosophical culture In the first 
place, it is imperative to obtain a clear view of the actual as opposed to the alleged functions of 
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philosophy in the USSR, because it is only against that background that we can understand the 
dynamic of Soviet philosophical culture [9 1) There were two sides to that culture, development 
and ¡imitation * The first side appears as the inner logic of development of philosophical 
theory, dialectical materialism displaying its inner, centrifugal forces and as the urge of 
philosophers to formulate their thought, the second side appears as the colonization of basic 
philosophical issues through an apodictic system of diamat and fitmat, freezing the inner logic 
ol development that might otherwise "blow up" the initial position, as the marginalization and 
eventually exclusion from legitimacy of free philosophical thought that did not off-hand accept 
these limits [9 м] The simultaneous presence of both development and limitations point to the 
basic tension of Soviet philosophical culture, and the question about the reality of philosophy 
in the USSR thus is the question about the solution of the tension between, on the one hand, 
the urge of philosophers to develop and express their thought, and, on the other hand, the need 
to sophisticate and develop Soviet philosophy, a solution partially found in a profes-
sionali/ation of Soviet philosophy into relatively independent disciplines [9 m] Any attempt to 
understand the Soviet philosophical phenomenon must take into account both sides -develop­
ment and limitation- and must not be led astray by the official, ideological image of Soviet 
philosophy, nor disregard it It must be stressed, finally, that both the situation and the 
ideology of Soviet philosophy were permanent factors their conung-into-being and disap­
pearance mark the beginning and the end of Soviet philosophy as such, and determine its 
reality 
Several authors on Soviet philosophy have set out to answer the question whether philosophy 
really existed in the USSR to begin with. Goerdt's answer was conditional: 
"Wenn man mit N Berdjdjcw Philosophie unti "philosophische Diskussion " als "freies Suchen nach 
Wahl heil', als Zusammcnprall verschiedener Slandpunkle im Dialog " versteht oder mit G A Welter als 
"vorurleilsloscs Suchen nach der Wahrheit", so ist in diesem Sinne "Sowjelphilosophie" nicht "Philosophie", da 
sie nicht Irci nach Wahrheit sucht, sondern als von wahr gesetzten und vorausgesetzten Thesen ausgehl "328 
When Beinard Jeu tried to answer the same question,129 he discerned three aspects: 
"the possibility, necessity, and the will to think the world and oneself"330 These three aspects 
shall return in the present chapter as the conditions of, the need, and the urge for philosophy. 
It is important to repeat that "philosophy" only exists concretely as some philosophers' 
thought, as a specific theory or as a particular text, and, more generally, as a specific 
philosophical culture. From this perspective, it is misleading to substantialize Soviet 
philosophy, and state, like Wetter, that "it is not freely seeking truth". Who is this "it"7 In fact, 
*A further hypothesis would be that any philosophical culture entails these two bides, but in different ways and 
degrees 
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to speak m this way is to be misled by the ideology of Soviet philosophy, which presented 
Soviet philosophy as the intellectual activity of a collectively thinking subject The collective, 
official Soviet philosophy was a theory with an alleged subject only René Zapata was more 
than right when he warned that " one must first of all get rid off certain stereotypes which, 
despite their «critical» appearance, in fact only reproduce the image that Stalinism wanted to 
give of itself "33 ' And the same point was rightly stressed by Scanlan in his call to look for the 
attempts of people, ι e thinking individuals, living in a concrete situation, to "invest whatever 
words they have with the meaning they find necessary in order to make sense of their 
experience " 3 3 2 
9.i Tbe Actual Functions of Soviet Philosophy 
If we do not 'believe' the ideology of Soviet philosophy with regard to the partisan, scientific, 
and systematic nature of Soviet Marxist-Leninist philosophy, we do not have any more reason 
to believe its account of the functions of Soviet philosophy [Ch 8 ι] If the alleged ideological 
function of Soviet philosophy, that of being the theoretical foundation of Marxist-Leninist 
ideology, is part of the ideology of Soviet philosophy, what then were the actual functions 
performed by Soviet philosophy9 In order to answer this question, we must, first of all, see 
what Soviet philosophers were doing Some 80% of the estimated 25,000 professional 
philosophers in the 1980s were engaged in vuzovskaja filosofia, the teaching of official 
philosophy, preparing students of all specializations for the obligatory examinations in diamat, 
istinat, scientific communism, political economy, and history of the CPSU the "philosophical 
disciplines', or ' skucnyjpredmet [the boring subject]" as they were popularly called There is 
every reason to suppose that some -perhaps 20%, according to Dobrochotov133- of these 
20,000 highschool teachers of philosophy also tried to give their students an idea of what 
philosophy could be like, but the fact remains that the exams in the "philosophical disciplines" 
had to be passed, and that students had to learn what they were expected to answer The job of 
the remaining 5,000 philosophers consisted in the preparation of future philosophers at the 
philosophical faculties [umversitetskajafilosofija], and in research at the institutes of AN 
SSSR, mainly at the IF [akademiceskaja filoso fija] 
Applying our account of possible functions of philosophy [Ch 1 in], the following actual 
functions of Soviet philosophy can be distinguished 
1 the creation, adaptation, and repetition of a theory about Marxism-Leninism and its 
philosophy, legitimizing its position and role in Soviet society, ι e a legitimizing 
ideological function [F7], 
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2. the transmission of official philosophy to generations of future Soviet intellectuals of all 
specializations, i.e. a doctrinal function [F4]; 
3. the technical function of improving official philosophy [F5]; 
4. the development of parts of the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, i.e. the elaboration 
of theories in specialist disciplines like aesthetics, philosophical questions of natural 
science, or history of philosophy [istoriko-filosofskaja nauka: TFN (Part IV)], i.e. an 
epistemic function [Fl]; 
5. the assimilation of the valuable content of past and present non-Soviet philosophy 
through IFN and "critique of bourgeois philosophy" [kritika burzuaznoj filosofíi: 
KBF\, which, again, points to an epistemic, along with an ideological function [Fl, 
F7]. 
Together this yields the following picture of actual functions performed by Soviet philosophy: 
Actual Functions of Soviet Philosophy 
intellectual life (science &c), 
including philosophical culture 
Weltanschauung, 
education 
Technical function [F5] 
Ideological function [F7] — ^ D o c t r i n a l function [F4] 
Epistemic function [Fl] 
<" 
; 
Ideological function [F7] 
[Fl] 
4 
bourgeois 
ideology and 
revisionist 
Marxism 
private life society / politics 
What is the possibility, given these actual functions, of 'genuine philosophy'? The ideological 
function [1 and 5] was dependent on the Soviet conditions of philosophy, and productive only 
as a reconfirmation of those conditions. To the extent to which one sees these conditions as 
negative, not favorable for philosophy, this function can be regarded as negative. And even if 
we grant that at this level actual philosophical practices were legitimized, and in that sense 
regard it as a positive function, it is clear that this would not have been necessary if there had 
not been "Soviet conditions". With respect to the doctrinal function [ 2], the possibility of 
philosophical thought was very limited: the most one might expect is that a local teacher of 
philosophy could inspire some student to become a philosopher himself. It is therefore at the 
level of the technical function [3] of Soviet philosophy that philosophy itself begins. Here, at 
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least formally coherent, logically consistent thought is required. The same is true of the 
epistemic function [4], but to a much greater extent. Exploring fields that had not been 
elaborated by official philosophical doctrine or the klassiki marksizma-leninizma, Soviet 
philosophers could "attempt at an understanding of reality by rational means". Likewise, in 
IFN and in KBF [5] philosophers at least had to understand and to interpret the philosophy 
they were studying, even if they were supposed to produce a Marxist-Leninist "critique" of it. 
6. Looking at Soviet philosophical culture as a whole, we can discern a further function -a 
function of any philosophical industry-, viz. the reproduction of Soviet philosophical culture 
itself, including the production of new generations of Soviet philosophers, fit to perform their 
tasks in vuzovskaja, universitetskaja, and akademiceskaja fìlosofìja . The other functions of 
philosophy here merge into the formation of new generations of Soviet philosophers. Here, 
qualitative development was possible, and new generations of philosophers obtained a sound 
philosophical training as soon as this was possible [Ch.lO.iii.e]. 
In direct connection with these functions, professional philosophers and philosophical publica-
tions can roughly be divided into six categories: 
1. party-philosophers; 
2. teachers of philosophy at VUZy, 
3. diamatöiki and istmatciki; 
4. specialists; 
5. historians of philosophy and ":critics of bourgeois philosophy"; 
6. teachers at philosophical faculties and institutions with an aspirantura in philosophy. 
As to texts: 
1. the "meta-texts" about Soviet philosophy;334 
2. the uSebniki; 
3. texts in materialist dialectics, diamat, and istmat; 
4. texts in aesthetics, ethics, fìlosofskie voprosy estestvoznanija etc.; 
5. texts in IFN and KBF; 
6. uöebnye posobija, e.g. courses in the history of philosophy, mediating between 
categories 1 and 2 on the one hand, 3 - 5 on the other. 
And a 7th category was formed by translations of foreign philosophical texts, editions of the 
klassiki marksizma-leninizma, and editions of non-Soviet Russian philosophers. 
Absent in this picture is the possible existential function of philosophy [F9]: it was essentially 
limited by the fact that official philosophy was identical with an obligatory world-view. The 
mirovozzrenceskaja funkcija of Soviet philosophy [Ch.S.i] made those people who did seek 
elements of a personal world-view look for it elsewhere. 
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The most striking feature of this picture, as opposed to that of the alleged functions of 
Soviet philosophy, is that philosophy had lost its cnticalandself-cntical function [F2] As we 
have seen, this function was 'converted' into "critique" of non-Soviet thought, and regular 
exercises in kntika ι samokntika [Ch 8 i] This left little room for a 'normal' critical and self-
cnticdl function, which perhaps is the greatest harm done to philosophy in the Soviet period. In 
spite of their labels, the alleged critical functions of Soviet philosophy performed different 
functions The aim of KBF was twofold In the first place, it served to create a radical 
dichotomy (contained in the very word "bourgeois") between right and wrong in philosophy 
This can be regarded as part of the ideological function of Soviet philosophy, too, inasmuch as 
the construction of a theoretical dichotomy matched and legitimized a practical dichotomy the 
actual isolation of Soviet philosophy from non-Soviet thought Secondly, this kntika 
performed an epistemic function, legitimized by the notion of the "rational grain [гасюпаГпое 
7emd\" contained in even the most reactionary philosophical theory It was through KBF that 
contemporary non-Soviet philosophy could be assimilated by Soviet philosophical culture 
Paradoxically, this assimilation was largely uncritical since "critique" often simply meant the 
mechanic application of Marxist-Leninist dogma plus ideologically motivated mgatel'stvo 
[abuse], there was little legitimate room for a serious, philosophical critique * As to the self-
critical function, it was ritualized in the form of kntikaisamokntika, and here, too, really self-
critical thought was rendered difficult and marginal 
There is a striking parallel here with the presentation of Western political and social reality in the So\iet 
media a reader ot the Pravda could either swallow the critique ot contemporary capitalism and bourgeois 
society or strip it and retain very little objective information, giving rise to all sorts of idealizations 
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9.Ü Of Limits. Margins, and Transgressions: the Legitimate Space of 
Philosophy in the USSR 
The predominance of a politically backed, dogmatic philosophical system, and the existence of 
an ideological legitimization of Soviet philosophy, containing an official conception of 
philosophy as partisan, scientific, and systematic, and as the theoretical, founding part of a 
Marxist-Leninist ideology, were facts of Soviet philosophical culture, setting the limits of 
legitimate existence of philosophy in the USSR In order to account for the possibility of 
philosophy, a closer look at these limitations is required 
The Limitations of Soviet Philosophy 
In order to perform the main, ideological and doctrinal functions ot Soviet philosophy a stable 
doctrine was needed The "system" of diamat and istmat with its in-built ' flexible orthodoxy" 
was fit to perform these functions, being presented, through the ideology of Soviet 
philosophy, as a true, superior, and developing, partisan, and scientific system of philosophy 
Diamat and ïstrnat, answering all fundamental questions in philosophy, and thus usurping the 
field traditionally covered by metaphysics, epistemology, and ontology, effectively prevented 
the development of fundamental philosophy Central philosophical issues were colomzedby 
official diamat and istmat, which precluded the self-foundational function of philosophy 
Consequently, philosophical thought m the USSR had to avoid these fundamental questions 
This becomes particularly clear if we compare the Soviet system ol philosophy to that 
of the philosopher it is most of all indebted to Hegel His Wissenschaft der Logik is a system 
of philosophical categories, a logic and a metaphysics at the same time So is materialist 
dialectics, but with an important ditference while the Logik is an attempt to develop the logic 
proper to thinking, the structure of the Idea itself, and in that sense a system sui generis, m 
diamat it is an objective logic of reality, merely 'reflected' in the subjective logic of individuals 
that have knowledge of reality As a result, where Hegel's claim that Nature is the logical 
consequence of the Idea, and that Spirit develops out of Nature, leads to a speculative system 
of philosophical sciences, diamat, by contrast, departing from "the recognition of matter as the 
substance [edmstvennaja osnova] of reality,"31'' becomes a positive theory about reality It is 
not, as in Hegel s case, the Idea which, as a result of a long process, comes to recognize itself 
as developing substance, but a theory about objective reality, developed by one part of that 
material reality its logic then can never be anything but an abstraction from a given theory 
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Consequently, logic, philosophy of nature, and philosophy of spirit become part of one general 
theory about objective reality as a whole It is clear that diamat contained a strong tendency to 
become an absolute system again, as becomes clear from the following passage, taken from the 
main Soviet ucebmk( 1982) 
The sum of the historical development of science and socio historical practice has been the proof of the 
materiality of the world its uncreatcdncss and indestructibility the eternity of ils existence in time and its 
infinity in spate, its inextinguishable self development which inevitably leads at a certain stage, to the 
emergence of life and ot thinking beings Through them matter becomes Lapable of knowing the laws of iti 
very own existence and development [italics mine, EvdZ] 346 
This looks very much like a Hegelian being-with-itself [Bei-sich-sein] ' of material 
substance We seem to be only one step away from regarding the system of dialectical 
materialism as the self knowledge of reality [Ch 12 ш] To be sure, many Soviet philosophers 
opposed such an ontologization and absolutization of diamat, and it may be doubted whether 
the above quotation reflects any Soviet philosopher's thinking at all The question therefore 
must not be whether all or most Soviet philosophers adhered to this position, but which were 
the effects ol the predominance of this official position 
One of the better-known statements from the Soviet period m Russian philosophy is Losev's 
qualification of dialectical materialism as a 'crying absurdity [vopijuscaja nelepost'] "337 This 
statement in Dialektikdmifa [Dialectic of Myth] (published privately after his arrest in 1930,338 
and apparently one of the last independent philosophical publications 339) marks the end of 
simultaneously independent and public philosophy in the USSR The crying absurdity" was 
elevated to the status of an olficial doctrine, and has kept this special status until the late 
1980s 340 Losev not only said that diamat was an absurdity, he also gave arguments "matter" 
is a concept (we do not see or experience matter, but material things, and even "thing" is a 
concept already),34i and in a dialectical philosophy that claims to be founded in itself, ι e in 
thought, every concept is connected with other concept (only the concept itself is general, and 
in that sense absolute) 342 
Dialectical materialism is of course a possible, though problematic philosophical 
position A materialist philosophy that seeks its foundation within itself, ι e in thought, 
contains a tension between a materialist theory and the conceptual foundation of that theory If 
the definition of matter as the substance of reality is to be a conceptual definition, this inevitably 
leads to idealism Materialism as a philosophical position has to be founded in something other 
than thought itself, e g in sensory experience, or in science in its actual stage Therefore, 
Marxist philosophy in the USSR could not but split, according to its inner logic, in the two 
opposed directions in the 1920s [Ch 41] 
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There is nothing wrong with holding a problematic philosophical position -there are no 
non-problematic philosophical positions-, but it will, if objective conditions allow, inevitably 
be exposed to criticism, and other positions, departing from it, will be developed What 
happened in 1929/30 was, from this perspective, not the sanctification of an absurdity, but the 
neutralization of the inner logic of development of philosophy the split of diamat was 
effectively prevented As several authors have shown, the same conflict reappeared on several 
occasions,343 and was suppressed every time, because it threatened the unity of Soviet 
philosophy This way, philosophy was deprived of its own history, because it was robbed of 
its inner truth-criteria, which would inevitably have led to its further development along lines of 
its inner logic 3 4 4 
One American specialist in Soviet diamat, Loren Graham, had it that "if dialectical materialism 
were allowed to develop freely in the USSR, it would no doubt evolve in a direction consistent 
with the common assumptions of a broad nonmechamstic, nonreductiomst materialism " 3 4 5 
However, diamat was not allowed to develop freely in the USSR, and the controversy over the 
status of dialectical materialism that took the form of the discussion between "mechanists" and 
"dialecticians" in the 1920s reemerged in Soviet philosophy whenever free discussion was 
granted some room Every time it was 'resolved' before it could lead to a differentiation of 
Soviet philosophy [Ch 5 n] As Scanlan diagnosed this situation 
The dispute belween the original mechanists and the Debonnisl dialecticians in the 1920s was resolved by the 
imposition of a philosophically impoverished orthodoxy It remains to be seen what will become ot the current 
disagreement between neomechamcists such as Sviderskn and nco Deborinists such as II enkov who represent 
the чате centrifugal tendencies of a philosophy seeking to be both materialist and dialectical [italics mine, 
EvdZl 146 
Soviet philosophy did not exist long enough to provide an answer to this question, but 
as long as Soviet philosophy would have been Soviet, this controversy would have reemerged 
again and again, as it belonged to the nature of Soviet philosophy to block the logic of develop­
ment with regard to fundamental philosophical issues in order to preserve the unity of the 
philosophy of Marxism-Leninism Diamat could not be substantially revised, and any 
philosophical position that stands unchallenged because it is not confronted with radical 
alternatives becomes mortified dogma 
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An Iceberg Without Tips 
The colonization of fundamental philosophical questions by diahistomat is a main reason why 
no ' great philosophers' emerged in Soviet philosophical culture 347 if we look at three 
candidates Losev, Il'enkov, and Mamardasvili, we find that they could not fully develop their 
philosophical position as such, and become the great philosophers they potentially were Of 
course, they enjoyed great reputations among their colleagues and many people were 
influenced by them, but they could not freely publish, teach, or travel, and thus fully realize 
their potential Losev could only work legitimately within the institutional world of Soviet 
academia, because his activity was limited to history of philosophy Il'enkov presented a 
problem to the Soviet system because he tried to develop diamat and istmat, ι e because he 
focused on fundamental philosophical questions such as the emergence of thought from 
being ^ Mamardasvili could only continue to work within Soviet philosophy because he 
accepted his marginahzation to oral philosophizing 1 4 9 
Of course, the fact that there emerged no great philosophers from Soviet philosophy 
leads to an overall disqualification of Soviet philosophy only it we focus -as we spontaneously 
do- on great philosophers This, however, is unhistoncal and unrealistic, because it interprets 
negatively the concrete nature of philosophy, the fact that it has to be done by individuals 
[Ch I n| The "great philosophers" would not and could not have been there, if there were not a 
lot of discussion and preparation by ' minor philosophers ', historians of philosophy, and 
writers of textbooks This is true of the history of philosophy in general, and it is true of Soviet 
philosophy, but the difference is that the situation in which philosophy existed in the USSR 
was such as to preclude the emergence of great philosophers Comparing the history of 
philosophy with a group of icebergs floating in an arctic sea, the tips of the icebergs are the 
great philosophers, but they would not be tips it there were not a lot going on beneath the 
surface Soviet philosophy in this comparison resembles an iceberg without a tip there was a 
lot going on below the surface, but the tips could not emerge 
The fact that "institutional' Marxism-Leninism excluded the legitimacy of ' intellectual Marx­
ism means that the closer Soviet philosophers got to the core of Marxism(-Leninism), the 
more they had to take into account the actual official version This explains the enigmatic 
phenomenon that attempts to renew Marxism itself (for instance by II enkov or LifSic) were 
suppressed, whereas Losev could almost continuously work (and publish since 1953), and 
teach [Ch 10 и c] The explanation is that Losev limited himself to the history of classical Greek 
philosophy 35° Therefore, his actual work bore little relation to Marxism except for regular 
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reference to the socio-economic formation -"slave-holding society '- Greek thought existed 
in351 Losev obediently acted as a Marxist from time to time, 352 and simply was declared a 
Marxist-Leninist in official sources 353 By contrast, Il'enkov, who was a convinced Marxist, 
set out to apply historical materialism, as conceived by Marx, to Soviet reality This 
"reasonable and well-informed Marxist"354 caused a scandal in 1965 with his "Marks ι 
zapadnyj mir [Marx and the Western World]", an article that was meant for a symposium at 
Notre Dame University Il'enkov was not allowed to go,355 and his text was published in 
English in 1967,356 but could not appear in the USSR until 1988, due to its 'anti-Marxist 
nature ' 357 One reason was the content of Il'enkov s text,358 but the style may have been an 
important ground, too 
' II enkov writes not as d Soviet delegale presenting an officiai line, but as an autonomous scholar addressing the 
specific concerns of the symposium in his own voice 359 
Quite symbolically, Il'enkov's first two words were "I think ,"360 to which he might 
have added " therefore I am a potential enemy of the people ' Il'enkov further stated that he 
"pei чопаПу preferred communism," and gave his "own answer to the four questions that were 
formulated in the brochure of this symposium [italics mine, EvdZ] "361 Evidently, Il'enkov's 
sin consisted in engaging in independent Marxist philosophical thought The touchstone was 
not genuine Marxist conviction, but non-contradiction of official philosophy Consequently, 
the criterion was not so much the Marxist(-Leninist) character of what Soviet philosophers said 
at international meetings, as the way they acted as représentants or as independent thinkers 
The more philosophers would seriously try to be Marxists or Marxist-Leninists in an intellec-
tually significant sense of the term, the greater the problems confronting them — which in the 
case of И enkov led to his suicide 362 Being a Soviet philosopher meant to accent limitations 
other than those resulting from one's own intellectual capacities, preferences, or taboos 
'The danger that free thought, even within the Marxist framework poses to entrenched political parties is too 
great to be tolerated '363 
Philosophers who acted as free-thinking individuals", such as Il'enkov, or Lina 
Bonsovna Tumánova (1936 1985),364 had to be 'destroyed' according to the logic of the 
Soviet system 
Andersdenkende sind allein deswegen weil sie denken, und zwar als Individuen der organisierten 
Staatsmacht verdachtig Dh nicht der Andersdenkende (inakomysljaSSij) -der Denkende an sich, das Denken 
überhaupt ist nicht erwünscht 365 
Legitimate philosophy in the USSR was limited in its possible development, and 
therefore philosophical thought could only be marginal, existing between the limits of 
legitimacy and official Marxist-Leninist philosophy So, apart from being limited by the 
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intellectual capacities of its participants, dominant cultural and intellectual traditions, Soviet 
philosophy was limited specifically in four ways 
ι theoretically, by the poorly developed presence of philosophical positions (either 
actually represented by philosophers, or accessible in historical studies), 
и materially, by the relative isolation from the international philosophical community, and 
by the general lack of non-Soviet primary sources, 
in economically, by planning and collectivization, 
lv politically, by the subordination of philosophy to the objectives of the Party-State, 
mediated by the ideology of Soviet philosophy' 
ι With respect to the first limitation, there was, at least formally, only one position 
present This situation slightly improved when Western philosophers, to begin with Alfred J 
Ayer in 1961, later followed by Jean-Paul Sartre, Jürgen Habermas, and others, were invited 
to present their views to (a selection) of the Soviet philosophical community, and saw their 
texts appeal in VF Also, the situation improved greatly and steadily with regard to historical 
studies in philosophy both their number, their scope, and their quality grew (Ch 10 ш с il ш f 
and 11 iv] 
и As regards the second limitation, it was lifted to a much lesser extent Soviet 
philosophers broke their isolation in 1954, when they started to send "Soviet delegations to 
international congresses, but these delegations were carefully selected and headed by Party-
philosophers like Mitin, Konstantinov, Fedoseev This delegation-policy was not abolished 
until the late 1980s it was still in force in 1988, when Frolov headed the Soviet delegation that 
presented the philosophy of perestrojka' at the 18th World Congress of Philosophy in 
Brighton |Ch 6 n] And it was only around that time that Soviet philosophers could accept 
individual invitations to philosophical congiesses abroad 366 
As to sources, access to non-Soviet philosophical material was very limited, not only 
due to political, but also to economic reasons the USSR could spend its scarce hard currency 
on more useful things than potentially subversive Western philosophical literature [Ch 111] 
Like travelling abroad, good medical treatment, and pornography, subversive literature was the 
privilege of the Party-elite, to which only a few philosophers belonged Gulyga reports that 
Losskij s Kton/a russkoj filosofa [The History of Russian Philosophy] was published in 
Russian in 1954 "in a scanty edition for the bureaucratic elite disseminated fiee of charge 
«by special subscription [po osobomu spisku]»" w According to Anatohj Fedorovic Zotov 
(b 1931), special small editions (50-100 copies) of translated woiks by authors like Sartre and 
Marcuse circulated in specialist circles, and there were so-called secret journals [skiytye 
zumaly] for internal use, as well as controversial translations of, e g , Heidegger 6^8 
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111. With regard to planning and collectivism, it is hard to tell to which extent they exerted a 
negative influence. It certainly was a major hindrance in the earlier years of Soviet 
philosophy,369 but m more recent times it seems to have been of less importance. Collectivism 
was largely a mechanism of collective self-control. As to planning, it certainly resulted in many 
superfluous pages, but, as in most sectors of Soviet economy, it was not very effective, and 
one positive effect was secured publication of whatever was collectively approved of and 
passed the censor.37° 
lv. The most serious limitation of Soviet philosophy was its Marxist-Leninist nature "by 
definition". Philosophy in the USSR could only be legitimate to the extent to which it did not 
threaten this official status. The objective fact of an official Marxist-Leninist position in 
philosophy rendered the epistemic function of philosophical thinking marginal: the truth was 
basically known already. The question as to what would constitute a 'threat' to official 
philosophy was a political question. The most effective means to effectuate this control and 
replace repressive forms of control, was the ideology of Soviet philosophy. Concretely, this 
meant that the limit of legitimacy in philosophy was made up by its main elements [Ch 7 ш and 
8 i i]-
- the Marxist-Leninist nature of Soviet philosophy; 
- the unity of the views of the klasvkimarksizma-Ienimzma; 
- the theoretical superiority of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, including its overt 
partisanship [partijnosf], its scientific nature [naucnosf], and its systematic character 
[sistemnost'i, 
- its supreme practical value as the theoretical foundation of social practice; 
- its status as a world-view, i.e. as the profound and motivating conviction of the 
international working class and the Soviet people, including its philosophers; 
- its status as the supreme result of mankind's philosophical, political, and economic 
thought 
In 'mature' Soviet philosophy a division of labor between Party-philosophers and professional 
philosophers took shape, which meant that professional philosophers could tum to regular hp-
service to official Marxism-Leninism and ritual or cunning quotatology, as long as they made 
sure not to enter in conflict with it In publications of the 1980s, the phrase "from a Marxist-
Leninist point of view" often seems to have the same function as "in my opinion" m Western 
philosophical texts But although it did not forcibly keep Soviet philosophers from saying what 
they wanted to say, to say "from a Marxist-Leninist point of view" instead of "in my opinion" 
did mean, firstly, to disappear as the author, the individual philosopher who is arguing,371 
and, secondly, to expose oneself 'voluntarily' to criticism from the side of the final authorities. 
In other words, if official philosophy was felt, by the responsible authorities, to be threatened, 
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the author of the text had already accepted such a verdict This substantially took the edge off 
disagreement among Soviet philosophers 
" even within this framework [of politically imposed dogma EvdZ] the disagreements that arise among Soviet 
philosophers cannot function in the way in which disagreements function in other philosophical communities 
For a further element of the dogmatic framework is the thesis that Soviet Marxism Leninism is in fact 
monolithic and as a result the genuine doctrinal differences that do exist within it are slighted and are prevented 
trom evolving naturally and constructively "372 
In sum, Soviet philosophy was limited first and foremost by its fundamental subordination to 
politics Roughly speaking, the post-war resuscitation of Soviet philosophy was an attempt to 
subordinate all philosophical activity to ideological struggle, but in the post-Stalin period (from 
1955/6 onwards) this subordination was replaced by a subordination of Soviet philosophy as a 
whole From this point onwards, a logic came into play that pointed towards two mutually 
complementary developments one towards mdrgmahzdtion, risking to reach and cross the 
limits of legitimacy, and one of professionalizdtion, immunizing philosophical work against 
direct subordination [9 in] 
MdTgindl Philosophizing the Modes of Philosophical Thought m the USSR 
As long as the actual version of official philosophy was not contradicted, and the ideology of 
Soviet philosophy was not challenged, professional Soviet philosophers could engage in 
'genuine' philosophical work, that was essentially marginal (and inevitably disappointing to 
anyone who expected free and wholly original philosophical thought) Four modes of 
marginahty can be distinguished, which certainly do not exclude each other (on the contrary, 
they often went together), and each of which is related to a "center" in relation to which it is 
marginal 
a gcogrdphic marginahty in relation to the Soviet capital, Moscow, 
b institutionaJ marginahty in relation to central philosophical institutions (IF, the fìlfak of 
MGU), and central philosophical journals, VF and FN. 
с disciplinary marginahty in relation to the theoretical center diamat and istmat, 
d ideological marginahty in relation to the ideology of Soviet philosophy 
a Geographic marginahty is exemplified by regional centers with a sometimes con­
siderable degree of autonomy The best example is the capital of Soviet Georgia, Tbilisi, where 
philosophers succeeded in preserving and continuing their national philosophical tradition to a 
considerable extent 373 Other examples are the chiet university of Estonia, Tartu, where the 
well-known semiotician Jury Michajlovic Lótman (1922-1993), banned from Moscow until 
1991 474
 ancj the unorthodox philosopher of history Eeru Loone375 were working Further, 
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we can point to the phenomenological studies in Riga and Rostov-na-Donu.376 Rostov also 
was the place where the philosophical faculty in 1983 declared itself a representant of the ideas 
of Il'enkov.377 Finally, the activity, resumed by Bachtin in Saransk also belongs to this 
category.378 
b. Institutional marginalization is exemplified by Losev, who taught ancient philology and 
philosophy at the MGPI, instead of elaborating his own philosophical system at the fìlfak of 
MGU or the IF AN. Another example is Mamardasvili, whose courses at MGU on existen-
tialism and Hegel's Phänomenologie des Geistes in the late 1960s were suspended,379 who 
worked as an editor of VF from 1968 to 1974.380 τ
η
 that year he was pushed aside by, 
reportedly, Frolov,38i and removed from the IF to work at the Institut Istorii i Teorii 
Estestvoznanija i Techniki [Institute of History and Theory of Science and Technology], 
"which accommodated him and many other undesirable and "punishable" philosophers,"382 
and forced to err from one university or institute to another,383 until he finally settled in his 
native Georgia in 1980.384 A third example is Bibler, who also resided in relatively remote 
institutes, not matching his standing as a philosopher, and who did not publish, until the late 
1980s, in the central philosophical journals. 385 To this category also belong the examples 
given by Pjatigorskij: as a scholar at the Institut Vostokovedenija [Institute of Oriental 
Studies]386 he was invited to lecture on Buddhist philosophy at an Aviation Engineering 
Institute, on which occasion the local CPSU-secretary asked him "not to tell things that are 
somewhere written," i.e. not to refer to published Soviet philosophy, and after a lecture at a 
chemical plant he was questioned for four hours on the relationship of science to religion — an 
issue long resolved in official philosophy.387 
с Disciplinary marginalization is the most frequent, and also the most gradual mode, 
bordering on the professionalization process [9 ш].. Not only are there several examples of 
philosophers who, like Losev, Asmus, or Bakradze, limited themselves to history of 
philosophy or formal logic, but one can say that esp. IFN has, at different stages in the 
development of Soviet philosophy, served as a 'refuge' [Ch.io.nc, and Ch I2.iv].388 i
n
 the 
words of Nikiforov: 
"The stagnant atmosphere of scholastic dogmatism forces every somewhat thinking man to escape to the 
periphery of the dominant paradigm. And we sec, in the years of stagnation, a most intensive development of 
precisely those fields of philosophical investigation, to which the metastases of dogmatism had not yet gotten 
to philosophical questions of natural science, methodology of science, critical analysis of foreign philosophy, 
history of philosophy, theory of culture, and the like. Precisely in these areas the most interesting works are 
created. In the fundamental parts of Marxist philosophy, however, a sepulchral peace and quiet [kladbis£enskij 
pokoj] reigns since long ago."389 
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The same "escape" was pointed to by Mamardasvili, who speaks of "exterritoriality". 
"For justice's, sake I must remark, however, that in times that were hard for our philosophy, too, some of my 
colleagues still managed to survive as philosophers They were forced to find themselves some "ecological 
niches" (for example, in history of philosophy, in logic, etc ) and, staying within them, to continue their 
work "390 
These remarks match the forecast given by Kamenka in 1963 
" a position from which Soviet philosophy can make future advances has in my opinion been reached Such 
advances arc not likely to lie in the direction ol creating a systematic Marxist philosophy, but in the direction of 
specific and no doubt mostly humble contributions to logical theory, philosophy ot science, ontology, the 
development of a realist theory o( knowledge and ol an empiricist theory ot mind and to discussion of the 
empirical content of ethical and aesthetic judgments "391 
And in 1977, Huber vindicated Kamenka's observation. 
"On pent observer en effet une prédilection des philosophes soviétiques pour la theorie de la connaissance, la 
sociologie, I éthique, I histoire de la philosophie et 1 étude des grands philosophes 1 e materialisme dialectique 
les interesse beaucoup moins '392 
d Ideological marginahty, finally, is the most distinctly Soviet mode Any attempt by a 
Soviet philosopher to address the "Marxist-Leninist" nature of Soviet philosophy, or one of the 
three "pillars" of the ideology of Soviet philosophy -partijnost', nauönost', sistemnost— 
implied "self-marginahzation", because to consider anything seriously and critically means to 
take into account the opposite possibility A fine example of this fourth mode is the attempt by 
Batiscev to stretch the crucial concept of partijnost'lo such an extent as to void it of its initial 
meaning, one of Scanlan's examples of "detensive or liberating doublethink "393 In an entry in 
the FE, Batiscev distinguished between subjective and objective partisanship, the first being 
"the subjective conviction that one is serving the interests of communism assure(s) one's 
correctness in a dispute and a true position in the resolution of every problem "394 Turning this 
idea of "(subjectively) partisan is true" into "(objectively) true is partisan", Batiscev reinvoked 
the notion of "partisanship" present m Hegel fCh 8 n], defended ob|ectivity against partisanship, 
and opposed dogmatism and ideologically motivated control 395 As Scanlan concluded 
"Thus partisanship in the usual sense can be rejected in fact without being rejected in words, and the whole 
proccduie is theoretically justified by the 'dialectical unity that permits Balishchev to assume the identity ot 
proletarian partisanship (properly understood) and objectivity "396 
Of course, under 'normal' conditions "liberating doublethink" would not be necessary 
But the point is, and here Scanlan is absolutely right, that this kind of cunning employment of 
official dogma is one of the ways in which philosophical thought liberated itself, one of the 
ways in which philosophers created more favorable conditions of work With his interpretation 
of partynost'Batisöev touched upon the core of Soviet ideology of philosophy Tf philosophy 
286 
Part Three Philosophy and Ideology — The Soviet Case 
is, as I have argued [Ch 11], free (self-determining), (self-)cnticaJ, and (self-)foundational 
thought, then the meta-philosophical question "What is philosophy ?" is a fundamental 
philosophical question As has been pointed out above, this question was answered by official 
Soviet philosophy, and not to be questioned This explains the position of the philosopher who 
persistently did raise that issue, viz MamardaSvili Counteracting the official conception of 
philosophy in content and in form, he both propagated and demonstrated in person, through 
lectures throughout the country, the texts whereof were not published until very recently,397 a 
conception of philosophy as consisting in the act of thinking· 
'Was auch immer das angekündigte Thema war, ob Descartes, Kant oder Kafka, fur Mamardaschwilr war die 
Sache immer diselbe Philosophie als solche Ob er cogito ergo sum interpretierte, Kants Begriff des 
Transzendentalen oder Husserls eidetische Reduktion, immer ging es um die Demonstration dessen, was das 
philosophische Denken ist "398 
Soviet philosophical culture was a culture in which the question as to what is 
philosophy was answered dogmatically, and hence could be addressed only 'marginally' or 
historically [Ch 12 ul Radically free philosophical thought, in the sense of self-foundational and 
self-critical thought, not ready to take any authority for granted, to regard any definition as self-
evident, or to accept any disciplinary demarcation as necessary, could not find a legitimate 
place in Soviet philosophy Consequently, its place was an illegitimate one outside the Soviet 
philosophical public space3" In one of the most impressive "documents" from the Soviet 
period in philosophy, Filosofia odnogo pereulka [Philosophy of a Certain Narrow Street], 
Pjatigorskij not only describes the attempts of his circle to set the outlines of philosophy, but 
also tells where they took place 
"Thus we are in the third period of philosophizing The first took place in the yard [ vo dvorc], the second in the 
smoking room of the Lenin library [v Lemnskoj kunlke], the third is taking place in the kitchen [ла 
kuíhné] "400 
If Hell exists, the Leninka kunlka is its Main Gate As to the kitchen Moscow's free 
intellectual life took place nakuchne anyway No surprise, therefore, that Pjatigorskij's heroes 
developed their thought there Due to this marginal position of 'genuine' philosophy in the 
USSR, its public space was dispersed, local, and eccentric Here again, a double perspective 
must be used Soviet philosophical culture had a public space (nationwide conferences, the 
pages of VF. the IF precincts, etc ), but that was not, as a rule, the place where discussion 
took place the public space of Soviet philosophy did not coincide with the "agora" of 
philosophy in the USSR * The effects of this situation were illuminated in the perestrojka-era 
by Rozov in an article entitled "Philosophy Without Fellowship [Filo4ofija bez soobSöestva]" 
— including the effect of idealizing philosophy -w 
*I owe the comparison with agora to Alessandro Mongili 
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The ultimate form of marginahty with respect to Soviet philosophy culture was the 
pn\ate sphere, the (not necessarily illegal or underground) "circle [kruiok]" Although private 
and public are opposed concepts, the private sphere can replace an absent public space Again, 
we can turn to Pjatigorskij for examples a lecturer at an Electric Engineering Institute who 
organized a seminar on ' Plato, Hegel, Christianity, and our Existence", that functioned 
incessantly from 1949 to 1971, a teacher of diahistomat at an Industrial Institute, who 
compensated ior his teaching by lecturing -to the same audience- at a friend's daöa, an artist 
who held seminars on Occultism and Godmanhood [bogoöeloveäestvo]" 4°2 There is no 
doubt that other examples could be found the privatissima at Losev's home on Moscow's 
Arbat Street, at Petrov's house in Rostov-na-Donu (see below), or, for a period ot 20 years, at 
Biblers place 403 
In each of these four modes, philosophy existed "in the margin" In other words the public 
space of philosophy in the USSR can be defined in negative terms, as "away from" These 
modes are thus distinct from attempts to develop diamat or istmat at central institutions in 
Moscow without regard to the ideology of philosophy Such attempts -in fact cases of the non-
acceptance of the limitations of Soviet philosophy- were bound to come to a deadlock they 
cither had to take on a different form, or led to marginalization or exclusion There have been 
such attempts, to be sure, and some of them were even urged by the Party, such as the debate 
over relativity theory [Ch 5 i], the debate over the status of dialectical logic |Ch 51], the on-going 
debate between "epislemologists" and "ontologists", the attempt to create a Marxist aesthetics 
by Gyorgy Lukács' friend LiRic in the 1930s,404 or the attempt to incorporate diamat m 
cybernetics in the 1960s 405 
A characteristic example is the solution found to the issue ovei dialectical and formal 
logic, from the end of the 1950s onwards, when symbolic logic was turned into a mathematical 
discipline, thus not threatening the unity of the "system of dialectical materialism" [Ch 5 и] This 
solution was to stay as late as 1985 we find it in a textbook [ucebnoe posobie] on dialectical 
logic 
' The creation of dialectical logic generated the problem of its correlation to the old lormal logic This problem 
is to the picsenlday a subject of discussion a battlefield ot dillerent sometimes contrary points of view 406 
As we sec the problem ot the correlation of formal (traditional) mathcmalical and dialectical logic is quite 
intensively studied in our philosophical literature But the importance and actuality ot that problem, the 
enormous significance of its correct solution not only for philosophy but also tor the development ot natural 
science demands further creative elaboration of this problem 407 
What is remarkable about this 'solution' is not so much the problematic relation 
between formal or symbolic logic and dialectics itself, but that it is regarded as an urgent 
problem for Soviet philosophical culture The question about the relation of logic and dialectics 
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is discussed in Western philosophy, too, but not as a major problem. Rather it forms a factor in 
the differentiation of Western philosophical culture into sub-cultures. It is only because Soviet 
philosophy defined itself as a system of dialectical and historical materialism, that it could not 
-by virtue of its being a system- 'leave alone' non-dialectical logic, and it was only because it 
conceived of itself as "Marxist-Leninist" that it could not simply drop the idea of dialectics as 
another, 'higher' form of logic.1*06 
Crossing the Border: the Limit of Legitimacy 
Attempts to address central issues in diamat or istmat have always resulted in a decision by the 
Party-authorities, a settlement of the question, facing the philosophers concerned with the 
choice between conformation or marginalization. The development of independent philosophi-
cal positions, Marxist or not, was, from the perspective of the Party, an unwanted effect of the 
development of official philosophy that was, also from the perspective of the Party, required. 
But we have to be precise at this point: as we shall see, Soviet philosophy both required 
independent philosophical thought and was endangered by it. Genuine philosophy was 
demanded, but only if it accepted in advance the limits to the development of philosophical 
thought set by political authorities. "Involuntarily self-limiting thought" is genuine and 
respectable to the extent to which it sacrifices some possibilities in order to realize others. At 
the same time, it is evident that under such circumstances only a small portion of the 'natural 
development' of philosophy can take place. The emergence, after 1956, of attempts to 
philosophize in a self-respecting manner shows that philosophy had not died out, and that there 
was a need for philosophy 'from above', due to the unresolved problems and unexplored fields 
of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, and an urge 'from below' of individual philosophers "to invest 
whatever words they have with the meanings they find necessary in order to make sense of 
their experience."409 
The history of these attempts and their fate, what was left of them and what died an 
untimely death, is fragmentary, and it is only now that we can hope to get a clear view on the 
history of philosophy and philosophers in the USSR in the 1970s and 1980s. On a more 
general level, it is clear that the period of relative freedom during which people started to acras 
individual thinkers has been of crucial importance for the fate of Soviet philosophy in later 
years. This change was linked with the emergence of a new intelligencija iCh.5.ii], one that, 
while stemming from Soviet institutions of higher learning, and thus a product of the system 
itself, was inspired by original Marxism and the pre-revolutionary Russian intelligencija, and 
consequently took a responsibility for the fate of society. The self-image of this newly 
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emerged intelligencija was expressed in a characteristic manner by the famous bard Bulat 
Okudzava, who, according to Jurij Glazov, "more than anyone else... gives us insight in the 
enigmatic world of the Soviet intelligentsia":410 
"Being a member of the intelligencija, I think, is most of all the capacity to think independently and in an 
autonomous manner, it is thirst for knowledge and the need to sacrifice one's knowledge, as they say, on the 
aliar of the fatherland."41 ' 
A characteristic feature of Soviet intellectual life since the end of ottepel' was the existence of 
independent, underground publications [samizdat], and publications abroad [tamizdat]. These 
have been dominated by literary and socio-political texts,4'2 but they have played a certain role 
in philosophy, too. Kline discussed uncensored texts by Esenin-Vol'pin, Calidze, and 
Pomeranc, published in the late 1960s and early 1970s,4'3 Goerdt mentions texts by 
Dobrovol'skij and Pjatigorskij, from about the same time.414 Yet, while there was un-
derground religion, underground music, art, and literature, there was relatively little "un-
derground philosophy". Why did the phenomenon of philosophical circles (filosofskoe 
sektantstvo, as Vasilij Vasil'eviC Rózanov (1856-1919) had labelled it415), not reappear in the 
Soviet period'? 
Part of an explanation is that the czarist state -the cenzor and the notorious Third 
Department*- was an external enemy, merely reacting to what the economically independent 
members of the intelligencija did. Soviet intelligencija, by contrast, not only depended 
economically upon the Party-State, but also was the product of its own educational system. 
Soviet control and censorship was not reactive but largely preventive, as was the KGB. 
Samizdat only occurred when some Soviet intellectuals, the authors of Iz-pod glub for 
example, started to seek their inspiration in the old, Russian intelligencija, i.e. started to regard 
the Soviet system, again, as something external and alien. 
A more substantial difference is that while the Russian state did have an official 
doctrine, it was not a philosophical system, but a State-religion. Philosophy was feared as free 
thinking, possibly conflicting with Russian Orthodoxy, and indeed limited by restrictions and 
prohibitions until 1863,416 the year when a decision in favor of academic freedom at the 
universities was taken by Aleksandr II (censorship naturally remained in place).417 By 
contrast, the Soviet system did embrace an explicitly philosophical doctrine, that left no room 
for other philosophical doctrines: these were declared either idealist (bourgeois, reactionary), or 
revisionist. In this respect, official Soviet philosophy was true to the traditional conception of 
philosophy which says that only one philosophy, if any, can be true. 
'Forerunner of Ceka (1917-1922), GPU ( 1922-1934), NKVD ( 1934-1943), NKGB ( 1943-1946), MGB ( 1946-
1953), and KGB (1953—>). 
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9.Ш The Basic Tension of Soviet Philosophy and Its Partial Solution 
Regardless of their number in relation to the many apparatala in Soviet philosophy, the leading 
minds in the USSR belonged to the new Soviet mtelhgencija, and the intellectual climate was 
determined by their failure to change Soviet society from within The attempts, before and 
during ottepel', to reform the central body of Soviet philosophy stuck against the absolute limit 
of Soviet philosophy, the "system of diamat and istmat" From that moment, a fundamental 
alienation from the Soviet political system took shape among the mtelligencija, including many 
philosophers The Soviet structures and the limits they placed on development of philosophical 
thought and discussion were accepted as a fact by most of them, but their 'loyalty' to it was 
pragmatic and formal, not motivated by any conviction 
They continued to work within the Soviet structures, but they no longer identified with 
the system This is but one example of how "developed socialism" -the Breznev-era- was 
living a myth that was known to be a myth, but that could not be done away with As a result, 
philosophers retreated to the marginal areas indicated above (MamardasVih, BatiSèev), or tried 
to find room (or serious philosophical work in specialist disciplines (Davydov, Bibler) or in 
history of philosophy (Solov'ev, MotroSilova) [Ch 10 и e] This is particularly clear in the case 
of the Sestidesjatmki, who received their formation in the 1960s, and subsequently found their 
way in the philosophical institutions, to emerge as leading philosophers in the 1980s Friedrich 
rightly warns against the simplistic attribution of positive developments in Soviet philosophical 
culture to "the creativity and subversiveness of the "generation of the 1960s","418 but their 
contribution to the preservation of at least some level of philosophical culture is not to be 
denied It is about these Sestidesjatmki that Okudzava said 
"I think that the Sestidajdtniki, ι e that small part of society that forced people to become thoughtful to 
think anew, did their job ( ) Today the Sestidesjatmki weigh a lot upon themselves, too because they are 
professionals, energetic have the experience of disagreement, but, of course they have not much time left to be 
at the helm [stojat' и rulja] "419 
An important effect of the blockage of philosophical developments was that the limit between 
legitimate and illegitimate philosophy in the USSR became systematically blurred The relative 
success of the Breznev-regime was the creation, in science as well as in economy, of a 'grey 
zone' in which activities could and did take place that were useful to the system as a whole, but 
could not legitimately exist within it Unless we take into account only those "martyrs" who 
"not only refused to cooperate, but continued to maintain and openly defend their convic­
tions , thereby exposing themselves to various repressions,"420 and dump all others 
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-including 90 % of today's philosophical community- on the shambles of history, we have to 
assess the value and the limited nature of what happened in this grey гопе 
For example in an editorial in VF we find a list of untimely deceased "genuine 
philosophers" "Erik Gngor'evi6 Judin, Boris Semenovic Grjaznov, Eval'd Vasil'eviC 
II enkov, Igor' Serafimovic Alekséev, Bonifatij Michajlovic Kedrov, Michail KonstantinoviC 
Petróv, Igor' Viktorovic Blauberg, Michail Abramovic Kurgáncev "42 ' Who would expect to 
encounter in one list Kedrov, famous for his studies of Lenin's Filosofskie tetrady, and a 
leading philosopher in diamat, Il'enkov, Petrov (1924-1987), the author of Jazyk, znak, 
kul'tura [Language, Sign, Culture]422 who was forced to lead a difficult and intellectually iso-
lated life in the suburbs of Rostov-na-Donu,421 and Blauberg (1929-1990),424 co-author of the 
official Kratkij s/ovar' pò filosofa [Short Dictionary of Philosophy], that saw four editions 
between 1966 and 1982742'> Who would expect that Spirkin, the author of many orthodox 
pieces on diamat,426 and of an attempt at a new ucebnik in 1988,427 was the person who 
'saved Losev, the last to have publicly called diamat a crying absurdity (and unlikely to have 
changed that opinion in later years), by offering him his daca to work undisturbed9428 We can 
only understand this if we understand the position of Soviet philosophers as a matter-of-fact 
acceptance of the conditions of their work The importance of the attempt to work within these 
conditions, entailing a lot of "collaboration" and "writing into the drawer [pisat' ν pis'mennyj 
4toI]" should not be underestimated, nor should the courage needed to stick to this task 4 2 9 
History is made by individual men and women, not by "mankind", that Marxist secularization 
of Hegel's absolute Spirit, and as such it depends not on superhistoncal forces or "laws of 
development", but on what people choose or refuse to do in a given historical situation 43° 
The essence of the 'grey zone' in the Breznev-era was the predominance of pragmatic 
loyalty to the system There is sufficient reason to believe Vladimir Shlapentokh when he says 
Genuine belief in official ideology began to dwindle in ine mid-1930s, and with ihe cessation ot mass terror 
following Ι9Ή, was reduced to a minimum level by the beginning of the 1970s Thus Soviet intellectuals 
entered the Brezhnev era almost unanimously contemptuous of the major postulates of Marxism, having been 
converted into either Wcstcrnizers (liberals) or Russophiles ' 4 3 ' 
But the brutal terror of the black Stalin era had given way to the more subtle repression 
and disciplining of the 'grey zone' This is the cause of Shlapentokh's "two-level mentality", a 
concept introduced by him to "explain how people can easily separate their behavior from their 
system of values,"412 or Scanlan's 'defensive doublethink" as "a means of enlisting the 
approbative force of authorized terms behind sympathetic attention to the exact opposite of 
what they stand for officially " 4 3 1 This may not always be too edifying, but it is how 
philosophical thought existed in the USSR in marginal forms and within the limits set by an 
official philosophical doctrine that was despised, but not challenged 
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The crux in understanding the Soviet philosophical phenomenon is that there not only was, at 
several points, a possibility to engage in 'genuine philosophy', but that there also was a 
demand for it 'from above'. This is clearest in the case of technical improvement. Conceptual 
clarification of a given philosophical position is impossible without serious -however local-
philosophizing. In order to reproduce an "official philosophy", you only have to take into 
account the official position itself, but you have to be a philosopher in order to refine, improve, 
and adapt it. Thus, Soviet philosophy was marked by conflicting demands, which resulted in 
the basic tension of Soviet philosophy, the tension between dogma and development. Part of 
the job of Soviet philosophers was to control this basic tension. However, even the most 
limited philosophical task presupposes consideration of different possibilities, of possible 
consequences, contradictions, etc., i.e. it presupposes the development of philosophical 
thought according to its inner logic.434 
This tension can be demonstrated at several points: 
i. If, after philosophical thought has come into existence, a philosophical problem is 
resolved by a political decision, this is manifest as such. The "logical pushes and ideological 
pulls... that have been operative in Soviet philosophy" become manifest.435 For this reason, 
Soviet philosophers became increasingly aware of the essential compromise between theory 
and practice. Even if official philosophy as developed during the "dead period" (1930-1946) 
was sincerely held by generations of Soviet philosophers, it still is clear that the exigency to 
improve it inevitably leads to philosophy itself. Every dogma contains the seed of its own 
destruction, inasmuch as it claims to be true theory and the product of free and rational human 
thought. This aspect occasioned Bernard Jeu to regard Soviet philosophy as what detached 
itself from ideology: 
"L'objet de la présente étude n'est pas l'examen d'une idéologie, soit d'une doctrine officielle, soit comme 
ensemble du reflet des infrastructures, bien qu'on ne puisse pas les oublier puisque c'est ce à partir de quoi il y a 
une philosophie. Mais c'est l'inessentiel. Et l'essentiel de cette étude est justement ce qui s'en détache. C'est la 
philosophie, ou l'idéologie qui prend conscience de soi et qui se veut cohérente et qui se juge."436 
Jeu idealizes ideology into something "wanting to be coherent", but he rightly points to 
the same source of philosophical development as did De George: 
"Within the Marxist-Leninist framework the task of Soviet philosophers is to explicate specific types of 
technical problems and to introduce order and clarity as far as is possible and consistent with the functions of 
ideology."437 
2 9 3 
Chapter 9: The Reality of Philosophy in the USSR 
Naturally, the demand for professional philosophy was an improvement in its own right, but it 
also points to the fundamental tension within Soviet philosophy: philosophical thought that 
takes its job seriously can not аргіогіЪе expected to remain within the boundaries of an official 
orthodoxy. In fact, the establishment of relatively autonomous philosophical disciplines like 
ethics, aesthetics, logic, philosophical questions of natural science, history of philosophy, 
within the framework of official philosophy, which began under Stalin with what Bocheriski 
called the "declassified doctrines" [Ch.5.ii], but gained momentum since the end of ottepel', has 
allowed the formation of a realm in which philosophers could work, albeit within the 
boundaries of their disciplines. Thus the internal criteria of truth and coherence [ChAiiil were 
restored, bui ai a local level only. The effect of this development has been the technical 
improvement of professional philosophers, and a manifest contrast between internal, 
philosophical criteria and external, 'ideological' criteria. 
In the long run, this development was disastrous for philosophical orthodoxy, as is 
testified, e.g., by the fact that, in the more recent period in Soviet philosophy, diamatöik and 
istmatöik became words of abuse.438 There was an objective interest of philosophical 
authorities to render Marxist-Leninist ideology more coherent and consistent, and more in line 
with contemporary science. This could only be done by letting specialists engage in serious 
philosophical work within a limited area, leaving it to the party-philosophers to decide what 
was to be adopted as part of official philosophy. Both professional philosophy and official 
orthodoxy thus existed legitimately. 
After all, why did the Soviet system appoint all those philosophers at scientific research 
institutes? Of course they were places where potentially critical intellectuals were stuffed away, 
but why do so? There would have been simpler and cheaper ways to crush them, and 
humanitarian considerations never were a main occupation of Soviet leadership. Why allow 
Soviet intellectuals to possess scientific literature from abroad, if nothing would have been 
simpler than to have their homes thoroughly searched by the KGB? Why allow them to visit 
international congresses and meet bourgeois colleagues, instead of simply prohibiting? The 
answer is that these intellectuals were important, provided they limited themselves to specialist 
work. 
ii. The same basic tension appears in the differentiation of philosophers and texts. At first 
sight, it may surprise that both ucebniki and specialist studies were presented as "Marxist-
Leninist". How could one and the same philosophy be contained in a dogmatic version and in a 
variety of specialist studies that display a plurality of positions? One solution would be to 
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regard the dogmatic version as a position itself, and texts like Osnovy marksistsko-lenmskoj 
filosofa as the expression of the thought of some primitive kind of philosophers But, however 
primitive the authors of those texts may have been, this interpretation misses the point The 
difference between uccbmki and specialist publications reflects a division of labor between 
Soviet philosophers, personifying the tension between dogmatic truth and developing theory 
The uëebmki were not the opera отпы of primitive philosophers, and the specialist studies 
were not attempts to emancipate thought from dogma They were elaborations of subordinate 
questions, the final consequences of which for official dogma were not made explicit This 
explains the existence of two kinds of philosophers 
"First those who attempt to argue rationally for their positions analyze and interpret the concepts they use, and 
attempt to reinterpret the meaning ot the classical Marxist Leninist statements in the light of rational 
consistency Then there are those who merely repeat and paraphrase what is contained in the Marxist Leninist 
classics and in the Party proclamations, who oppose any attempt at interpretation or reinterprelation from 
below and who argue from authority In both kinds of thinker however there is the strain and tension of the 
demands of philosophy on the one hand and of ideology on the other [italics mine EvdZ] For philosophical 
clarity and consistency are pedagogically and so ideologically usetul only if they do not undermine the 
ideological edifice itself Yet safe, simple ideological conformity is often pedagogically and so ideologically 
sterile and ineffective "439 
The professionahzation of Soviet philosophy brought to light the insoluble tension 
between dogma and development As soon as some philosophers were not expected to limit 
themselves to an endless repetition of official dogma, but to improve its quality instead, this 
tension appeared and reappeared, as the conflict between the call for Leninist "militant 
partijnobt" [ partijnost' 2, Ch 8 u], and the tendency among philosophers not to link their 
professional activity to political decisions and orientations in a direct way 
"Soviet leaders are anxious to foster education and technical skill they are anxious to suppress critical 
independence and heresy Yet the former strains -in Russia as in Catholic Europe- produce and foster the 
latter 440 
in The basic tension is also perceptible m the sophistication of Soviet 'meta-philosophy" 
It has been remarked by several authors that Soviet philosophers presented diverging views on 
the nature and status of philosophy, and, consequently, of its relation to science, ideology, and 
world-view 441 in the course of the 1970s, a compromise was elaborated, that became the 
official position in the 1980s Scanlan points to Ojzerman as the chief architect of this "most 
ambitious and sophisticated attempt' to develop a conception of philosophy that suited its 
various actual functions, entailed in Ojzerman's definition of philosophy as "philosophical 
world-view", and of Marxist-Leninist philosophy as a "scientific philosophical 
world-view" 442 it must be noted, that the other two positions, viz philosophy as a general 
science ' versus "philosophy as ideology' were both 'sublated' in Ojzerman s conception 443 
Irrespective of their theoretical merits, all three positions were attempts to develop a tenable 
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position in the ideological field. Ojzerman's position legitimized the subordination of 
philosophy to a primarily ideological function, and at the same time stated the relative 
independence of philosophical work, which meant the creation of a legitimate place for 
professional philosophy with a primarily epistemic function. 
As Scanlan has pointed out, it was this notion of the polyfunctionality of philosophy, 
together with the actual development of relatively independent philosophical disciplines, that 
created "a modus vivendi for still more widely divergent views than appear on the surface," 
and that "eminently suited to allow people to disagree while retaining a semblance of innocuous 
unanimity."444 Talk of polyfunctionality thus served the legitimization 'from below' by Soviet 
philosophers of what they were actually doing. Ojzerman had it that "the subject-matter 
[predmct] of philosophy in general, and of scientific, Marxist-Leninist philosophy in particular, 
can not be determined unequivocally or reduced to a single definition, since the development of 
philosophy inevitably turns the subject-matter of philosophical research into a system of 
objects, into a system of historically developing philosophical disciplines enriched with new 
content [italics mine, EvdZ]."4^ The relevance of this statement becomes clear when we read, 
a few lines above: 
"In the present time. Marxist-Leninist philosophy is a system of philosophical disciplines... The practice of 
research has demonstrated the expediency [ celcsoobraznost] of a methodic delimitation of dialectical... and 
historical materialism... Specialist investigations in the field of' epistemology, philosophical questions of 
natural science, and dialectical logic testify that these fields also are.'separating [vydcljajutsjaf into special 
philosophical disciplines. lithics and aesthetics will, possibly, tum into independent scientific disciplines in the 
near future, in the present time, however, they are component parts of Marxist-Leninist philosophy [italics 
mine, EvdZ]."44^ 
In this manner, the sophistication of the conception of Soviet philosophy created a place 
for relatively independent philosophical disciplines, and facilitated their separation from diamat 
and istmat. This was done in terms of the official philosophy itself: it was permanently 
developing reality itself-a basic tenet of diamat- that occasioned this emergence of separate 
disciplines. One could foresee a gradual reduction of diamat and istmat to the status of 
specialisms themselves, and a "dissolution" of the "system" into separate disciplines (a 
tendency not unlike that in Western philosophical culture). It is because ideological legitimiza-
tion 'from above' and 'from below' meet in such more sophisticated theories about (Soviet) 
philosophy, that were developed by Soviet philosophers themselves, that makes it so difficult 
to assess the precise relation between official Marxism-Leninism, and actual, professional 
philosophy. This vagueness, moreover, was a condition for the ideological efficacy of the 
theory in question, and hence for the legitimate existence of philosophy. 
T h e use of the impcrfective aspect at this point indicates a process that is actually taking place, and apparently 
with Ojzerman's approval. 
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lv The basic tension further appears as the opposition between collectivism and in­
dividuality in philosophical work Soviet philosophy was, on its own account, creatively and 
collectively developed by thousands of Marxist-Leninist philosophers [Ch 8 ш] To compare, 
suppose that we say "phenomenological philosophy was creatively and collectively developed 
in the 20th century by a large group of Western philosophers ' Clearly, we would understand 
'phenomenology" not as a philosophical doctrine, but as a shared background and orientation 
Phenomenology might be fashionable ior a certain period, which might incite philosophers to 
call their thought "phenomenological ', struggles would arise over the essence of 
"phenomenology', it might get out of fashion, and then philosophers would start accusing each 
other of being "phenomenologists", a few decades or centuries later, philosophers might find 
old phenomenology a source of inspiration, and "neo-phenomenology ' would arise Et cetera 
Although Soviet philosophy imitated this kind of collectivity, its own collectivism 
clearly was of different nature If a given philosophical theory, however primitive, spurious or 
sophisticated it may be, has to be developed, this development has to be done by individual 
philosophers people can think about the same thing, they can even think the same thoughts, 
but they cannot think together But the demand to develop Marxist-Leninist philosophy 
collectively, had the powerful ideological effect of representing Soviet philosophers as a group, 
deeply convinced of the truth of the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism In practice this meant 
the acceptance of limitations of development, effectuated through collective self-control 
Surprisingly, this much loathed collectivism of Soviet philosophy proved to be, to 
some extent, a protection mechanism a group ot philosophers at a department of a philosophi­
cal faculty, or at a sector of the IF could tolerate diverging positions by containing them within 
the group By publishing texts in sufficiently small editions to never reach a larger public, they 
could give some room to philosophical thought as long as they did not challenge the "system of 
Marxist-Leninist philosophy" 
ν Finally, the basic tension appears as the conflict between the doctrinal and apodictic 
character of official philosophy, and the alleged scientific nature of Marxism-Leninism 447 This 
meant, in the first place, that Soviet philosophy had to take into account the actual results and 
development of science, an aspect already present in Lenin's famous distinction between a 
philosophical and a scientific concept of matter, leaving it to science to determine its precise 
content 
For the only «property» of mailer, with the recognition of which is connected philosophical materialism, is the 
property lo be objective reality to exist outside our consciousness 448 
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But it also meant that Marxism-Leninism was conceived as the result of the cognitive 
capacities of human beings, endowed with the right method The dogmatic nature of the 
foundations ofdiamat thus conflicted with its sc/enf//Jcpretensions 
This account of the basic tension of Soviet philosophy throws particular light on the training of 
futuie philosophers It aimed at the production of new generations of philosophers, and 
reproduced the basic tension in the type of Soviet philosophers What 'the system' needed was 
people, capable of performing the tasks required of Soviet philosophers, ι e who accepted the 
fact of official Marxist-Leninist philosophy, and were ready to participate in the (re)production 
of the ideology of that philosophy, but who could, at the same time, solve 'local", technical 
philosophical problems, engage in specialist research, write about the history of philosophy, 
and enter into a discussion with foreign, esp "bourgeois" colleagues All these tasks, as well 
as the training of the next generation of philosophers, required philosophical skills at a certain 
level of sophistication The product of this process was the "Soviet philosopher", neither a 
"mere ideologist", nor an independently thinking individual, but "Dienstphilosophen" 
(Goerdt) «о 
As the tension between the different functions of Soviet philosophy became more 
pronounced, a stronger differentiation in the training of future Soviet philosophers appeared 
The profile' of the Soviet philosopher differed according to the future specialization of the 
students teachers of philosophy at VUZy did not have to do anything but repeat the prescribed 
subject-matter By contrast, future specialist in one of the philosophical disciplines, or future 
historians of philosophy did need a sound understanding of philosophy, and knowledge of its 
history 
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Conclusion 
To conclude, it is important to stress that the impulses to engage in philosophical thought came 
both from below', from the urge of individual philosophers to "invest whatever words they 
have with the meaning they find necessary in order to make sense of their experience,"450 and 
stick to their "philosophical inclination to follow an argument to its conclusion,"^ι and 'from 
above', from the Party's need for a "progressively more coherent and consistent, more 
believable and teachable"^2 ideology The fundamental contradiction of Soviet philosophy 
was a dual ¡equirement, both the need and therefore possibility for legitimate philosophizing, 
and the threat and hence limitation of its development, expressed in the call for creative 
development of a given philosophical doctrine that yet was to remain the same doctrine This 
contradiction is beautifully illustrated in Jeu s rendering of the words of the classic example of 
a Party philosopher, Konstantinov, in 1963 
"LAcadémicien Konstantinov rappelle quii faut «une pensee creatrice et indépendante» [qu ]il faut la 
formulation de problèmes nouveaux appelant une réponse originale et il nest pas impensable quon prenne 
position de façon divergente sur des problèmes particuliers Cette divergence, bien sûr ne doit pas constituer une 
fin en soi on doit viser un but unique Mais с est la discussion qui permet de 1 apprécier de façon plus juste et 
plus exacte [italics mine EvdZ] 4 5 1 
So, Jeu concludes, Soviet philosophy had realized that "the possibility to make 
mistakes is a condition for the discovery of the truth"454 But soon after 1963 Soviet 
philosophy also realized, to quote Jeu again, that " if one has taken the decision to do 
philosophy, one must go all the way It is impossible to foresee all consequences that will 
come out of the development of the content of thought Problems and solutions will ineluctably 
arise "455 The existence of unorthodox and 'heretical philosophical thought was the inevitable 
consequence of the "decision to do philosophy', viz to improve the practical efficacy of 
official doctrine by raising its theoretical level and quality The rather successful marginahza-
tion (instead of total suppression or destruction) of this philosophical thought was the best 
possible way, from the perspective of the political status quo, to meet the contradictory 
objective of development and orthodoxy 
The cause of this contradiction of Soviet philosophy resides in the fact that, however 
dogmatic and subordinated, official Soviet philosophy continued to claim to be philosophy, to 
be not only true, but also rational and scientific, and the result of human cognitive capacities 
(and not of some privileged human beings, but in principle of all human beings) Therefore it 
was, contrary to religious convictions, and contrary also to, for example, Nazi ideology, open 
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to critical investigation as to its coherence, consistency, and adequacy, that is, it was a possible 
object of philosophical thought 
The need to do philosophy came 'from above', from the exigency to make official 
philosophy more believable and teachable As Jeu rightly remarks, "the necessity to do 
philosophy implies its possibility "4 % With respect to the urge to do philosophy 'from below', 
the emergence of a plurality of discussions and positions as soon the "decision to do 
philosophy" was taken, is sufficient evidence. 
*** 
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Conclusion to Part Three 
In this part, I have aimed at an analysis of Soviet philosophical culture I have departed from a 
definition of Soviet philosophy as being subordinated, in principle and as a whole, to an 
ideological function This has led me to pose three subsequent questions a question about the 
nature of Soviet ideology [Ch 7], about its relation to philosophy [Ch 8], and about the 
possibility of philosophy under these conditions [Ch 9] The answer to the first question is that 
Soviet Marxism-Leninism was an extreme case of ideology because it was а иш versa/ medium 
of legitimacy, including a meta-ideology that concealed the ideological nature of Marxism-
Leninism by claiming it to be motivating (instead of legitimizing), scientific, and true, and by 
claiming to be an ideology 
With respect to the second question, the subordination of philosophy was mediated 
through an ideology of Soviet philosophy, ι e a meta-philosophical theory about (Soviet) 
philosophy in terms of the universal medium of legitimacy that was Marxism(-Leninism) This 
ideology warranted, through the key notions of partijnost', naucnost, and sistemnost', the 
final authority of the Party in philosophical matters, the establishment of an оШсіаІ position in 
philosophy and the legitimate exclusion oí other philosophical positions than the "system" of 
diamat and ¡stmat, and, finally, the development of a system of philosophical disciplines 
The answers to the first two questions point the way to an answer to the third, the 
question how philosophy, stipulatively defined as "attempt to understand reality by rational 
means' (the epistemic function), including the preparatory work for such understanding, was 
possible, given the existence of official philosophy (diamat and ïstmat), and the "ideology of 
Soviet philosophy" The answer is that it was possible as a result of the division of labor 
within Soviet philosophy, ι e of the actual (not the alleged) functions of philosophy in the 
Soviet Union, some of which not only made possible, but required philosophical thought The 
establishment of a system of specialist branches created a field for legitimate professional 
philosophy, improving in quality and exposing dogmatic official philosophy as such 
But official philosophy, legitimized by the ideology oí Soviet philosophy, also formed 
an absolute limit, and theretore philosophy had to be marginal There was not a single field of 
legitimate philosophical activity in the USSR that did not participate in the ideological function 
oí philosophy in the USSR, but there was only one that was identical with it, viz the 
(re)production of the ideology of Soviet philosophy Thus, the existence of 'real philosophy' 
in the USSR was a reality, and the conditions of its existence, the Soviet conditions of 
philosophy, must be seen as its determinants Most of these conditions were not favorable the 
collectivism, the international isolation, the absence of a plurality of actually present positions, 
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and, most of all, the general subordination of philosophy to an ideological function, including 
the obligation, for Soviet philosophy, to legitimize their activity in terms of a ruling ideology of 
Soviet philosophy, i.e. to act as convinced Marxist-Leninist philosophers. Being a Marxist-
Leninist philosopher was virtually the only way to engage in philosophical activity in a 
legitimate way. 
Philosophical thought was a reality in the USSR, but its articulation, as well as its effect on 
Soviet philosophical culture were limited: to approach these limits meant to become marginal, 
to cross them meant to become illegitimate. Inserting the results of the present chapter in the 
overall picture of philosophy in the USSR, given at the beginning of this part, we obtain the 
following image: 
Philosophy in the USSR 
The defence mechanisms employed by Soviet philosophers, both individually and collectively, 
were partly successful. The professionalization of philosophy created some room for 
philosophical discussion, but at the price of 'alienation' from public debate. The differentiation 
into a system of disciplines created (relatively) 'free areas', but at the cost of not being able to 
address fundamental philosophical issues in a direct manner. The sophisticated 'ideology from 
below' through which individual philosophers sought a certain legitimacy, the ritual 
quotatology, and the 'cunning of individual reason' in "defensive or liberating double-think" 
were also possible means, but at the price of losing credibility with the philosophically 
302 
Part Three: Philosophy and Ideology — The Soviet Case 
interested public both home and abroad. The ultimate limit of development was Marxist-
Leninist philosophy itself, the system of diamat and istmat. Therefore, for those Soviet 
philosophers who did develop into independently thinking philosophers, people like Il'enkov 
or Mamardasvili, this limit became a barrier. 
Soviet philosophical culture was intrinsically limited by the subordination of 
philosophy to an ideological and doctrinal function of philosophical theory, and by the 
resulting colonization of fundamental philosophical question by an apodictic philosophical 
system, formally excluding other positions than a Marxist(-Leninist), dialectical and historical 
materialist one. The ensuing limitations of Soviet philosophy were at odds both with the urge 
of individual philosophers to formulate and express their thought, as well as with the need of 
the Soviet system to dispose of a "flexibly orthodox" ideology, taking into account any new 
development in science, society, or international politics, and becoming increasingly believable 
and teachable. This need created a legitimate place for serious work in philosophy -studying 
philosophy's past and making it accessible to present philosophy, analyzing developments in 
natural science, developing symbolic logic- within a system of relatively independent 
disciplines, and in that respect could satisfy the 'subjective' urge of some philosophers. This 
urge tended to reach beyond that legitimate place and refuse an off-hand solution to fundamen-
tal philosophical questions. The first development was favored by the situation of Soviet 
philosophy, whereas the second was precluded. The two different ways to resolve this 
immanent contradiction of Soviet philosophical culture were marginalization of free 
philosophical thought, and professionalization and specialization. The next part will investigate 
a major case of this professionalization and specialization: Soviet history of philosophy 
[istoriko-fìlosofskaja пайка]. 
*** 
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PART FOUR 
ISTORIKO-FILOSOFSKAJA NAUKA: 
SOVIET PHILOSOPHY AND THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 
"At the basis of Marxist investigation of the history of philosophy lies the 
brilliant idea of V.l. Lenin, that Marxist philosophy is «the result, the sum, 
the conclusion of the history of knowledge of the world», and in the first 
place of the history of philosophy. It is precisely this that guides Soviet 
historians of philosophy in raising and resolving the fundamental problems 
of their science."1 
M.T. Iovcuk, 1967 
Introduction 
The three preceding parts have yielded a general analysis of Soviet philosophy that can serve as 
the background for a more detailed investigation of its branches. In Chapter 2, I have in 
particular pointed to the importance, for a flourishing philosophical culture, of history of 
philosophy as a philosophical discipline [Ch.2.iii]. Part III has shown the importance, for the 
survival of philosophical thought in the USSR, of a process of professionalization as a main 
alternative to marginalization, i.e. of the development of "declassified doctrines", and relatively 
independent philosophical disciplines. Among these, history of philosophy [istoriko-
filosoi'skaja nauka (literally: "science of the history of philosophy" or "scientific history of 
philosophy");* IFN] is of particular importance, since an interpretation of philosophy's history 
as leading to and resulting in diamat and ¡stmat was an indispensable part of the "ideology of 
Soviet ideology" and the tailpiece of its systematic structure. 
This provides two sufficient reasons to submit the Soviet account of philosophy's 
history to closer scrutiny, and together they provide a third: in IFN, the tension between 
"logical pushes and ideological pulls" (De George) manifests itself in all clarity. To this can be 
added as a fourth reason the fact that this branch of Soviet philosophy has not been seriously 
investigated recently, and a fifth, namely that contemporary philosophy in post-Soviet Russia 
will be helped with a better understanding of what was done in its recent, Soviet past (rather 
than rejecting it and returning to a pre-revolutionary point, where history should be resumed). 
Western scholarly works on Soviet philosophy often hinted at the relatively high quality 
of IFN. This runs from Kamcnka's casual remark that the kandidatskajadissertacija of Aleksej 
'The translation of istoriko-filosofskaja nauka and istorija filosotii как пайка as "history of philosophy as a 
science" is misleading, as it leaves undecided whether it is philosophy or its history that is regarded as a science; 
the Russian original is unequivocal in this respect: in istorija fílosofii как nauka it is istorija, not filosofija that 
is a science. 
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Sergeevic Bogomólov (1927-1983), a leading historian of philosophy at MGU, was one of the 
very few theses that "suggest a very good M A thesis verging on the English, Australian or 
good American Ph D ,"2 via its qualification by Ballestrem as a field "of no little importance,"3 
to Rybarczyk s explicit statement that "Soviet historiography of philosophy is the most active 
portion of contemporary Soviet philosophy "4 But despite this appraisal, IFN was scantily 
investigated by Western scholars short articles by Ballestrem,5 Kamenka,6 and Bocheiiski,7 
and a useful but unpublished dissertation by Rybarczyk in 1975 8 Even a thorough and 
complete work like Scanlan's Maixism m the USSR lacks a chapter on history of philosophy 
Likewise, general works on historiography of philosophy seldom refer to Soviet work done in 
this field, and if they do, they do so superficially and with standard comments 9 
I shall delend the thesis that IFN has been, both quantitatively and qualitatively, one of 
the more important branches of Soviet philosophy, one that will be of great importance in post-
Soviet Russian philosophy, and that yielded results which retain their value as contributions to 
the theory of the history of philosophy after the decay of Marxist-Leninist philosophy in the 
USSR Within the framework of official Soviet philosophy, IFN was a relatively independent 
discipline relatively independent, because it developed in rather exact synchrony with Soviet 
philosophy as a whole in its subsequent stages of development, but independent to the extent to 
which it gained a momentum of its own, which is why it also offers a new perspective on 
Soviet philosophy as a whole 
In the preceding part [Ch 9 и ш], I have analyzed marginalization and professionalization as the 
two main foims of development of philosophy in the USSR given its general subordination to 
an ideological function IFN, as a both philosophical and historical discipline, was apt to 
engage in a process of professionahzation, becoming relatively immune to direct political 
supervision and intervention From 1930 onwards, and esp in the 1930s and after the running-
down of ottcpel', IFN has been a place of escape for Soviet philosophers it was a field where 
philosophers could more or less 'safely ' pursue scholarly work, and it offered a possibility to 
address issues central to (Soviet) philosophy These included basic issues of diamat (the 
notions of matter and substance, related to the "basic question" of philosophy) and istmat (such 
as the recurrent discussion about the determination of the ideological superstructure by the 
socio-economic basis), as well as the 'meta-philosophical" question "What is philosophy'", a 
question that could not be legitimately addressed because it undermined the ideology of Soviet 
philosophy From the first perspective, IFN was a place where the conditions for a future 
prosperity of philosophical culture were realized From the second, it was a place where 
philosophy itself was cultivated and guarded 
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It is impossible to speak about IFN without discussing its historical and systematic 
background. Therefore, I shall sketch its historical background, i.e. the views on the history of 
philosophy of the klassikimarksizma-leninizma: Marx, Engels, and Lenin [lO.i], the discus-
sions about history of philosophy in Russian Marxism before 1930 [lO.ii-a], and the develop-
ment of IFN as a specialist branch of Soviet philosophy since 1930 and up to the 1980s in four 
subsequent stages [I0.ii.b-e], and, finally, the foundations, functions, and disciplinarystructure 
of IFN [lO.iii]. The next chapter is dedicated to a selective, but representative survey of the 
practice of IFN in the 1980s: the material basis of this part of Soviet philosophical culture, 
[l l.i], the reproduction of IFN, i.e. the formation of future historians of philosophy [l l.U], in 
the third place, a survey of the actual historiographical work done by Soviet historians of 
philosophy [ll.iiia-f], and a sketch of the dissolution of IFN in the period of decay of Soviet 
philosophical culture [11.iv]. The concluding chapter, finally, analyzes Soviet theory oí the 
history of philosophy from the perspective of the tension between professionalism and 
ideology; to this end a first section portrays this field as a "sub-discipline" of IFN [12.i], and a 
second section analyzes in detail Soviet conceptions of the history of philosophy, organized 
around a mainstream, "sophisticated" position, that formed a link and buffer between the 
demands of professionalism and the exigencies of ideology [I2.ii); a third section shows how 
Soviet theory of the history of philosophy manifested a hegelianizing trend, culminating in a 
conception of philosophy as "spiritual quintessence" of historical epoch [12.Ш]; a fourth 
section, finally, assesses developments in this area during the period of decline of Soviet 
philosophy as reactions and corrections with respect to the "sophisticated position" [12.iv]. 
*** 
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CHAPTER TEN 
Background, Development, and Status of 
Istoriko-Filosofskaja Nauka 
"And we see, that in the years of stagnation precisely those fields of 
philosophical research were developed most intensively, to which the 
metastases of dogmatism had not yet advanced: philosophical questions of 
natural science, methodology of science, critical analysis of foreign 
philosophy, history of philosophy, theory of culture and the likc."'0 
A.L. Nikiforov, 1990 
The general objective of this part is to analyze mature Istoriko-filosofskaja nauka, one of the 
disciplines within the framework of the system of the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, as an 
example of the process of professionalization in Soviet philosophy that formed a main 
alternative to marginalization, displaying the intrinsic tension between the professional 
demands of an adequate account of philosophy's past and, the ineluctable predominance of the 
ideological function of Soviet philosophy, including the importance of a historical anchoring of 
the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism as the supreme achievement of mankind's philosophical 
development, a point at which this ideological requirement matches the inclusion of a reflexive 
conception of philosophy's history in the idea of a philosophical system. The aim of this 
chapter is to set the stage for that analysis. 
The first section of this chapter deals with the heritage of the klassiki marksizma-
ieninizma with respect to the history of philosophy, since this heritage was an inevitable 
element of Soviet philosophical culture. The second section follows the gradual development of 
IFN throughout the history of Soviet philosophy. This account is partly historical, partly 
systematical: a number of themes come to the fore that are of crucial importance for the practice 
and theory of IFN in its mature stage, to be discussed in the next two chapters. The third 
section offers an analysis of the place and functions of IFN in the 1980s as part of Soviet 
philosophical culture, applying the general conception of Soviet philosophy developed in the 
preceding part. 
Our general theoretical discussion of philosophy's history has focused on Hegel's 
conception and the problems connected with it [Ch.2]. The Hegelian conception, including its 
problematic aspects, also serves as the theoretical background of the present section. For Marx 
and Engels, Hegel's philosophy was the philosophy of their time. They adopted Hegel's view 
of his own system as a concluding stage in the development of philosophical theory, and 
regarded their own practical and theoretical activity as its sublation [Aufhebung]. Both the idea 
of the "sublation" of a previous form into the subsequent one, and the conception of history as 
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a necessary and progressive development, are purely Hegelian Because Marx and Engels 
denied the core of Hegelian philosophy, ι e the notion of absolute Idea which made for the 
unity of history and philosophy m Hegel s case, the result was, as regards the history of 
philosophy, a denial of various aspects of the Hegelian conception, and a plurality of 
conceptions of the history of philosophy, each "negating" part of the Hegelian position 
lO.i The "Klassiki Marksizma-Lenimzma" on History of Philosophy 
All three klassiki marksizma-lenmizma wrote on history of philosophy Marx in his doctoral 
dissertation, Differenz der demokritischen und epikureischen Naturphilosophie (1841)11, 
Engels m Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang der klassischen deutschen Philosophie 
(1888),12 and Lenin in Matenalizm ι empmoknticizm (1909),13 and in his commentary on 
Hegel s Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie "Konspekt knigi Gegelja «Leken po 
istorn filosofa»" (1915) | 4 Apart from these monographs, all three klassiki extensively 
discussed themes from the history of philosophy, related to their own theoretical activity a 
collection by Irrhtz and Lubke of texts by Marx and Engels that address the history of 
philosophy counts nearly 700 pages Finally, all three of them greatly admired Hegel's work in 
this area '5 Marx commented that Hegel's history of philosophy marked the very beginning of 
historiography of philosophy as such,16 and, much later, that Hegel had "comprehended the 
entire history of philosophy for the first time "n Engels called Hegel's Vorlesungen über die 
Geschichte der Philosophie "one of [Hegel's] most ingenious works "18 And Lenin's 
' Konspekt " abundantly testifies of his passionate reading of Hegel he wonders at his 
'slanders on materialism [klevety namateriahzm] ,19 criticizes his "idealistic rubbish [svoloö' 
idealisticeskaia],"^ ridicules Hegel's attempt to portray Aristotle as an idealist instead of a 
realist -"hah' he's afraid""21-, but at the same time admires his analysis -rejoicing "true1" or 
"bien dit'"-, and basically agrees with Hegel's critique of materialism upon the consideration 
that thought is necessarily general 
Wilh this Hegel defeats every materialism cxccptdialectical " 2 2 
However, none of the klassiki elaborated a Marxist conception of the history of 
philosophy Irrlitz and Lubke claim that there was no area in which Marx and Engels had a 
more continuous and stable opinion,23 but they also state that, in spite of their evident interest 
in history of philosophy, they never found the time to write the historical studies they 
planned 24 Lenin, finally, was too busy with political affairs to elaborate a conception of the 
history ot philosophy Matcnalizmiempinoknticizm is, in spite of its many references to Kant, 
Hume, and others, a polemical rather than a historical work, and what remains of his studies 
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of, among others, Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik and his Vorlesungen (on both history of 
philosophy and philosophy of history), which he pursued in exile Switzerland in 1914-5, are a 
combination of excerpt and commentary, which, though sometimes interesting, do not offer a 
theory of the history of philosophy 
Between Reduction and Retrospect Six Marx-Engeisian Impulses 
As I have indicated [Ch 2 n], a mam problem with the Hegelian conception of the history of 
philosophy was that it could not really give an answer to the question how philosophy is 
concretely related to history m general Inner logic of development and outer history of 
philosophy, I have argued, are left to stand next to each other as two "sides" I have suggested 
that a solution to this problem should be sought in stress on the concrete nature of philosophy 
as active thought by finite individuals in a socio-histoncal situation, aiming at true understan-
ding of reality Historical materialism, as a philosophical theory of society and history, arose 
from a critique of Hegel's philosophy, denying his conception of "Idee" and "Geist" as the 
substance of (historical) reality, turning to the material (re)production of mankind instead It 
therefore seems reasonable to expect an answer to the same problem trom historical 
materialism Irrht? and Lubke claim that Marx and Engels solved Hegel s problem indeed 
In der großen ï-inlcitung zur philosophiehistorischen Vorlesung wirft der /weile Hauptteil ( Verhältnis der 
Philosophie zu anderen Gebieten ) methodisch prinzipiell die Frage nach dem Verhältnis von realer Geschichte 
der Gesellschaft und Philosophicgcschichte aut ( ) Marx und Engels \ ermochten durch die Begründung der 
materialistischen Geschichtsauüassung das entscheidende Problem der realen Kausalität zwischen den Gebieten 
des gesellschaftlichen Lebens zu losen 2 5 
In fact, they raise an even more sweeping claim Specifying their gratuitous remark that 
"Marx and Engels' materialist conception of history started a new epoch in historiography of 
philosophy,"26 they argue that the "productive principles of the main precedent stages" are 
united in Marxism 27 
Damit wurden die produkmen Ansätze sowohl der aufklärerischen wie der Hegclschen Kulturge-
schichtsschreibung, also das Prinzip des Kampfes zwischen progressiven und konservativen Ideen als 
Hauptinhalt der Philosophicgcschichte und der Totahtatsgesichlspunkl im Rahmen materialistischer 
Kausalauilassungentfaltet ' 2 8 
Leaving aside the question as to what exactly is a "materialist conception of causality', 
it is worthwhile to try to assess the adequacy of this claim, since, if true, Soviet philosophy 
would have inherited a ready-made Marxist(-Leninist) conception of the history of philosophy, 
only to be further elaborated and applied by Soviet historians of philosophy This is most 
clearly not the case the three elements mentioned by Irrlitz and Lubke (the principle of the 
straggle of progressive and conservative ideas, the viewpoint of totality [Totalitats-
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gesichtspunkt], and the material determination) in fact are recognizable as partial conceptions or 
impulses in the works of Marx and Engels. Soviet philosophy thus inherited, through 
Plechanov and Lenin, a number of partially elaborated conceptions of the history of 
philosophy. 
1. In the first place, there is Marx' doctoral dissertation ( 1841 ), "written in the flush of his 
Young-Hegelian period."29 Employing Hegel as a champion of rationality and freedom in anti-
religious struggle,30 Marx stressed the importance of atheism and materialism for social 
progress, placing Epicurus in the "Promethean" tradition.31 In this respect he significantly 
amended Hegel, 32 but for Marx this was not a fundamental critique of Hegel's work in the 
history of philosophy, but rather a supplementation: 
"Hegel hat zwar das Allgemeine der genannten Systeme [of Democritus and Epicurus, EvdZ] im ganzen richtig 
bestimmt; allein bei dem bewunderungswürdig großen und kühnen Plan seiner Geschichte der Philosophie, von 
der überhaupt erst die Geschichte der Philosophie datiert werden kann, war es teils unmöglich, in das einzelne 
einzugehen, teils hinderte den riesenhaften Denker seine Ansicht von dem, was er par excellence spekulativ 
nannte, in diesen Systemen die hohe Bedeutung zu erkennen, die sie für die Geschichte der griechischen 
Philosophie und den griechischen Geist überhaupt habcn."33 
Marx also followed the Hegelian conception of the history of philosophy, when he 
explained the development from Democritus to Epicurus in terms of contradiction in the 
formers' system: 
"The theme of his doctoral dissertation... was the inadequacy of the Democritcan view of science, which treated 
the atom purely 'empirically', in isolated abstraction, and therefore failed to develop and resolve the logical 
contradictions contained within it. These contradictions, Marx argued, led necessarily, as a matter of logical 
development, to the Epicurean doctrine of the 'swerve'."34 
Philosophy develops historically, due to the inner logic of philosophical theory, and the 
progressive effect of "Promethean" philosophy is a result of its rationality: 
"Epikur ist... der größte griechische Aufklärer... Bei Epikur ist daher die Atomistik mit allen ihren 
Widersprüchen als die Naturwissenschaft des Selbstbewußtseins, das sich unter der Form der abstrakten 
Einzelheil absolutes Prinzip ist, bis zur höchsten Konsequenz... durchgeführt und vollendet."35 
2. A second impulse is present in Die deutsche Ideologie (1845/6) and Das Manifest der 
kommunistischen Partei (1848). Its most concise formulation can be found in the theses against 
Feuerbach (1845), esp. the 3rd, the 8th and the 11th. 36 The central idea is the rejection of 
philosophy altogether as delusive speculation, and its replacement, or "sublation" by science 
andrevolutionary practice: 
"Da, wo die Spekulation aufhört, beim wirklichen Leben, beginnt also die wirkliche, positive Wissenschaft, die 
Darstellung der praktischen Betätigung, des praktischen Entwicklungsprozesses der Menschen. (...) Die 
selbständige Philosophie verliert mit der Darstellung der Wirklichkeit ihr Existenzmedium."37 
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Philosophy is as such a form of false consciousness, replacing reality with ideality In 
Hegel's philosophy this ideological character becomes manifest. Philosophy sublates itself in 
Marx and Engels 
3 The third element is the historical-materialist interpretation of philosophy as part of 
social consciousness, determined by the socio-economic basis The classical formulation of 
this basic idea of historical materialism can be found in Marx' Zur Kritik der politischen 
Ökonomie ( 1858/9) 
'In der gesellschaftlichen Produktion ihres Lebens gehen die Menschen bestimmte, notwendige, von ihrem 
Willen unabhängige Verhallnisse ein, Produktionsverhaltnisse, die einer bestimmten Entwicklungsstufe ihrer 
materiellen Produktivkräfte entsprechen Die Gesamtheit dieser Produktionsverhaltnisse bildet die ökonomische 
Struktur der Gesellschaft, die reale Basis, worauf sich ein juristischer und politischer Überbau erhebt und welcher 
bestimmte gesellschaftliche Bcwußtseinsformen entsprechen Die Produktionsweise des materiellen Ixbcns 
bedingt den sozialen, politischen und geistigen Lebensprozeß überhaupt Es ist nicht das Bewußtsein der 
Menschen, daß ihr Sein, sondern umgekehrt ihr gesellschaftliches Sein, daß ihr Bewußtsein bestimmt "38 
Lenin heralded this definition as "an integral formulation of the fundamental theses of 
materialism, extended to human society and its history," 39 and it has become a classic 
quotation in authoritative Soviet sources 4o This economism means to deprive philosophy of its 
autonomy and of its proper history Like any form of social consciousness, philosophy is a 
reflection of the historical development of society through class struggle, "an illustration of the 
history of something else "41 To quote Marx and Engels 
"Die Moral, Religion, Metaphysik und sonstige Ideologie und die ihnen entsprechenden Bewußtseinsformen 
behalten hiermit nicht langer den Schein der Selbständigkeit Sie haben keine Geschichte, sie haben keine 
Entwicklung, sondern die ihre materielle Produktion und ihren materiellen Verkehr entwickelnden Menschen 
andern mit dieser ihrer Wirklichkeit auch ihr Denken und die Produkte ihres Denkens Nicht das Bewußtsein 
bestimmt das I eben, sondern das Leben bestimmt das Bewußtsein ( ) Die selbständige Philosophie verliert 
mit der Darstellung der Wirklichkeit ihr Existcnzmedium "42 
It is one thing to claim that social reality is a historically developing totality, but it is 
quite something else to write the history of that developing totality More specifically, this 
interpretation leaves no room for rational argument, for philosophical problems as a particular 
kind of problems, or for the fact that philosophers react mainly to the work of their 
predecessors (as Marx' and Engels' own intellectual biography testifies) As Kamenka argued 
' The point may be brought out by taking a period of philosophical development at first sight extremely 
favorable to the Marxist position the development ol German Idealism at the hands of Hehle, Schelling, and 
Hegel ЛИ three men passed from revolutionary ardor to conservative reaction, all three saw their philosophies 
as having clear implications for politics in general and German policies in particular, all three had close relations 
with the Government and were treated by it as valuable political ideologists As fornicators of conclusions, as 
inspirers of policies, as expressions of a Zeitgeist they may be of interest to the political historian But to the 
historian ot philosophy they are philosophers insofar as they were attempting to solve certain characteristically 
philosophical problems and to develop certain characteristically philosophical arguments "43 
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It is a mistake to draw a dividing line between philosophers as philosophers and 
philosophers as members of a given society, declaring the first to be the sole object of history 
of philosophy. Hegel's relation to a specific Zeitgeist, and his conception of the role of 
philosophers with regard to society and politics was part of his philosophy, and is a 
philosophical problem, but Kamenka is right that to neglect the philosophical nature of what 
philosophers are doing is to deny an important part of what happens in history. This radical 
position not only does not yield a workable basis for concrete historical research, but it also 
fails to do justice to the intellectual "pre-history" of the Marx-Engelsian theory itself. 
4. A fourth position repairs this situation. Engels' Ludwig Feuerbach und der Ausgang 
der klassischen deutschen Philosophie (1888) is an attempt to give Marxism its place in the 
history of philosophy, and to rehabilitate, against the spirit of the time, Hegel as a 
philosopher.44 "The genius, Kamenka commented, of Hegel, for Engels as for Marx, lay in 
Hegel's closeness to, and discovery of, important truths that were not relative to his time or 
anyone's time."45 In this text, Engels presents the thesis of the existence in philosophy of "two 
camps", linked with contrary answers to the "basic question of philosophy" with its two sides, 
the ontological and the epistemological: 
"Die große Grundfrage aller, speziell neueren Philosophie ist die nach dem Verhältnis von Denken und Sein. 
(...) Die Frage nach dem Verhältnis... des Geistes zur Natur... (...) Je nachdem diese Frage so oder so 
beantwortet wurde, spalteten sich die Philosophen in zwei große Lager. Diejenigen, die die Ursprünglichkeit des 
Geistes gegenüber der Natur behaupteten, also in letzter Instanz eine Weltschöpfung irgendeiner Art annahmen... 
bildeten das Lager des Idealismus. Die andern, die die Natur als das Ursprüngliche ansahen, gehören zu den 
verschiednen Schulen des Materialismus."46 
These two "camps" are not mere expressions or reflections of "real contradictions", i.e. 
of class struggle, although they are linked to and do play a role in that struggle.47 The very fact 
that Engels takes this "basic question" seriously is a toning down of economic reductionism: 
"Noch höhere, d.h. noch mehr von der materiellen, ökonomischen Grundlage sich entfernende Ideologien nehmen 
die Form der Philosophie und der Religion an. Hier wird der Zusammenhang der Vorstellungen mit ihren 
materiellen Daseinsbedingungen immer verwickelter, immer mehr durch Zwischenglieder verdunkelt. Aber er 
existiert."48 
We witness here a return of the question of philosophical truth. Although Engels 
repeats the thesis about the end of philosophy in Hegel and its replacement by science,49 it is 
clear that he presupposes the truth of the materialist answer to the "basic question". The history 
of philosophy is the battleground of two camps which side with class struggle: materialism 
with progress, idealism with conservation and reaction. Further, Engels distinguishes two 
philosophical methods, and links these with political positions, too: metaphysics with status 
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quo, dialectics with change and revolution.50 In this way, Engels' text entails a vertical 
dichotomization of the history of philosophy. 
5. A fifth position is implied by Engels' conception of dialectical materialism as the "right 
combination" of answers to both sides of the basic question of philosophy: a materialist answer 
to the ontological side, a realist answer to the second, epistemological side, and a dialectical 
answer to the other basic question, viz. the question of method. In philosophy up to Marx, 
materialism has always been, according to Engels, "mechanical" materialism, regarding nature 
as a realm of blind necessity in which no real change can take place. Dialectics, however, was 
developed in the "idealist camp" finding its supreme formulation in Hegel. Therefore, it was 
possible, after Hegel, to put an end to the dichotomic history of philosophy by bringing 
materialism and dialectics together. 
A consequence is that philosophy regains its proper history, not only as a battleground 
of "camps", but also as the pre-history of the linking of the right answers to the basic question 
with the right philosophical method.51 In this sense "philosophy before Marx and philosophy 
after Marx are really incomparable."52 AH philosophical trends and schools relate themselves, 
one way or another, to the history of philosophy. Engels, when formulating the "historical 
self-awareness" of the philosophy of Marx, presented it as the end and result of philosophy in 
the traditional (speculative) meaning of the term. This means a reconstitution of the history of 
philosophy as a history in its own right. 
6. Finally a sixth motive can be discerned that rehabilitates philosophy as a profession, 
i.e. takes philosophical thought seriously as being more than a "mere reflection" of class-
struggle: 
"For Marx, as for Hegel, inadequacy and abstraction reveal themselves by generating contradictions and resultant 
instability of view - instabilities that would show themselves in the actual historical working-out and 
development of philosophical movements and positions. In this spirit, the history of philosophy might he seen 
as an object lesson in falsity, as an argument worked out in time, leading through its contradictions, to the 
exposure of false views."5^ 
This latent position is suggested by, e.g., a famous statement in Engels' Dialektik der 
Natur, widely employed in Soviet philosophy as a justification for investigations into the 
history of philosophy:54 
"Das theoretische Denken ist aber nur der Anlage nach eine angebome Eigenschaft Diese Anlage muß 
entwickelt, ausgebildet werden, und fur diese Ausbildung gibt es bis jetzt kein andres Mittel als das Studium der 
bisherigen Philosophie."55 
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A Mixed (Anti-) Hegehan Legacy 
These six impulses are not present in the works of Marx and Engels as six different and 
subsequent positions The point is not that each of them excludes all others, but that it is 
difficult to unite them all into a ' Marxist conception ot the history of philosophy" As a matter 
of fact, they demonstrate a development, firstly, from Young Hegehanism to historical 
materialism (impulses 1 - З ^ 6 and then from historical materialism to dialectical materialism 
(impulses 4 and 5) There is a tension between an (allegedly) scientific theory of society and 
history (including philosophy as part of the ideological superstructure), and an (allegedly) 
universal theory of reality, ι e a conception of the absolute, hence a philosophical theory In 
other words, it is not inevitable for Marxists to claim that they give, as Hegelians would say, a 
determination [Bestimmung] of the Absolute, but to the extent to which they actually do so, 
they are forced in the direction of a philosophical theory and, consequently, in the direction of 
position 5 
All six impulses are "negations" of parts of the Hegelian conception of the history of 
philosophy The 1st denies Hegel's identification of genuine philosophy with idealism, and 
rehabilitates materialism The 2nd denies the status ot philosophy as speculative truth, hence its 
furthei development can only be the transition to revolutionary practice The 3rd inverts the 
relation of philosophy to history both Hegel and Marx regarded social-historical reality as a 
developing totality, but what in Hegel is the true understanding of its own epoch in philosophy 
becomes, in Marx, an expression of contradictory social reality The 4th impulse turns Hegel 
"upside down ', materialism being elevated to the status of true philosophy The 5th resumes 
the claim ascribed to Hegel to be the conclusion of the history of philosophy (a claim taken for 
granted in impulses 1 to 3) as the claim ot Marxism itself to be that concluding stage The 6th, 
finally, simplifies Hegel's history of philosophy to a catalogue of one-sided, already refuted 
and therefore instructive positions 
The 1st impulse adopts the Hegelian idea of an inner logic of historical development of 
philosophy, the 2nd accepts Hegel's claim to conclude that development, but denies its truth, 
the 3rd absolutizes the notion of "outer history', the 4th absolutizes the struggle of opposites, 
the 5th, by contrast, reintroduces the notion of concluding result, and the 6th impulse, finally, 
absolutizes the notion of one-sidcdness 
Of these six approaches the first two can be left out of account, since they clearly do not belong 
to classical Marxism, as can the sixth, because it remains implicit and is not distinctively 
344 
Part Four: Soviet Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 
Marxist.57 We are left, then, three main impulses, which do not forcibly exclude each other, 
but which are not easily united into one conception. These impulses will be referred to as the 
economist, the dichotomic, and the totalizing view on the history of philosophy. They became 
important parts of official Soviet Marxism,: they were not included just because they appeared 
in classical texts, but because they could perform an important function in Marxist-Leninist 
philosophy. 
The economist impulse is closest to historical materialism, and might be seen as the 
most "Marxist" position. The totalizing view, by contrast, is closer to dialectical materialism, 
and becomes important to the extent to which the latter is promoted to the status of a 
fundamental philosophy, a "system". This totalizing view is the necessary consequence of the 
claim of Marxism(-Leninism) to be both the last and the final stage in philosophy. The 
dichotomic impulse, finally, is closest to the function of Soviet philosophy in ideological 
struggle. The economist and the dichotomic impulse can be linked in an arguable way, and so 
can the dichotomic and the totalizing impulse, but the economist and the totalizing impulse can 
not be linked in a consistent way. 
In the combination of the economist and the dichotomic impulse, philosophical ideas 
reflect objective social contradictions. Upon this view, history is the history of class struggle. 
There always is a ruling class which produces idealist ideas that relate the conciliation of social 
differences to an ideal, supernatural world, and metaphysical ideas that deny any real progress. 
The oppositional, revolutionary class produces materialist and dialectical ideas, the first 
keeping the problems on the level where they belong, the second treating development as the 
very essence of reality, the two together pointing the way to social progress. The totalizing 
view is thereby excluded, because the victory of one social class would ultimately favor one 
side in philosophical class struggle. 
The combination of the totalizing and the dichotomic impulse yields a totally different 
conception that sees the formation of a true philosophical theory, dialectical materialism, as the 
outcome and synthesis of a struggle of theories. Giving the same two oppositions of dialectical 
versus metaphysical and idealist versus materialist, the revolution in the history of philosophy 
is the emergence of the "right combination". Materialism is the only right answer to the basic 
question of the relation of thought to being, dialectics is the right philosophical method, and the 
history of philosophy was necessary to reach this conclusion. This conception sees philosophy 
not as an expression of something else, but as true theory, which implies the exclusion of 
economic reductionism. 
The combination of economist and totalizing view, finally, is inconsistent inasmuch as 
the reduction of philosophy to an effect of class struggle is incompatible with the elevation of 
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dialectical materialism to the status of historically inevitable true result of philosophy's 
development From an reductionist perspective, truth can never be more than an accidental 
effect of history The only way to unite them is to regard class struggle as the vehicle of 
philosophical truth one class would be in the privileged position to discover it This, however, 
excludes the dichotomic view, because it renders all dichotomy temporary, to be elevated in a 
final synthesis Moreover, it "absorbs the economist position because philosophy no longer is 
relative to the economic basis Social progress and philosophical development coincide, 
because the incarnation of historical progress is the bearer of true theory at the same time 
Thus, the three impulses can only be kept together if, indeed, the economist impulse is 
absorbed and the dichotomic impulse temporized, and both thus sublated into a totalizing 
position This is another way of saying that the kUssiki remained profoundly indebted to the 
Hegelian scheme, and it points out the logic at play in IFN 
The Third Klassik Mdrksizma-Lenimzma Lenin on the History of Philosophy 
This is not the place for an elaborate discussion of the reception and complicated development 
of Marxism in czarist Russia I shall stick to the generally accepted opinion that Russian 
Marxism was founded, most of all, by Plechanov, both practically as the initiator of the first 
explicitly Marxist political organization,5^ and theoretically, inspiring such protagonists of 
early Soviet history as Lenin, Aksel'rod-Ortodoks, and Deborin, all three his immediate 
disciples 59 Plechanov, who regarded himself as an orthodox Marxist, saw Marxism as a 
philosophical system, viz dialectical materialism, thus following the "Engelsian" rather than 
the "Marxian" line 60 He rejected any sort of dualism, recognizing only the two monistic 
answers, materialism and idealism, as genuine answers to the "basic question" 
'Dualism was never able to reply satisfactorily to the inevitable question how could these two separate and 
independent substances | spirit' and matter , EvdZ] which have nothing in common between them, influence 
each other > Therefore the most consistent and most profound thinkers were always inclined to monism '61 
Like Engels, he invoked Hegelian dialectics in order to solve the basic question 62 He 
clearly opposed a "determinist" or "economist" interpretation of history, stressing instead 
"social man" as the sole "tactor" in history, capable of achieving freedom -understood as 
"recognized necessity '63- to act in, though not against the general trend of history,64 by means 
of a true understanding of (historical) reality 
Thus dialectical materialism not only does not strive, as its opponents attribute to it to convince man that it is 
absurd to icvolt against economic necessity but it is the first to point out how to overcome the latter Thus is 
eliminated ihe inevitably fatalist character inherent in metaphysical materialism ( ) once we have discovered 
that iron law it depends on us to overthrow us yoke it depends on us to make necessity the obedient slave of 
reason 6 S 
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With respect to the history of philosophy, Plechanov adopted a combination of the 
dichotomic and the totalizing view. 66 He took both the basic question and the answer, 
dialectical materialism, seriously as philosophy, not as mere reflection of social oppositions. In 
his own words: 
"People made and had to make their history unconsciously as long as the motive forces of historical 
development worked behind their backs, independently of their consciousness. Once those forces have been 
discovered, once the laws by which they work have been studied, people will be able to take them in their own 
hands and submit them to their own reason. (...) For Marx and the Marxists the proletariat is a majestic force, 
the bearer of the future. Only the proletariat is capable of mastering the teaching of Marx (we arc not speaking 
of exceptions), and we sec how it is in fact becoming more and more permeated with its content."67 
Lenin accepted Plechanov's vision of orthodox Marxism as, first of all, a systematic 
dialectical materialist philosophy. In Lenin, too, we find a clear tendency towards the 
dichotomic and the totalizing impulse. In Matcríalizm i émpiriokríticizm he stressed, in 
matchless militancy, the opposition between materialism and idealism: 
"In the course of the entire foregoing exposition... we have been tracing the struggle between materialism and 
idealism. Behind the heap of new terminological contrivances, behind the dust of Ge/e/irtcn-scholaslics, we 
always, without exception, have found two basic lines, two fundamental tendencies in the solution of 
philosophical problems. Should one take as primary nature, matter, the physical, the external world — and 
regard as secondary consciousness, spirit, sensation (— experience, according to the terminology prevalentin 
our day), the psychic and so on, that is the radical question, which in fact continues to divide the philosophers 
into two large camps."68 
However, in Filosofskie tetrady Lenin showed himself deeply impressed by Hegel's 
account of the history of philosophy. And, commenting on Hegel's Wissenschaft der Logik, 
Lenin almost identified idealismand materialism: 
It is remarkable, thai the whole chapter about "the absolute idea" hardly says a word [slove£ka\ about god..., and 
moreover - this NB-, hardly contains anything specifically idealistic, but has as its main subject dialectical 
method. Result and résumé, the final word and the essence of the logic of Hegel is the dialectical method — this 
is most remarkable. And also this: in this most idealistic work by Hegel is the least idealism, the most 
materialism. "Contradictory", but a matter of faci.6" 
In Materializm i émpiríokriticiszm, Lenin put all stress on the dichotomy of idealism 
and materialism, thus reducing philosophy to a radical choice, and depriving philosophy of its 
history,70 but in Filosofskie tetrady he attached equal importance to the question of 
philosophical method, i.e. to the opposition of dialectics and metaphysics, thereby subsuming 
the dichotomic under the totalizing impulse. Philosophy then has a history at least in the sense 
of the emergence of the right combination of materialism and dialectics. In this work 
philosophy is not just a position, but also a system of categories: Hegel's Logik "just" has to 
be materialistically turned upside down in order to reflect the "universal, all-sided, vital 
connection of everything with everything,"71 and to express mankind's experience with natural 
and social reality: 
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"Continuation of the work of Hegel and Marx must consist in the dialectical elaboration of the history of human 
thought, science, and technology "72 
The totalizing impulse is also manifest in Lenin's presentation of Marxism as the 
synthesis of "the best that mankind has created in the 19th century," viz German idealist 
philosophy, French Utopian socialism and British political economy,73 which, again, takes 
theory, including philosophical theory, seriously in a way that seems hard to insert in a 
economist interpretation of "social consciousness" 
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lO.ii The Development of Istoriko-Filosofskaja Nauka (1920s-1980sT 
The conception of dialectical materialism as a philosophical system was predominant in Soviet 
philosophical culture [Ch.8.ii]. Likewise, the combination of the dichotomic and the totalizing 
view on the history of philosophy has dominated, too. This is not to say that no other positions 
manifested themselves. During a short period, "liquidationist" and "mechanicist" positions 
have dominated, that wanted either to abolish philosophy altogether, or sought to limit it to a 
method [Ch.4.i]. Economic reductionism always remained as a tendency, employed occasionally 
to "expose" philosophers as mere "mouthpieces of the bourgeoisie", but has never dominated, 
for the obvious reason that it is hard to reconcile with the notion of the leading role of ideas in 
history.74 The mutual exclusion of the three impulses [lO.i] was itself excluded by the fact that 
there was to be a Marxist-Leninist position on this issue, like on any other. The unity of 
Marxism-Leninism was one of the axioms of Soviet philosophy, and the three positions 
therefore could exist only as tendencies. Containing these tendencies, IFN displayed a tension, 
which tended to be resolved in the direction of the totalizing position. Therefore, the core of the 
Soviet conception of the history of philosophy became the "basic question", with a strong 
tendency in the direction of a totalizing position. 
Soviet history of philosophy began around 1930 with the reduction of Marxism in the USSR to 
one, orthodox Marxism-Leninism [Ch.4.ii]. In historiography of philosophy, too, the Soviet 
period was marked by a fundamental subordination of philosophy to its ideological function, a 
subordination that, though less severe in later years, has continued to exert its pressure on both 
practice and theory of the history of philosophy as a discipline. There was not a single Marxist 
conception of the history of philosophy. As a consequence, history of philosophy was one of 
the fields in which Soviet philosophy was not burdened with an elaborated Marxist(-Leninist) 
theory, and thus relatively virgin soil.75 
From the klassikimarksizma-leninizma, IFNInherited the economist, dichotomic, and 
totalizing impulses outlined above. Further, it inherited some writings on themes from 
philosophy's past by classical authors: on Democritus and Epicurus, on Hegel, on Russian 
philosophers and theoreticians, on philosophers like David Hume and Immanuel Kant, and on 
the positivists Ernst Mach and Richard Avenarius. Finally, it inherited a large number of loose 
*In writing this section, I have greatly profited from the unpublished dissertation by M.L. Rybarc¿yk 
(Rybarc7yk 1975), which, although rather schematic, contains a lot of valuable information, including an 
extensive bibliography over the period until 1970. 
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remarks and comments by Marx, Engels, and Lenin on a wide variety of philosophers and 
philosophical positions. These were of varying quality and adequacy, but given the 
authoritative status of the kiassikimarksizma-leninizma, they could serve as a reservoir of apt 
quotations for actual work in the history of philosophy. The resulting citatniäestvo [quota-
tology] was one of the main causes of frustration on the part of Western scholars, and a 
regularly diagnosed, but incurable disease of Soviet philosophy. 
Soviet philosophy set itself the task to rewrite the history of philosophy from a 
Marxist-Leninist perspective and to work out a theory of the history of philosophy. This task 
inescapably ensued from Soviet philosophy's pretension to be a system of philosophy, 
totalizing the historical development of philosophy. But it could not consist in the deduction of 
such a theory from the works of the klassiki. Both practice and theory had to be developed: as 
Bolotnikov noted in 1933, "there are in our country hardly any specialist researchers in history 
of philosophy yet."76 
The development of IFN as a branch of Soviet philosophy follows roughly the 
periodization of Soviet philosophy as a whole [Part II, Introduction]. The "pre-history" of IFN 
covers the period until the establishment of Soviet philosophy around 1930 [lO.ii.a]; a second 
period runs from the beginnings of Soviet philosophy, around 1930, to 1947, with the famous 
discussion about Aleksandrov's lstorija zapadno-evwpejskojñlosofíi [lO.ii.b]; a third period 
coincides with the "offensive period" in Soviet philosophy (1947-1955) [lO.ii.c]; it is followed 
by the period of ottepel', running from 1955 to approx. 1968 [lO.ii.d]; a fifth period, finally, 
begins with the end of ottepel', and can be called the period of professionalization, leading to 
the mature IFN oí the 1980s [lO.ii.e].77 
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lO.ii.a Hegel and Spinoza: Towards a Soviet History of Philosophy 
(1917-1930) 
The basic issue of the discussion between "mechanicists" and "dialecticians" was about the 
status of (Marxist) philosophy with respect to (natural) science [Ch 41 и], but it was intimately 
related with the question about the historical background of Marxism as being either a radical 
break with philosophy as such or, on the contrary, a continuation of "the best" of the 
philosophical tradition of the West78 The main representant of the last position, Debonn, 
followed his master, Plechanov, m regarding dialectical materialism as a synthesis, performed 
by Marx and Engels, of Hegelian dialectics and Feuerbachian materialism 7 9 Like Plechanov, 
Debonn с s identified matter with the concept of substance as developed by Spinoza, making 
thought an attribute of material substance 8 0 Plechanov qualified Marxism as a "variety of 
Spmozism ',8i and Debonn promoted this interpretation in 1927 
Debonn slates his case quite directly at Ihc beginning of his essay, 'Spinozas World View', by saying, 
Spinoza is essentially a great atheist and materialist And he concludes the section on Spinoza s influences 
by saying, ' there is no doubt about Ihe faci thai Spinoza s 'God' is to be understood as matter (nature), which 
has the two fundamental properties, extension and thought [italics in Debonn, EvdZ] S 2 
In this way, dialectical materialism was understood as a system of philosophy, 
consisting of Hegelian dialectics, materialistically put "upside down" with the help of an 
identification of "matter" with Spinozas causa sui Both operations are historically and 
philosophically problematic, leaving out of account a lot ol Hegel's and Spinoza's philosophy 
A materialist interpretation of Hegel's system raises the question as to the source of 
development, as nature is the "exteriorization [Entäußerung]" of Spirit This source has then to 
be situated within nature (' matter") and here, of course, the notion of causa sui can be of avail, 
but at the price of a constriction of substance to one of its attributes, more precisely, of an 
identification of Deus sive Natura with matter As Bakker showed convincingly, this is not 
consistent with Spinoza's philosophy, and the places referred to by Debonn were wrongly 
interpreted by him 83 
Another important side to the discussions around Hegel and Spinoza was that they 
affected the position of dialectical materialism itself as a philosophy in Soviet academic 
institutions, and its right to interfere with science The "mechanicists" could invoke classical 
texts by Marx and Engels, in which they regarded their own work as the completion of 
philosophy as such, and its replacement by science However, the "dialecticians" found 
powerful support in Engels' Dialektik der Natur or Ludwig Feuerbach ,84 and in Lenin 
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Lenin's admiration of Hegel was manifest in his Filosofskie tetrady, for example in his famous 
"aphorism" 
Aphorism It is impossible to fully understand Marx Das Kapital without having studied and understood the 
whole of Hegel s Logik Hence, not one Marxist has understood Marx > /2 a century later' '"85 
And it was Lenin again who had presented Marxism as the synthesis of the "best" of 
European intellectual history, including German classical philosophy, it was Lenin who had 
called upon the editors and collaborators of PZM to form an "association of materialist friends 
of Hegelian dialectic",86 and it was Lenin who wrote, as late as 1921 
It seems appropriate to me to remark on behalt of the younger members of the parry, that it is impossible to 
become a conscious, real communist without studying -and I mean studying- all that Plechanov has written on 
philosophy since that is the best there is in the entire international Marxist literature " 8 ? 
Plechanov was Lenin's political opponent in most respects,88 and it is therefore likely 
that this statement by Lenin indeed "embarrassed his followers for close to four decades,"89 
but it certainly helped Debonn in the discussions with regard to Hegel and Spinoza that started 
around 1925 
Among the "mechanicists", Aksel'rod-Ortodoks vehemently criticized the Hegehanism of 
Debonn c s * 
'In our country they have now made Hegel a Marxist in order to become in the end, Hegelians themselves 
That is why I emphasize again and again we are orthodox Marxists, and we see you all as neo Hegelians 9 ' 
Against the hegehanizing tendency of the "dialecticians" it was argued that to adopt the 
categorical apparatus of Hegel's Logik without engaging in scientific analysis of natural and 
social reality, would lead, in the end, to "abstract philosophy", imposing conceptual schemes 
without any real content92 In the second place, stress was laid on the "reactionary nature" of 
Hegel s system -a classical Marxist tenet- as opposed to its "revolutionary method" — the 
"algebra of revolution" (Herzen [Ch 11 ш с]) 9 3 
The fact of the matter was that, for the "debonnists", Hegel stood for ' philosophy with 
a scientific status", as did Spinoza Their objective was as Jachot showed, not "exegetic", but 
"apologetic" 9 4 Aksel'rod also attempted to counteract the identification of Spinoza's substance 
with "matter", for instance in an article of 1927 with the expressive title "Nadoelo [I'm fed 
up] '« 
Any competent and conscientious reader will understand that the strict consistency of Spinoza is related to a 
consistent denial of transcendental teleology These elements I regard and continue to regard as the soul of 
materialism 9<> 
My grave mistake from the point of view ot my adversaries consists in regarding Spinozas substance as the 
source of causality [zakonomcrnost'i From the point of view of my opponents, god or Spinoza s substance is 
nature identical with matter In other words substance is matter ' 9 7 
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The anti-teleological stance of Spinoza fitted perfectly into Aksel'rod's mechanicist 
materialism, but she clearly perceived the profoundly religious nature of Spinoza's thought, as 
well as its Jewish background.98 
Deborin replied in "Revizionizm pod maskoj ortodoksii [Revisionism Under a Mask of 
Orthodoxy]" with a paragraph "Ortodoks i sionistskaja filosofija istorii [Ortodoks and the 
Zionist Philosophy of History]", in which he qualified Aksel'rod-Ortodoks' attempt to relate 
Spinoza's philosophy to his Jewish descent as "Zionism,"" an accusation the more serious in 
view of growing anti-Semitism in Soviet Russia in those days. During the Great Purge (1936-
1938), anti-Semitism was to become a quasi-official position, pretext to remove people with 
Jewish ancestors -such as Aksel'rod and Deborin- from leading positions. 100 
The "mechanicists" sought to defend science against philosophy,101 and the "dialecticians" 
sought to defend philosophy against ideology. '02 Both failed, and the effect was the 
subordination of science to philosophy, and of philosophy to politics through the official 
ideology of the Party and State [Ch.4.ii]. The discussion about Hegel was too important for 
Marxism to let it go on: it was resolved in 1931 through the establishment of an "official 
position", which stressed both the importance of Hegel for Marxism and the deeply reactionary 
nature of his philosophy, using the notorious "contradiction" between system and method, юз 
Mitin accomplished a "revision [peresmotr]" of the interpretation of both Hegel and Spinoza. 
He criticized Deborin for ignoring the metaphysical character of Spinoza's thought, stressing 
the "most serious inconsequence of his philosophy, the fact that he did not yet reach a 
consistent materialism," and denied that Marxism could be regarded as a kind of Spinozism, '04 
but then proceeded to criticize Aksel'rod with Deborin's arguments, saying that in her position 
there was "not a grain of Marxism nor of materialism," because she "grants Spinoza a 
materialism... but without material substance, in other words, she assumes a materialism 
without matter..."'05 
Apart from displaying the "dialectical versatility" of Mitin, this establishment of an 
official position offers a fine example of flexible dogma [Ch.s.ii]. The discussion on Spinoza 
died out quickly. Deborin c.s. were criticized for "an unjustified rapprochement of Marxism 
and Spinozism... in a whole series of works after 1932,"106 and Jachot mentions, e.g., a 
discussion in 1934 between the "deborinist" Grigorij SamuiloviS Tymjánskij (1893-1941) and 
the "aksel'rodian" Aaron Il'iC Rubin (1889-1961) -both of Jewish descent, too-,107 but the 
"received view" that the "deborinists", in their ardor to elevate philosophy to a dialectical 
science, tended to defend absolute truth and to identify Marxist philosophy with Spinozism and 
Hegelianism, was firmly established.'08 Both issues were "resolved" in the sense of an 
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"orthodox position", and therefore returned later on several occasions, because they obviously 
point to serious problems in official Soviet philosophy: its status as a scientific philosophical 
system, and its relation to philosophy's past. 
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lO.ii.b Orthodoxy and Escape (1930-1946) 
After the "resolution" of philosophical controversy around 1930, the stage was set for the 
elaboration of a Marxist-Leninist history of philosophy IFN was conceived, from the very 
outset, as a philosophicaldisciplme, an application of historical materialism to a specific realm 
of social consciousness 
"Scientific investigation in the field of history of philosophy -and such can at the moment only be a study, 
carried out on the basis of materialist dialectics- presupposes two fundamental conditions In the first place, a 
careful analysis of the epoch of the philosopher or philosophical trend under investigation, both with regard to 
the socio economic relations of that epoch, and with regard to the ideological (scientific, literary etc ) content, 
proper to it In the second place, it is imperative to study the thinker himself by means of primary sources (if 
possible original) "Ό9 
So, "empirical historiography" and philosophical interpretation were united from the 
very beginning First attempts to formulate a Marxist-Leninist conception of the history of 
philosophy can be found in texts, dated 1937 by authors like Aleksandrov or Viktor MarkoviC 
Pózner (1877-1957), where already the existence of a "scientific history of philosophy [istonja 
filosofi! как пайка]" is claimed ' ' n Also, m these texts, we come across all three impulses or 
tendencies outlined above ' · ' The fact that the klassiki did not supply Soviet philosophy with 
an elaborated theory of the history of philosophy contradicted the alleged unity and all-
sidedncss of Marxist-Leninist philosophy Therefore, part of the ideology of Soviet philosophy 
was the quasi-empirical statement that they did furnish such a theory 
' Relentlessly exposing the pscudo scientific character of bourgeois idealist philosophy and history of 
philosophy, Marx and Fngcls created the only fully consistent, scientific world view of the proletariat 
-dialectical materialism- and elaborated a dialectical materialist scientific history of philosophy " " 2 
Similar formulations were repeated in official sources ever since,111 even in such 
otherwise renowned texts as the F£of 1960-1970 
The history of philosophy in the full sense of the term arose in the middle of the 19lh century with the 
appearance of Marxism dialectical and historical materialism which gave a scientific explanation of the origin 
and development of all form of social consciousness, including philosophy ' I ' 4 
It is the development of an allegedly true, scientific philosophy, that enables a true, 
scientific account of philosophy's history, too >15 Consequently, we find a Marxist-Leninist 
history of the "pre-history" of scientific history of philosophy ' '6 Only much later do we find a 
recognition of the fact that the klassiki had not elaborated such a "scientific history of 
philosophy' explicitly in interviews with Soviet historians of philosophy like Anjur Museevic 
Kdnmskij (1932-1994) and Vasilij Vasil'evic Sokolóv (b 1919),"7 implicitly in the 
considerable eflorts invested in the elaboration of such a theory [Ch 121 ш] 
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When Soviet philosophy was "bolshevized" in 1930/1, history of philosophy became "the only 
field, where philosophical thought was still glimmering, and serious philosophical work was 
accomplished"118 It was, according to Aleksandr Fedoroviò Okúlov (1908-1994), who 
looked back upon this period in 1962, "the personality cult that urged many philosophical 
cadres to move from actual problems to the problems of the history of philosophy "49 Early m 
the 1930s, a department [kafedra] of history of philosophy was established at MIFLI [Ch4 u], 
with a staff of both pre-Soviet (A V Kubickij, Viktor Konstantinovic Sereznikov (1873-
1944), Michail Aleksandrovic Dynnik (1896-1971)), and Soviet formation (Ivan Kapitonovic 
Luppol (1897-1943), David Jur'eviö Kvitkó (1889-1942), Boris Stepanovic Cernysev (1896-
1944), Bernard EmmanuiloviC Bychóvskij (1901-1980), Georgij FedoroviS Aleksándrov 
(1908-1961)) >20 This MIFLI has produced many Soviet historians of philosophy, e g , 
Zachar AbramoviC Kaménskij (b 1915) and Teodor Ι1Ί6 Ojzermán (b 1914) 
History of philosophy was not only a field of empirical and therefore ideologically 
neutral activity (the decision to translate the works of Diderot may be ideologically motivated, 
but once that decision is taken, the work itself is ideologically neutral), but also a relatively 
complicatedfield 
Hilher it was more difficult to get to for the philosophical ignorants — here it was necessary to know the 
works of past thinkers the literature that polemized with their ideas or analysed them, that disclosed the socio-
Lultural context of the emergence of the philosophical systems of the past "'21 
Philosophers who were sharply criticized as "menshevizing idealists" or "debonnists", 
such as Asmus, Luppol and Losev,122 subsequently limited themselves to historical work, 
waiting, in Asmus' and Losev's case, for better times They knew themselves backed by 
Lenin, who stressed the importance of study and translation of the materialist and atheist 
tradition,121 and who said that "the collaborators of the journal PZM should organize a 
systematic study of Hegel's dialectic from a materialist point of view "124 As a result, this field 
showed remarkable growth, over the period 1931-1947, in the form of studies into the history 
of philosophy -and not only classical Western philosophy-125, but also and especially in the 
form of translations of Western and publications of Russian classical philosophers 12б 
Of the 108 translations mentioned by Ballestrem for the period 1922-1960, 46 (42%) 
appeared in the 1930s,'27 and so "most editions were done between 1931 and 1940, during the 
'dead period in Soviet philosophy" "128 These translations made "available to the public, m 
large scale, low priced editions, many of the classics of philosophical thought hardly ever 
printed in Russia previously,"129 and it is hardly surprising, that Mitin, in his survey of 25 
years of Soviet philosophy (1919-1944), paid more attention to history of philosophy than to 
dumat and istmat together ™ There was strong stress on philosophers who could be classified 
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as either materialists (the French materialists, Spinoza, Bacon, Hobbes) or dialecticians (Hegel, 
Fichte, Schelling), but classical texts by Kant, Descartes, and Aristotle also were published, 
the only real taboo being an inveterate idealist like Plato | 3 1 One of the small miracles of this 
period was the publication, in 1937, of a Russian translation of Nicholas of Cusa by Losev '32 
However, Western evaluations of Soviet historical work from this period are generally 
negative,133 and the relative prosperity of IFN was short-lived, as later Soviet sources 
recognized 
Gradually a degradation of the level of work into the history of philosophy is beginning The number of 
works by classical philosophers published in Russian translation, is decreasing ' 3 4 
In the 1940s a mere 11 editions appeared, contrasting with the 46 of the 1930s, and the 
34 of the 1950s >35 Certainly, the USSR had other priorities during World War II, but then the 
same might be said of the 1930s with their heavy industrialization, collectivization, famine, and 
terror So there must have been another reason, which was that "the influence of Stalin's 
personality cult was a serious obstacle for the elaboration of a history of philosophy " 1 3 6 If we 
take the "personality cult" as the form of subordination of philosophy to ideology of that 
period, we can discern three aspects of IFN in the 1930s, that have determined its nature 
during its whole subsequent existence 
ι the establishment ot a field of investigation of historical sources, including the 
production of a material basis in the form of editions and translations, 
и the writing of a 'Marxist-Leninist history of philosophy" as an application of historical 
materialism to one form of social consciousness, as well as the development of a 
theoretical conception of philosophy's history (the process) and history of philosophy 
(as a discipline), 
in the subordination of history of philosophy to the exigencies of Soviet ideology in its 
actual form this subordination has been a permanent factor, but has vaned in quality 
and intensity 
Immediate Pohticalization of IFN the Great Patriotic War, Hegel, and Russian 
Philosophy 
The Great Terror (1936-1938), and the publication of Kratkij kurs (1938) meant a reduction of 
philosophy to a single official line [Ch 4 ш] The effect on IFN was that one of its tasks became 
the hagiography of the four klassikimarkuzma-lemmzma, ι e the production of an important 
part of the ideology of Soviet philosophy As the international situation became more grim 
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towards the end of the 1930s, philosophy was deployed in ideological warfare It is instructive 
to listen to a war veteran like Anatohj Daniloviö Kósicev, who wrote 1986 [sic'] 
"In the battle with international Fascism the professors and lecturers of the philosophical faculty, with their 
scientific investigations, teaching propagandists and ideological work, armed the students and aspiranty with 
the Marxist world view, brought them up in a spirit of socialist, Soviet patriotism and proletarian 
internationalism ' '37 
In this deployment, an important role was granted to history and historians of 
philosophy,138 but the confrontation with Nazism and Fascism had more lasting effects on 
¡FN One was the playing down of the importance of German philosophy, esp Hegel (but also 
Feuerbach and Marx) for the development of Marxism, '39 the other the inflation of the role of 
Russian materialist and dialectical traditions in that same process 14° The latter was linked with 
the general establishment of Soviet Patriotism* as a means to mobilize a population that was not 
easily motivated for the construction of "socialism in one country" The calling in of the 
Russian Orthodox Church, the "rehabilitation" of Aleksandr Nevskij and Ivan Groznyj, and the 
upgrading ot (part of) Russia's philosophical past all formed part of a single development 
"The struggle against Fascist ideology the tasks of patriotic education of the Soviet people required further 
investigation of everything valuable, progressive in Russian philosophical and socio-political thought "'41 
Further, the complexity of the relation between dialectical materialism and Hegelian 
dialectics did not and could not suit "stalinist" dogma, and it was resolved by Stalin, at least in 
his name, in 1938 
'In characterising their dialectical method Marx and Engels commonly referred to Hegel as the philosopher who 
had formulated the basic features ot dialectics This however, does not mean that the dialectics of Marx and 
Engels is identical with the dialectics of Hegel In reality Marx and Engels took from Hegel s dialectics only its 
«rational kernel [гасюпаі nnezerno]» discarding the idealistic shell [ie/uc/ia] and developing dialectics further, so 
as to give it a contemporary scientific appearance ' ' 4 ^ 
For these reasons, the historiography of Marxism, and of its immediate predecessor, 
ι e German idealism, suffered most from "personality cult" 1 4 3 Although the edition of 
Hegel's Collected Works was continued -11 volumes appeared between 1930 and 1940-, the 
number of studies into his philosophy decreased, and Lenin's Filosofskie tetrady were 
neglected | 4 4 Soviet "orthodoxy ' meant not so much allegiance to classical texts, but to their 
actual selection It is worthwhile to take a brief look at the reception of Hegel's works during 
the 1930s The Russian translation of his Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, 
published 1932-1935 in less than 20 to 30,000 copies, was received quite favorably it was 
criticized for ignoring materialist philosophy, and in general for absolutizing the history of 
philosophy,'4<> and the 'menshevizing idealists' [ι e the "deborinists", EvdZ] were attacked 
*World War II was called, in the USSR, the Great Patriotic War [ Velikaja Oteiestvennaja Vojna] 
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for uncritically "trying to transfer the Hegelian history of philosophy as a whole into the arsenal 
of Marxism, to include it into a dialectical materialist history of philosophy,"146 but, on the 
whole, Hegel's Vorlesungen... were treated as the "highest point of bourgeois thought about 
the history of philosophy,"147 and as the starting-point of a Marxist-Leninist history of 
philosophy.148 Indeed, Soviet commentators were cautiously seeking the right middle between 
"mechanicist underestimation of this great thinker... [and] deborinist overcstimation."149 
By contrast, in a discussion, in 1936, by Michail DavidoviC Kámmari (1898-1965) of 
Hegel's Philosophie der Geschichte (published in Russian translation in 1936), we find a 
strange mixture of rejection of a simplistic interpretation of Hegel as a reactionary philosopher, 
merely substantiating Prussian monarchy, of protest against a "shortsighted" perception of 
Hegel's notorious identification of the real and the rational as a justification of any actually 
existing political status quo,150 and primitive accusations of "mystification" and "theodicy": 
"The obscurantists of Fascism... also reach for this arch-reactionary rubbish and superstition. (...) Is it necessary 
to show that this scheme [of history moving from East to West, EvdZ] embellishes the pitiful reality of 
bourgeois-landowner Germany, substantiates the bourgeois-nationalist idea of a special mission of «the German 
world», justifies the views of European colonizers about the peoples of China, India, Egypt as objects of 
colonization? Hegel does not recognize these peoples as world-historical [vsemirnojsionccsfcie]."'^1 
Increasing anti-Hegelianism matched a revaluation of Russian philosophy. In 1938, 
idealism (Plato, Kant, Hegel) disappeared from philosophical instruction at MIFLI,^2 where 
in 1937, a first course in history of Russian philosophy was taught. '53 In 1942/3 a systematic 
course on the same subject was taught at MGU,154 and in 1943, a department of the history of 
Russian philosophy was established within the philosophical faculty of MGU, headed by 
lovcuk until 1947, and then by Ivan Jakovlevic SCipánov (1904-1983) for 36 years,'55 who 
may be regarded as the main architects of the much-loathed " revdemokratizm" in Soviet 
historiography of Russian philosophy. In 1942, a book by Vaseckij and IovCuk appeared, 
Oöerki po ¡stoni russkogo materíalízma Х Ш i XIX [Studies into the History of Russian 
Materialism of the 18th and 19th Century], in which "a Marxist appraisal of the materialist 
views of V.G. Belinskij, N.G. Cernysevskij, A.I. Gercen [Herzen], P.N. Ogarev, N.A. 
Dobroljubov was given," and their views were characterized as "the philosophy of 
revolutionary democracy [revoljucionnyj demokratizm],"^6 and as a "mature, in fact the 
highest form of pre-Marxist philosophical materialism, containing fruitful dialectical principles 
and indissolubly linked with the ideas of socialism and people's revolution."157 
A critical investigation of the Soviet interpretation of Russia's philosophical past falls 
beyond the scope of this study. What is important here is the ideologization of this field of 
¡FN, in fact the motivation of its very establishment out of the ideological exigencies of the 
Great Patriotic War. Thus we read in the Ocerki: 
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"The peoples of Russia, and esp its working class, may be proud that Russia became the native land of 
Leninism, that Marxism was not only apprehended in Russia, but also developed, raised to a higher level in the 
works of Lenin and Stalin ( ) Leninism, as comrade Stalin has pointed out, is the highest achievement of 
Russian culture At the same time Leninism, incarnated in the works of Lenin and Stalin, is the summit of 
universal human culture [obS£c£elove£eskaja mirovaja kul'tura] 
It is beyond doubt, that the victory of Marxism in Russia and its triumph in one sixth part of the earth were to a 
considerable extent facilitated by the circumstance that «among the main currents of progressive social thought 
in Russia» there was, as Lenin wrote, «a sound materialist tradition» " 1 5 8 
This view on the history of Russian philosophy is, to say the least, one-sided, '59 and it 
was criticized as such already in 1947 in the second issue of VF by Kamenskij 16° His article 
was one of the grounds to lift Kedrov from his position of editor-in-chief of VF. as appears 
from the commentary by the new board of VF. who claim that it should not have been taken 
into consideration, because "it raises questions that are not subject to discussion, and revises 
the Marxist-Leninist position with respect to the history of Russian social thought."161 
Kamenskij was removed from the IF for some four years, and Bibler, who stood to his 
defence, was exiled to Siberia for several years (both fell victim to the "anti-cosmopolitan" 
campaign of those years) l62 
Nevertheless, Hegel remained the most extensively discussed philosopher in the entire Soviet 
period (with the exception, of course, of the klassiki) Of course, the "Great Patriotic War" 
was a special period, during which it was not hard to find a justification for the subordination 
of theoretical work to immediate practical ends,161 but inasmuch as Soviet-Russian patriotism 
remained an indispensable element of Soviet ideology after the War, anti-Hegellanism and 
revdemokratizm have stayed as elements in IFN throughout the whole period of its existence. 
This ideologization of the history of philosophy bordered on forgery, as is manifest in a 
text ot 1967 by IovCuk, where Russian materialism is almost inserted into the development of 
Marxism: 
"As an important moment [in the work of historians of Russian philosophy, EvdZ] must be regarded here the 
disclosing [raskrytic] of the fact, that classical 19th century Russian materialist philosophy -the philosophy of 
Gercen [Нсггеп], Ogarev, Behnskij, Cernysevskij, Dobroljubov- forms a new, highest stage in the development 
ot pre-Marxist materialism, representing a transitory form from the dialectic of German classical philosophy to 
the materialist dialectic of Marx [italics mine, EvdZ] " , 6 4 
«Seraja LoScad' [The Grey Horse]». The First Marxist-Leninist History of Philosophy 
The years immediately preceding World War II saw continued, though decreased publication of 
classical philosophical texts (Aristotle, Bacon, Helvétius, Rousseau, Hegel's Vorlesungen über 
die Ästhetik),к>5 and an increase of publication of classical texts from the Russian tradition 
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(Lomonosov, Radiscev, Belinskij, Gercen [Herzen], CernySevskij, Dobroljubov, Pisarev, 
Plechanov), in which "the profound and everlasting power of the best traditions of 
philosophical thought of the Russian people and of the other peoples of the USSR was 
shown."166 in 1941, the faculties of MIFLI were fused with MGU, and the MIFLI-department 
of history of philosophy, headed by Cernysev since 1940 (succeeding Aleksandrov, who had 
been chairman since 1938)167, became, in 1944, after the establishment of the department of 
the history of Russian philosophy, one of two historical departments of the philosophical 
faculty of MGU, under the name of kafedra istorii zapadnoevropejskoj Filosofii.](>s In this 
way, IFN remained firmly established in the country's leading philosophical faculty. 
Further, first steps were set towards the production of a Soviet, Marxist-Leninist 
account of philosophy's past. Thus, in 1939, a book by Aleksandrov was published, entitled 
Oöerk novoj Filosofii na zapade [An Outline of Modern Western Philosophy]. For his review of 
this work, "in which I mentioned some of its mistakes and actual inexactitudes," Evgenij 
Petrovié Sitkóvskij (1900-1989) was sent to a "corrective labor camp" for a couple of years.169 
In 1940 a concise history of philosophy, written by A.V. Sceglov, appeared.170 
But the main event of these years was the preparation by the IF of a monumental 
Istorija Ftlosofìi [IFJ], planned in seven volumes,171 edited by Aleksandrov, Bychovskij, 
Mitin, and Judin,172 with contributions by historians of philosophy like Asmus, Dynnik, 
Cernysev, Orest VladimiroviC Trachtenberg (1889-1959), and Boris Fëdorovic PórSnev (1905-
1972). In 1939 the first volume (on the philosophy of Antiquity and the Middle Ages), and in 
1940 the second volume (on philosophy from the 15th to the 18th century) of this work were 
ready for publication,,73 and they both appeared in 1941, also serving the cause of war, if we 
believelovcuk: 
"...it was necessary lo show, lhat precisely ihc Soviet people and those democratic forces that joined it in the 
anti-Hitler coalition were standing for the achievements of the world's civilization, including the philosophical 
heritage of mankind. To this was dedicated, in particular,... «Istorija Filosofii». In it it was shown that the 
values of the world's civilization, including those of philosophy, belong to socialism and democracy."17'* 
Apart from this propagandistic goal, the IF3 was a first attempt to compose a history of 
philosophy from a Marxist-Leninist perspective,'75 making the transition "from the analysis of 
the doctrines of separate philosophers... to an examination of the history of philosophy of the 
world as a whole,"176 and "illuminating its main line — from the philosophy of Antiquity to 
the sources of dialectical materialism."177 It focused on the role of materialist and dialectical 
traditions in the history of philosophy,17S and aimed, in line with historical materialism and 
proletarian internationalism, at a universal history of philosophy. The work was nick-named 
"Seraja loscad' [The Grey Horse]" because of its color, and its high intellectual level. Being 
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intended, primarily, to instruct future Soviet philosophers, it was received approvingly, 1 7 9 and 
remained an important source for subsequent IFN 18° 
In 1942, the authors of IF3 were awarded the Stalin-prize for their work on the first 
three volumes ι«' However, when the third volume (on philosophy in the first half of the 19th 
century, ι e esp German classical philosophy) appeared in 1943, it was heavily attacked In 
1944 the Central Committee issued a special resolution, signed by Stalin,182 and published in 
Bol sevik. under the title "On the Shortcomings and Mistakes in the Illumination of the History 
of German Philosophy of the End of the 18th and the Beginning of the 19th Century",'83
 m 
which the first two volumes were mildly criticized, but the third very severely 1 8 4 The Stalin-
prize for the third volume, edited mainly by Bychovskij,'85 was withdrawn, 186 and the book 
"was withdrawn from scientific use and from the libraries," 1 8 7 thus becoming an absolute 
antiquarian rarity In this manner, Aleksandrov, Mitin, and Judin could become heroes of 
Soviet philosophy without the third volume exerting its disastrous influence 1 8 8 This episode 
has been watered down in later Soviet hagiography of .iT-iV,189 but apparently it was serious 
enough to drive one of the main accused, Cernysev, to death 19° 
What was so inadmissibly bad about this third volume9 In the light of the foregoing 
discussion, it comes as no surprise that this book suffered from an insufficiently critical attitude 
towards German philosophy, esp with respect to the nationalist and racist elements in Hegel s 
philosophy,191 of a "rapprochement of Hegelian and Marxist dialectics,"192 and an 
underestimation of the Russian philosophical heritage 
The third volume ot «Istonja filosofii» was subject to criticism in the Soviet press Attempting to set otf 
against Fascist ideology the spiritual richness, created in the past by the progressive minds of Germany the 
authors insufficiently criticized the reactionary socio-political aspects of German idealism, , which was a 
serious mistake esp in those years, when these ideas were employed and inflated [галУи а/is 1 by Fascism ' 1 9 3 
Reportedly, the qualification of Hegel's philosophy as an "aristocratic reaction to the 
French revolution and French materialism' was a contribution to IFN by Stalin himself,!94 
eclipsing more balanced judgments like that of Kamman in 1936 "One should not forget that 
Hegel stressed the «universal historical significance» of the revolution of 1789 "1 95 Such 
nuancing clearly was unacceptable not only "to the obscurantists [ттакоЬечу] of Fascism,"196 
but also to their equally "obscurantist" adversary Stalin 
The real error of 1F3 was its pursuit of some level of historical adequacy The criticism, 
voiced by Іо бик as late as 1958, that the first two volumes did not discuss the philosophy of 
the peoples of the USSR,19? at first sight is absurd, because that discussion was planned for 
the 5th volume'198 But the problem was that the 4th volume would discuss the emergence of 
Marxism Which would then appear as the direct result of West European philosophy (vols I-
III), eclipsing Russian philosophy as a forerunner ot Marxism-Leninism Not surprisingly, the 
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authors of IF3, and esp. the author of the part on Hegel, CemySev,i99
 w e r e accused of 
"objectivism" — a synonym for "lack of partynosf'."2*3 
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lO.ii.c The Cold Start of Post-War IFN (1947-1955) 
No more volumes of IF3 appeared,201 even though the fourth volume was ready for print 202 
Instead, Aleksandrov, one of the editors of the rejected work, was given the task to write a 
work to replace it 203 It appeared in 1945 in 25,300 copies (republished 1946 in 50,000 
copies), based on a series of lectures at the VP§ pn CK VKP(b) Istonja zapadnoevwpejskoj 
filosofa [The History of West European Philosophy] 204 This "elementary exposition of the 
history of philosophy in Western Europe, abounding in mistakes and inaccuracies,"205 was 
awarded the Stahn-pnze in 1946,206 but then became the corpus delicti of the discussion of 
1947 |Ch 51) 207 Aleksandrov showed himself "self-critical" and conscious of his guilt,208 and 
the many speeches were highly critical of his book 
' Aleksandrov wurde beschuldigt das Wesen des Marxismus und seine Beziehung zu den früheren Philosophien 
nicht hegntfen 7U haben die russische Philosophie habe er vernachlässigt er besitze nicht den Kampfgeist der 
Partei gebrauche nicht die starke Sprache l enins und sei objektiv — ganz zu schweigen von den technischen 
Irrtumern und erheblichen Lucken 2°9 
The charges of objectivism2·0 and lack of Leninist militancy [partijnost' 2 (Ch 8 и)],21 ' 
are related to Aleksandrov s overestimation of Hegel", not sufficiently taking into account his 
disqualification as aristocratic reaction to the French revolution" 2 1 2 As Bogdanov remarked, 
many philosophers rejected that qualification during the discussion of 1947, but it continued to 
prevent serious study of Hegel s philosophy until the mid ^ O s , 2 1 1 becoming part of "actual 
Marxism" (Kolakowski) 
Im Jahre 1950 wußte jeder Marxist daß Hegels Philosophie cinc aristokratische Reaktion auf die 
franzosische Revolution war Jeder Marxist ivuflfc es auch dann wenn er keine Ahnung hatte in welchem 
Jahrhundert Hegel lebte 2 1 4 
There is certainly some substance in these charges, although it is hard to believe that 
Aleksandrov was to be blamed for them The chapter on German philosophy (Kant to 
Feuerbach) is about three times as long as that on the formation of Marxism a clear testimony 
of lack of Bolshevik partijnost' And Aleksandrov at times merely recounts "objectively" the 
position of a given philosopher, which he justifies with the anyhow questionable thesis that the 
conservative and reactionary aspects of the philosophies of Kant, Fichte, and Hegel were not 
significant in the historical development of science "Of significance was the progressive aspect 
of German philosophy of the 18th and the beginning of the 19th century — the doctrine of the 
dialectical development of thought "2И Aleksandrov further substantiates his positive 
appreciation of Hegel with Lenin s Filosofskie tetrady, but he dutifully appeals to Stalin to 
stress the difference between Hegelian and Marxist dialectics 2 1 6 As a whole, the charge of 
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lack of partisanship [parti/nost 2] is a clear-cut example of the ideologically legitimized control 
of the CPSU over Soviet philosophy [partijnost' 3 and 4] 
The charge of eurocentnsm' 217 was to the point as well Aleksandrov did write about 
West European philosophy Now, this may sound like accusing someone who wrote a book 
about bumblebees of not having written about butterflies, but we arc dealing with attempts to 
produce an official Marxist-Leninist account of the historical development of philosophy The 
point is that, ending with chapters on German philosophy (chapter 7) and the emergence of 
Marxism (chapter 8), Aleksandrov indeed skips Russian philosophy, limiting himself to the 
remark that "the history of West European thought received an outstanding and profound 
illumination in the works of the great Russian scientists and thinkers "2 | 8 Aleksandrov can 
hardly be accused of lack of patriotism, as he begins his work with the declaration that "the 
Soviet people, fighting, under the guidance of the Bolshevik party, for great and noble ideas, 
comes forward as the genuine defendant of the centuries-old culture and civilization of the 
world against its destructors,"219 and ends by stating that "the fact, that the Red Army has 
gained victory over a German-Fascist army of many millions, is evidence of the force and 
truth of the theory that guides the Soviet people "22° But Aleksandrov did not manage to 
(re)wnte the history of philosophy in such a way as to ascribe to Russian philosophical thought 
the role of, so to speak, catalyst 
The main charge, viz that Aleksandrov did not adequately interpret the relationship of 
Marxism to preceding philosophy, underestimating" the revolutionary nature of Marxism,22' 
was equally to the point Despite his obedient declaration of the superiority of Marxism-
Leninism,222 and his frequent reference to the philosophical genius of Stalin,2^ Aleksandrov 
failed to demonstrate that Marxism was at the same time the supreme outcome of the whole 
history of philosophy and the completely original creation of four subsequent philosophical 
geniuses Marx and Engels, Lenin and Stalin 
Of greater philosophical interest is Aleksandrov's general approach to the history of 
philosophy He is rather sparing m indicating the socio-economic and political background of 
philosophical positions his account is largely ' immanent", and not "historical materialist" in 
any recognizable sense He attempts to justify this by modifying the fundamental thesis of 
historical materialism, that "the spiritual life of society is a reflection of the conditions of its 
material life,"224 by saying that "at the same time, they [the klassiki, including Stalin, EvdZ] 
showed the enormous role of ideas in social development, its organizing significance for the 
progressive class of contemporary society,"225 and by relativizing it with the thesis that "the 
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history of the ideologies is in the final analysis the reflection of the economic and political life 
of people in this or that epoch of the development of society " 2 2 6 
This points to two central theoretical questions of IFN that of the independent status of 
philosophy,227 and that of penodization of its history Both are recurring themes m IFN 
Determination "In the Final Analysis the'Relative Independence" of Philosophy 
The question of the independence of philosophy, is a consequence of the dual status of 
philosophy On the one hand, philosophy is part of the ideological superstructure and thus falls 
within the scope of historical materialism [Ch 81 and 101] On the other hand, the Soviet system 
itself stressed the enormous importance of the "right ' philosophy as the theoretical basis of 
Marxist-Leninist ideology [Ch 7 и ш] Philosophy was seen as a cause rather than as an effect 
of social progress, technical development etc , and thus " historical materialism not only does 
not deny, but, on the contrary, stresses the important role and importance of ideas in social 
life "228 
The Soviet solution to this problem was a wonderful specimen of "flexible dogma" 
[Ch 8 n] In official sources on IFN we nearly always find, from the 1930s to the 1980s, a 
double statement, claiming, on the one hand, the determination "in the final analysis [v 
koneönom sâete] ' of philosophy by historical, ι e socio-economic conditions, and stressing, 
on the other hand, its 'relative independence [otnositel'naja samostojatel'nost"]' 2 2 9 Both 
formulations have a textual basis in letters by the late Engels, where he is at pains to prevent a 
vulgar interpretation of historical materialism 23o The thesis of the relative independence of 
philosophy has entitled Soviet historians of philosophy to treat philosophy as having a history 
of its own, and the study of this history as philosophically, not just historically relevant But 
this stress also served the subordination of philosophy to its ideological function, as it 
substantiated the thesis that philosophy was a cause in historical development, ι e in building 
socialism 
The "double statement' is already present m 1937 in a key text by Aleksandrov 
Marx and Engels Lenin and Slahn minutely elaborated not only general and fundamental questions about the 
dependence of the history of ideas in the final analysis, upon the history of relations of production of the 
economic basis of society, but they also applied the materialist understanding of history to the explanation of 
the large-scale phenomena of the history of philosophy ' 2 3 · 
Consequently, the history of philosophy, "like the history of any other science, does 
not have an independent character, because the history of ideologies is a reflection of the 
history of human society itself,"232 and this means that 
these requirements of historical materialism, with respca to the history of philosophy, come down, 
basically to three main provisos 
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1 To regard the history of philosophy as one of the ideological superstructures, developing in connection with 
the whole totality of social life and being the reflection in the consciousness of people of, in the final analysis, 
their relations of production 
2 To conduct the investigation of philosophical doctrines and the elucidation of their essence with maximum 
concrétenos·; as far as accessible in \ lew of the slate of corresponding fields of knowledge 
3 To study the history of philosophy as a special field of ideological class struggle, remembering that 
contemporary philosophy is just as partisan as it was two thousand years ago '233 
In Aleksandrov's htonja zapadnoevropejskoj filosofi! of 1945/6 the "double statement" 
occupies a central place, too 
' Marxist-I eninist science, having fixed [ustanoviv] that the development of philosophical thought is 
determined, in the final analysis, by the conditions of the material life of society, remarks at the same time the 
relativendcpendence of the development ot philosophical science as well as the connection and succession of 
ideas that exist in history The history of philosophy is the history of a particular field of social ideological 
activity of people [italics mine, EvdZ] "234 
Aleksandrov's argument for history of philosophy as a separate field is rather tortuous 
"The founders of Marxism-Leninism think that philosophical systems possess in their history only a certain 
relativandependencc of development And therefore [italics mine, bvdZ] we are entitled to say that history of 
philosophy has as its proper subject matter not the history of economics, not the history of politics, not the 
history of art or literature but precisely the history of philosophical ideas History of philosophy has Us own 
particular subject, Philosophy possesses in its development a relative independence "235 
The shift from "only a certain relative independence" to "relative independence" 
legitimizes IFN as an independent discipline Of course, it is an obvious rhetorical trick, but 
there are two complementary reasons for it the (subjective) urge of philosophers to engage in 
history of philosophy as itself a "relatively independent" field of activity, and the (objective) 
need of the Party to obtain a defensible account of philosophy's past that could substantiate the 
ideology of philosophy [Ch 9 m] Once these two requirements had met, the further 
development of IFN was a matter of tug-of-war between the historians, who stressed the 
independence of their discipline, and the "party-philosophers", who insisted on the partijnost' 
of philosophy 
Soviet historians of philosophy have preferred to stick to a less than final analysis The reason 
for this is, in the first place, that it is difficult to write the history of philosophy in a reductionist 
manner It is worthwhile to look at Aleksandrov's argument as to why and how philosophical 
thought is determined by "social being" 
The relations of production between people determine the nature of philosophical theories only in the final 
analysis being the final source of philosophical theories, the source of the direction [ napravleme, by which is 
meant their politically progressive or reactionary nature bvdZl of these theories and their content In the second 
place they determine the selection of intellectual material that a philosopher turns to In the third place, 
economy determines which content is put into [vkladyvactsja] the old philosophical categories, concepts, 
theories and hypotheses by the new social class In the fourth place the relations of production between people, 
their practical activity reveals the laws ot nature and society and philosoph) reflects these laws The practical 
activity of people confronts social consciousness with new tasks and finally in the fifth place, the productive 
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activily of man not only reveals new aspects of the objective world and presents new tasks, but also yields 
practical means for the realization of these tasks "236 
It is both easier and more interesting to describe the subsequent philosophical doctrines, and 
simply add to this a general picture of social, political, cultural, and scientific "circumstances", 
than to enter into an analysis of the precise determination of philosophy by the relations of 
production 
In the second place, a reductionist approach would be incompatible both with the 
educational function of IFN, and with the role and pretension of Soviet philosophy itself If, 
therefore, the account of the actual determination of philosophy by "social being" offers an 
unreflected catalogue of vague forms of determination of theory by practice, this is precisely 
how it fitted its purpose This "primitive" attempt at a historical materialist conception of the 
history of philosophy was, itself, favored by the historical situation, and in that sense an 
example of the "determination" of philosophy by "social being", in this case by the Party's 
need to turn philosophy into an "ideological instrument " As Kamenka wrote in 1965 
"The dissolution of philosophy as a discipline, implicit in the concept of Marxism as the scientific foundation 
for all knowledge and in its tendency toward economic reductionism, has not become part of the official ideology 
ot BoKhevik Marxism ( ) Marxism Leninism was proclaimed as the guiding philosophy permeating all 
Communist activities and as the indispensable foundation for all Soviet practical and intellectual work ( ) As 
Soviet leaders, from Stalin onward, came to ascribe more and more importance to ideology as a means of 
gaining social support and exercising social control, the economic reductionism implicit in the materialist 
interpretation ot history was modified more and more "237 
The shift towards stress on philosophy as a factor in historical development is manifest 
in a main official "stalinist" source, the KSF, where it says about "History of philosophy as a 
science" 
" only the ideology of the proletariate -Marxism- yields the sole true criterion and the guiding ideas for the 
creation of a science of the history ot philosophy ( ) Philosophical theories and views form a superstructure 
and change together with the changes of its basis Just like any superstructure, philosophical views and theories, 
forming an active force of social development, help their basis to become stronger [italics mine, EvdZ] "238 
History and Truth the Problem ofPenodization 
The other fundamental question of IFN, that of the proper, "Marxist-Leninist" penodization of 
philosophy's history, shows the tension between the economist and totalizing impulses to the 
history of philosophy 239 The Marxist penodization of history was based on Marx' 
formulation in the "Preface" to Zur Kritik 
"In großen Umrissen können asiatische, antike, feudale und modern bürgerliche Produktionsweisen als 
progressive Epochen der ökonomischen Gesellschaftsformation bezeichnet werden Die bürgerlichen 
Produktionsverhaltnisse sind die letzte antagonistische Form des gesellschaftlichen Produktionsprozesses, aber 
die im Schoß der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft sich entwickelnden Produktivkräfte schaffen zugleich die materiellen 
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Bedingungen 7ur Losung dieses Antagonismus Mit dieser Gesellschaftsformation schließt daher die 
Vorgeschichte der menschlichen Gesellschaft ab "240 
Soviet ïstnmt had a problem with the "asiatic mode of production": it was ascribed, by 
Marx, to geographic circumstance, which undermined the absolute primacy of productive 
forces, it was historically stable, which weakened the inevitability of progress, and it cut across 
the universal scheme of evolution of society, being situated between primitive and antique 
society, but clearly not part of Europe's development241 In official sources, it was eliminated, 
and the pjatiölenka [five-stage sequence] consisted of. primitive communahsm - slave-holding 
society - feudalism - capitalism - (socialism) communism 242 
The relation of universal historical penodization with the historical development of 
philosophy presented a problem to ¡FN One the one hand, if philosophy is part of ideological 
superstructure, following in its development the succession of socio-economic formations, and 
if that succession is historically inevitable, then there must be, in all parts of the world, a 
parallel development of philosophy w This has led Soviet historians of philosophy to discern 
a slave-holding, a feudal, and a bourgeois-capitalist period in the development of philosophy 
in, e g , Japan, Russia, Georgia, or Argentine.244 On the other hand, if diamat and istmat 
represent true, scientific philosophy, then the history of philosophy must be the history of the 
coming-into-being ofthat single philosophical truth 245 Thus a conflict between parallelism and 
unity of development appears. 
Both ideas can be traced back to Hegel's idea of philosophy as "child of its epoch", as 
"ihre Zeit, in Gedanken erfaßt", and the idea of the historical coming-into-being of one 
philosophical truth. In Hegel, these ideas are linked and substantiated by the idea that both are 
thought as part of one and the same process, the appearance and commg-to-itself [Fur-sich-
werden] of the absolute idea. Rejection of this objective idealist foundation implies a conflict 
between determination of the development of philosophical thought by socio-economic 
conditions, and the teleology present in the genesis of truth, if manifest truth [an und tur sich 
wahres Wissen] is not the immanent goal of reality, then its appearance in history is 
inexplicable, with respect to both the fact and the moment of its appearance, and hence is either 
a miracle, or the work of pure genius. The latter interpretation fitted well to the predominantly 
ideological function of Soviet philosophy, but is theoretically not satisfying, and at odds with 
histoncalmatenalism. 
In sum, the conflict is that between a universal history of philosophy and a history of universal 
philosophy. Two stones are in conflict here: according to one story, philosophy is part of the 
ideological superstructure, and its penodization is in line with the succession of socio-
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economic formations; according to the other story, Marxism meant a revolution in the history 
of philosophy, dividing it into two epochs: 
"Philosophy before and philosophy after Marx are really incomparable."^ 
The solution to this problem is to identify the formulation of dialectical and historical 
materialism, the revolution in philosophy, i.e. the transition from pre-Marxist to Marxist 
thought, with the breakdown of capitalism and the proletarian revolution, i.e. with the 
transition from pre-history to history. But the price paid for this solution is a recognition of the 
primacy of ideas over history, since Marxist thought is supposed to have played a major role in 
a transition that it preceded: in the second half of the 20th century, international class struggle 
and the construction of socialism in one country were far from accomplished fact.* 
IFN at a Standstill 
What was demanded of IFN during the 1947 discussion demonstrated the very limit of history 
of philosophy. It is impossible, first of all, to insert Russian philosophical thought, however 
materialist, dialectical, or revolutionary it may have been, between Hegel and Marx: even if 
Russian thinkers might have led Marx and Engels to historical and dialectical materialism, they 
did not do so. Secondly, it is impossible to minimalize the influence of Hegel on Marxism 
without ignoring much of what not only Deborin and Plechanov, but Marx, Engels, and Lenin 
had written. Thirdly, it is impossible to regard Marxism-Leninism as the sum-total of 
everything valuable in past philosophy and as the product of original genius. 
The requirements set before IFN thus made /FNimpossible: 
"The discussion about the book by G.F. Aleksandrov had most deplorable consequences not just for the science 
of the history of philosophy, but for all scholarly work in the Field of philosophy."24^ 
The consequences became quickly visible: there was a slight increase in the number of 
translations of classical philosophical texts, growth setting in only after 1953,248 and a sharp 
decrease in historical studies.249 A Soviet source of 1965 does not mention a single title in IFN 
over the whole period 1947-1955,250 Rybarczyk reports an average of 1 review in IFN until 
the mid 1950s, and of about 10 per year in the period 1955-1970.251 of the 300 books and 
articles he took into account over the period 1947-1970, a mere 20 fell into the 1947-1955 
period (2.2 a year), the remaining 280 into 1956-1970 (18.6 yearly).^2 The work that was 
done fell mainly into the categories of history of Russian philosophy 2^3 and KBF.™ τ
η m e
 18 
*I take lor granted that both the problem, resulting from a "doctrinal" interpretation of texts and single 
statements by Marx, and the solution have little to do with Marxist theory as such: they are specifically Soviet 
phenomena (the present section has been inspired by Fleischer 1984 and Nikiforov 1990c). 
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issues of VF that appeared 1951-1953, there were a mere 8 articles on pre-Marxist foreign 
philosophy 255 
The critique of eurocentusm was linked to ideological struggle,256 to a schematic 
polarization ot the history of philosophy into materialists and idealists,2,57 and to the qualitative 
difference between Marxist and non-Marxist philosophy 258 The net result was a ' militant" 
critique of non-Marxist philosophy 
Der Diskussionsbeitrag [of2danov EvdZ] hatte die gewünschte Wirkung die Sowjet Philosophen verbanden 
seitdem ihre Kritik der bürgerlichen Philosophie mit besonders heftigen Schimpfkanonaden und betonten weit 
radikaler als vorher den angeblich qualitativen Unterschied zwischen bürgerlicher und marxistischer 
Philosophie ' 2 5 9 
During the 1947 discussion, one philosopher stood out as a "partisan" of history of 
philosophy as a discipline Asmus He was one of the very few who displayed some 
knowledge of contemporary non-Soviet philosophy, and made a plea for critical discussion of 
the works of "the historians of philosophy of contemporary capitalist society,"26" rhetorically 
asking 
"Do we, Soviet philosophers, have the right not to keep up with all these phenomena [such as non materialist 
interpretations of modern science in Western literature, EvdV], not to answer them with our own works, our 
own articles and books, not to expose not only those, who talk an open, clear mystical and idealist nonsense, 
but also those, who attempt to dress contemporary idealism in the cloak of strict science9 It seems lo me, that 
we not only do not have such a right, but also that, if we act that way, we make a serious, at the same time 
theoretical, scholarly and political mistake"261 
It was only towards the end of the 1950s that Soviet philosophy began to show an 
interest in Western philosophical thought It was in the late 1950s that Jury KonstantinoviC 
Mel'vil (1912-1993) founded the first systematic course in KBF,™ and it was in 1958 that 
KBF was established as a sub-discipline of IFN with a department at the IF 263 
So, if the 1947 discussion can be seen as the beginning of a revival of Soviet philosophy,264 
this certainly is not true of IFN 
' A A Zdanov did not so much teach Soviet philosophers how to write the history of their science, but 
how to get away from their histoncism and how lo treat current problems in an original way 
This may explain the general revival of Soviet philosophy after 1947 and the relatively little interest in the 
history of philosophy '265 
Shortly after the discussion, "the Central Committee of the Ali-Union Communist Party 
commissioned Comrades G F Aleksandrov, M A Dynnik, Μ Τ Iovcuk, В M Kedrov, 
M A Leonov, M В Mitin, and О V Trachtenberg to write a new Istonja filosofii, this time in 
two volumes, in which the conclusions of the philosophical discussion and the criticism made 
during the discussion of Comrade Aleksandrov's book should be given close considera­
tion " 2 6 6 In the konspekt [synopsis] of IF2, published m the second issue of VF, and to which 
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the editors awaited "criticism from readers, directed toward the improvement of this prospectus 
and the fullest possible application of the results of the 1947 philosophical discussion,"267 
two volumes were planned, the first dealing with pre-Marxist philosophy, the second with the 
development of Marxism Three features are remarkable about this konspekt26* 
ι The question about the place of Russian philosophy was "resolved", after ample 
discussion,2^ m such a way as not to violate historical truth too seriously, but upholding the 
suggestion that Russia was on the edge of founding historical and dialectical materialism itself 
In the konspekt of chapters 15 and 16 of vol I, it reads 
"The task of these chapters is to reveal the nature and significance of the philosophy of Russian revolutionary 
democracy of the 1840 s 1860 s as the highest form of pre-Marxist materialistic philosophy to show that the 
Russian materialistic philosophy was the sole progressive philosophical movement contemporary with Marx 
and Engels which subjected the reactionary bourgeois philosophy of that time to sharp criticism, 2 7° 
и Non-Marxist philosophy after the formation of Marxism was dealt with in part two, but 
notseparately 
'The majority of the authors were inclined to the belief that this criticism of bourgeois philosophy should be set 
forth in terms of the struggle of Marxism against contemporary bourgeois philosophy 271 
in Hegel, finally, was dealt with in a chapter obediently entitled "The Aristocratic Reaction 
in Germany to the French Bourgeois Revolution and French Materialism" 2 7 2 
This second attempt at a Marxist-Leninist universal history of philosophy never saw the light of 
day A discussion within the IF was announced for 1950,273 and some chapters were 
published for discussion in VF 2 7 4 It was decided to publish a maket [draft version] in 550 
copies in 1950, and the book itself in 1951, but then nothing was heard of it until 1953, when 
the first volume was announced for 1954 2 7 5 The maket of the first volume, covering the 
whole history of pre-Marxist philosophy, appeared with references to Stalin on every page, 
and in total independence of the subject at hand 2 7 6 The book never appeared in print, and the 
authors's collective was heavily criticized in 1955 
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lO.ii.d The Liberation of IFN (1955-1968) 
Kline reported some relaxation in IFN since 1953,277 but it was "only after 1954 or 1955 [that] 
studies in history of philosophy became more frequent again." 278 ¡n fact, there was a 
remarkable quantitative increase.279 When, in 1967, an exhibition of the "numerous works in 
various branches of historical study in philosophy created in the USSR in 1956-1966" was 
organized, there was no mention of works of an earlier date.280 In this respect, 1955 can be 
regarded as the year of birth of IFN as a recognized separate field in Soviet philosophy.28· In 
1954, Ojzerman was appointed chairman of the department of history of West European 
philosophy at MGU, which he remained until 1968.282 One of the immediate effects of this 
appointment was a renewed study of the formation of Marxism itself (Ojzerman's name was 
made with his Formirovanie ñlosofii marksizma [The Formation of the Philosophy of 
Marxism] of 1962 ICh.ll.iii.d]).283 Though explicitly opposing any kind of "revisionism", esp. 
any distinction of an "early" and a "mature" Marx, this meant at least a return to original 
sources, as well as a recognition of the fact that Marxism had come into being in a discussion 
within German philosophy, which thus became a legitimate field of historical study. 
In 1955, the department of history of Russian philosophy was renamed department of 
the history of the philosophy of the peoples of the USSR [kafedra istorii füosofü narodov 
SSSR],2*4 and became a place where aspiranty [post-graduates] from the Soviet republics 
learned to (re)write the history of philosophy of their country in a Marxist-Leninist vein. 2g5 In 
1957, the department of history of West European philosophy was renamed department of the 
history of foreign philosophy [kafedra istorii zarubeinoj filosofii, IZF], more in line with the 
actual investigations of Chinese, Japanese, Indian, and Arabian philosophy.286 In 1958, 
finally, a department of the history of Marxist-Leninist philosophy [kafedra istorii marksistsko-
leninskoj filosofii] was established,287 headed until 1963 by IovCuk, and then by Vaseckij 
(until 1970, when KosiCev replaced him).288 Needless to say that the kafedra IZF was the least 
"ideologized" of these three historical departments: it became renowned and popular for its high 
quality and relative lack of orthodoxy. At this department, comprehensive courses on the entire 
history of Western philosophy up to Marx were created by Sokolov and Narskij in the late 
1950s — early 1960s [Ch.l l.ii].289 
But there also was qualitative change, consisting, in the first place, in a shift in the appreciation 
of the philosophy of Hegel, whose works had, according to an article in Kommunist, the 
official theoretical organ of the CPSU, unjustly been "underestimated",290 and there was a 
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revival in "bourgeois-objectivist" studies on such philosophers as Kant, Spinoza, and 
Hegel 291 The previous stress on the "materialist line" gave way to a more balanced division of 
attention, both in studies and in translations of classical figures of Western philosophy 
'There are of course, studies on materialistic philosophers like the two recent books on Democnlus and three 
books on Giordano Bruno But there is a considerable number of publications on progressive but non-
matenalistic philosophers like the book by V F Asmus on Descartes and six recent books on Hegel The most 
astonishing fact in this context is the number of books on Kant (here are six since 1957 292 
" we know of editions in translation ot works of 51 philosophers of whom 28 are materialists', 8 idealists 
and 17 in between The number of these editions is 110 some of them in several volumes ' 294 
In the second place, Soviet historians of philosophy were accused, in editorials in 
Kommunist and VF, of not writing the history of philosophy, of "failing to exhibit the process 
of development of specifically philosophic questions," 294 and of reducing philosophy to 
ideology 295 
In the third place, the editors oí VF. objected to "the overvaluation of the role of Russian 
philosophy "296 Scipanov was reproached for failing to criticize, in a review, the author's 
""groundless" setting up ot Russian materialism as superior to foreign matenalism"297 (this 
author most probably had acted upon guidelines set by Scipanov himself, who supervised than 
85 candidate s and 15 doctoral dissertations'298) Non-Soviet histories of Russian philosophy 
(Zen'kovskij 1948 and Losskij 1951) were reviewed for the first time in VF and Kommunist 
— critically, to be sure, but the "spasmodic attacks interspersed between paragraphs of quite 
calm analysis [had] the disconnected air of editorial afterthoughts,"299
 and a plea was made to 
study, again of course critically, Russian idealist philosophers, too, instead of only 
materialists, "as had hitherto been the practice "300 
In 1955, too, the project of the new IF2 was submitted to severe criticism in an editorial in VF 
The authors had presented past philosophy as mere ideology, " refuting the systems of 
classical European philosophy and giving the impression that dialectical materialism 'had 
simply dropped from the heavens' "301 Aleksandrov was accused of having passed from 
"bourgeois objectivism" (the accusation of 1947) to "a nihilistic denial of the value of 
bourgeois philosophers,"302 and of "conjuncturalism [konjunkturscma]", ι e lack of principle 
in his elaboration and evaluation of philosophy's history 3 0 3 Where Aleksandrov previously, 
in 1945/6, had presented the emergence of Marxism as an evolutionary development out of 
preceding philosophy, thus eclipsing the genius of the klassiki, now he had failed to take into 
account "that the "revolution", realized in the history of philosophy by Marxism, was the 
inevitable result of previous development " 3 0 4 Also, the "previous minimizing of Western 
influences on Behnskij, Cernysevskij, Dobroljubov, and others" now was "repudiated as 
erroneous "W 
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Finally, there was a remarkable change towards contemporary Western philosophy in 
"style and seriousness of content,"106 part of a "slightly increased hospitality toward the ideas 
of non-Marxist-Leninist thinkers "307 In 1954, translations appeared of hitherto neglected 
philosophers, e g , of F Bacons New Atlantis, Montaigne's Essays Also, in this exercise of 
kntika ι samokritika it was complained that there were no recent editions of, e g , Hegel, and 
that "publication of the works of outstanding foreign philosophers during the last few years has 
been neglected — which is absolutely intolerable " 308 This also applied to non-European 
philosophy the translation of Introduction of Indian Philosophy by S Chatterjee and D M 
Datta was "an event difficult to imagine m the Stalinist period "309 
IFN Under Revision «Krasnyj Osci [The Red Donkey]» 
One of the effects of "destahmzation ' was a third attempt at a universal Istonja filosofa [IF6\ 
" after 1954 or 1955 preparations were begun for a new general outline of the history of 
philosophy, for which one had still not found a satisfactory solution "ЗЮ The first two 
volumes were edited by Dynnik, Iovcuk, Kedrov, Mitin, and Trachtenberg, from the 3rd 
volume onwards Ojzerman and Okulov replaced Trachtenberg, who had died in 1959 Initially 
planned in 4, the final edition comprised 6 volumes,1! ι was published by the IF from 1957 till 
1965 in impressive editions (between 37,000 and 50,000 copies), and translated into 9 foreign 
languages312 But the book came out with considerable delay The first two volumes appeared 
1957, the next two 1959, the 5th in 1961, but the sixth was announced first for 1962,313 then 
for 1964,314 and finally appeared m 1965 This delay of the last volume is not surprising, as "a 
central place in this book is occupied by the analysis of the Leninist stage in the philosophy of 
Marxism after 1917 "315 In those politically turbulent years of destahmzation, ottepel', and 
Breznevian "restoration", this was a most sensitive area With the exception of Aleksandrov, 
the same people were responsible Dynnik, Іо бик, Kedrov, Mitin, and Trachtenberg had been 
in charge of the failed IF2 as well, and Dynnik, Mitin, and Trachtenberg had also participated 
in the first, broken-off IF3 Nevertheless, the retrospective m the last volume is critical of the 
past 
'The discussion of 1947 was useful to a certain extent, because it drew attention to some shortcomings of 
philosophical work, especially in the field of history of philosophy But it could not, under the conditions of 
Stalin s personality cult lead to a radical improvement of the state of philosophical science ( ) In that period, 
there frequently arose a conception of investigations into the history of philosophy as something not actual 
attempts to elucidate what is rational in the doctrines of pre Marxist thinkers were considered by some 
theoretical workers as an underestimation of the revolutionary overturn accomplished in philosophy by 
Marxism attempts took place at a simplistic appraisal of philosophical doctrines according to the scheme 
«materialism — progress idealism-—reaction» '316 
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There certainly is some ground for the pride of Soviet philosophers to have finished a 
job begun in the late 1930s, and to have produced "such a broad presentation of the 
development of the philosophical thought of the world, as there has not been during the whole 
period ol existence of scientific history ot philosophy "317 As late as 1988, Ojzerman showed 
himself proud of this work, and stressed that "until the present day this edition remains the sole 
investigation in world literature of the process of the history of philosophy as a whole "418 
However, the work as a whole was hardly a success, as its nickname, "Krasnyj osel" 
suggests red for the color of the cover, donkey for its intellectual level In 1966 its first two 
volumes of the Red Donkey ' were compared, by Bogomolov and Sokolov, two leading 
Soviet historians of philosophy, to the Grey Horse of 1941-1943, to the advantage of the 
latter The exposition of West European philosophy was, in the 6-volume work was "more 
sparingly," suffering irom "particular schematism" and a "quotationist exposition of the 
material "1iy Three years after the appearance of the first volumes of IF6, another authoritative 
source in IFN appeared, a general outline (in fact a students textbook 320)
 0f the history of 
philosophy in one volume Kratkij ocerk ¡stoni Filosofa [A Short Outline of the History of 
Philosophy, KIF], edited by, among others, Iovcuk, Asmus, SSipanov, and Oj/erman, and 
published four times in large editions 321 
For a short time, IF6 was "the standard text in the field,"122 but its shortcomings were 
only too evident The general opinion about the "Red Donkey" was probably fairly adequately 
reflected by Sokolov, who qualified it as "scandalously bad [stydno plocho] "323 As early as 
1969 a new htonja Filosofa in 10 volumes was announced by Iovcuk 124 This successor still 
has to appear In 1985 Malinin wrote that "possibly, a new edition of the history of philosophy 
ot the world is going to be prepared," in 1986 Mel'vil and Sokolov confirmed this 
announcement,12^ and in 1988 Ojzerman stated that "in the present five-year plan [1986-1990, 
EvdZ]326 the IF AN SSSR is beginning basic scientific research on the creation of a new 
«Universal history of philosophy» in 10 volumes "127 In 1989, he stated that work on the first 
(on Ancient philosophy) and second (on Chinese and Indian philosophy) volumes was in 
progress 128 The statement by Kamensky, in 1992, that "Soviet scholars have started to 
write a new Universal history of philosophy,"129 sounds more like wishful thinking than like a 
reflection ot the actual activities of the historians gathered m the IF 
Together, IF6 and KIF bring to light two major problems in IFN the alleged universal 
development of philosophy as related to subsequent modes of production, and the relation 
between philosophy as a reflection of class struggle and as a field of theoretical knowledge 
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A Fust Major Problem the Universality of Philosophical Development 
The first problem results from the "fight against Western 'Eurocentrism' in treating history of 
philosophy,"330 in connection with the idea of parallel development of philosophy in different 
parts of the world "philosophy in the East developed in the same direction as philosophy in the 
West"331 In opposition to "bourgeois conceptions," which "regarded the development of 
philosophy as the result of the creative work of only the so-called «philosophical» peoples," 
the authors of IF6 set out to write the history of all peoples in every phase of socio-economic 
development, aiming to demonstrate the "universal character of the philosophical thought of 
mankind," and to "show that contemporary philosophy is the result of the development of 
philosophical thought of all peoples, not just the West European "332 In 1967, Bocheriski 
showed himself " impressed by a completely new approach which overcomes our own 
deplorable Eurocentric attitude,"333 and this feature is certainly interesting Optimism was, 
however, somewhat premature 
'Soviet attempt to avoid Europe centered history of philosophy comes down to popular introductions in 
which Chinese sages, Indian guru\ South American progressives' and Cuban orators are all treated as equally 
important, in which there is no attempt to distinguish the philosopher from Ihe poet, priest or sage, and in 
which we never find any serious discussion ot the factors that distinguish the self consciously autonomous 
history ot philosophy as a discipline in the West from its tusion with moral, political, and religious concerns in 
the bast ' 3 3 4 
This diagnosis was echoed in Soviet reactions 
'Unfortunately in the course of exposition the authors of the six-volume work assume a broadened 
interpretation of the object of a history of philosophy, as a result of which one comes in these volumes, across 
quite a few names that belong not to the history of philosophy, but to the history of socio political 
thought 335 
Ballestrem argued that this universal approach was in fact misleading 
" if in a general history of philosophy the Mexican philosopher Diaz de Gamarra is said to have held that 
'philosophy is the knowledge of the true by means ot reason and understanding' and that in his opinion 'logic is 
an instrument for the knowledge ot truth', this is most misleading not so much because ot the profundity of 
these statements but because the unprepared reader will attribute their profundity to Diaz de Gamarra, whose 
merits, it any, must definitely be placed somewhere else "33^ 
What IF6 offers is not a "self-consciously autonomous history of philosophy as a 
discipline," not a history of thought, but a history of the presence of ideas in a succession of 
socio-economicformations 
' emphasis on the materialist idealist conflict has tended to focus attention on the conclusions reached by 
philosophers rather than their arguments, and to encourage the awarding of marks as a substitute for bringing 
out the problems of the time " 3 3 7 
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This point was noted by Soviet philosophers, too 
"The authors have laid special stress on a socio historical approach, profoundly disclosing the connection of 
philosophical ideas with the requirements and needs of the epoch, but in doing so they somewhat moved away 
trom a consistent logical exposition of the development of philosophical problems "338 
This is the consequence of a "historical materialist" perception of the history of philosophy, 
both if it stresses the determination by socio-economic conditions and if stress is laid on the 
struggle between materialism and idealism 
" ihc Soviet historian of philosophy will have to mention Dia? de Ganiarra, because progressivcness is for 
them a higher criterion than the originality and scientific quality of a philosopher "339 
IF6 testifies of this with paragraphs on "The development of progressive philosophical 
and sociological thought in the period of disintegration of feudal society and transition to 
capitalism in Moldavia" 340 and "Philosophical and sociological thought in Uruguay at the end 
of the 19th - beginning of the 20th century"341 One may well sympathize with the attempt to 
abolish Eurocentnsm, but the underlying assumption is that, because these countries were in a 
specific phase of social development, there had to be certain, both reactionary and progressive 
philosophical ideas 
In CTFlhis anti-eurocentrism is explicit Hegel is accused of eurocentnsm, because he 
"wrongly held that the peoples, «embodying» in their «national spirit» the philosophical nches 
of «absolute spint», were only the West European peoples: the Greeks, the Romans, and 
especially the Germans."342 The authors characteristically mistake Hegel's "Germanic 
world",343 but Hegel did of course hold that "philosophy in the proper sense begins in the 
West "344 Rightly charging "the majority of contemporary bourgeois historians of philosophy" 
of this kind of eurocentnsm, the authors continue. 
"The incorrect views that deny the role of Eastern philosophy in the development of universal philosophical 
thought, arc reluted by the facts of the history of philosophy The development ot philosophical thought in the 
countries ot the ancient East (Egypt, Babylonia, China, India) began long before the origin of ancient Greek 
philosophy Henceforth, philosophy in the East developed in the same direction as in the West All this is 
evidence ol how groundless the «curocentnc» theories are, that speak about the «eternal» opposition and 
hostility of the so-called Western and Eastern ways of thinking "345 
In fact, four different topics are united in this Soviet anti-eurocentnsm: 
ι the universal parallel development of philosophy, along with the pjaticlenka, 
и the status of philosophy in the Middle East until the genesis of Greek philosophy, 
in the significance of independent philosophical traditions ot the Far East, 
lv the independence and sigmhcance of Russian philosophy 
Sokolov remarked that the authors of IF6 and KfFuncntically employed the concept of 
"Eastern philosophy", because "with this concept... are often united the quite strongly differing 
Chinese, Indian, Islamic philosophy, in spite of the fact that the latter is much closer to ancient 
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European philosophy that to Indian philosophy "34<> This remark points to a contrast between 
two approaches, that may be called, with some precaution,* a 'historical ' and a "philosophical" 
approach The first approach, motivated by historical materialism, seeks to investigate, in 
dilferent societies in their historical development, the development of philosophical doctrines, 
assuming that comparable socio-economic conditions "produce" (or favor) and "preclude" 
(disfavor) similar philosophical positions This is an interesting hypothesis, even if it is 
difficult to effectuate in actual historical research However, it does not compel to project the 
same philosophical development that took place in the West onto Africa or Latin America On 
the contrary, the actual absence or presence of such development could be regarded as telling 
something about the society in question (just like Marx' "asiatic mode of production" is an 
attempt to assess empirical differences) The second approach, motivated by the claim of Soviet 
philosophy to be (universal) philosophy at its highest stage of development, seeks to appreciate 
everything in philosophy's past as either a contribution to diamat, or a (vain) attempt to develop 
an alternative position This hypothesis is, if diamat is this highest stage, a tautology, and, if it 
is not, a mere declaration of superiority 
Due to the combination of these two approaches, Soviet historians were logically 
necessitated to look for a struggle between materialism and idealism everywhere If diamat is at 
the same time the highest possible form of philosophy and the necessary outcome of socio­
economic development, then any empii ical development of society must display a parallel 
philosophical development That this is not the case was recognized by Soviet historians of 
philosophy, too The authors of IF6 acknowledged that "under the conditions of oppression 
not all peoples could make an equal contribution to the development of philosophical 
thought,"147 and in the third edition of KIFdn "asiatic mode of philosophy" was introduced 
' However, in comparison with the West where the epoch of Renaissance, the revolutions of Ihc 17th and 18lh 
centuries, scientific and technological progress, and csp the liberation movement of the working class have 
given rise lo a stormy development of scientific philosophical and social thought in the countries of the bast, 
where for many ages the predominance of feudalism and ot religious ideology dragged on, there were not such 
lavoratile conditions for the development of progressive philosophy '1 4 1* 
The Soviet cntique of eurocentnsm" thus was not only a consequence of historical 
materialism, but performed an ideological function, too, to the extent to which it went hand in 
hand with stress on the importance of Russian philosophy (but any exaggerated 
"slavoccntnsm ' could be contested with the same scheme), and with critique on any form of 
"asiacentnsm" on the part of the Chinese or North-Korean comrades, who did with Confucius 
what the Soviets did with Herzen 141·> 
Ί do nol suggest that the first is nol philosophically committed or the second not dealing with history 
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A Second Major Problem A Shift From Class-Struggle to Philosophy 
The second problem is a reappearance of the "double statement" 110 » c], and stems from the 
fact that the IF6 was conceived and produced while an important shift in the Soviet conception 
of the history of philosophy was underway 
"In the lasl seven years [1958-1965, EvdZ] a shift from treating the history of philosophy as the history of a 
superstructure' mirroring class conflict, through treating it as primarily the growth ot materialism and the 
discomfiture of idealist 'ideologists', to seeing it as the conflict of idealist and materialist theories 
themselves "350 
This shift was "skillfully brought out" by Ballestrem "by drawing our attention to three 
'definitions' of an official character handed down between 1947 and I960 "351 
"In his famous speech in 1947 A A Zdanov still defined the object of 'history of philosophy as a science' as 
"the hisloiy ot the birth, of the appearance and of the development of the scientific materialist world-view and its 
laws As lar as [poskolku]* materialism grew and developed in the battle against idealist currents, the history of 
philosophy is therelorc also the history ot the battle between materialism and idealism " 
This definition was still accepted in 1954 in the fourth edition of the Short Philosophical Dictionary [KFS] 
A new definition is given in the first volume of the large History of Philosophy (1957) [1F6\ 'The object of 
history of philosophy as a science is the history of the development of philosophical ideas in the different 
periods of the development of society, above all the history of the origin, of the formation and of the 
development of the basic philosophical tendencies -materialism and idealism- and of the struggle between 
them " 
finally, in a definition of I960 [KIF] the second aspect is clearly accepted "The object of Marxist history of 
philosophy as a science is the origin and development of doctrines about the general bases of being and 
knowledge, that give one or another solution to the basic question of philosophy History of philosophy as a 
science examines the doctrines about the general laws of being and thinking that originate in the process of 
development of philosophical thought The object of history ol philosophy as a science is the history of the 
philosophical thought ot mankind, above all the history ot the formation and development of the basic 
philosophical tendencies — materialism and idealism, of the struggle between them and the therewith tightly 
connected history of the formation and development of the struggle between dialectics and metaphysics" "352 
In the revised third edition of KIF (1971) (Ballestrem referred to the first edition of 
1960) the shift from ideological class-struggle to philosophical problems is completed 
' The object of Marxist history of philosophy as a science is the history of the origin and development of the 
doctrines that give one or another solution ot the problems οΓ philosophy, one or another materialist or idealist, 
dialectical or metaphysical explanation of the general laws of being and knowledge The object of history of 
philosophy as a science is the history of the origin and solution of philosophical problemi, and most of all the 
history ol the formation and development ot the basic philosophical tendencies - materialism and idealism, of 
the struggle between them and the therewith tightly connected history of the formation and development of the 
struggle between dialectics and metaphysics ' [italics mine, EvdZ] "353 
Thus, Kamenka concluded, "Soviet philosophers have been forced to concede that 
the center of interest of any history of philosophy must be philosophical ideas themselves and 
'Kamenka translates 'poskolku as as", see Note on Language' 
380 
Part Four Soviet Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 
that merely reducing philosophical positions to class interests will miss most of what is 
important and philosophical in these positions "154 
This return to philosophical problems as the proper object of IFN was effectuated, in the first 
place, through a restoration and upgrading of the other "basic question" of philosophy, viz the 
'struggle ' between dialectics and metaphysics 
'As early as Antiquity two contrary tendencies take shape in philosophy — materialism and idealism, and the 
struggle between them becomes a regularity [ 7akonomcrnost'\ of the development of philosophical knowledge 
Side by side with [narjadus, italics mine EvdZ] the opposition of materialist and idealist world views, in the 
course of development ot philosophy emerges and deepens the opposition between dialectical and metaphysical 
methods of thought ' 3 5 5 
This juxtaposition of two basic oppositions instantly yields a more differentiated picture 
of the history of philosophy If philosophers are merely classified as "materialists, idealists or 
as holding an intermediary position,"1"56 and judged according to the scheme materialism = 
progress, idealism = reaction, the resulting picture is one of simple dichotomy "the line of 
Plato" against "the line of Democntus",1'^ as Lenin had it in one of his unambiguous 
statements on the history of philosophy 1 , f ! To be sure, this polarized dichotomy never fully 
disappeared,3"59 and was dutifully repeated in, eg , IF6 and Osnovymarksistsko-lemnskoj 
Filosofa 16° But if the other opposition, of dialectics and metaphysics, is given equal 
importance, the resulting picture becomes more complicated, not only because there now are 
four categories to classify philosophical positions -metaphysical idealism (Plato), metaphysical 
(' mechanical") materialism (Democntus, Gassendi, Diderot), dialectical idealism (Hegel), 
dialectical materialism-, but also, and more importantly, because the "right" position, 
dialectical materialism, only emerges at a certain point in history It would be ridiculous to 
construct a struggle between dialectical materialism and other philosophies before the 
emergence of dialectical materialism Instead of the battle-ground of the perennial struggle 
between two lines or camps, the history of pre-Marxist philosophy becomes the history of the 
strife tor dialectical materialism, ι e its prehistory 
Together with the recognition of middle positions" between idealism and materialism 
(Aristotle) or between dialectics and metaphysics (Kant), and the recognition of the historical 
nature of philosophy, the stage is set for a fairly objective account of the history of pre-Marxist 
philosophy By contrast, the situation with respect to post-Marxist non-Marxist philosophy 
barely changes Marxist philosophy still stands out as the superior form of both materialist and 
dialectical philosophy So the vertical dichotomy of materialism and idealism was overruled by 
a horizontal dichotomy of pre-Marxist and post-Marxist philosophy, indeed making 
"philosophy before Marx and philosophy after Marx incomparable"161 
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In the second place, the return to philosophical problems was effectuated through the 
"cognitive aspect", the recognition of the fact that philosophers not only take positions, but also 
argue for them, and that these positions express an understanding of reality. This means a 
rehabilitation of the "epistemic function" of philosophy. At this point, the "double statement", 
asserting, on the one hand, the determination "in the final analysis" of philosophy by socio-
economic conditions, and stressing, on the other hand, the relative independence of 
philosophy, gains importance, as becomes clear when we compare the first and the third 
edition of KIF. 
In 1960, the first lines of the section on "Basic characteristics of the Marxist method in 
history of philosophy" read as follows: 
"Dialectical and historical materialism regard philosophy as a component of the ideological superstructure, 
determined in the final analysis by the mode of production of the material life of society This is what explains 
the motives by which philosophers arc guided as they are creating their doctrines, and the fundamental causes, by 
virtue of which philosophical ideas obtained a definite direction "362 
In 1971, tone and content have changed: 
"Dialectical and historical materialism perceive two aspect!, in philosophy a cognitive, in so lar as philosophy 
lo a greater or lesser extent carries out the functions of knowing the world, and under certain conditions the 
functions of science, and an ideological, in so far as it is a component part of the ideological superstructure 
Revealing the dependence of philosophical doctrines on the social relations of a given epoch.. , on class-
struggle, on the development of science and other forms of social consciousness, history of philosophy explains 
the motives, by which philosophers are guided, as they arc creating their doctrines, and reveals the fundamental 
causes, according to which philosophical ideas, expressing the world-view of one or another social group, 
obtained a definite direction [italics mine, EvdZ] "363 
As to the "relative independence", an almost identical criticism of "vulgarizers of 
Marxism,"364
 w n o attempted to "deduce every philosophical idea directly from the conditions 
of the material life of society,"365 ¡s present in 1960 and 1971: 
"If in the final analysis the direction of development of philosophy is conditioned by the economic life of 
society, then the content of philosophical ideas and especially the logical categories, the forms in which 
philosophical thought develops, do not directly follow from economics, but are connected to a considerable 
extent with the ideological struggle of that period, with the development of adjacent forms of social 
consciousness (science, art, religion, and others), and with the thought-material that is left to philosophers by 
their predecessors In this the relative independence of philosophy manifests itself most of all."366 
The significant difference between the two versions is that, in the 1960 edition here 
quoted, science is placed within the brackets gathering the "adjacent forms of social 
consciousness," whereas in the 1971 edition it is placed outside, i.e. it no longer appears as a 
form of social consciousness. This means that philosophy, to the extent to which it is 
scientific, is not a form of class-bound social consciousness, and hence is determined by socio-
economic conditions only in as far as it is not scientific. The impact of this difference appears 
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from a comparison of a crucial passage about the "inner logic of development [vnutrennjajj 
logika razvitijd] of philosophy " The text is identical in both editions, but in the edition of 1971 
one line -here italicized- is added 
The inner logic of development of philosophical thought consists in the fact that this process goes, mainly 
from the simple to the complicated from the lower to the higher This process of «increase» of philosophical 
learning is not rectilinear, but zigzag like In its course there also quite oltcn occur digressions from the correct 
cognition of reality in the direction of idealism mysticism religion But as a whole this process is progressive 
[vosthodjaScij] and in the final analysis leading to knowledge ot objective truth 367 
A MixedPenodization 
These two problems appear in Soviet attempts at a penodization of philosophy's past, made up 
of a combination of two penodizations one that follows the succession of socio-economic 
formations, and one that stresses the ' horizontal dichotomy" of pre-Marxist and (post-)Marxist 
philosophy The link with the "double statement" is manifest in the brief remarks on 
penodization in KIFoi 1960 and 1971 
In so far as the development of philosophy as of other tonus of social consciousness is in the final analysis 
detenmnedby the rise and development of socio economic formations and their shift, Marxism divides the 
history ot philosophy into periods, that correspond to the basis socio economic formations or the periods of 
transition from one socio economic formation to another [italics mine, EvdZ] "368 
This correspondence with socio-economic formations and transitions yields a standard 
penodization in seven periods,369 preceded by a "zero-stage" 37° 
0 absence of philosophy in primitive society 
1 philosophy in slave-holding society 
2 philosophy in feudal society 
3 philosophy in the period of transition irom feudalism to capitalism 
4 philosophy m the era of consolidation oí capitalism until the beginning of the 
revolutionary movements (in KIF until the origin of Marxism) 
5 philosophy in the era of pre-monopolistic capitalism 
6 philosophy in the period of imperialism until the great socialist October Revolution 
7 philosophy in the time of revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism, of 
socialist and national liberation movements, of the crumbling of imperialism, ot the 
triumph ot socialism and Communism on a global scale 
However, this is only one side of the "double statement" 
Regarding as decisive the principle of penodization ol the history of philosophy in dependence of the shift of 
one socio-economic formation to another and the development of class struggle Marxist history of philosophy 
lakes into account the relativemdependencc of the development of philosophy The scientific history of 
philosophy divides the history of philosophy into two eras 1) the history ot philosophy until the beginning of 
Marxism and 2) the history of philosophy after the beginning of Marxism ( ) The highest historical form of 
materialism and dialectics — the philosophy ot Marxism does not stand still but is developed and enriched 
[italics mine EvdZ] 3 7 1 
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Thus, the 7 stages outlined in the first periodization are complemented by 2 eras, A and 
B, which are fundamentally different in character: A [1 4] is marked by the struggles between 
materialism and idealism, dialectics and metaphysics, whereas В [5 7] is divided in B+, 
Marxist philosophy, and B-, non-Marxist (or revisionist) philosophy. The importance of the 
"relative independence" of philosophy appears in full, when we realize that only in the history 
of West European philosophy, the transition from A to В coincides with the transition from 4 
to 5. The philosophy of the peoples of the USSR, e.g. the Uzbeks, would make an instant 
jump from "philosophy in feudal society" [2] to B+, and Siberian tribes would make an instant 
jump from the "zero-stage", a jump that would then precede their equally sudden jump from 
primitivism to the planned construction of socialism in one country. Once found, philosophical 
truth cancels socio-economic determination by steering it. 
The philosophical development through the two oppositions, and the general historical 
development through a succession of socio-economic formations together result in the 
following picture of the global development of philosophy in history:* 
/
^~ Global Historical Development of Philosophy According to ¡FN 
Philosophical Development Socio-economic formations: 
"Line of Democritus" "Line of Plato" 0: primitive society 
500 B.C 
dialectics 1 • slave-holding society 
idealism 
2: feudal society 
3: transition to capitalism 
K.int 4 consolidated capitalism 
Hegel 
_ Marx. Engels 5: pre-monopolistic 
fe capitalism 
bourgeois idealism 
' 6: imperialism until*1 
October, 1917 
"•"__•«.. Lenin 7: transition from 
capitalism to socialism, 
liberation movemnts, 
crumbling of imperialism, j 
riumph of socialism and 
Permanently developing Marxist-Leninist philosophy communism 
'The bold lines correspond to the pjatiilenka: primitive society, slave-owning society, feudal society, capitalist 
society, and socialist / communist society. 
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lO.n.e Blooming and Booming of IFN (1968- 1980s) 
A period of continuous growth of IFN began around the end of ottepel' In 1967, a large 
symposium of historians of philosophy was held, the first since 1947 372 Rybarczyk gives a 
total of 30Ü titles of books and articles in IFN over the period 1947-1970, a mere of them 20 
falling into the 1947-1955 period (2 2 a year), the remaining 280 into 1956-1970 (18 6 
yearly) A current survey in FN of philosophical monographs gave an annual average of 41 
books in IFN (including 16 in KBF) over the period 1961-1974,373 and a Soviet bibliography 
from 1977 listed 261 book titles over the years 1972-1975, an average of 65 174 
In order to explain this rapid development, three factors can be discerned First of all, a major 
condition was fulfilled by a broadening of the official conception of the history of philosophy, 
described above The theoretical legitimization of a more or less "objective" rendering of past 
and, to a lesser extent, contemporary non-Marxist philosophy was provided by the turn to 
philosophical ideas and theories themselves as the (main) object of IFN375 Kamenka remarked 
that the 5-volume FE of 1960-1970 presented "a fair and reasonably accurate account of the 
work of contemporary Western philosophers "376 in Western philosophy, such "fair and 
reasonably accurate accounts" of past and present philosophical positions are an essential part 
of philosophical culture, but it is clear that under Soviet conditions they meant an enormous 
improvement a basic distinction of presentation and interpretation, account and critique 377 
A second cause for the bloom of IFN was the running-down of ottepel' As Ballestrem 
concluded his account of Soviet IFN of the first decade since Stalin's death 
' Il is indeed probable that Soviet philosopherb became historians of philosophy in order to escape Ihe risks 
involved in Ihe field of systematic philosophy But this move has certainly not damaged the developments of 
systematic philosophy On the contrary the intensive study of the history of philosophy has enlarged and 
ameliorated Soviet philosophy in at least three regards (I) It has enlarged the number of problems and fields 
known and studied by Soviet philosophers (2) it has taught them to see systematic problems in their historical 
context (3) it has established the study ol the history of philosophy as a branch of Soviet philosophy "378 
Subsequent development has shown this judgment to be to the point As a matter of 
fact, the essence of subsequent development is contained in the first and last sentence of 
Ballestrem's conclusion as he could not know in 1963, the relative freedom of offepe/'was 
soon to disappear, and a considerable part of the philosophers who received their training 
during these years, the sestidesjdtmkt, indeed turned to IFN as to a relatively safe area, remote 
from ideological turmoil This move was made possible by the establishment of IFN as a 
separate discipline, but also formed a powerful impulse for its further development 
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Somewhere near mid 1966, I realized that I was obliged to deploy my capacities in histonco-philosophical 
writing ι e to try to speak about the present the direct investigation whereof more and more was subject to 
the prohibitions of ideological censorship in an indirect language [na kosvennom jazyke] by means of an actual 
(and if possible, topical) molding of events that belong to Lhe past history ot society, Lulture, and social 
thought 379 
The establishment oí IFN ль a professional specialism thus served as a major alternative 
to the mdiginalizdtion that was characteristic of Soviet philosophical culture [Ch 9 и ш] And 
although the establishment ol IFN was part of the natural development of Soviet philosophy, 
the guard dogs of pärtijnost' clearly perceived its function as a refuge On several occasions, 
Soviet philosophers were criticized for turning to the history of philosophy instead of turning 
their attention to actual social and political problems in 1947 by ¿danov, in 195^ by the editors 
or VF and Kommunist, in 1987 by Gorbacev 380 
A distinction can be made between voluntary and involuntary historians of philosophy 
In 1961, Ballestrem mentioned as "the most prominent historians of philosophy" Asmus, 
Dynnik, who studied with Asmus in Kiev, started out as a specialist in classical Greek 
philosophy, and later became one of the leading Soviet historians of philosophy,381 
participating in all three attempts at a universal Istonja filosofila2 Iovcuk, Ojzerman, and 
Trachtenberg w In 1988, Michail Antonovic Kissel' (b 1934) distinguished a first and a 
second generation of Soviet historians of philosophy To the second he reckoned Ojzerman, 
Sokolov, Narski|, and Gulyga, to the first Asmus, Bakradze, Losev, Bychovskij, Sitkovskij, 
and Kedrov 384 
It is questionable whether the reinforcement of the ranks of 'real' historians of 
philosophy -people like Sokolov, Bogomolov, Gulyga, or Kamcnskij- by an inflow of willy-
nilly historians ol philosophy has been an improvement of IFN as a historical discipline in 
every respect, but it has certainly turned IFN into the main preserve of philosophical culture 
and into a place where philosophers tried to do philosophy under the cover of historical 
investigation This applies, for example, to Solov'ev, Motrosilova, Puma Pavlovna Gajdénko 
(1934), or Violetta Pavlovna Gajdénko (1934) 385 in 1986, Motrosilova wrote 
Auch Ρ Gajdénko teilt die Überzeugung daß gerade »Geschichte die drängendsten Fragen unserer Gegenwart 
beantworten kann und soll« ( ) Solov ev versucht nicht Gegenwart mit Hilfe der Vergangenheit /u klaren er 
versucht lediglich Gegenwart besser deutlicher 7U sehen Die Vergangenheitsbeschreibung ist bei ihm 
metaphorisch Wenn auch Solov cv von der Gegenwart als der primaren sinngebenden Instanz ausgeht so 
sucht er doch zugleich historische Epochen und Situationen die in den ihn interessierenden Dimensionen 
wirklich der Gegenwart isomorph sind [italics mine FvdZl ' 386 
Solov ev explicitly subscribed to this analysis 387 Thls may also explain the title of his 
monograph on Martin Luther The Invincible Heretic 388 As to MotroSilova, her systematic 
interests are manifest in most of her work [Ch limb and Ch 12 iv] But she acknowledged the 
other side of the coin 
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There is another side to this affair it is hardly possible not to accept the reproach, directed in a soft form by 
Mamardasvih at those of our [otcCestvennye] philosophers who in hard times, and in the name of their own 
rescue as working professionals, sought shelter in the «ecological niche» of history of philosophy, and 
sometimes lost «the spirit of philosophizing [temperament filosofslvovamjd] — not as a professional 
occupation, in universities or the academy, but precisely as the self awareness [•.amooSCuSöcme] of life» "389 
A third major cause was the presence of a few "relics from the past" In the first place, 
of course, we must mention here Losev, because of his longevity, his standing as a scholar, 
and because he was the sole living representant of pre-revolutionary Russian philosophy in 
Soviet times But mention should also be made of Bachtm, who studied at Petrograd 
University from 1914 till 1918,^ 90 Asmus, who finished his studies m Kiev in 1919,391 and 
Bakradze, who studied philosophy in Germany under Edmund Husserl in the 1920s 392 The 
ways m which these "relics" influenced IFN is varied generally speaking, Bakradze and 
Asmus represent an unorthodox Marxist approach to the history of philosophy, whereas Losev 
and Bachtm stand for a, however thin, thread of continuity with pre-Soviet non-Marxist 
philosophy and philology 
Condemned in the 1930s, 393 Losev resumed teaching in Moscow during World War II 
[Ch 4 in], and although he could never teach philosophy as such, he taught classical philology, 
logic, psychology, history of philosophy, and history of aesthetics, which testifies to both the 
general level of education, and the importance of Losev in the "production" of new generations 
of scholars 394 Placing the aesthetic moment at the center of his interpretation of Greek 
Antiquity, he in fact taught classical philology and history of Greek philosophy at once 395 He 
quickly grew into the first and foremost Soviet specialist in classical Greek and Hellenistic 
philosophy, and into the "patriarch" of Soviet aesthetics 396 He published some 500 works, 
including his monumental, 8-volume Istonja anticnoj estetiki [History of Ancient Aesthetics 
(1963-1988)], completed shortly before his death in 1988 The first volume was completed m 
1941, but could not appear until 1963 397 in 1983, he received the "Order of the Red Banner 
of Labor' [Orden Trudovogo Krasnogo Znameni] for the training of philosophical cadres, and, 
in 1986, the "State Prize" [Gosudarstvennaja premija] for the first six volumes of Istonja 
anticnojestetiki 398 The chief importance of Losev is his stress on philosophically critical and 
adequate philological work in the history of philosophy 
Bachtm is a well-known linguist and philosopher, author of among others Problemypoetiki 
Dostoevbkogo [Problems of Dostoevskij s Poetics (1963)], Tvorcestvo Fransua Rabie ι 
tidrodndjd kul tura srednevckov'ja ι Renes^dnsa [The Creative Work of François Rabelais and 
Medieval and Renaissance Popular Culture (1965)], and Estetikd slovesnogo tvorcesfva 
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[Aesthetics of Verbal Creation (1979)] 399 Already an established scholar at that time, he was 
arrested in 1929, accused of "the Socratic crime of 'spoiling the young' "400 He was exiled to 
Kustanaj in Kazachstan in 1930,40i and in 1936 moved to Saransk, the capital of the 
Mordovian Autonomous Republic, where he started teaching literature at the local Pedagogical 
Institute (later Mordovskij State University) 402 He worked and taught in Saransk with some 
interruptions until 1967, when he, seriously ill, was taken to the Kremlin hospital (with the 
help of the daughter of Junj Andropov, longtime head of the KGB and short-term leader of the 
USSR) From 1972 until his death m 1975 he was allowed to work in Moscow 403 
Bachtin's conditions of work and publication were hard, but he more or less 
continuously worked, and taught widely, apparently being an able and popular lecturer 404 
During ottcpel', Soviet inteliigenty became aware again of his existence, and started visiting 
him in Saransk By the late 1950s, "students in senior seminars at Moscow University were 
discussing Bachtin's book on Dostoevskij, which had never been mentioned in class 
before,"4^ and during his last years in Moscow, his influence was great,406 both directly and 
indirectly, as an example of independent scholarship 
Asmus' career was less troublesome. He came to Moscow in 1927, and started working as a 
philosopher and logician m a number of institutions, including IKP and MIFLI, and then at 
MGU as a professor in history of philosophy, (formal) logic, and aesthetics from 1942 until 
1972 407 Asmus, a member of the OVMD headed by Debonn, was accused in 1930 of "idealist 
mistakes"40'' and of "formalism" ICh 4 il,409 but this did not fully rum his career 410 He 
became a professor in 1935, and from the reminiscences of Gulyga he appears as a ray of hope 
in the dark 1930s· 
" at MIFLI in 1938, I heard V F Asmus for the first time His lectures on the history of philosophy were 
distinguished by a highly refined language, a profound understanding of the subject, and boundless erudition In 
(hose yean, we were not spoilt with such things When V F Asmus was lecturing, the auditorium was full "411 
Apparently a convinced Communist, Asmus also was, through his sound knowledge of 
important parts of philosophy's past, a living protest against the simplified accounts of the 
history of philosophy 412 He wrote, among others, on Plato, Descartes, and Kant,4!1 whom 
he greatly admired (he asked for a small engraving of Kant to take with him in his grave414). 
His book on Descartes, e.g , is a scholarly combination of intellectual biography and immanent 
exposition of the philosophy of this "pride of all progressive mankind",415 based on original 
sources, and, of course, defending Descartes as a rationalist and scientist against "the myth 
about Descartes, created by idealist reaction," by which he refers to J -P. Sartre in 
particular416 Asmus thus stand at the basis of a "professionalist" trend in IFN, for which 
knowledge of past philosophy retains its value irrespective of Marxist(-Leninist) appreciation. 
388 
Part Four Soviet Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 
As to Bakradze, finally, he can be regarded as founder of the (relatively) independent 
philosophical center of Tbilisi in Georgia Active as a logician and historian of philosophy he 
has formed and influenced generations of Georgian and other Soviet scholars Especially 
influential was his Sistema ι metod filosofii Gcgelja [System and Method of Hegel's 
Philosophy] of 1958 [Ch и ш b ] 4 1 7 Fighting the "stalinist" qualification of Hegel as an 
"aristocratic reaction to the French Revolution",418 and loosening up the classical Engelsian 
opposition between metaphysics and dialectics by pointing out that "Hegel distinguished 
between critical Verstandsmetaphysik and speculative Vemunffujietaphynk''^9 Bakradze, 
like Asmus, personifies the distinction between presentation and interpretation 
In spite of difficulties of a varying degree,420 these "relics" did have their place in IFN Their 
importance can not be overstressed, and should not be measured by some "universal" standard, 
but by the standard of quality within Soviet philosophical culture Their role was fully 
recognized by MotroSilova, a pupil of Asmus 
"Glan/cndc Werke zur Philosophie- und Literaturgeschichte sowjetischer Zeit, verfaßt von den Forschern der 
alteren Generation V Asmus, M Bachlin, К Bakradze, A Losev, schulen fur uns alle die gemeinsame Basis 
einer Verbindung von allgemeiner Gcistesgcschichte und nationaler Denklradmon, weckten das Interesse einer 
breiten Leserschaft an Arbeiten über Piaton und Kant Shakespeare oder Rabelais, an schwierigsten 
methodologischen Fragen der historisch philosophischen und litcratur-wisscnschafllichen Analyse " 4 2 ' 
"Perhaps some people will say today that V F Asmus followed elementary norms of scientific research, 
indisputable for philosophy loo That is true But he had the courage to follow those elementary, but, in 
essence, elevated «golden» rules of human and scientific activity al a time, when rules turned into exceptions, 
and when to tollow them simply became a dangerous affair " 4 2 2 
In sum, the history of IFN from the 1930s to the 1980s shows, in the first place, the 
fundamental subordination to the ideological function of Soviet philosophy, both directly in the 
mobilization of an account of philosophy's history in "ideological battle", and indirectly in IFN 
providing a historical legitimization of ' the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism" Secondly, the 
steady development of a specialist subdisciphne, with its relatively independent status, and its 
"inner logic" of cumulative covering of philosophy's past and increasing professionalism 
Thirdly, the "inflow" of philosophers who lound, in historical studies, a possibility to address 
philosophical issues that could not be 'safely" discussed within the system of Soviet 
philosophy, thus making IFNd main alternative to marginahzation 
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lO.iii IFN in tbe 1980s: Foundations. Functions, and Disciplinary Structure 
Qualitatively, IFN was as important branch of Soviet philosophy, because many Soviet 
philosophers chose this field for its remoteness from ideology This is also why IFN was an 
attractive field for students in philosophy, esp for those who took an interest in philosophy m 
a broader sense than Marxist-Leninist philosophy 4 2 3 Secondly, to become a historian of 
philosophy was a way to get access to non Soviet philosophers in the original 4 2 4 In the third 
place, IFN opened the way to vast virgin territories recent developments in non-Soviet 
philosophy, as well as not yet investigated periods or personages from the past For the same 
reasons, history of philosophy was popular among a broader audience, books selling much 
quicker that those in diamdt or istmdt, and public lectures by historians of philosophy attracting 
large audiences 4 2 5 Especially popular were the editions of classical philosophical texts In 
1989, Ojzei man expressed his sarcastic wonder about the "incomprehensibly large interest" for 
such editions as the Collected works of Aristotle (220,000 copies) or Nicholas of Cusa 
( 140,000), both sold-out instantly, and he suspected that it was fashionable among intellectuals 
to have these books standing unread on their bookshelves 4 2 6 That may well be part of the 
truth, but such editions were also popular because they offered access to 'unprocessed" 
philosophical thought 
Quantitatively, Я7 was important too A survey of the production in IFN during the 
11th five-year plan (1981-1985) lists 70 monographs in the fields of methodology and theory, 
and history of West European philosophy alone, as well as large numbers of monographs, 
collections, and articles on the history of Russian philosophy 4 2 7 In 1985, the areas of 
methodology and theory, and of the history of West European philosophy together constituted 
some 27% of all publications in IFN [see further below| Given the selective nature ot the source 
referred to, this allows us to suppose that the total number of monographs over 1981-1985 was 
at least 300, an average of 60 per year, as opposed to the annual 18 6 over 1956-1970, but in 
line with the average of 65 over 1972-1975 [10 u c] and with the 67 monographs and collections 
ot articles listed for 1985 in the selective bibliography in the first Istonko-filsosofskij 
ezegodnik of 1986 4 2 8 In fact, IFN a considerable share of Soviet philosophical production a 
subdivision of articles in VF over the period 1980-1986 according to 7 main subjects shows 
that some 11% of all publications belong to IFN m the strict sense, and if we take into account 
the investigations of contemporary non-Soviet philosophy, gathered under the headings of 
KSBFand philosophy abroad [fìlosolìjd za rubezom], this proportion rises to 30% 429 
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Field 
Diiimat 
fctmat 
Ethics 
Aesthetics 
History of 
KSBF 
Philosophy 
philosophy 
abroad 
1980 
54 (34%) 
54 (34%) 
8 (5%) 
20 (Π%) 
5 (3%) 
17(11%) 
1982 
29 (20%) 
48 (33%) 
9 (6%) 
5 (3%) 
18(12%) 
13(9%) 
24(17%) 
1984 
41 (28%) 
53 (37%) 
5 (3%) 
7 (5%) 
16(11%) 
5 (3%) 
18(13%) 
1986 
48 (40%) 
26(21%) 
1 (1%) 
8 (7%) 
8 (7%) 
5 (3%) 
24 (20%) 
Total 
172 (30%) 
181 (32%) 
15 (3%) 
28 (5%) 
62 (117r) 
28 (5%) 
83 (14%) 
"Historical" disciplines 42(27%) 54(38%) 39(27%) 37(31%) 173(30%) 
(Total) (158) (146) (145) (120) (569) 
The same importance appears from the proportion of ¡FN among the staff of MGU's 
philosophical faculty It had, in 1986, 14 departments, with a total of 41 professors,410 6 of 
them working within the section of scientific communism, the remaining 35 within the 
philosophical section, which comprised 9 departments [kafedry] Close to half of these 
professors (15 out of 35) where working at the historical departments (3 out of 9): 6 at the 
katedra IZF, 6 at the kafedra istorii marksistsko-lemnskoj filosofìi, 3 at the kafedra istorii 
filosofa narodov SSSR 411 To give an idea of the number of specialists in IFN: 280 Soviet 
specialists participated in a conference in 1967 on "Actual problems of history of 
philosophy",4^ and some 400 Soviet historians of philosophy attended a similar conference 
on "Methodogical and ideological [тіго о^ггепсечкіе] problems of the history of philosophy," 
organized by the IF in 1986 4 3 3 Finally, the importance of IFN is shown by its relative 
proportion in the themes of candidate's and doctoral dissertations, over the period 1981 - first 
half of 1983, 20 5% of doctoral dissertations (22 out of 107), and 15 2% of candidates' 
dissertations (148 out of 971) were on subjects within the field of ÍFN434 
These figures testify of the growth of this branch since World War II, and they become 
even more revealing if we realize that historical work was generally of a higher quality. 
The Place of IFN m Soviet Philosophy 
IFN was a separate discipline within the framework of "the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism": 
"The concept «philosophy ot Marxism» has a wider range than the concept «dialectical and historical 
materialism», because it also includes a scientific history of philosophy, as well as, by the way, a few other 
philosophical disciplines (ethics, aesthetics, etc ) " 4 3 5 
IFN formed an integral part of the "developing system" of Marxist-Leninist 
philosophy This meant, first oí all, that it could not (legitimately) contradict main tenets of the 
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core disciplines of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, diamat and istmat Secondly, the system of 
Soviet philosophy was conceived as a system of disciplines, each of which was relatively 
independent of the others, with its own field of interest, and its own methodology [Ch 8 n] 
Thirdly, the systematic character of Soviet philosophy determined the position of ¡FN as the 
'historical self-awareness' of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, one of its tasks being to 
demonstrate the superiority of Soviet philosophy 
One feature of Soviet philosophical culture must be bome in mind the accounts of the 
nature, status, functions, and main tenets of IFN, given by Soviet historians of philosophy, 
esp in sources of an official nature, are neither merely descriptive statements, nor prescriptions 
as to what historians of philosophy should do They performed, at the same time, an 
ideological function, legitimizing ¡FNas it existed in terms of the dominant "ideology of Soviet 
philosophy" [Ch 8 ш] The story about ¡FN, performing primarily an ideological function, and 
the theory of the historical process of philosophy, performing an epistemic and methodological 
function in the first place, are not two separate discourses, because that would expose the 
ideological function as mere rhetoric 
It is necessary to distinguish, at this point, two ways of ideological functioning On the 
one hand, ¡FNparticipated in the general ' ideology of Soviet philosophy", presenting it as the 
result' ot the historical development of philosophy On the other hand, an ideological 
legitimization of ¡FN itself was required, fit to mediate between official requirements and the 
actual practice of Soviet historians of philosophy As part of "the philosophy of Marxism-
Lenimsm", ¡FN was a legitimate element of Soviet philosophical culture At the same time, it 
had its own facticity and professional requirements, which had to be legitimate in terms of that 
same ideology As a result, the Soviet account of ¡FN presents a mixture of ideological moves 
'from above' and 'from below' This can be shown with respect, to its foundations, its 
functions, and its disciplinary structure 
The Foundations ot ¡FN, A Marxist-Leninist History of Philosophy 
The main elements of the ideology of Soviet philosophy" reappear in the foundations of ¡FN 
as a branch of Soviet philosophy they were implied by its claim to be a Marxist(-Lenmist) 
history of philosophy [Ch 7 m), and by its partisan character, its place within the system of 
Soviet philosophy, and its scientific pretension [Ch 8 и] The Marxist-Leninist heritage, as I 
have shown [lOi], consisted of three impulses an economist reduction [i], a vertical 
dichotomization [ii], and a totalizing view that yielded a horizontal dichotomy of philosophy 
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before and after the Marxist revolution in philosophy [iii], easily retraced in official sources, 
e.g. in the FÉS of 1983: 
"Counterbalancing the Hegelian idealist theory, they [the klassiki, EvdZ] regarded philosophical development as 
a process, the inner moving forces whereof are in the final analysis brought about by socio-economic progress 
[i|, by the achievements of science and the development of the forms of social consciousness as a whole, by the 
struggle between progressive and reactionary classes and social groups. (...) ...the Marxist-Leninist theory of the 
historical process of philosophy,... reveals the development of philosophy to be the struggle of different 
doctrines, trends, tendencies, in the course of which a radical polarization takes place into main trends -the 
materialist and the idealist trend-, the struggle of which forms the moving ideal source [dvizuSöaja idejnaja sila] 
of philosophical development [ii]. (...) The genesis of dialectical and historical materialism is a/ the [see "Note 
on Language") supreme revolution in philosophical development, commencing the history of Marxist 
philosophy [Ш1."436 
These three elements were ineluctable dogmata of the Soviet account of the history of 
philosophy, and the link between them resided in the well-known "basic question of 
philosophy", connected to the idea of the partisan, class-bound nature of all phenomena of 
social consciousness. The official position can be summarized as follows: human society, in its 
historical development, is determined by a struggle between progressive and reactionary 
classes, a struggle that finds expression in a struggle of philosophical positions that focuses on 
the basic question about the relation of thought and being, and continues to divide philosophers 
into two "camps", directly connected with the camps in class struggle, without the possibility 
of a neutral position that would be "above" class struggle.437 This struggle is, in principle, 
ended by a revolution in philosophy, the victory in class struggle coinciding with the final 
victory of materialism in the history of philosophy,438 which is the supreme result of the 
historical development of philosophy: it is both the last (in time) and the final (in the 
development of true theory) philosophy: 
"Dialectical materialism is the highest form of materialism, constituting the result [itog] of the whole preceding 
history of the development of philosophical thought."43? 
As part of Soviet philosophy, IFN was claimed to be a scientific history of philosophy 
[istoriko-filosofskaja nauka. istonja filosofii как пайка]. This can mean a history that is 
somehow connected with historical science, or a history that conceives of philosophy's past as 
governed by laws. In the Soviet case, this amounted to the same: like general history, IFN was 
subsumed under historical materialism, and the laws governing historical development in 
general were supposed to apply to the development of philosophy. Moreover, the universal 
laws established by diamat, on the strength of their universality, governed the historical 
development of philosophy, too [Ch.l2.ii]. 
It is important, in this connection, to point out the crucial distinction made by Soviet 
philosophers between the concepts of zakon [law in the strong sense of the term, having the 
force of a law of nature], and of zakonomemost' [translatable as "(lawlike) regularity" or 
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"ldwhkeness", having less than absolute force] 440 As Scanlan has shown, attempts were made 
in the 1960s, e g by Aron Jakovlevic Gurévi6 (b 1924),441 to replace the "general laws of 
historical development ' by more local' "concrete regularities" to account for the "complexity 
of historical causation," and esp the "human content of history", ι e the fact that history is 
made by people, who can not be regarded as "bearers of a law that stands above them," but are 
"autonomous," which makes the resulting historical process "objectively undetermined, an 
open system with an unlimited set of probabilities and variations "442 Of course this view 
was not the official one, but the toning down of the idea of universal historical laws in the 
direction of particular historical "lawlikenesses" could be found elsewhere, too, e g m the 
work of an Estonian philosopher of history, Eeru N Lóone 44i Also, in works by established 
Soviet historians of philosophy like Ojzerman, one finds the notion of "lawlike regularity" 
instead of 'law" [Ch 12 ni 444 
In official sources the notion of zakonomemost'ib prominent 
' In this manner the history of philosophy created by Marxism Leninism not only founds the methodological 
principles ol the investigation of the historical process of philosophy, but also reveals its regularities 
[/jkonomcrnosti\ 445 
History of philosophy, a field of knowledge studying the development of philosophy revealing the regularities 
[zakonmcmosli], by virtue of which philosophical doctrines, tendencies give place to others "446 
Accepting the "top-down" order of Soviet philosophy, the "laws" and "regularities" that 
were of importance for a scientific study of the history of philosophy include, first of all, the 
three universal laws [vseobZcie zakony] of materialist dialectics unity and struggle of 
opposites, transition of quantitative changes in qualitative ones and the other way around, and 
negation of negation 447 Further, philosophy, a form of social consciousness, falls within the 
scope of istmjt, and therefore its laws apply too 448 At this point, Soviet sources are unclear 
Although the same elements recur, their status is difficult to decide upon Are they (universal) 
laws, (particular) regularities, or (methodological) principles7 To the first category we may 
reckon the determination "in the final analysis" of social consciousness by social being, and the 
progressive historical development of society through a series of socio-economic formations 
[IOne] To the second category belong the "relative independence" of forms of social 
consciousness, closely linked with the notion of continuity [preemstvennost] within a given 
form of social consciousness In the third category, finally, we encounter the principles of 
historicity [pnncipistonzma] and of partisanship [pnncippartijnosti] 
Whatever their exact status, six recurring elements can be discerned 
1 determination in the final analysis [ ν koneënom scefe] by socio-economic conditions, 
2 historical sequence through the "five stages ' [pjdticlenka]. 
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3 the relative independence [ofnosjfe/ naja samostojatel nost] of social consciousness, 
4 the continuity [preemstvennost'] within a form of social consciousness, 
5 the principle of historicity [principi stonzma], 
6 the principle of partisanship [pnncippdrtijnosti\ 
In an official definition of IFNoi 1982 these six elements are easily discernible 
Little by little in work in the history of philosophy the principle of historicity [pnncip istonzma] permeates 
the idea that philosophical doctrines of the past contain correct tenets as well, grains of truth that must be 
detached from delusions [5] ( ) A scientific history of philosophy was made possible with the genesis of 
Marxist Leninist philosophy As a result of the knowledge of the regularities [¿akonomernosti] of development 
of society and first of all of the law ( zakon) of the determining role [ opredeljajuSCajd rol"\ ot social being with 
respect to social consciousness [1], it proved to be possible to understand correctly and to explain the 
development ot philosophical thought ( ) The methodological basis of a scientific history of philosophy is 
materialist dialectics The initial principles of Marxist history of philosophy allow to single out definite stages 
in the historical development of philosophy connected with the shift of socio economic formations [2], they 
explain the genesis of different philosophical trends and tendencies showing that their character is determined by 
the level ot development of society, by social practice, social relations ( ) In judging philosophical doctrines 
from the past Marxism Leninism is guided by the principle of partisanship [pnnuppartijnosli] [6] ( ) In 
reality the process of historical development of philosophy is highly complicated The content of philosophical 
doctrines is ínlluenced by the development of sc;ence and other forms ot social consciousness [3] Elaborating 
their own doctrines, philosophers lean on [opimjuhja] the ideas of their predecessors |4] 449 
These six elements are the posts that mark the field of ÍFNas a legitimate activity within 
the framework of Soviet philosophy [Ch 12 u] 
Knowledge and Ideology the Functions oflFN 
Within the framework of Soviet philosophy, IFN performed three distinguishable functions 
[Ch 1 in] 450 
1 an epistemic function [Fl] the provision of knowledge of the history of philosophy 
This epistemic function can be further divided into 
a a histonogrdphical function, aiming at a description and analysis of the history 
of philosophy the provision of empirical information about past philosophy as 
well as contemporary non-Soviet philosophy, 
b an appropnative function, aiming at an assimilation of past, and of 
contemporary non-Soviet philosophical theories and positions, 
с a systematic function, interpreting the historical process of philosophy as a 
whole, providing the system of Soviet philosophy with a reconstruction of its 
own (pre)history, 
2 the systematic function was closely connected to, but not identical with the ideological 
function [F7], consisting in the legitimization of the dominant position of 'the 
philosophy of Marxism-Leninism' by means ot a (hi)story that presents it as the 
concluding stage and supreme outcome of the whole historical development of 
philosophy, resulting from a revolution in philosophy performed by Marx and Engels, 
3 finally, it is important to distinguish a technical lunction (bordering on the appropnative 
function [lb] distinguished above, but limited to the formal aspect of philosophy) [F5] 
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Again, these functions are easily discernible in official accounts of, e g , 1970 and 1983 
' Marxism leninism does not reduce the function of history of philosophy to the study, description, analysis and 
appreciation of philosophical doctrines of past and present though without the cognitive-analytical function 
[function la] a scientific investigation of the historical process of philosophy is unthinkable Marxist IFN 
concenes of philosophical doctrines ot past and present as a component part of the whole ideological 
process thus IFN performs an important ideological function [function 2] However the basic tasks of 
Marxist IFN are the critical assimilation [usvoentc] of the «intellectual material [myshtclnyj material]» of the 
past the all sided investigation of the regularities [7акопотсгпоЧі\ of the development of philosophy, its 
results and conclusions for a creative development of ideological [ітго огггепбечкіе] and methodological 
problems at a contemporary scientific level The synthetic generalizing methodological, and to a considerable 
extent heuristic function of Marxist IFN acquires paramount scientific significance under the conditions of the 
last third ot the 20th century [function lb] ( ) 
Without a profound mastery of the philosophical culture it would he extremely difficult if not impossible, 
to develop and perfect the capacities of people to theoretical thought [function 3] « Theoretical thought is an 
innate property only in the form of a capacity Engels wrote This capacity must be developed perfected and to 
that end there is until now no other means but the study of the enure preceding philosophy» 
( ) IFN is by no means a descriptive narrative branch of knowledge, in reality it is, like the other 
philosophical sciences called upon to reveal the profound processes of development and their general regularities 
and correlations in this case with respect to the sphere of philosophical knowledge itself, to its main stages 
[function lc] « I 
History of philosophy the science of the development of philosophical knowledge [function la and b], of the 
struggle of the fundamental -materialist and idealist- trends in philosophy, of the coming-to-be and development 
of the scientific philosophical dialectical materialist world view [lunction lc and function 2] ( ) The study 
and investigation of the historical process of philosophy is as Engels pointed out, a school of theoretical 
thought [function 3] ' 4 <> 2 
However, due to the predominant ideology of Soviet philosophy, esp its claim to be a 
scientific philosophy, the difference between the appropnative [ lb], systematic [ lc], and 
ideological function [2] tended to be blurred, as the first two were, subordinated to the latter 
This leaves us with the histonographical [la] and the technical function [3] as obviously 
distinct functions, focusing on the merely material and the purely formal aspects of philosophy 
They have exerted considerable influence on Soviet philosophy as a whole the increased 
professionalism of Soviet philosophers that Western commentators have pointed to was due to 
a large extent to a grown familiarity with the historical heritage of philosophy itself 
Still, the less obvious distinctions between the other three functions have to be 
observed in order to understand the nature and development of IFN Of considerable 
importance was the appropriation of recent developments m non-Marxist philosophy IFN 
served the assimilation by Soviet philosophy of the results of, e g , Western philosophy of 
language or philosophy of science However, study of contemporary non-Soviet philosophy 
was not a self-evident occupation for a Soviet philosopher, given its apnon (dis)qualification 
as ' bourgeois" or 'revisionist ' Soviet historians of philosophy had to present these "forbidden 
foreign philosophical fruits ' in an objective manner, ι e to distinguish clearly between 
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presentation, interpretation and comment, at the same time, they had to "wrap" these 
presentations in a Marxist-Leninist ' critique" This accounts for the notable growth of the 
number of serious discussions of non-Marxist philosophy in Soviet publications, as well as for 
the significant number of translations of "bourgeois ' philosophical texts, esp from such 
disciplines as logic, philosophy of science, and philosophy of language [Ch 111] Even if the 
comment was sometimes primitive or dogmatic, and even if the interpretation was perhaps not 
very illuminating to Western historians of philosophy, still this was of utmost importance for 
the development of Soviet philosophical culture 
Likewise, it is important to distinguish between the ideological and the systematic 
function, because the latter contains the seeds of destruction of the former [Ch 12 in] For the 
moment, it is sufficient to state that IFN moved between two poles on the one hand the 
historical foundation of dialectical and historical materialism as the superior outcome of the 
historical development of philosophy, in the service of official ideology [2], and on the other 
hand 'pure' historiography m the service of formal training and the appropriation of 
contemporary non-Marxist philosophy [la, 3 and lb] What the latter three have in common is 
a concentration on philosophical ideas, problems, positions, and theories, thus making 
research that focuses on texts and on philosophical content a legitimate affair By contrast, the 
ideological function resided in a preconceived interpretation of the history of philosophy as 
"leading up to" Marxist-Leninist philosophy, and of contemporary non-Soviet philosophy as 
interior The systematic function stands between these two poles, and forms in that respect the 
core of IFN Within this systematic function, two tasks can be distinguished the elaboration of 
a Marxist-Leninist theory of the history of philosophy, and of an overall account of 
philosophy s history, that is both historically adequate and compatible with Marxist-Leninist 
philosophy as a whole 
So, we find that IFN occupied a particular place in Soviet philosophy On the one hand, it was 
remote from ideological battle and official philosophy What could be more ' ideologically 
neutral" than histonographical studies9 And indeed it is not difficult to find studies by Soviet 
historians of philosophy, that could have been written by any scholar, East or West453 On the 
other hand, no field in Soviet philosophy was as closely related to the ideological defense of 
Marxist-Leninist philosophy as a whole In other words, IFN performed strongly different, not 
to say incompatible functions Therefore, one more task can be distinguished, again ideological 
in character, but this time from below' 
4 an infra-ideological self legitimization of IFN [F7], consisting in the attempt to 
accommodate these potentially conflicting functions, reconciling the actual activities of 
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Soviet historians of philosophy, i.e. the performance of functions 1-3, within the 
general framework of the ideology of Soviet philosophy. 
Not only is this task difficult to distinguish from the others (its not being distinguishable is a 
necessary condition of its efficacy), but it also blurs the distinctions between the others. Yet it 
was essential for the very existence of IFN. It is ideological in the proper sense of the term: it is 
a function of a theory about what Soviet historians of philosophy are doing, that, regardless of 
its being true or false, i.e. of whether it adequately describes what they are doing, serves to 
make their activity legitimate within the context of, and in terms of the Soviet system and its 
ruling ideology. 
The Disciplinary Structure of IFN 
A clear sign of the development of ¡FN was its increasing professionalism. It is manifest in 
such things as specialization, attention for methodological and didactical questions, and 
recourse to original source-material, even in the case of antagonistic bourgeois philosophy. In 
the late 1950s and the 1960s [lO.ii.d], a process of specialization of IFN took shape that resulted 
in the establishment of separate departments at the philosophical faculty of MGU for the history 
of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, the history of philosophy of the peoples of the USSR, and 
"foreign" philosophy. Among the tasks of these departments were the production of studies in 
their respective fields, but also the preparation of specialists in these fields. Within the 
specialization into these fields, a further differentiation took place, yielding the following 
picture of the "division of labor" among Soviet historians of philosophy: 
This structure clearly displays the predominance of the horizontal dichotomy ("before 
Marx" and "after Marx") over the vertical dichotomy (materialism versus idealism), and a 
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predominance of a geographic principle of division over the socio-economic pjaticlenka [ 10 u d] 
The reason for this may have been largely pragmatic in terms of the skills required it is far 
more easy to train somebody who is able to study German or Chinese or North American 
philosophy in its subsequent phases, than it is to train someone who can study "philosophy in 
slave-holding society" in both Greece, Japan, Egypt, and India At the same time, it is one of 
the many points in which IFN was remarkably traditional [Ch 11 и] 
History of philosophy is not only a practical affair, a matter of actually studying, describing, 
and analyzing past philosophy, it also presupposes and produces a theoretical field in IFN 
-just as in Western philosophy- we find next to each other a practice of historiography and a 
theory of the history of philosophy As a matter of fact, theoretical considerations have formed 
an important part of the work of Soviet historians of philosophy The attempt to outline a more 
complete conception of IFN as a discipline, comprising both a practical and a theoretical part 
was done by Kamenskij m 1984, when he distinguished three meanings of the concept of 
"history of philosophy" [Ch 2 0] 4 5 4 
"1 an objective process, 
2 historiography (empirical and scientific) 
3 a science, [also] including 
a a theory of research into the history of philosophy 
b a doctrine about the forms and goals of research into the history of philosophy 
с a doctrine about the methods (or a methodology) of research into the history of philosophy 
d a historiography of the scientific history of philosophy (the self consciousness ot the 
scientific history of philosophy) ' 4 , 5 
These different subdisciphnes, however, were not relegated to separate realms Historiography 
[2] and theory of the history of philosophy [3], characterized by Kamenskij as a "reflection 
upon the regularities [zakonomemosti] of the historical process of philosophy", and further 
[3a-c] as a "reflection with respect to the goals, forms and methods of investigation into the 
history of philosophy"456 were supposed, e g by Ojzerman, to form a unity 
"We are speaking of history of philosophy as of a unity of historical and theoretical investigation ( ) We are 
convinced that a theoretical comprehension [osmysleme] of the historical process of philosophy is 
indispensable for any study in this field, however limited its tasks may be " 4 5 7 
But if we follow Kamenskij in his distinctions, add to his considerations that besides a 
methodology of history of philosophy as a discipline there also was a didactic of history of 
philosophy, and further agree with Ojzerman that, from the perspective of Soviet philosophy, 
"an integral component of Marxist-Leninist IFN is the critical analysis of contemporary 
bourgeois philosophy, including the latest idealist theories of the historical process of 
philosophy,"458 we can include these as further theoretical subdisciphnes within IFN 
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This yields the following picture 
With this picture, the account of the foundations, functions, and disciplinary structure of IFN 
as part of mature Soviet philosophy is complete, and the ground is prepared for a survey of its 
historiographie practice [Ch.l 1], as well as for an analysis of its theory [Ch.12]. 
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Conclusion 
Soviet IFN has developed, through a number of subsequent phases, into a firmly established 
branch of Soviet philosophy Its growth has been stimulated, in the 1930s and since ottepel', 
by the general "freeze" of Soviet philosophical life The first stimulus was largely outdone by 
the ideological strains of the "offensive period" (1947-1955), but the second proved to be more 
lasting, due to a process of professionalization and specialization that made IFN less sensitive 
to changes in the general intellectual climate A steady growth of the number of historians of 
philosophy and of the number of translations and editions of classical philosophical texts has 
strengthened the institutional and material basis of this discipline 
When, in the late 1970s and the 1980s, Soviet philosophy as a whole was strongly, 
and negatively influenced by so-called "stagnation ' [Ch 61], IFN continued to develop and 
grow The increase in historical work in philosophy is a widespread, and often-loathed 
phenomenon m 20th century philosophy, and Soviet philosophy made no exception But there 
was another reason, too IFN was a typical example of the professionalization of Soviet 
philosophy after the running-down of ottepel' as a major alternative to marginalization 
[Ch 9 in] Also, by virtue of its being a histoucal discipline with a considerable level of 
facticity, IFN was less affected by political change philosophers working in branches like 
ethics or istmat were likely to see their work immediately influenced by changes in political 
climate, whereas historians of philosophy could continue their scholarly work more or less 
undisturbed 
A most distinctive feature of IFN throughout its development has been the project of a 
universal Marxist-Leninist history of philosophy None of the attempts in this direction has 
really yielded satisfactory results, and the project as a whole demonstrates the basic tension 
between the three impulses inherited by IFN from the klassiki The reductionist impulse, 
ensuing from historical materialism, the dichotomic impulse, related to the idea of an 
expression of class-struggle at the level of philosophical positions, and the totalizing impulse, 
resulting from the claim of Soviet philosophy to represent a true and scientific understanding of 
all reality and to be, in that sense, the conclusion of the history of philosophy, can not be 
united into a single theoretical conception of the history of philosophy The "double statement", 
stressing both the determination "in the final analysis" of philosophical positions by socio-
economic conditions and their relative independence, represents an attempt to relieve this basic 
tension, and has been a permanent element of IFN 
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The shift from economic reductionism, militant partisanship, and a one-dimensional 
scheme of classification, and from Russian and Soviet patriotism, to a more sophisticated, 
objective, and source-oriented approach, focusing on philosophical ideas, theories, and 
problems,459 was necessitated by the claim of Soviet philosophy to embody philosophical 
truth. Did this mean a return to "bourgeois objectivism"? The answer to this question is of 
decisive importance for a proper understanding of IFNof the 1980s, because it both did and 
did not. It led, as a matter of fact, to a discrepancy between different functions of IFN. its 
epistemic function, its systematic function, and its ideological function. The requirement to 
assimilate the content of past philosophy and of contemporary non-Soviet philosophical 
thought has caused the development of a flourishing historiographie practice. The need to have 
IFN perform different functions has urged the development of a theory of the history of 
philosophy, capable of linking them. This brings us to the subject of the next two chapters: an 
account of the historiographie practice, and an analysis of Soviet theory of the history of 
philosophy. 
*** 
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CHAPTER ELEVEN 
Soviet History of Philosophy: Historiographical Practice 
"Das theoretische Denken ist aber nur der Anlage nach eine angebome 
Eigenschaft Diese Anlage muß entwickelt, ausgebildet werden, und fur diese 
Ausbildung gibt es bis jetzt kein andres Mittel als das Studium der 
bisherigen Philosophie " 4 6 ° 
F Engels, 1878 
"In order to seriously come to understand the connection of, be it even 
Medieval discussions, with the history of materialism would require a 
special investigation "461 
VI Lenin, 1914 
In the first part of this study, I have outlined the idea of a philosophical culture as a principle of 
individuation of philosophy in history, and in the second and third part this idea has been 
applied to the "Soviet philosophical phenomenon". I have indicated the importance of the 
material basis and of the socio-histoncal situation as 'determinants' of a philosophical culture, 
as well as of the philosophical heritage and a philosophical industry, determining the 'level' of 
a given philosophical culture [Ch l n] Also, I have argued that philosophy is developed in the 
concrete actions of philosophers, and creates its own history in the 'accumulated objectivity' of 
a heritage. In the course of this process, its 'historical self-awareness' gams importance, both 
as a historical reflection as to where present philosophy came from, and as a growing need to 
make philosophy's history accessible and present, i.e. to create a tradition [Ch 2 ш). 
One of the consequences of this situation is that a philosophical culture contains a field 
of intellectual (historical - descriptive, and philosophical - interpretative) activity that is 
accumulative and relatively autonomous: history of philosophy. Of course, this discipline 
exists within the limitations of a given philosophical culture, but these limitations are not static, 
and may be changed by, among others, the achievements of the history of philosophy. Further, 
this discipline comprises both a practical part, a historiography, and a theoretical part, a theory 
about philosophy as a historical phenomenon or "process", and a theory (methodology, 
didactic, history) of history of philosophy as a discipline [Ch Ю ш]. 
In the case of Soviet philosophical culture, and its historical discipline, IFN, two 
further elements must be added to this 'standard' situation, namely the fact of the subordination 
of philosophy as a whole to an ideological function [Ch 10 H-UI], and the fact that IFN, due to its 
level of specialization and its "facticity",462 was one of the 'niches' to which philosophers 
could 'escape', an example of professionahzation as an alternative to marginahzation [Ch 9 u-iu, 
and Ch 10 ne] 
403 
Chapter 11 Soviet History of Philosophy Histonographwal Practice 
Departing from these three elements, this chapter aims at an analysis of the histonographical 
practice of IFN in the 1980s The first element is recognizable as a professionellst trend a 
tendency towards scholarly, source-oriented study, aiming at a "neutral' account of 
philosophy's history The second element is present in the mobilization of the ideological 
function of IFN, directly in ideological struggle, and indirectly in the historical underpinning of 
the ideology of Soviet philosophy" The third element comes to the fore in the attempts of 
Soviet historians of philosophy to address, via a historical detour, issues that one would expect 
under the headings of diamat and istmat 
This detour is a familiar element of Western philosophical culture as well (the present 
study is an example), but in Soviet philosophical culture it gained importance due to the 
"colonization" of central philosophical questions [Ch 9 n] Therefore, in terms of functions of 
philosophy [Ch l ш and Ch 10 m], we are dealing with ι) an epistemicfunction [Fl], proper to 
history of philosophy (histonographical [ la] and appropnativc [ lb]), π) an ideological 
function [F7], partly also proper to history of philosophy [2], and in) an epistemic function 
[Fl] not proper to history of philosophy As I have argued [Ch 1 in], these different functions 
do not exclude each other, but they do create tensions A professional approach is potentially at 
odds with an ideological function, because not every fact from philosophy's history may 
equally well suit the latter There is a clear tension between an ideological function and the 
attempt to address philosophical issues by means of historical study And there is a familiar 
conflict between the professional-histonographical and the systematic-philosophical approach 
These tensions are manifest to a varying extent in the different parts of IFN that shall be 
discussed 
I shall distinguish three different areas of histonographical practice In the first place, the 
creation of a material basis reliable editions and translations, as well as access to foreign 
primary and secondary literature [ili] In the second place, philosophical education the role of 
history of philosophy in philosophical instruction in general, and the preparation· of historians 
of philosophy [Пи] In the third place, historiography of philosophy in the familiar sense 
accounts, analyses, interpretations, and surveys of philosophy's past [l l ш] This third section 
is divided into six sub-sections [lima-fl, corresponding to the global penodization and 
disciplinary structure of /fN[Ch 10 ш] A fourth section discusses the dissolution of IFN m 
the years of perestrojka and glasnost', the disconnection of the three elements just indicated 
shows their close connection to be part of the sovietness of IFN [11 ïv] 
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The leitmotif running through this chapter is that of the tension between, on the one 
hand, the objective requirements of a historical practice with an increasing level of profes-
sionalism, specialization, and accompanying disciplinary differentiation, and, on the other 
hand, the equally objective "sovietness" of this branch of Soviet philosophy, meaning that it 
had to be legitimate in terms of Soviet ideology of philosophy [Ch.7, Ch.8, and Ch. lO.iii]. 
l l . i The Material Basis of IFN: Editions and Translations 
One of the achievements of IFN has been the production of an impressive body of classical 
philosophical literature. The central place is occupied by a series called " Filosofskoe nasledie 
[Philosophical Heritage, FN]", begun 1963 by the IF and the publishing house of the AON, 
«Mysl' [Idea]»,463 and intended to cover "all fundamental stages of the development of 
philosophical thought."464 The overall plan consisted of 500 volumes by 200 different authors, 
and in 1987, the 100th volume appeared.465 This feat occasioned a lot of praise,466 as well as 
critical remarks about the weak representation of Russian idealists, which "gives rise to 
dilettante, narrow-minded judgments about them, creates the ground for an inadequate 
interpretation of the relation between religious and secular sources in the history of Russian 
culture, and for erroneous ideas about the hypertrophied role of religion in the spiritual life and 
artistic culture of Russia."467 Other critical remarks concerned the absence of Descartes, 
Bruno, and Spinoza, of main works by Fichte and Schelling, of Feuerbach's Wesen des 
Christentums, and of Hegel's Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophien 
It is obvious that, since "no textbook can replace the study of primary sources,"46? this 
series "raises the level of philosophical culture, contributes to the development of philosophical 
training, performs an important enlightening function [prosvetitel'skaja funkcija], and is an 
irreplaceable remedy for philosophical dilettantism, since only the study and assimilation of 
philosophical texts can mould a truly professional philosopher."470 The volumes in the FN 
series appeared in large editions: from 6 to 10 thousand for the first volumes, to tens of 
thousands towards the end of the 1960s, and 100,000 and 200,000 in the 1970s, raising the 
average over the first 100 volumes to 80,000.47· 
Thus the conditions to become acquainted with a considerable part of the philosophical 
heritage of mankind were realized. However, it is one thing to know a philosophical heritage, 
but quite another thing to deploy that knowledge in philosophical thought itself, i.e. to link it to 
present philosophical discussion. This deployment was hampered by the general limitations of 
Soviet philosophy. Another, more serious shortcoming was that series like FN, or "Istorija 
cstetiki ν pamjatnikach i dokumentach [The History of Aesthetics in Texts and Documents]", 
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published by «Iskusstvo [Art]», focused almost exclusively on pre-Marxist, in any case pre-
Sovietphilosophicalhterature 
' One of the obvious manifestations of dogmatism and playing-safe in our country is that in the series 
«Filosotskoe nasledie» nothing is published from the period of the development of bourgeois thought since 
Feuerbach ' 4 7 2 
There was in fact a gap of some 100 years between these two series and the main series 
in contemporary "bourgeois" philosophy, published by «Progress» Texts by important 
philosophers like Nietzsche, Husserl, Cassirer, Peirce, Bergson, or Russell were simply 
lacking 471 
With respect to contemporary non-Soviet philosophical literature, the situation was (though 
better than one might expect, and much better than in the period immediately after World War 
II474) considerably less favorable than in the case of pre-Marxist philosophy Few works were 
published (with the exception of Marxist authors475), editions were small, access therefore 
more complicated, and translations often appeared at a moment when the texts translated had 
already become "classical ' For example, Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus iogico-
philosophicus (1921) appeared in the USSR in 1958, 4™ Gottlob Frege's 'Über Sinn und 
Bedeutung' (1892) in 1977,477 a Karl R Popper reader was published in 1983, containing 
parts of The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), chapters from Conjectures and Refutations 
(1963) and Objective Knowledge (1972),478 Claude Lévi-Strauss' Anthropologiestructurale 
(1958) was published in 1983,479 Robin G Collingwood's The Ided of History (1946) m 
1980,480 and Hans-Georg Gadamer's Wahrheit und Methode (1960) appeared in 1988 481 
Other major texts in Western philosophy were translated much quicker Michel Foucault's Les 
mors et les choses (1966), appearing m 1977,482 and some works by Ilya Prigogine, whose 
From Being to Becoming (1977) appeared in Russian translation in 1985, followed a year later 
by Dialogue With Nature ( 1980) W 
Philosophical texts oriented on "hard science" penetrated on the Soviet market much 
easier than those on social or political theory, philosophy of history, ethics, etc Examples of 
the first category are Thomas Kuhn, Imre Lakatos, Rudolf Carnap, Michael Ruse, René 
Wellek & Austin Warren, Stephen Toulmin, and Gerald Holton484 With respect to 
philosophers who were regarded as "irrationalists", "subjective idealists", or "revisionists", the 
situation was considerably worse Martin Heidegger, for example, whose "nrationalist 
philosophy" was qualified in FES as "one of the acute manifestations of the crisis of contem-
porary bourgeois consciousness,"485 did not exist in a Soviet edition until 1981 486 In that 
year, a collection of articles ( 'Einfuhrung in 'Was ist Metaphysik9'", "Die Frage nach der 
Technik", "Die Zeit des Weltbildes") appeared, translated by Vladimir Veniaminovic Bibíchin, 
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in an edition "for official use only" [dlja sluzebnogopol'zovamja] [Ch 9 n],487 and it was only 
in 1986 that public editions began to appear 488 In 1989 the collection by Bibichin appeared in 
a 50,000 copy edition,489 in 1991 Dobrochotov edited a collection of articles and interviews, 
Razgovor na proseloänoj doroge [Conversation on a Country Road], which appeared in 
65,000 copies,490 and in 1993 a collection of translations by Bibichin appeared in 51,000 
copies491 These editions testify of the enormous gap in literature (and of the "Heidegger-
boom" in post-Soviet philosophy) With regard to prominent 20th century philosophers like 
Jürgen Habermas or Paul Ricoeur, the situation was comparable no public editions until 1986 
or later 492 
It should be remembered in this connection that the original publications of major texts of 20th 
century philosophy were not accessible m the USSR due to customs regulation and lack of 
hard currency Philosophers often depended, in practice, on the odd copy sent to them by a 
foreign colleague 493 Moreover, philosophical journals from outside the socialist block were 
hardly accessible, too As a result translations remained isolated phenomena, lacking the 
background of reception and discussion in which they were "embedded" m their countries of 
origin This situation is indicated by the authors of the recent lexicon Sovremennaja zapadnaja 
fìlosolìja [Dictionary of Contemporary Western -no longer "bourgeois"- Philosophy] 
"For many long years, the acquaintance with the creative work of contemporary foreign philosophers was, for 
the Soviet reader hampered by the scant access [malodostupnost'] to their works, the very limited number of 
translations "494 
It is interesting, finally, to note the strong accent on the Western philosophical tradition 
in the FN series, clearly appearing from the division of subjects of the FN senes (1963-1987) 
German philosophy 
brench philosophy 
British philosophy 
Classical Greek philosophy 
Europ Medieval philosophy 
American Enlightenment 
Western philosophy 
Latin American philosophy 
Chinese philosophy 
Indian philosophy 
Non- Western philosophy 
Armenian philosophy 
Georgian philosophy 
Ukrainian philosophy 
Russian philosophy 
Phil of the Fatherland 
Anthology ot World Phil 
30 
15 
14 
η 
2 
2 
76 
1 
2 
1 
4 
1 
1 
2 
10 
14 
4 
Feuerbach (3), Schelling ( 1 ), Kant (6) 
Gassendi (2), Condillac(3) Lamettne 
British materialists (3), Locke (2), Hume (2) 
Aristotle (4), Diogenes L (1), Plato (4) Sextus E (2) 
Nicholas of Cusa (2) 
Amenkanskie prosvetitch (2) 
Progressive thinkers 
Anthology (2) 
Anthology (1) 
DavidAnacht 
Ioane Pctnci 
G S Skovoroda(2) 
Radiscev e a (2) A I Gercen (2) Ρ L Lavrov (2), Ρ N 
Tkaccv (2) N F Fedorov, N G CernySevskij (2) 
Antologijd mirovoj filosofi! (4) 
407 
Chapter 11 Soviet History of Philosophy Histonographical Practice 
The scanty representation of Medieval and Eastern philosophy was attributed to lack of 
specialists,495 although in the case of Medieval philosophy the overall rejection of 'Christian 
philosophy' played a part, too Soviet philosophy was a true heir of European Enlightenment 
in this respect, one of its main contemporary philosophical enemies being Neo-Thomism In 
the case of Russian philosophy, there is a clear predominance of revdemokratizm in the 
editorial policy with the exception of Fedorov all authors belong to this category This, too, 
was regretted " we should not forget the idealist thinkers of Russia, otherwise our idea of 
the struggle of materialism and idealism will be extremely impoverished (note that foreign 
philosophy is represented in the FN series by both materialists and idealists) "496 And although 
Volodin complained about lack of specialists in Russian philosophy "who love and are able to 
work with the texts,"497 this certainly was only part of the reason The choice of authors was 
motivated by ideological reasons, viz to stress the important role of progressive Russian 
thought in preparing the ground for revolutionary Russian Marxism 
With regard to pre-Marxist philosophy, the presence of source material was impressive, though 
incomplete and showing serious gaps, esp in Medieval philosophy There was a systematic 
attempt to remedy that situation, and the preference for "materialist" philosophers did not 
exclude "idealists" With respect to Russian philosophy, there was a tendency to reduce 
Russian philosophy to the "revolutionary democrats" With respect to non-Russian 
"philosophy of the peoples of the USSR" there was a mixture of stress on "forerunners" of 
istmat and diamat, and "national pride" for example, the Russian editions of works by Al-
Farabi and Ibn-Sina [Avicenna],498 published in Alma-Ata and DuSanbe (capitals of 
Kazachstan and Tddzikstan), as well as those of David Anacht [David Invictus] and Ioané 
Petrici [Petncius] testify of this mixture As for contemporary non-Soviet philosophical 
thought, finally, the material was very limited, highly selective, and often outdated Here, the 
problem was not simply lack of sources, but lack of foundation for philosophical assimilation 
and discussion Thus, Soviet philosophical culture passively absorbed lots of information, 
lacking the ideological and material conditions to process that information actively 
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11.ii History of Philosophy in Soviet Education 
Every Soviet student of any speudlnost' was presented a historical account of philosophy 
Even standard textbooks in philosophy such as Osnovy marksistsko-lenmskoj filosofa, which 
were not meant for university students but for those in a wide range of medical, polytechnic, 
pedagogical etc institutes (all belonging, with the universities, to the category of VUZy), 
contained a lot of historical references, inserted to demonstrate the superiority of Marxist 
philosophy over previous philosophical thought 
The revolution in philosophy, carried oui by К Marx and F Engels had nothing in common with a nihilistic 
denial of the achievements of previous philosophy and of knowledge in general As V I Lenin has pointed out 
[ика7у а[\ the very genius of Marx consisted in the fact that he answered the questions, raised by his 
outstanding predecessors in this he «leaned on the sound foundations of human knowledge, won under 
capitalism » 4 " 
The historical material in this type of textbook is highly predictable the mechanist and 
"metaphysical" nature of pre-Marxian materialism, the idealist nature of pre-Marxian dialectics, 
the revolution in philosophy, prepared by Hegel, who formulated "the for its time most 
complete theory of development, albeit developed from erroneous, idealist positions "50° 
Moreover, chapters such as 'Matter and the basic forms of its existence' or "Historical 
progress" begin with a discussion ot Milesian materialists, Greek atomism, Gassendi and 
Hobbes, or, in the second case, Herder, Hegel, Comte, and Spencer 501 A standard element, 
finally, is the implicit insertion of the Russian revolutionary democrats as "outstanding 
représentants of materialism" between French materialism and Feuerbach on the one hand, and 
the "highest form of contemporary materialism - dialectical and historical materialism" on the 
other, without any further indication of their historical role,502 and their representation as one 
ot the "basic stages in the history of dialectics," situated between German classical philosophy 
(preceded by "the spontaneous, naive dialectics of ancient thinkers" and "the dialectics of 
Renaissance materialists"), and "Marxist-Leninist materialist dialectics — the highest form of 
contemporary dialectics "503 
History of Philosophy m Soviet Higher Education 
History of philosophy was presumably not the least interesting element of the obligatory 
philosophy courses at universities and other VUZy Every student in any discipline had to pass 
a State exam in his proper trade, e g physics or history, and in 'foundations of Marxism-
Leninism [osnovy mdrksizma-lcnimzma] , which included philosophy, and was popularly 
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referred to as "the red subjects" [krasnye predmety] or 'the boring subject" [skucnyj predmet] 
What exactly was done in philosophy depended on the special'nost', and there was more stress 
on philosophy in the humanities than there was in the natural sciences A student in physics 
would have to do courses in scientific atheism, scientific communism, political economy, and 
ditimat and istmat 504 Students in the humanities would have one "red subject" each year, 
amounting to a total of 10 For example history of the CPSU (the first two years) based on a 
textbook popularly referred to as "the brick [kirp¡6\'\ political economy (the third year, 2 
courses one on capitalism and one on socialism), Marxist-Leninist philosophy (fourth year, 2 
courses, using a textbook like Osnovy marksistsko-Iemnskoj fìlosofìi), and scientific 
communism (the concluding fifth year, again 2 courses),05 
History of philosophy occupied a well-determined place in these course For example, 
in the case of a 140-hour programma, 4 hours were dedicated to "The struggle of materialism 
and idealism in pre-Mar\ist philosophy", 2 more to "The emergence and basic stages of 
development of Marxist philosophy", 4 hours were reserved, within the diamat section, for 
"Critique of Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy", and 2, within the ïstmat section, for 
"Critique of Contemporary Bourgeois Sociology" — 12 hours out of 140,4 subjects on a total 
of 24 In the case of a 90-hour course, all four subjects were dealt with m 2 hours each— 8 
hours out of 90 S06 A closer look at this ' Struggle of materialism and idealism in pre-Marxist 
philosophy" gives an idea of what Soviet students were supposed to make themselves familiar 
with 
"The historical stages of development of philosophy, and their connection with socio-economic formations 
Forms of materialism and idealism 
Philosophy in the period of slave holding society Basic peculiarities of materialism in the countries of the 
ancient world The «line of Democntus» and the «line of Plato» Aristotle and his place in the history of 
philosophy 
Philosophy in the period of feudal society Medieval scholasticism as «anelila theologiae» The struggle of 
nominalism and realism Materialist tendencies in Medieval philosophy 
Philosophy in the period of capitalist society Us bond with the development of natural science Metaphysical 
limitcdness \metañ¿i£eskaja ogram£ennosC\ and elements of dialectics in Modern philosophy Empiricism and 
rationalism Objective and subjective idealism of the 17th and 18th centuries The struggle of 17th and 18th 
century materialists against idealism and religion 
Classical German philosophy The philosophy of Kant Kantian agnosticism Hegel s objective idealism and 
dialectics The contradiction of method and system in Hegels philosophy The anthropological materialism of 
Feuerbach and his struggle against idealism and religion 
Basic features of the philosophy of the revolutionary democrats The materialism of the revolutionary democrats, 
their struggle against idealism and religion Elements of dialectics in the philosophy of revolutionary 
democratism The most prominent représentants of revolutionary democratism in Russia V G Belinskij, A I 
Herzen, N G Cernysevskij, N A Dobroljubov The international nature of revolutionary democratism "507 
The literature to be studied in this connection consisted of some 105 pages by the 
klassiki parts from Die heilige Familie, Anti-Duliring, and esp Ludwig Feuerbach , 
Materialism ι empiriokriticizm,50* Pamjati Gercena [To the Memory of Herzen], and 
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Filosofskie tetrady (the last page of Lenin's summary of Feuerbach's Vorlesungen über das 
Wesen der Religion, the part on pre-Socratic philosophy from his summary of Hegel's 
Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie, from his summary of Lassalle's book on 
Herachtus, and his summary of Aristotle's Metaphysics) Ludwig Feuerbach and 
Matenalizmiempinokriticizm were studied in 4 and 8 seminar hours respectively, with Lenin's 
Gosudarstvoi revoljucija [State and Revolution] the only obligatory philosophical texts 
What was actually done during those hours depended on the capacities and courage of 
the teacher, but the exams were identical for all students Institutionally important philosophers 
like Ojzcrman or Mel'vil', not to mention the specialists working under their custody, were 
strongly critical of these programmes,509 but as late as 1987 there was very little change The 
programme was almost literally identical,510 but teachers were granted some freedom to 
"introduce necessary changes in the approximate time-table for studying the course, they are 
allowed to increase the amount of time for holding seminars and the organization of indepen-
dent work of students, at the expense of the number of lecture hours, provided that they 
guarantee the full mastery by the students of the content of the corresponding course "5· ι 
More elaborate, but displaying the same structure, was the instruction in history of philosophy 
of Soviet post-graduates [aspiranty] in disciplines other than philosophy They had to pass an 
obligatory and centralized "kandidatskij ckzamen [candidate's exam]" in diamat and istmat, 
they were supposed to have passed the exams in Marxist-Leninist philosophy at Vi/Z-level, 
and to prepare for the exam by themselves 5 I 2 The programme for the exam was made up of 
three parts historical introduction to philosophy (8 sections), diamat (5 sections, including a 
' Critique of Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy"), istmat (10 sections, including a "Critique 
of Contemporary Bourgeois Sociology") 5 ' 3 The historical introduction comprised the 
following subjects 1) philosophy of slave holding society, 2) philosophy of feudal society, 3) 
the struggle of materialism and idealism in the 16th and 17th centuries, 4) the struggle of 
materialism and idealism in the 18th century, 5) classical German philosophy, 6) the 
philosophy of the [Russian, EvdZ] revolutionary democrats of the 19th century, 7) the 
emergence and development of Marxist philosophy, 8) the Leninist stage \lemnskijetap] in the 
development of Marxist philosophy — the latter including ' the struggle of the CPSU for the 
further creative development of Marxist-Leninist philosophy on the basis of the achievements 
oí science and social practice" 514 
The literature to be mastered was, again, largely 'classical ' (79 titles by Marx, Engels, 
and Lenin (varying from Das Manifest , Ludwig Feuerbach and three chapters of Das 
Kapital to letters and parts trom Die heilige Familie, and all major works by Lenin), 19 Party-
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documents and texts by (1984) KU Cernenko and Ju V Andropov), but included some 
primary sources, too G V Plechanov, V G Behnskij, A I Gercen, N G Cernyevskij, F 
Bacon, G W F Hegel (the 1st volume of the Enzyklopädie , ι e the Logik), R Descartes 
(Discours de ¡a Méthode), D Diderot, and L Feuerbach (Grundsätze der Philosophie der 
Zukunft) 5'5 As to secondary sources, the aspiranty were supposed to master KIF and 
Overman s Formirovanie filosofa marksizma 
Here, too, the approach of 'philosophy until Marx" and "philosophy after Marx" is 
radically different The historical introduction follows the development of philosophy from its 
very beginning to the "Leninist stage of Marxist philosophy in 6 subsequent stages, cor-
responding to the pjaticlenka [Ch ione], and inserts Russian revolutionary democratism 
between German classical philosophy and Marxism The genesis of Marxism is reconstructed, 
employing the historical remarks of the klassiL·^^6 Then a section on "the essence and 
significance of the revolutionary overturn [revoljucionnyj perevorot] in philosophy, ac-
complished by К Marx and Engels' follows, after which "the creative development by V I 
Lenin of dialectical and historical materialism" and the "further creative development of Marxist-
Leninist philosophy" are discussed 517 Non-Marxist philosophy after Marx, however, is not 
discussed from a historical perspective, but from that of diamat and istmat, and its treatment is 
entirely critical, as appears from the synopsis 
'The essence of contemporary bourgeois philosophy and the diversity of its appearance The reflection of the 
crisis of capitalism in contemporary bourgeois philosophy the predominance ot idealism and metaphysics, the 
dissemination of irrationalism mysticism and religious ideas their anti humane nature 
The basic trends of contemporary bourgeois philosophy nco positivism, irrationalst anthropologism, religious 
philosophy ( ) 
The eclectic nature of contemporary bourgeois philosophy The use of the principle of «pluralism» in the 
struggle against the monism of the dialectical materialist world view New trends in bourgeois philosophy 
structuralism hcmieneutics critical rationalism 
The significance of the works by К Marx F Engels, V I I enin for the critique of contemporary bourgeois 
philosophy 
The 26th Party Congress and the plenary session of the Central Committee of the CPSU of June 1983 about 
the necessity of intensification of the struggle against bourgeois ideology '518 
Thus, instruction in history of philosophy for students and aspiranty of specializations 
other than philosophy itself was strongly orthodox and highly predictable, perfectly matching, 
in the 1980s, the official position developed in earlier years As such it contrasts with the 
instruction of future philosophers, esp of future historians of philosophy But even so, the 
stress on the philosophical roots of Marxism is remarkable enough 
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Becoming a Soviet Historian of Philosophy 
History of philosophy at philosophical faculties was quite a different matter. In the course of a 
full programm in philosophy at MGU, students would get introductory courses in 4 historical 
subjects: history of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, history of the philosophy of the peoples of 
the USSR, critique of contemporary bourgeois philosophy, and history of "foreign" philo-
sophy [istorija zarubeznoj fílosoñi: IZF\.5^ Further, IFN was one out of 7 possible specializa-
tions in philosophy at MGU (the others being diamat, istmat, logic, atheism, aesthetics, and 
ethics).520 At this level, the programme in IZF alone comprised 476 hours (half lectures, half 
seminars, in which both primary and secondary literature was discussed). 
History of foreign philosophy in the philosophy curriculum (MGU. philosophical faculty):52' 
Subject 
1. Introduction 
2. Phil, of slave-holding society (Egypt, Babylon, Far East, Greece, Rome) 
3. Philosophy of feudal society 
4. W. Eur. phil. of the transition from feudalism to capitalism (Renaissance) 
5. W. Eur. phil. at the time of early bourgeois revolutions (17th c.) 
6. British idealism and Enlightenment philosophy in the 17th century 
7. German Enlightenment and classical German philosophy (18lh-19th c.) 
8. History of bourgeois philosophy of the imperialist period 
Total 
Further qualification was possible in the form of an aspirantura in a number of specializations, 
including / /Wand KBF.522 
University Textbooks in IFN 
Official accounts like KIF от IF6 [Ch.lO.ii.d] were too schematic and outdated by current 
research to satisfy the need for manuals. This is why Soviet historians of philosophy engaged 
in a large project: the creation, over the years 1973-1980, of a set of "textbooks [uöebnye 
posobija] for students and post-graduates of the philosophical faculties of state universities on 
the history of philosophy."523 They were written by the staff of the philosophical faculty of 
MGU, published by «Vyssaja Skola [High school]», and completed in 1980 with an 8th 
volume.524 This series would provide an alternative to IF6 as "a first Soviet history of 
philosophy in many volumes that meets today's elevated theoretical and ideological 
demands,"525 if it would include, as was urged in several reviews, volumes on Russian and on 
Marxist-Leninist philosophy.526 Although this goal was never realized, the series was 
Lectures 
2 
48 
18 
16 
32 
28 
26 
6J_ 
238 
Sem 
60 
8 
8 
36 
22 
36 
68_ 
238 
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successful by 1981, all volumes had become bibliographical rarities and editions were judged 
to be too small527 Reviews were generally favorable the book by Asmus on classical philoso-
phy, e g , was praised for "the first sufficiently complete and precise appreciation of Plato's 
dialectics in Marxist literature on the history of philosophy "528 This positive appreciation 
meant a farewell to the conception of the history of philosophy as essentially the history of 
materialism (a price apparently too high for one reviewer who complained about the presence 
of Plotinus and Proclus rather than Democntus and Epicurus on the dust-cover of Asmus' 
book) "9 
In spite of this success, a series of additional volumes appeared within years one by 
Sokolov on European philosophy in the 15th-17th centuries, and another by Vitahj Nikolaevic 
Kuznecóv (b 1932), MGU's chief specialist in French Enlightenment philosophy, and others, 
on 18th century West European philosophy 53° Soviet reviewers wondered why a new senes 
was required, the more so since "among the authors [of the first series, EvdZ], six were 
working at the same department where the publication under review was prepared "531 The 
reviewers further asked about the differences in methodology and content, noting a contrast 
between Sokolov's work, presenting John Locke as an agnostic with respect to spiritual and 
material substances, and that by Kuznecov, where he appears as an immediate predecessor of 
English materialism 532 
With respect to the volume by Sokolov, the answer is partly provided by his own 
review of one of the books that his work came to replace, where he criticized A Ch Gor-
funkcl' for not dedicating a full chapter to Nicholas of Cusa, for overestimating Jakob Böhme, 
and for omitting Protestantism and Counter Reformation 533 These flaws, as well as that of 
paying too little attention to "second scholasticism' (Suárez) in Sokolov's own volume on 
Medieval philosophy,534 were remedied in his own book 
Kuznecov's book on 18th century philosophy focused on (deist) materialism in Britain 
and France (J Toland, A Collins, D Hartley, J Priestley, J Meslier, Ch -L Montesquieu, 
F -M Voltaire, J -J Rousseau, E de Condillac, and, of course, the "militant materialism" of 
J О de Lamettne, D Diderot, С Helvétius, and PH Holbach),535 pointing out that the 
"knowledge of these [philosophies, EvdZl has not only historical, but also actual significance" 
'On the one hand il can equip [the reader] with the capacity to diagnose [ra%po7navat'\ the idealist, fideist, and 
agnostic essence of a whole series of contemporary bourgeois philosophical conceptions, that lay claim to 
ideological «neutrality» [mirovozzrenCeskajavnejtralnost»], and to use it as a sharp histonco-philosophical 
weapon [osiroe ічюпко fìhsohkoe oruzic] On the other hand this knowledge assists to the formation of a 
scientific materialist world view and to ideological education [ide¡noc vospitame] on the basis of revolutionary-
democratic traditions '53(> 
Narskij, whose book on 18th century philosophy was replaced by this volume, 
apparently had not paid sufficient attention to the possible use of historical work in philosophy 
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as a ' sharp weapon" Narskij discussed the major British philosophers of that period -Locke, 
Berkeley, Hume-, and French Enlightenment, as did the subsequent volume by Kuznecov, but 
he was criticized for concentrating on "big names" In his book on West European 19th century 
philosophy, he dedicated 93% of the pages to five représentants of German classical 
philosophy (from Kant to Feuerbach) 30% to Kant, and even more to Hegel, leaving 7% for 
Schopenhauer and Kierkegaard, and not discussing non-German philosophy at all 537 Also, 
Narskij was criticized for dividing the material into three volumes, one per century (which then 
forced him to situate Kant in the 19th century, Locke in the 18th, etc ) 538 
On the whole, Narskij's leading idea was the "transformation of rationalism," from an 
ontologico-epistemological ( 17th century), through a naturalistic and political ( 18th century), to 
a historical and dialectical phase (19th century) that found its scientific foundation in Mar-
xism,^ an approach that focuses on philosophical theory itself rather than on its connection 
with class-struggle His attention to the development of rationalism (ultimately a form of 
objective idealism) at the expense of materialism was remedied by the volume by Kuznecov (as 
well as by the one by Sokolov) with discussions of the "minor figures" (Toland, Shaftesbury, 
Mandeville) omitted by Narskij 54° 
Apart from relative stress on materialist traditions, these series of university textbooks offer a 
strikingly traditional account of the history of West European philosophy Whoever would 
expect a "reductionist" or historical materialist approach, or Leninist militancy, is bound to be 
disappointed Full stress is on philosophical theories, and this stress is presented as "Marxist-
Leninist" pur sang-
'Already in the very choice of figures and in Ihc division of the history of philosophy mio periods dealt with in 
the separate volumes, the plan can be clearly perceived to realize Lenins idea of the mnerdialecticalcontradic-
lonncss [ vnutrennjaja dialckliteskaja protivoreCivost'] of the historical process of philosophy, the /an * essential 
feature of which is the struggle ot materialism and idealism ( ) It seems to us, that in the series of books at 
hand a most successful solution has been found a problem oriented theoretical analysis of those philosophical 
doctrines by means of which the philosophical thought ot mankind has accomplished «breaches» forward and 
into the depths [«proryvy» vpered ι vglub] on the road of knowing Out of the entire varied histonco-
philosophical material the outstanding philosophers are taken, who are regarded «not as amazing loners 
[udmtelnye odmo£ki\ but as the personification of the utmost achievements of the epoch [olicctvoreme 
prede! nych dostiíemj epoch¡\» ( ) This way the object of analysis turns out to be those qualitative jumps, of 
which К Marx said « in the history of philosophy there arc junction points, that elevate philosophy in itself 
[\o¿vyíajuf fìlosofìju ν samoj sebe] that break off rectilinear development » [all italics mine, LvdZ] "541 
It requires recurrence to the very early Marx of 1839-1840, to present as "Marxist" a 
position that in fact restores to philosophy its inner history 5 4 2 Philosophical thought itself 
moves forward through history, making "qualitative jumps" that enhance quantitative 
*See Note on language 
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accumulation. Via young Marx, Hegel is used to legitimize a shift to philosophical theory. This 
leads to books, intended for the training of future philosophers, that do not really differ, in 
form or names, from standard Western histories of philosophy, as is in fact recognized by 
Sokolov: 
"The second part ot the book is dedicated to the most important philosophers of the 17th century — Bacon, 
Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Locke, whose doHnnes tor a long time already make up the gold 
reserves [¿olotoj tond] ot the philosophical thought of the world " , 4 3 
It is worthwhile, in this connection, to take a look at the division of subjects of 
Sokolov's survey of 15th-17th century philosophy, and compare this with "standard" Western 
histories of philosophy by Châtelet, Vorlander, and Copleston * 
SubjeU 
1 Renaissance and humanism 
2 Italian anti-scholasticism [Valla, Mirandola] 
3 Nicholas of Cusa 
4 Humanists [Macchiavclli, Montaigne, ] 
5 Religious movements [Reformation, Suárez] 
6 Renaissance science [da Vinci, Kepler] 
7 Philosophy ot nature [Paracelsus, Bruno, ] 
8 Francis Bacon 
9 Galileo Galilei 
10 Rene Descartes (+ Malebranche) 
11 Thomas Hobbes (+ adversaries) 
12 Pierre Gassendi 
13 Blaise Pascal 
14 Baruch de Spinoza 
15 Isaac Newton 
16 G F Leibniz 
17 John Locke 
18 Pierre Bayle 
Sokolov 
7 
26 
24 
43 
23 
17 
35 
27 
11 
38 
28 
12 
12 
34 
9 
30 
25 
7 
Châtelet 
27 [3, 4, 7] 
t->3] 
23 
[->3] 
22 
38+11 
24 
34 
23 
27 
Vorländer 
8 
27 [3, 7] 
10 
19 
22 
8 
4 
23 [10, 13] 
10 
10 [12, 15] 
[->10] 
15 
[->12] 
20 
6 
Copleston 
24 [1,2] 
[->i] 
17 
24 
53 [Suarez] 
17 
18 
90 + 25 
56 
21 
59 
14 
67 
91 
'The division of subjects is Sokolov's The division of subjects of the other works have, when they differed, 
been adapted E g , Sokolov discusses Malebranche in his chapter on Descartes, Châtelet has a separate chapter 
on Malebranche, which thus, for the present purpose, has been added to the chapter on Descartes Likewise, the 
order of subjects has at places been adapted, tor example in the case of Copleston, who deals with the 
"rationalist ' and "empiricist" tradition in separate volumes For each subject, the number of pages, dedicated to 
it in each ot the works, has been indicated What is relevant, of course, is not the absolute number of pages, but 
their proportion Apart from Sokolov 1984,1 have made use of three general, widely used histories of 
philosophy from three main European languages F Châtelet, Histoire de la philosophie, l- ПІ (Pans 
Hachette, 1972-1973) vol Ш, La Philosophie du monde nouveau XVP et XV№ siècle, and vol IV, Les 
Lumières ІеХ ПР siecle.K Vorlander, Geschichte der Philosophie, I-III (Reinbek Rowohlt, ( 1949) 1990) 
Band II, Mittelalter und Renaissance, Teil II, ' Renaissance ', and Band Ш, Neuzeit bis Kant, Teil I, ' 17 
Jahrhundert ', and Teil II, "Aufklarung", F С Copleston, A History ot Philosophy, vols I-VI (New York 
Image Books, (1946-1950) 1985) vol III, Ockham to Suáre?, vol IV, Descartes to Leibniz, and vol V, 
Hobbes to Hume 
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As a matter of fact, Sokolov is more complete and more traditional than the other three, paying 
attention to all "classical" philosophers equally and systematically, whereas the others omit 
Bacon, Gassendi, Pascal, or Newton. The only surprise is Pierre Bayle, who appears in 
Sokolov as a major skeptical critic of Locke's "theological and metaphysical dogmatism".544 In 
Copleston and Vorländer, Bayle is treated as part of French Enlightenment. Sokolov's reason 
may have been mainly chronological, and he was criticized by Soviet reviewers on this 
point. 545 
He effectively breaks through the traditional "division" into "rationalists" and "em-
piricists", observed by Copleston, Châtelet, and Vorländer but under attack in Western 
historiography of philosophy, too.54^ It is difficult to divide the rationalists and empiricists 
along the lines of the opposition "materialism-idealism". Sokolov largely ignores the "basic 
question", limiting himself instead to stating the presence, in several authors (Descartes, 
Hobbes, Gassendi, Spinoza, Locke), of both materialist and idealist doctrines or elements. The 
philosophers of the 15th-17th centuries can not be regarded as belonging to "two camps" in 
terms of materialism and idealism, nor can we, Sokolov states, construct a rationalist and an 
empiricist"camp": 
"As shall become clear from the concrete exposition, these two trends did not form isolated «camps [/agery'a]», 
but found themselves in complicated interaction with each other and in even more complicated interaction with 
materialist and idealist traditions, dating from Antiquity."547 
As we see, Sokolov pays more attention to what H.J. Störig called "the three great 
systems of baroque",548 Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, than to materialists like Hobbes and 
Gassendi. Nor does he try to make a materialist out of Spinoza: stressing his naturalism, and 
his mechanicist conception of matter, he argues that Spinoza's "naturalist pantheism... virtually 
acted as materialism," recognizing (opposing a long-standing Soviet tradition) that "it is 
impossible not to take into account the fact that the philosopher himself by no means identified 
the substance-nature with matter, understood by him in a simplistic mechanicist way 
[uproscenno-mcchanistiöeski]."5*9 
What remains is an anti-clericalism,550 stress on the progressive development of philosophical 
thought, and special attention to the development of natural science (from Galileo to New-
ton).551 None of these three elements is specifically Marxist or Marxist-Leninist: they are part 
of a received self-image of Modern Western philosophy, as is the reduction of European 
philosophy to West European philosophy,552 a reduction Sokolov was criticized for. Whether 
he so intended or not, Russian philosophy is thereby excluded.553 
It is clear that this traditional account, "useful more for post-graduates than for 
students,"554 not only served to improve the historical competence of future Soviet 
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philosophers, but also made acceptable non-Soviet secondary literature. Sokolov employed 
general histories of philosophy by a series of "bourgeois" authors: W. Windelband, G.W.F. 
Hegel, В. Russell, R. Falkenberg (these existed in Russian translation),555 F. Überweg, W. 
Totok, F.C. Copleston, J. Chevalier, W.T. Jones, W. Tatarkiewicz, W. Weischedel, A. 
Kenny, and E. Bréhier,556 and he made use of, among others, M. Guéroult's commentary on 
Spinoza, R. Peters and L. Strauss on Hobbes, works by E. Gilson, A. Koyré, К. Fischer and 
many others. 557 Sokolov's work is based on his "many years of lecturing at the philosophical 
faculty of Moscow university in the classes of students and post-graduates,"558
 a
nd someone 
who -like the present author- has had the opportunity to attend those classes knows that they 
concentrated on knowing and understanding main philosophical positions, carefully separating 
presentation and interpretation. 
In the programme for students specializing in IFN these textbooks, written by their own 
teachers, played an important role. 559 Generally speaking, it seems safe to conclude that future 
historians of philosophy were given fairly complete and highly traditional training in knowing 
philosophy's past, rather than a dogmatically Marxist-Leninist interpretation. This situation is 
different with respect to post-Marxist philosophy. Suddenly, the CPSU program and printed 
materials of subsequent Party congresses pop up as main literature to the theme "General 
characteristic of bourgeois philosophy of the imperialist period".560 it seems questionable 
whether these texts played any major role other than as obligatory displays of orthodoxy. It is 
interesting to see that students were, in 1982, expected to read (partly as "additional literature" 
[a] partly in pre-revolutionary translations [p]), (parts of) works by A. Comte (ρ), Herbert 
Spencer (ρ), J. S. Mill (a, p), P. Natorp (p), H. Rickert [ Kulturwissenschaft und Naturwis­
senschaft] (ρ), E. Cassirer (a, ρ), E. Mach (p), R. Avenarius (a, p), F. Nietzsche [ Willezur 
Macht] (ρ), W. Dilthey (p), G. Simmel (a), E. Bernstein ( a, p), H. Bergson [Évolution 
créatrice] (p), O. Spengler, В. Bosanquet (p), W. James [Pragmatism] (p), J. Dewey (a, p), 
E. Husserl [Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft (p), and Logische Untersuchungen (a, ρ)], 
J.-P. Sartre [L'existentialisme — c'esf un humanisme. Les Mots] (a), A. Camus (a), L. 
Wittgenstein [ Tractatuslogico-philosophicus], R. Carnap, В. Russell, M. Cornforth (a), E. 
Gcllner(a), Th. Kuhn [The Structure of Scientific Revolutions], I. Lakatos, and M. Foucault 
[Les mots et les choses].56^ 
At the same time, students were supposed to master the essentials of Marxist-Leninist 
critique of these "bourgeois" philosophers. Works by Lenin were prescribed (and not as 
"additional" literature) with respect to: the general characteristic of bourgeois philosophy, 
positivism [Comte, Spencer], neo-kantianism, second positivism [Mach, Avenarius], vitalism, 
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pragmatism, American and English "realism", phenomenology, neo-hegclianism, existen-
tialism, neo-positivism [Wittgenstein, Carnap], and "the historical trend in bourgeois 
«philosophy of science»" [Kuhn, Lakatos].562 As a matter of fact, Lenin's Materíalizm i 
cmpiriokriticizm was obligatory with respect to every subject, with the exception of Neo~ 
Thomism and "some of the latest tendencies in contemporary bourgeois philosophy" [systems 
theory, structuralism, hermeneutics, and philosophical anthropology].563 Dissertations in these 
subjects were to be conceived from a Marxist-Leninist point of view, although it was not 
evident what such a point of view would mean apart from frequent reference to Materíalizm i 
émpiriokriticizm. МеГ іГ, a general of KBF¿(¿ and at that time chairman of the department of 
IZF, assured me that "we all regard ourselves as Marxists, but that is a basic position, creating 
a large space, in which substantial discussions take place."565 The same Mel'vil' sent home a 
young aspirantka, who was writing her kandidatskaja dissertacija on Hegel's Vorlesungen über 
die Geschichte der Philosophie, remarking that she had merely described, not analyzed, and 
suggested that she should read Lenin's konspekt of Hegel's text. 
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11.iii Reproducing the Historical Process of Philosophy: Research in IFN 
The collective aim of Soviet historians of philosophy was a complete Marxist-Leninist history 
of philosophy This project was understood, firstly, as the ' reproduction of the historical 
process of philosophy in consciousness", and, secondly, as a Marxist-Leninist science of that 
process, ι e an explanation of that process in terms of laws or something close to it 
Kamenskij distinguished, in 1984, three histories of philosophy 
' History ot philosophy is first ot all the objective protess ot development of philosophical knowledge — the 
historical process of philosophy, becoming objective in philosophical ideas and their systems ( ) But history 
of philosophy is also the reproduction of that process in consciousness, becoming objective in descriptions and 
analyses in texts, in historiography That is the second cognitive history of philosophy ( ) the third 
history of philosophy is the science of the regularities [7akonornerno<¡tí] of the historical process of 
philosophy of goals forms and methods of its reproduction (investigation), but also of the history of the self-
consciousness ol the history of philosophy as a science 566 
This recognition of the difference between historiographical description and analysis on 
the one hand, scientific explanation on the other, reflects a separation in works in IFN of 
presentation and interpretation, already noted by Ballcstrem in 1963,567 but leaves unaffected 
the claim to a scientific understanding of an objective process One of the consequences of this 
conception is the idea of a definitive account and explanation of that objective process Further, 
it suggests a division of labor the task of Soviet historians of philosophy would be to map and 
study the entire history of philosophy, the whole ' objective process The unfortunate project 
of a universal history of philosophy displayed this tendency [Ch 10 u] 
The "scientific approach" of that process was supposed to be well-established and 
shared by all Soviet historians of philosophy, hence the best way to tackle this problem would 
seem to divide forces As a result, IFN was a highly specialized discipline, much more so than 
its Western counterpart For example, the largest department in history of philosophy, the 
kdfedra IZF at MGU, housed experts in American philosophy, French philosophy, and 
Spanish philosophy, and tended to "cover" the whole history of philosophy with 
specialists 568 The price for such "completeness" is a relatively small number of specialists in 
any field, lack of competent discussion, and restrictive limitation, so that, e g , a specialist in 
contemporary American philosophy was not entitled to dedicate part of his research to David 
Hume, as the latter was already "taken care of' by other specialists Moreover, there could not 
be any serious difference of interpretation between specialists, given their common ' Marxist-
Leninist background' 
The overall results of this endeavour were, as we have seen [Ch 10 ш], impressive 5 6 9 
Monographs appeared on specific philosophical schools, individual philosophers, and 
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historical periods 570 There was no longer a near-exclusive stress on materialist positions, even 
though they continued to be more intensively studied than in Western historiography of 
philosophy571 Also, there were monographs focusing on specific philosophical problems,"2 
and studies of aspects of the work of a particular philosopher 573 On closer examination, 
however, the division of attention over different areas is far from balanced The most widely 
studied philosopher (apart from the klasstkimarksizma-leninizma) no doubt was Hegel, but on 
Kant, too, no less than 275 Soviet titles were mentioned in a bibliography over 1960-1975 574 
Aristotle and Spinoza also received much attention 575 Three fields were of particular 
importance for Marxist-Leninist philosophy West European philosophy, esp German classical 
philosophy, philosophy of the peoples of the USSR, esp Russia, and KSBF 
It is worthwhile, in this connection, to take a look at the division of publications in IFN 
over subdisciphnes (1985-1987) 576 
Field 
[a] Ancient and Medieval Philosophy 
[b] Philosophy of Renaissance and Modem Age 
[c] KSBl· 
[d] History of Marxist Leninist Philosophy 
[e] History of Philosophy of Asia and Africa 
[f] History of Philosophy of the Fatherland 
Methodological and Theoretical Questions 
Translations and Editions 
Total 
In the remainder of this chapter, I shall follow this division, which also corresponds to the 
disciplinary structure of IFN [Ch 10 ш], in a survey of the research done by Soviet historians of 
philosophy This discussion is -given the wealth of material- highly selective, but fairly 
representative, due to extensive reading, numerous interviews, and also because of a con­
siderable degree of repetition in the material I shall largely refrain from an attempt to assess the 
value or significance of Soviet work as compared to the work of Western specialists, because 
that is both impossible and inappropriate Impossible because to judge the scholarly value of a 
hundred texts on Kant would require a Kant-specialist, inappropriate as our objective is not that 
of a comparative study, but of an investigation of a part of Soviet philosophical culture as a 
phenomenon in its own right 
Particular attention shall be given to, first of all, the aspiration at a complete account of 
the history of philosophy, and to fill the "gaps", secondly, to the "totalizing" tendency to 
regard all past philosophy as somehow contributing to present philosophy [Ch 101 and 10 in], 
bringing IFN close to a ' Hegelian" conception of the history of philosophy [Ch 12 m], and, 
thirdly, to the professionalism manifest in the attempt of Soviet historians of philosophy to 
Í985 
14 
15 
25 
13 
17 
25 
8 
17 
134 
1986 
8 
20 
38 
17 
17 
36 
18 
24 
178 
1987 
15 
39 
32 
19 
22 
32 
18 
31 
208 
total 
37 ( 7 2%) 
74(14 3%) 
95(18 2%) 
49 ( 9 4%) 
56(10 7%) 
93(17 9%) 
44 ( 8 4%) 
72(13 9%) 
520 
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base their account on original sources. Finally, a fourth aspect is added: the attempt, by a 
number of Soviet philosophers, to address philosophical questions in an indirect way. This 
attempt explains the strong interest in Hegel: he was not only the major predecessor of 
Marxism, but also, by the same token, the main "gateway" to philosophical tradition. 
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ll.iii.a IFN on Ancient and Medieval Philosophy 
The standard Soviet account of philosophy's history was highly traditional [Π и], and so was 
its global penodization [Ch 10 и d] Philosophy (really) began in Ancient Greece, "slumbered" 
through the Middle Ages, and had its period of bloom in Modernity, beginning with Italian 
Renaissance — it is only with the advent of Marxism that the Soviet vision of the history of 
philosophy begins to diverge, and radically so, from standard accounts in the West 
The Beginnings of Philosophy 
From a Marxist-Leninist point of view, the main event in the first phase of philosophy's 
historical development was the formation of the opposition materialism - idealism, the 
emergence of the "line of Dcmocntus" and the "line of Plato" [Ch Ю и d], the second being a 
reaction to the first, and in that sense quite literally reactionary Consequently, there was 
relative stress on Greek and Roman materialism, esp on atomism Second best is Aristotle, 
presumably the most widely appreciated author from Antiquity in Soviet times, reflecting 
Hegel's interpretation of Aristotle as a first synthesis 577 (Aristotle appears as a forerunner of 
Soviet philosophy in another respect, too, namely as the first historian of philosophy 
[Ch 1211] ) For Soviet philosophy, the development of both materialism and dialectics began, 
basically, in Greece 
The first philosophical doctrines emerged 2500 years ago in India ( ), China ( ) and ancient Greece The 
early ancient Greek philosophical doctrines had a spontaneous materialist and naive dialectical character The 
historically first form of dialectic was ancient dialectic, the most important representative of which was 
Hcrachtus The atomistic variant of materialism was brought forward by Democntus, Epicurus and Lucretius 
developed his ideas First in the fclcatic and Pythagorean school, then in Socrates idealism took shape, coming 
out as a tendency opposed to materialism The father of objective idealism was Plato, who developed an idealist 
dialectic ot concepts Ancient philosophy reached its summit in Aristotle, whose doctrine, despite its idealist 
nature contained profound materialist and dialectical ideas "578 
Soviet studies of ancient philosophy became decreasingly dogmatic and schematic, 
increasingly source-oriented and focusing on philosophical problems and categories, 
employing non-Soviet sources as much as possible Studies (all published m 1984) on the 
categories of necessity and chance in Democntus by Vasilij Pavlovic Goran, or on the logic of 
Aristotle by Ratmir Konstantinovic" Lukánin and by Vjaceslav AleksandroviC Bocarov, all share 
these qualities , 7 9 Again, it is a job for specialists to judge the value of these studies as 
contributions to historical scholarship What is lemarkable in these studies is that their "Marxist-
Leninist character" is largely reduced to inclusion of the collected works of the klasuki at the 
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beginning of the bibliography, and standard references to their works m order to legitimize the 
very study of the subject,580 or the use of Aristotle as a major source on Democntus 5 8 1 
If Plato was important as a major enemy of materialism, for Neo-Platonism, by contrast, IFN 
barely held a place The "bourgeois objectivist" book by Aleksandrov [Ch 10 и с], for example, 
jumped from Epicureanism and Stoa to Patristic philosophy, but implicitly disqualified Neo-
Platonism as "mysticism" 5 8 2 This qualification was explicit in IF3 of the early 1940s, where it 
reads, in the chapter on "misticizm" 
' All Ihe characteristic peculiarities of the decadent [ upjdoCnaja] philosophy at the end of slave holding society 
found their clearest expression in Neo Plalonism Neo Platonism is the final product of the decomposition and 
vulgarization of classical philosophy and at the same time one of the major philosophical sources of medieval 
theology ' 5 8 1 
In 1983, there was a comprehensive and detailed entry on neoplatonizm in the FES, 
which, however, was purely histonographical and factual It neither mentioned the key-notions 
of "idealism", "materialism", "dialectics", and "metaphysics", nor referred to historical 
background, thus managing not to classify or evaluate, and it referred to a single Soviet source 
Losev's Monja anticnoj estetiki584 In passing, the author mentions the influence of Neo-
Platonism on Russian idealism of the end of the 19th, beginning of the 20th century -VI S 
Solov'ev, Ρ A Florenskij, S L Frank- and it is this reference that offers the key to un­
derstanding the special position of Neo-Platonism The total rejection of Neo-Platonism m 
official Soviet philosophy has more to do with Russia's philosophical past than with Neo-
Platonism itself For Russian philosophy, ever since the first inflow of Patristic philosophy, 
the most important part of the philosophy of antiquity had been neither the materialists, nor 
Aristotle, but the Platonic and esp Neo-Platonic tradition 
It is a true miracle of history that Losev, the leading Soviet specialist in the philosophy 
of Antiquity, was at the same time the only remaining representant of Russian religious 
philosophy, and profoundly influenced by Neo-Platonism himself His main contribution to 
IFN was a monumental 8-volume Istonja antiänoj estetiki, highly praised by Soviet historians 
of philosophy [Ch io ne] Even if some Soviet historians of philosophy saw him as a pure 
historian, merely gathering material,585 and even if his work was the best source for Soviet 
philosophers in the field of ancient Greek and Roman philosophy, it also was a continuation of 
Russian interest in Neo-Platonism, as is testified by the fact that three out of eight volumes of 
Losev's work were dedicated to it,586 which is disproportionate by any standard but that of a 
philosophical position that is sympathetic to Neo-Platonism In fact, Losev himself hinted at 
the "hidden motivation" behind this work. 
The author studied the history ot ancient aesthetics already in the 1920s The «History of ancient aesthetics» in 
many volumes was conceived by him in 1934 5 8 7 
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If we realize that, in the 1920s, Losev had developed his religiously inspired idealist 
philosophy in a series of works, and that in 1934 he had just returned from the labor camp 
[Ch 4 a], little imagination is needed to understand why Losev chose this path. 
During his lifetime, Losev refused to have his works translated, but this situation may 
have changed In that case, the philosophical public at large would be in a position to judge 
whether the work of this "patriarch" of Soviet classical philology and aesthetics588 is indeed 
"unparalleled in world literature "58i) Its actual value can only be judged by specialists in the 
field, and such judgment is highly recommendable now that Losev has become the object of a 
historically understandable, but scientifically unacceptable idealization in post-Soviet Russia. 
However, one ought to distinguish clearly between Losev's importance as a historian 
of philosophy, and his importance within Soviet philosophical culture As A A Tacho-Godi, 
his widow and biographer, wrote, his Istoaja "was, as the clever reader [umnyj citatel'] had 
understood a long time ago, a genuine history of all classical philosophy and of classical 
culture precisely in its integral-typological sense "59° We may assume that there were many 
"clever readers" among his vast audience who understood why, e g , he wrote more than 300 
pages on Proclus, only some 30 of these dealing directly with his aesthetics, the remainder 
discussing his philosophical system, his "dialectics of myth" (also the theme and title of one of 
Losev's major early works), his doctrines of unity and trinity, etc 191 
A Hereditary Gap IFN on Medieval Philosophy 
The chief gap in IFN was Medieval philosophy, both West European and Eastern (Middle 
East, Georgia and Armenia, Eastern Europe, Russia) The importance of developing this field, 
and the necessity of using non-Soviet sources in doing so, were explicitly recognized. 
"Some results have been achieved in the investigation of the Eastern and Western Middle Ages But in this field, 
too they have been, with few exceptions, insufficient Meanwhile, if we approach an evaluation of the 
numerous works ot contemporary non-Marxist medievalism from a dialectical-matenalist point of view, it must 
be noted that, although they accumulate a lot of tactual material with respect to the spiritual heritage of the 
Middle Ages, they contain serious errors of both a scientific and ideological [mirovozzrcniebkij] character This 
material requires a Marxist-I eninist interpretation and critical re-shaping The more so since until now, one of 
the founding instructions [ osnovopolagjjuiCie ukazamjd] of Lenin has remained unexecuted until the present 
day "In order to seriously come to understand the connection of be it even Medieval discussions with the history 
ot materialism would require a special investigation" ' 592 
Of 37 publications over 1985-1987 in Classical and Medieval philosophy, 27 were on 
subjects from Classical Greek and Roman philosophy, 10 on Medieval philosophy (including 
Augustine and Boethius) Still, this was mass production in comparison to earlier times As 
was indicated in a review of an introduction to West European Medieval philosophy, there had 
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appeared until then only five Soviet studies in the field of Medieval philosophy, three of them 
published in the 1970s 593 A few years later, in 1986, in a survey of /FN during the current 
five-year plan, the authors stated that "as regards medieval philosophy, the first works 
appeared only in the years that immediately precede the five-year period considered here, laying 
the basis for Soviet philosophical medieval studies," and they could add five more titles over 
the years 1979-1985 594 In spite of this increase, Soviet medievalism still was in its infancy 
when it became post-Soviet medievalism It seems questionable whether such projects as "the 
creation of a collective work on the philosophy of the Middle Ages in which a Marxist-Leninist 
approach is combined with an effective rebuff of Neo-Thomist interpretations of the problems 
of philosophical medievalism, and in which, in particular, a fully convincing penodization of 
the development in Medieval philosophy will be given,"595 shall ever be completed 
Apart from stress on 'progressive tendencies" in Medieval philosophy -Ockhamism, 
Averroism- it is difficult to perceive anything strongly Marxist(-Lenimst) in Soviet philosophi-
cal medievalism The Marxist-Leninist approach appears as something entirely external, when 
we read 
This work carried out from the position of the fundamental principles of Marxist Leninist hislonography, 
consists of a preface, eight chapters a conclusion and a bibliography, organized in accordance with the 
chapters ' 596 
This statement seems to be the expression of either total stupidity or superb irony, but 
is rather the automatic repetition of a ritual phrase One shouldn't be surprised to find the same 
phrase about "fundamental principles of Marxist-Leninist historiography" in preface and 
conclusion, without any impact on the eight chapters m-between And this impression becomes 
even stronger when we read that "the analysis of Medieval philosophical doctrines is conducted 
by the authors on the basis of a subdivision of the teachings of those days into fundamental 
tendencies [italics mine, EvdZ] realism (Thomas Aquinas and the Thomists), conceptuahsm 
(Duns Scotus and his followers), nominalism (Ockham and the Ockhamists)," along with the 
claim that "the specific nature of the struggle of materialism and idealism, dialectics and 
metaphysics in that epoch is convincingly brought to light "597 The two claims stand uncon-
nected, since in virtually all accounts of Marxist-Leninist historiography of philosophy the "fun-
damental tendencies" are materialism and idealism, dialectics and metaphysics 
Of course, it is difficult to let the opposition between materialism and idealism play a 
major role in a rendering of Medieval philosophy, and this was de facto recognized by Soviet 
authors For example, the entry "Materiahzm" in the FES of 1983 has it that "under the 
conditions of the supremacy of religious ideology, materialism was ousted by idealism," a fact 
attributed both to social factors and to the "incapacity of the materialism of antiquity to explain 
the relationship of thought to matter, to disclose the genesis of consciousness "598 it is not 
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totally nonsensical to state that in "Medieval scholasticism the struggle between materialism and 
idealism took the form of the struggle between nominalism and realism," but if, in spite of 
"sprouts of materialist views (a first approaching of the conception of sensual experience in R. 
Bacon; Scotus' question «Can matter think?»)," it is impossible to speak of the formation of a 
materialist line of thought,5" it is questionable what sticking to these oppositions could bring 
in terms of an understanding of Medieval thought. 
The general "condemnation" of Medieval philosophy on the grounds of its subordina­
tion to theology and Christian faith -again: a modem theme- has hindered study of Medieval 
philosophy in its own right.600 The more surprising, perhaps, that such study nevertheless did 
take place: an important figure in this respect is Averincev, who wrote on a variety of subjects 
in early Medieval thought,601 and contributed a series of just informative and "ideologically 
neutral" entries to the FES.&02 (in more recent times, he became known as the author of a new 
translation of the ВУЬУе,603 and as a politician.604) 
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ll.iii.b Modern West European Philosophy Revisited 
It is virtually impossible to enter into anything near a full discussion of Soviet studies into the 
history of Western philosophy between the Middle Ages and Marx a selective bibliography in 
1986 gave 36 titles of monographs over 1981-1985,6°5 and the number of articles is several 
times greater This part, therefore, will be limited to a few examples Generally speaking, the 
later period of IFN saw the production of large numbers of studies into a wide variety of 
philosophers, schools, philosophical problems, and discussions Apart from a considerable 
amount ol dull and repetitive standard Soviet production, more appealing attempts can be 
discerned as well Three elements can be distinguished ι) attempts to evade the "orthodox" 
interpretation of a given philosopher or period, or of philosophy's history as a whole, и) 
attempts to sop/usficaiethat interpretation, and in) attempts to influence Soviet philosophy itself 
through historical discussion In what follows, I shall, in the first place, discuss the attempt, 
by Soviet historians of philosophy, at an "integral approach" to the history of "philosophy of 
the period of early bourgeois revolutions", and, secondly, dwell at some length upon Soviet 
discussions of Hegel 
The Integral Approach Early Bourgeois Philosophy as Part of History 
One of the most interesting and valuable achievements of IRVis the elaboration of an integral 
approach, the attempt to regard the development of philosophy within a given historical period 
as part of that period without reducing it to class-struggle and the subsequent development of 
socio-economic formations As such it fits in with the "Hegelian tum" in Soviet theory of the 
history of philosophy [Ch 12 in] A famous product of this approach, consisting in "the 
transition from an analysis of separate philosophical conceptions and trends to a study of the 
philosophy of a fixed historical period in the context of the entire spiritual and material life of 
society of that period as a whole,"606 was Filosofija epochi ranmch burzuaznych revoljucij 
[Philosophy in the Age of Early Bourgeois Revolutions] (1983), proudly announced as "the 
first systematic investigation, in Marxist history of philosophy, of the philosophy of the 16th-
17th century, regarded in close connection with the epoch of early bourgeois revolutions "бО"? 
The aim of the "integral approach" was set very high 
" an attempt to analyze the philosophical strivings [ískanija] of the I6lh-17th centunes as the expression of a 
single socio-histoncal situation, to show iheir connection with the contradictory processes of the genesis of 
capitalism with the profound reconstruction [perestrojka] of mass consciousness, with the scientific revolution 
that took place in the 17th century The collective work is dedicated to a bringing to light of these 
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multifaceted [mnogoplano\ye] dependencies, to an analysis of early bourgeois philosophy as a form of self-
consciousness of a particular historical epoch '608 
The book was reviewed in both Soviet philosophical journals and in the leading 
ideological journal, Kommunist 609 What is striking is the serious slant of the reviews, made 
explicit by Mitrochin, who defended his large number of critical remarks by saying that "this 
work to us seemed to be too serious and fundamental as to respond to it with a trivial 
review "бю The reviews contained a lot of criticism, but the criticism was not concerned about 
orthodoxy and to the point For example, Gorfunkel' criticized Solov'ev for simplifying 
medieval theological orientations as denying human freedom, and for turning Reformation into 
the main source of Enlightenment by eclipsing the persisting influence of "the first forms of 
bourgeois enlightenment," viz the "undogmatic, free-thinking humanists" of Renaissance 6 ' ' 
A positive appreciation of Reformation m connection with the historical development of 
philosophy, as present in the parts written by Solov'ev and Valentin Vasil'evic" Lázarev,6i2 
was an novelty in Soviet philosophy,6n and in this respect, the book as a whole was 
programmatic 
"Behind it stands not only the intensive many years work of an experienced collective, but also a genuine 
scientific passion of its participants It only remains to be hoped that the method applied in this book and the 
accomplished results, will be incarnated in ditferent students textbooks, and that the authors will realize a 
similar approach with respect to other periods of development of philosophical thought "6I4 
One of the most interesting parts of the book is the chapter on skepticism, written by 
Venjamin Mojseevic Boguslávskij (b 1908) Skepticism, in the sense of a disbelief in the 
capacity of the human mind to achieve objectively true knowledge, was unacceptable to 
Marxism,61*5 and almost absent m the Russian philosophical tradition Marxism grafted onto 6I6 
It is interesting to note, therefore, that Boguslavskij arrives at a more positive appreciation of 
skepticism 
' But does this mean that, staying in oscillation between opposite solutions of fundamental epistemological 
problems, the «new Pyrrhonians» did not occupy any specific epistemological position''' 617 
The answer is negative pointing out the stress of skeptics like Francesco Sanches, 
Michel de Montaigne, Pierre Gassendi, Pierre Bayle on empirical (as opposed to speculative) 
science of nature, their close contact with leading scientists of their age, and their own scientific 
work, Boguslavskij comes to an appreciative conclusion 
' Thus the skeptical thought of the period of early bourgeois revolutions performs a great constructive task — 
it assists the confirmation [ufverzdeme] of the new science ( ) Once more wc are in front of a paradoxical 
situation we discover epistemological optimism in the représentants of that tendency of philosophical thought, 
that is commonly regarded [kotoroc pnnjato sufjf] as a pessimistic conception of knowledge '61H 
Discussing the emancipatory" function of skepticism, with regard to both Medieval 
science (Gassendi) and religious dogmatism (Bayle, Pascal),619 and stressing that concentra-
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tion on rationalism and empiricism as the main opposite trends of Modern philosophy tends to 
eclipse the role of skeptic ideas in the philosophy of Enlightenment, Boguslavskij concludes, 
with implicit criticism of Soviet traditions 
"The extraordinarily important role played by skeptical thought of the period of early bourgeois revolutions in 
the process of development of the theory of dialectics in the philosophy of the Modem age must finally be 
appropriately appreciated [dolina byt nakonec ocenena do dostojnstvj] "6 2° 
What if the period under discussion were extended to the 18th century, thus including 
David Hume, who stressed the distinction between excessive and mitigated skepticism,621 and 
who was, along with Kant, a main target of Lenin's biting criticism9622 
The general tendency of the book was adequately rendered by Ojzcrman's definition of 
philosophy as "self-consciousness of its epoch" [Ch 12 ш] The contributors tried to interpret 
philosophical theories as conscious assimilation of and rational answers to problems of a 
social, scientific and religious nature, ι e problems that were facing not just individual 
philosophers, but society as a whole The "relative independence" of philosophy as a form of 
social consciousness becomes the relative independence of philosophers as thinking in­
dividuals, and the attempt to "represent a historical stage in the development of philosophical 
thought as the philosophy of a particular epoch, integrating the various philosophical doctrines 
of different countries," inevitably leads to a neglect of "the inner contradictions in bourgeois 
philosophy which, through the confrontation of empiricism and rationalism, sensualism and 
the conception of innate ideas etc , appeared in the final analysis as the struggle of materialism 
and idealism "6 23 This way, not only the determination "in the final analysis" of philosophy by 
the socio-economic basis, but also the reduction of philosophical controversy to the single 
dichotomy between materialism and idealism, lose ground 6 2 4 What remains is the attempt to 
see philosophy indeed as part of the historical process, an approach esp manifest in the part 
written by MotroSilova on "philosophy of man", the part that received most favorable 
criticism 625 
It is not without importance to note, finally, that the book appeared in 1983, when there 
was no perceptible sign or expectation of perestrojka, and "stagnation" was at its height A few 
years later, the volume was heralded as "an especially outstanding expression" of "a fruitful 
tendency in recent work of Soviet historians of philosophy " 6 2 6 The book resulted from the 
inner development of /FN as a discipline within the framework of Soviet philosophy Even if it 
might be argued that the "integral approach" still suffers from (histoncist) reductionism, the 
advantage over economic and political reductionism is obvious And even if it is marked by the 
limitations of its Soviet nature,627 it shows what could be done within those confines 
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This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the approach developed in this work did 
not vanish after the disappearance of the Soviet conditions It became more explicit, e g in 
later work by Motrosilova [Ch 12 iv], who presented her article on "The Orientation of the New 
Personality and its Expression in 17th Century Philosophy of Man",628 as a supplement to her 
contribution to Filosofija cpochi Motrosilova's intention here was to analyze the change of 
anthropological conceptions that took place m 17th-century philosophy as a result of changing 
social conditions 
'The inclusion ot the features just mentioned [innate equality, the freedom of the individual to pursue his proper 
înlcrcsts, the right to strive lor the common good as one perceives it as an individual rational being, etc (EvdZ)l 
in human nature, and their special consideration stands in close relation [ ν tesnoj svjazi] with the objective 
historical changes ot the epoch of the early bourgeois revolutions ' 629 
These notions should be understood, according to MotroSilova, as a result of the "new 
particularities of spiritual production [duchovnoeproizvodstvo], especially of the intellectual 
work of scientists and philosophers,"63o and it is the conscious development of the "scientific 
factor", the recognition of the need for objective knowledge as a condition for industry, 
commerce, sea-fanng and warfare, that led to new orientations and values of what Motrosilova 
labels the 'people of knowledge" [ljudi znamja] 631 
' We suppose, that the most «intimate» and «relevant» influence of the epoch [ vozdejstvie epochi] on ihe 
innóvame ideas mentioned was accomplished through the normative orientations of the new personality, 
obtaining objective knowledge "<>32 
The search for truth having become the highest value, 17th-century philosophers 
formulated a number of normative requirements, which "people of knowledge" should fulfill 
Referring most of all to F Bacon, Motrosilova points to objectivity of investigation, struggle 
against prejudices, practical applicability of knowledge, the readiness to accept only clear and 
venfiable knowledge In addition to these subjective requirements, she points to one objective 
condition the philosophers of the 17th century recognized, in her view, that the objective 
knowledge which society and particularly early capitalist industry needed, could flourish only 
in those states which guaranteed their citizens freedom of investigation and publication, ι e 
freedom of thought and speech 6 3 3 Referring to philosophers like Descartes and Spinoza, 
Motrosilova states that "the objective social situation of 17th-century scientists and thinkers . 
made them the most unselfish [ beskorystnye] defenders of freedom as a universal right of 
the individual " 6 3 4 At this point, when past philosophers are presented as not simply "reflec­
ting" their objective class position, but as recognizing the situation they exist in, and as 
consciously acting within it, Motrosilova's position becomes a reflexive one 
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Hegel: the Crowbar of Soviet Philosophy* 
The historical bond of Marxism with the history of West European philosophy was manifest in 
the numerous studies on "classical German philosophy", esp. on Kant, Hegel, and Feuerbach. 
For example, 18 out of the 59 monographs on pre-Marxist West European philosophy, listed 
in a selective bibliography over 1981-1985, deal with this period: 9 on Kant,635 l on 
Schelling, 6 on Hegel, and 2 on Feuerbach.636 An important specialist on classical German 
philosophy was Arsenij VladimiroviS Gulyga (b. 1921), whose great merit was to have written 
a scries of "intellectual biographies" of Kant, Herder, Hegel, and Schelling, "simply" 
recounting their lives and ideas, with only a few easily detectable indications of the "solution" 
of the problems troubling the philosopher under discussion by dialectical materialism.637 
Hegel was a figure of special significance not only because of the ambiguous attitude to 
his philosophy from the side of (Soviet) Marxism. His influence is strongly present in pre-
Soviet Russian philosophy, too, and is part of the national heritage post-Soviet Russian 
philosophers will have to "deal with". Important Soviet specialists on Hegel were Bakradze, 
Ojzerman, MotroSilova, Karimskij, Kissel', Viktor Arsen'evic Malinin (b. 1921), and the 
Georgians Meri Ivanovna Celidze and Guram Benediktovic' Tevzádze. 
In spite of ¿danov's claim in 1947 that "the question about Hegel was resolved a long 
time ago,"63« Hegel remained at the very heart of IFN: in the early 1960s Ballestrem and 
Blakeley noted renewed interest in Hegel, mentioning the recent appearance of 6 studies,639 
and esp. after 1955 many studies on Hegel began to appear, a fact clearly related to the post-
Stalin "rehabilitation" of Hegel, one of the official proclaimers whereof was Ojzerman.мо A 
Soviet bibliography of 1973 mentioned 289 studies (monographs and articles) on Hegel over 
the period 1960-1970,641 and in 1982 Ojzerman stated that the total number of studies on 
Hegel in the Soviet period (1917-1982) came close to lOOO.6« If 289 titles appeared over 
1960-1970, it may be assumed that the number over 1971-1980 was not under 300, which 
yields an annual average of 30. It is this large-scale occupation with Hegel's philosophy that 
allowed Zubaty and Rakitov to state, in 1975 and 1985 respectively, that no philosopher was 
more intensively studied by Soviet historians of philosophy than Hegel.643 
As Marx and Engels had developed their philosophical position in direct relation to 
Hegel, he was important enough for Soviet philosophy to be the subject of an official position 
[Ch.l0.ii]. In fact, the attitude to his philosophy can be seen as an indication of the "level of 
"There is every reason lo study Soviet literature on Hegel more closely than is possible within the confines of 
the present book. Such an investigation would, however, not only require a thorough knowledge of Hegel's 
philosophy, but also full access to, and critical scrutiny of the Russian translations used by (post-)Sovict 
scholars. 
432 
Part Four Soviet Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 
orthodoxy" of Soviet philosophy Whenever the (current) official position on Hegel's absolute 
idealism left room for it, a variety of positions emerged, ranging from "hegehanizing Marxism" 
(Debonn and his school, H'enkov and his followers) to a critical approach, inspired by 
Kantianism or neo-positivist philosophy Given the close bond between Marxism and Hegel, 
the latter could indeed reinforce the position of Marxism, and in this sense Hegel was useful to 
the "conservatives" At the same time, his thought contains many possibilities to point out 
problematic aspects of Marxism, and it therefore is only partly to the point to construct, as 
Zubaty did, an opposition between Hegel and Kant as congruent with the opposition of 
dogmatic and critical б44 Attempts to "loosen up" Soviet philosophy via Hegel could never be 
more than partly successful, because studies into Hegel's philosophy were wrapped up m a 
number of "Marxist-Leninist" dogma's, first of all the panacea about the "contradiction" 
between dialectical method and idealist system 
"System" and "Method" a Vulnerable Spot m Soviet Philosophy 
The existence of an official position on Hegel explains the importance of texts about Hegel that 
merely expound "what he said and what were his arguments", such as an article by Asmus 
from 1970, in which he set out to ask "the question, whether Hegel acknowledged, to which 
extent, and in which sense, the rights of formal reasoning "^45 Naturally, the answer is 
affirmative full recognition and realization of "form" means consistent rejection of any abstract 
opposition between form and content In other words rejection of mere form is not identical 
with rejection of form as such, on the contrary The importance of this text was its opposition 
to the received view that Hegel was the advocate of "dialectical logic" as opposed to formal 
logic The same holds for Bakradze's Sistema ι metod ν filosofa Gegelja [System and Method 
in the Philosophy of Hegel] Kamenka may well be right that he "writes of Hegel with genuine 
knowledge and insight, but an insight which never goes beyond the achievements of Hegelian 
scholarship in Germany, on which Bakradze is patently drawing,"^ but this already was of 
great importance in the Soviet context 
The restoration of a fair account of Hegel's thought also served as a means to address 
philosophical issues, "colonized" and dogmatically resolved by official Soviet philosophy 
[Ch 9 ul, by means of a historical detour M~l The special significance of, e g , Bakradze's book 
was brought forward by Bronislav Vasil'eviö Bogdánov 
' The focus of the book is on the question of the correlation of the system and method of Hegel s philosophy 
К S Bakradze departs from the idea ot the identity of method and system, considering that their correlation must 
be understood by analogy with the solution of the problem of the correlation of content and form This organic 
link between idealism and dialectical method points to the circumstance, that the method must display features 
of the general world-view of Hegel Departing from this, К S Bakradze considers as simplified the view, 
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according to which the philosophical system and the method in Hegel s doctrine are independent and that Marx 
and Fngcls rejected Hegels system as something absolutely false and reactionary, accepting his method as 
something unconditionally positive and revolutionary ,f>48 
The theme of the relation of system and method in Hegel is central to the Marxist 
tradition Marx and Engels held that there was a contradiction in Hegel's philosophy between 
revolutionary dialectical method and reactionary idealist system,649 the latter being the 
'mystifying veil [mystische Huile]" of the former 650 This "dissection' of Hegel,651 was 
strong in Russian "left Hegehanism", too, e g in the qualification, by the "revolutionary 
democrat" Aleksandr Ivanovic Hérzen [Gercen] (1812-1870), of dialectical method as the 
' algebra of revolution" 652 
At the same time, Soviet philosophy itself was claimed to be a system [Ch 8 n] 
Consequently, the notion of system was of crucial importance to Soviet philosophers, and a 
plausible way of discussing it was to return to Hegel It may well be questioned whether, or in 
which sense Hegel regarded his system as "conclusive" — certainly not in the sense that it 
would exist entirely in eternity But, more importantly, it is impossible to separate method and 
system in such a way as to retain the tormer and discard the latter The system is the result of a 
method that consists in the inner development of the (absolute) idea into the totality of its deter-
minations The result of this procedure necessarily appears in concrete history as a system of 
philosophical disciplines, ι e in a fixed form, but to treat this system, as it took shape m a 
series of books and recorded lectures, as identical with Hegel's absolute idealism is to take the 
objectivization for the idea 
Philosophers like Bakradze paved the way for a more adequate interpretation of the 
relation of "system" and "method" in Hegel The attempt to get over the opposition of system 
and method is manifest in Rakitov's non-dialectical question "whether there is not also, next to 
the contradiction, a unity between these two components of his philosophy, and what this 
would consist in [italics mine, EvdZ] " 6 5 3 Well before the advent of perestrojka (1980), an 
affirmative answer to this question was given by MotroSilova, who distinguished between 
' system" in the sense of a "system of related disciplines and subdisciphnes", and in the sense 
of a systematic principle, which presented "a side of dialectical method " 6 5 4 "System" then 
means "totality of theory inner coherence of concepts, categories, and fundamental laws by 
virtue of a specific immanent dialectic "655 Studies like these testify that Soviet historians of 
philosophy attempted to take Hegel seriously beyond the "received view", to keep up with 
Western studies in the same field, and to use elements of his philosophy in order to amend 
Soviet philosophy In the case of Motrosilova, the use of Hegel to foster systems theory 
appears as an alternative to ' materialist dialectics ' 
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' The mam thing is that Hegel s systematic ideas are not seldom reduced to the mere question about the 
articulation [ölencnic, German Gliederung EvdZ] of the philosophical system into corresponding disciplines 
and about their hierarchy Meanwhile, the philosophy of Hegel is notable for its richness or approaches to the 
system problematic, the diversity of us aspects, which have not lost their actual meaning even today "656 
Kissel' also stressed the need to overcome dogma as a necessary prerequisite for an 
objective study of Hegel's philosophy in Gegel' ι sovremennyj mir [Hegel and the World 
Today] (1982) Appealing to Lenin's Filosofskie fefrady,657 he pointed out that a first 
component of the "dialectical-materialist sublation [snjatie] of a past philosophical doctrine" is 
the "reproduction of the object in its entirety," the "immanent reconstruction of the object" 
being a "necessary condition for further work with i t " 6 5 8 In contrast with other Soviet 
authors, his distinction of tasks gave occasion to a new discussion of the "dialectic of system 
and method" in Hegel's thought,6^ m which Kissel' vehemently rejects the alleged ' contradic­
tion" 
'The system is nothing but the fully deployed method, and the method is the system, condensed to the 
characteristics here summarized Therefore if you value the Hegelian method you can not approach his system 
with disdain On the other hand the shortcomings of the system are, al the same time defects of the very 
method It is a completely mistaken view that the method is what is «positive» in Hegel, but the system 
«negative», or that the method is dialectical but the system «metaphysical» ( ) The identity of method and 
system lies at the basis of the Hegelian way of philosophizing "<>60 
Progress and Freedom a Revaluation of Hegel's Idea of History 
Criticizing Soviet stereotypes of Hegel as a "hidden atheist",661 a defender of aristocracy ,662 
or a German nationalist,663 Kissel' arrived at a positive appreciation of "the use for us today of 
some Hegelian ideas, apart from those that long ago have entered (in a materialistically re-cast 
form) the custom of Marxist philosophical thought [italics mine, EvdZ] " 6 6 4 These include his 
stress on human labor, and in general on "action' as essential for the realization of ideas, the 
"working of spint" in history,665 his analysis of the struggle for mutual recognition of self-con­
sciousness [Herrschaft und Knechtschaft],66*· and his conception of history as progress in the 
consciousness of freedom 6 6 7 Hegel was right, Kissel' argues, that bourgeois society, as 
realized by the "Germanic world" achieved the consciousness of freedom as "the democratic 
consciousness of the fundamental equality of people," but "what Hegel did not demonstrate 
was his thesis about the synchrony of the development of consciousness with the transfor­
mation of social institutions, the social structure as a whole [italics mine, EvdZ] "6 68 And 
"Hegel himself, in his analysts of contemporary historical reality [Hegel's essay about the 
Rcformbill of 1831, EvdZ] to a certain extent assisted to the elucidation of the fact, that 
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«human emancipation», to employ the terminology of Marx and Engels of the period when 
they were developing their views [1 е., m the early 1840s, EvdZ], was still ahead " ^ 9 
At this point Kissel' is wrong, I think, to hold that "in one word, Hegel as an observer 
and investigator of the reality that was contemporary to him entered m contradiction with 
himself as the speculative system-builder, deducing actual reality [dejstvitelhosf] out of its 
concept "670 The problem lies m the ambiguous word "synchrony" Both the realization of 
"free institutions", and the developing consciousness of freedom take place in history, and are 
the result of "action" of human beings, and the two processes are intimately related, but that 
does not imply that the full realization (in consciousness) of the idea of freedom is ever an ac­
complished fact, nor that it is identical or synchronic with the realization (in time and space) of 
a "perfect" society that would correspond to that idea Hence, the contradictions observed by 
Hegel in contemporary political reality were not contradictions between his system and "actual 
reality", but between actual reality and the idea at work and recognized within that reality. 
Nevertheless, Kissel' rehabilitates Hegel as a critic of contemporary society, both of 
Hegel's day and of our present 
"Hegel, the philosopher of «real freedom» is our contemporary and ally He is our contemporary, for he clearly 
understands that man's freedom is a world historical achievement [ vsemimo-istonöeskoczavoevanie], and not the 
result of a simple change of individual adjustment to the world, as the adherents of personalist and existentialist 
robinsonads think ( ) He is our ally, for he knows that not the efforts of individual minds [usilija otdel'nych 
umov], looking for the formula of salvation, are moving history, but the «desires , the labor and struggle» of 
the masses in the course of a long time lead to essential changes of social organization And these social 
changes go hand in hand with the development of consciousness from animal immediateness, permitting to 
relate to oneself as to a thing, lo the full flourishing of the mind [rascveí ducha], uniting man with mankind and 
requiring freedom for all " 6 7 1 
Of course, the USSR claimed to have realized this "freedom for all", but it is not hard 
to imagine a more critical employment of these ideas within "real existing socialism". 
Moreover, to put "the full flourishing of the mind" at the same level as "essential changes of 
social organization" is a move away from any kind of "sociologism" or vulgar Marxism In a 
single move, Hegel is turned from a conservative conciliator of the contradiction between 
egoist bourgeois society and a state that embodies freedom for all into a proto-socialist. Finding 
support in Marx' early works, Kissel' stresses: 
"Rather than «reconciling» social contradictions in an illusory synthesis, Hegel laid them bare lo such an extent, 
that he himself pointed the way to an interpretation of his views in the spint of revolutionary democracy and 
(initially) Utopian socialism " 6 7 2 
Kissel' also praised Hegel for being the first philosopher to include political economy m his 
field of considerations, which "testifies, perhaps more than anything else, of the depth of his 
understanding of the nature of the new epoch, that Europe was entering before his very eyes, 
the epoch of the triumph of bourgeoisie." 6?3 Several years later, as the programm of perestroj-
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ka was in progress, Hegel's contribution to political economy was the subject of a monograph 
by the economist Aleksandr AndreeviC Chandruev Sympathetic to the "revisionist" G Lukács 
in Der junge Hegel (1948), but claiming an economist rather than a philosophical (as was 
Lukács') approach,671* Chandruev argues that Hegel was ahead, in his JenaerRealphilosophie, 
of A Smith and D Ricardo in the analysis of money, calling it "the form of unity or of the pos-
sibility of all objects of demand [die Form der Einheit, oder der Möglichkeit aller Dinge des 
Bedürfnissen] "675 The originality of Hegel in this respect is beyond my capacity to judge, but 
the positive appreciation by Chandruev is important to note 
Hegel came close to an adequate understanding of Ihe additional use value [dobdvoCnajapotrebitelnjjd 
stoimost] of money which included the feature to be immediately exchangeable to any commodity ' 676 
One may wonder why Chandruev believes that "now it becomes important to regard 
Hegel the philosopher through the eyes of an economist "677 The answer appears in the 
concluding chapter, entitled "Dialectical Method Since Marx", in which a sharp critique of the 
Soviet canonization of Marxist political economy is given Soviet political economy suffered, 
according to Chandruev, from 'scholastic theorizing" and lack of serious application of 
dialectics on the realities of real existing socialism 
Unfortunately, in the process of historical development of the political economy of socialism, the fortune of 
dialectical method was in danger ( ) After 1956 the political economy of socialism was given a historical 
chance to clean its theoretical conscience However, after a short lived splash of creative activity the habit of 
constructions in which the real dialectic of economic life was made to fit preconceived schemes, got the upper 
hand again ' 678 
Chandruev employs the positive appreciation of Hegelian dialectic by Marx and Engels 
to urge a return to serious Marxist economics, opposing any simplistic opposition of Hegelian, 
idealist, and Marxian, materialist dialectic 679 So in the field of economics, too, Hegel served 
as a crowbar to reopen issues central to "intellectual Marxism", that were excluded due to 
"simplistic notions of the cognitive functions of the social sciences,"680 ι e to the subordina­
tion of theory to its ideological function Even in a case like that of Ojzerman and Bogomolov, 
where creative use was made of the Hegelian conception of the history of philosophy, this use 
was limited and steered by other than theory-immanent exigencies [Ch 12 ш] 
In sum, Hegel was not simply one among many past philosophers, but a means within Soviet 
philosophical culture to return, through historical study, to philosophical issues like human 
freedom as the ultimate goal of history,68' and to the distinction of consciousness of freedom 
and 'real' freedom within a given state 6 8 2 These issues had been addressed by the klassiki, 
but their answers were petrified in the official version of istmat To emphasize, as did 
Kanmskij, that "Hegel s ideas in philosophy of history are -in the light of their historical fate 
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and role, and of the reviving interest in them in our days- very up-to-date,"683 and to make 
him "a contemporary and an ally" (Kissel') also is to take seriously Marx' struggle with the 
Hegelian heritage. In this area of IFN, finally, we touch upon a "hegelianizing trend" that 
played a crucial role in the development of Soviet theory of the history of philosophy as well 
[Ch.12.iii]. 
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ll.ih.c "Crìtique" of Bourgeois Philosophy ÍKBFI 
An important sub-discipline of /HV was so-called kntika burzuaznoj fìlosofii, a field fundamen-
tally marked by the conception of diamat as the supreme outcome of the development of 
philosophy until Marx 684 As we have seen, the result of the supposed "revolution in 
philosophy" performed by Marx and Engels, was a radical "horizontal dichotomy" between 
philosophy before and after Marx, related to the recognition ot philosophical truth, or the 
incapacity or "refusal" to recognize that truth [Ch 10 и dl Inasmuch as post-Marxist philosophy 
was vertically divided into "bourgeois" and "proletarian" philosophy, the first was wholly 
rejected Consequently, a more positive appreciation presupposed some relativization of the 
"revolution in philosophy", of the ' basic question", of the two dichotomies, and of the class-
bound nature of philosophy On the level of theory, such relativization took place, and a major 
role in this respect was played by a largely implicit "principle of objective content" [Ch 12 ••] 
One of the most remarkable features of KBF was its insistence on the unity of 
bourgeois philosophy, which makes it the counterpart of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, instead 
of presenting the latter as one among a large number of philosophical positions Soviet 
philosophy was presented as a unity, due to its common basis, dialectical materialism, and so 
was bourgeois philosophy Of course, the diversity and multiformity of Western philosophy 
was not denied They were explained as a "symptom" of its bourgeois nature, of its linkage 
with capitalist society and its crisis 6*"> To quote an authoritative Soviet source 
"It has been inconteslably demonstrated in Marxist critique, that the pluralism of contemporary idealist theories, 
unequalled in the history of philosophy (with the possible exception of the period of crisis of slave-holding 
society [1 e late Hellenism bvdZ]), stems from the general crisis ot modern capitalism and from the ideological 
disorder proper to that capitalism, against the background of the unlucky attempts to find a way out -any way 
out- of this, to speak with existentialism limit situation in which capitalism exists today No less 
convincingly the epistcmological roots [gnoseologiicskie korni] of that same pluralism have been uncovered 
the absoluti7ation of different aspects of the complex and mullifacctcd process of knowing objective reality "686 
This last explanation of bourgeois pluralism is fairly traditional (in a sense Hegelian), 
and runs counter to the economist reductionism manifest in the first part of the quotation 
Moreover, it provides ample reason to analyze pluralist bourgeois philosophy, focusing on its 
philosophical content and argument (as opposed to its political stance, its partijnosf), while at 
the same time it assumes the superiority of the (Soviet) position from which such analysis 
would ensue 
Bourgeois philosophy after the rise of Marxism was divided into two main periods before and 
after the Great October Revolution, marking the beginning of the world-wide victory of 
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communism Given the inevitability of the latter as the outcome of the (pre)history of mankind, 
bourgeois philosophy was a necessarily futile struggle against that process Hence post-
Marxian non-Marxist philosophy was essentially reactionary, reflecting the ' ever-sharpening" 
crisis of capitalism (the crisis of capitalism "sharpened" to roughly the same degree as 
socialism "developed") Since the "declassification" of language, logic, and natural science 
[On 41], and the abolition of their dichotomic qualification as either "bourgeois" or 
' proletarian", a positive appreciation of Western (hard) science was possible, and, conse-
quently, a positive appreciation of Western logic, philosophy of science, and, to a certain 
extent, philosophy of language This explains the difference between the vehement rejection of 
a philosopher from the imperialist period like Friedrich Nietzsche and philosophers inspired by 
him, and the more balanced treatment of con temporary bourgeois philosophy 
Sickle Against Hammer Soviet Philosophy on Nietzsche 
From the perspective of the Marxist-Leninist penodization of philosophy s history, Nietzsche 
(1844-1900) fell within the period of monopolistic capitalism The Soviet reception of 
Nietzsche, well-documented in Western literature,687 offers an illustrative example of the 
development of TFN Nietzsche was widely received in Russian philosophical and artistic 
circles around the tum of the century, for example by Vjaccslav Ivanovic Ivanov (1866-1942), 
and his thought was influential until the beginnings of Soviet philosophy (± 1930) 688 His 
influence on Russian Marxists was considerable, too, esp on so-called " bogostroitel'stvo 
[Godbuilding] (Maksim Gór'kij [Peslóv,] 1868-1936), Bogdanov, Lunaòarskij) 689 
For Soviet philosophy, Niet/sehe was not acceptable he was used "as a whipping 
boy for trends or traits they consider undesirable or dangerous "69° Nietzsche was a "proto-
nazi and an irrationalst,691 representing "one of the most reactionary idealist tendencies of 
German bourgeoisie,"692 an aristocratic defender of Herrenmoral, an anti-socialist and anti-
humanist, a racist, a fake atheist, and a general danger to Marxism 691 As early as 1922/3 
Nietzsche's works were removed from public libraries, and made accessible to a few 
specialists only 694 Soviet editions appeared only in 1990, and there was only one study of his 
thought, pregnantly entitled The Reactionary Essence of Nietzscheamsmfi^ until its author, 
Sergej F Oduev, published Tropami Zaratustry [In the Footsteps of Zarathustra] (1971),696 
which then became the standard Soviet text on Nietzsche 697 Oduev stressed "the necessity of 
struggling against Nietzsche and Nietzscheanism, for they appeal to 'the hidden instincts that 
break down capitalist man, gradually arousing in him all that is evil, barbaric, and wild, 
destroying his reason and soul, silencing his conscience' "698 
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What is of interest to our investigation is that the revival of legitimate interest in 
Nietzsche and his influence in Russia was mediated through historical study of Russia's 
philosophical past, esp. of early 20th-century modernism and symbolism,699 and, ideological 
controversy within the USSR. The latter was part of a more general move to include the 
Russian national heritage, esp. of its undeniably great writers, into Soviet ideology by 
stressing their humanist nature, their concern for the poor and the ordinary people, and their 
anti-capitalist and anti-bourgeois stance. 
A prime -but not the only700- example in this respect is the book Étíka Ijubvi i 
metafìzika svoevolija [The Ethics of Love and the Metaphysics of Self-will] by Davydov. 
Sharply critical of Nietzsche, the book, though nowhere explicitly anti-Marxist, is completely 
non-Marxist: Davydov opposed the moral views of Tolstoj and Dostoevskij to the nihilism of 
Western philosophers like Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, or, in a modem variety, Sartre. This 
leads to an interpretation of Nietzsche that contrasts with Western views, esp. in the com-
parison of Nietzsche and Dostoevskij, often regarded as kindred thinkers in the West, but 
strongly opposed to each other by Soviet authors, "invariably to Nietzsche's detriment".701 
It raised a scandal for its reprise of the moral views of Tolstoj and Dostoevskij as a 
means to save Russian (i.e., not Soviet) youth.7°2 It was published in a 50,000 copy edition in 
1982 by the «Molodajagvardija» publishing-house, known as a stronghold of "national-
bolshevism". One of the recenzenty (people who were politically responsible for a publication) 
of this book reportedly was the "orthodox" party-philosopher Mitin,™3 an indication that 
permission for print came from on high, presumably from M.A. Suslov in person. Later in 
1982, Suslov being dead, and Andropov the new gensek, Russophilism received a severe 
blow, and Davydov's book was severely criticized in Kommunist by Rostislav Petropáv-
lovskij, as was «Molodajagvardija» for publishing it, "the like of which, we may venture, will 
not soon happen again."704 Nevertheless, the book reappeared 1989 in 65,000 copies at a price 
of 80 kopecks, very little for a hardcover-book even in the USSR. 
When VF started to publish Jenseits von Gut und Böse in 1989,705 this was justified 
by pointing to its /jj'síorica/importance: 
"Although, contrary to the sub-title..., Nietzsche's teaching is not "the philosophy of the future", acquaintance 
with it is essential to anyone who tries to understand the course of development of European philosophy in our 
century."706 
The editor, Aleksandr Viktorovic Michájlov, opened his introduction by stating that 
"for decades our science has hardly known a quiet, balanced academic attitude towards 
Nietzsche, a suitable scientific approach of his heritage. According to the logic of the time, this 
indisputable predilection could only come to an ultra-right political interpretation of the 
philosophy of Nietzsche, on the basis of which he was subject to a crushing critical defeat 
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[podleîal kriticeskomu razgromu] "707 He concluded by saying that "Beyond Good and Evil 
occupies a particular place in Nietzsche's works, and this allows us to thmk that it may serve 
as a convenient introduction to the whole range of ideas and notions of Nietzsche for those 
who have had no opportunity to read his texts (and there are, no doubt, many such rea-
ders) "708 
The actual diversity of late Soviet attitudes towards the history of "bourgeois" 
philosophy is illustrated by the judgments of the philosophy of Nietzsche They range from the 
warning by Msvenieradze against an "unhealthy" interest in Nietzsche,709 through the radical 
condemnation of Nietzsche's amoralism and nihilism by Davydov in favor of moral ab-
solutism, to the more balanced appreciation of Michajlov 
" Nietzsche himself was perfectly aware of his decadence but he also knew that he was a decadent who is 
getting over his own decadence, just like he was a nihilist who is surmounting and criticizing nihilism " 7 1 ° 
Bef ween Struggle and Dialogue Critique of Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy 
Because of the horizontal dichotomy of the history of philosophy, post-Marxist bourgeois 
philosophy was inevitably interpreted negatively, being outdated by historical progress The 
same negative attitude is required by the important function of philosophy in ideological 
struggle However, as capitalist society persisted, and bourgeois philosophy became "simul-
taneously developing" Western philosophy, it continued to contain valuable elements -as it did 
before Marxism- in various forms of dialectical and materialist philosophy Marxist philosophy 
therefore had to take seriously the content of bourgeois philosophy, and, consequently, the 
superiority of Marxist-Leninist philosophy had to reside in its capacity to assimi/afeeverything 
valuable in contemporary non-Marxist-Leninist philosophy As a result, a significant shift 
gradually took shape in the field of kntika sovremennoj burzuaznoj filosofíi [KSBF\ * 
The choice between splendid isolation plus ideologically motivated "critique" and 
serious study plus philosophically motivated criticism (already pleaded for by Asmus in 1947 
[Ch 10ne]) tended to be resolved in favor of the latter From the 1950s onwards, "special 
courses, especially dedicated to the critique of separate currents of contemporary bourgeois 
philosophy" were started at the kafedra IZF&l MGU,711 
' and the teachers, providing minimal information, tried to convince the students of its reactionary nature At 
the same time, Soviet philosophers became acquainted with the doctrines of Western authors, studied their 
works, and became convinced, that far from all of their content is sheer obscurantism [splotnoe mrakobesie] 
They discovered ( ) a good deal of serious problems, the formulation of interesting questions, that had to be 
taken into consideration [nad kotorym nado bylo dumat] ( ) Moreover, serious investigations into the history 
'Very often, the phrasing j sociologi!' was added, because, in the Soviet conception sociology fell 
within the scope of istmat 
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of philosophy were conducted in our country as well, which were in the least degree hampered by established 
dogmas [italics mine, EvdZ] " 7 1 2 
In 1967, during the closing session on KBF of a large symposium of Soviet historians 
of philosophy, one of the leading specialists in this field, Aleksej Sergeevic Bogomólov (1929-
1982) "subscribed to the conclusion, expressed by many, that one ought to combine critical 
work with positive investigations of problems, and that, moreover, the creative development of 
Marxist philosophy would be noticeably hampered without a scrutiny of problems and a critical 
analysis of their solution by bourgeois philosophers " 7 n 
At a similar conference in 1986 on methodological problems of IFN, one of the 
"generals" of KBF, Mel'vil', distinguished three periods 
" the first covers the 10 to 12 years when critique sought to unmask [razoblaSatl bourgeois philosophers as 
hired ideological henchmen [naemnye ideologiöeskie oruïenosey] of imperialism, and perceived a reactionary 
political meaning and mauvaise hi [ zlaja volja] in all their pronouncements The second period began approx 
with the appearance in 1957 of the collective work Contemporary subjective idealism It was marked by a 
transition from pigeonholing [па еЧі ате jarlykov] to a sorting out [razbor] and theoretical analysis of Western 
conceptions However, critique here was primarily negative, oriented towards unmasking, though no longer of 
the political, but also of the theoretical reactionary character of idealistic constructions A third period begins 
at the end of the 1960s The previous tendency is basically preserved, but critique obtains a positive character, 
too real problems arc distinguished, interesting solutions and approaches arc being accentuated, a senes of 
problems, presented by Western philosophers, arc being elaborated by Soviet authors in a positive manner, most 
of all in that field, which in the West is called philosophy of science ', and by us 'logic and methodology of 
science" "714 
What KBFIooked like around 1960 appears from a characteristic given by Kamenka-
"There is an official Soviet recipe for writing the 'scientific', Marxist study of any philosopher The author 
begins by portraying briefly the economic and political situation at the time the author lived, paying special 
attention to any direct links he has with dominant or emerging (or oppressed) classes He refers to the 
philosophers non-philosophic activities especially to any political or social engagements, but also to his 
scientific interests (if any) and to the general state of science at the time The author then goes on to present and 
discuss the subject's philosophical work In general, the more philosophically serious the work being produced, 
the more perfunctory this 'social' introduction and the less related to the fairly conventional philosophic 
exposition that follows As one Soviet philosopher has tellingly complained [Bogomolov, reviewing Bakradie s 
Essays m the History of Modern and Contemporary Bourgeois Philosophy, in VF. 1962, №6], Marxist 
historians ol philosophy tend to make 'mechanical connections' between a philosophers known political views 
and his general philosophic system they tail to reveal a genuine organic connection and confuse the 'social 
address of a philosophy with its social content "715 
In 1963, Kline reported on the lack of knowledge of contemporary Western philosophy 
among the Soviet delegation to the 13th International Congress of Philosophy m Mexico City, 
an ignorance that went hand in hand with severe criticism ofthat same Western philosophy 7 1 6 
This ignorance after at least thirty years of isolation is as understandable as the criticism of the 
unknown must have been irritating Twenty years later, this situation was considerably 
remedied in both respects Soviet specialists in KBF knew fairly well what they were talking 
about -although their proper field of investigation tended to be limited to French existentialism, 
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American neo-positivism or German hermeneutics a result of the "division of labor"- and 
criticism had largely given way to a more or less objective account This in fact points to the 
main, assimilative function of KBF Again, it should be remembered that to write a critical 
dissertation or monograph on, say, Heidegger or Wittgenstein was, for a very long time, 
virtually the only legitimate access to the texts of these philosophers Consequently, virtually 
the only way to become informed about contemporary non-Soviet philosophy was to read 
those "critical" studies 
"When a reader in the USSR opens a book, that is named "The Anti-Scientific Nature of the Bourgeois 
Conception of , ' A Critique of Contemporary Bourgeois Theory ' , The Conception of in Bourgeois 
Philosophy' etc , he may expect from such a book one of two things that it proves to be a primitive 
collection of misquotations from Western authors, alternated with bad language pointed against them, and does 
not contain any hint at thought or information, or that the book is an attempt at serious analysis In the latter 
case, the book may, regardless of all mutilation by outer and inner censorship, give the reader some 
information, and urge him to considerations that are new to him This is the case especially as we are talking 
about the Soviet reader, who has become used to read between the lines for over 60 years now " 7 1 7 
Thus, e g , the attitude to contemporary idealism changed, "not from a negative to a 
positive attitude, but from an abstract negation to a concrete appreciation of its role and 
significance " 7 1 8 In the 1980s "new improvements were planned Their essence consists in 
idealism ceasing to be a bogy [zupel\ and being recognized as an inevitable element of the 
historical process of philosophy, that could and can have a positive significance " 7 1 9 The link 
of this tendential shift from Marxist-Leninist critique to a philosophically motivated study of 
contemporary non-Marxist philosophy with the principle of partijnost' [Ch 8 и], as well as with 
the "double statement" [Ch 10 и c], is evident But it clearly makes a difference whether 
partijnoit'is understood as determination ot a philosophical position by its "embeddedness" in 
an ideological superstructure [partijnost'l], or as "conscious" partisanship, "taking sides" 
with one social class or another [partijnost'l] And in this case, determination facilitates the 
shift from "critique" to critical assimilation 
It equally makes a difference whether the relative independence of philosophy is 
understood as independence from socio-economic conditions, or (also) as independence from 
class-struggle Economic or historical determinism did not easily fit into the "voluntarist" 
ideological function of Soviet philosophy Just as it is hard to blame the capitalist for being a 
capitalist if you regard him as a mere instrument of historical development, or to praise a 
proletarian for being a vehicle of revolution, it is hard to reproach a bourgeois philosopher for 
being an apologist of imperialism, if his theory merely reflects the objective contradictory 
conditions of society he is a "victim" rather than a "criminal" As Ignatow remarked 
' Such a version of pjrtynosi comes closer to Marx cjmera-o/wtura thesis or Engels "final analysis" argument 
than to the formulations of Lenin In the end, 'bourgeois' theoreticians are not so much active reactionaries, as 
passive objects, or even victims, ot the class conditioned aberrations ' 720 
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So, Leninist voluntarism with its concomitant praise and blame gave way, m later 
KSBF, by a more truly historical approach, that freed Soviet philosophers of the obligation to 
accuse their philosophical opponents 7 2 i 
It would be a gross mistake, and a confusion of the epistemic and ideological function of 
philosophy, to regard K(S)BF simply as what it claimed itself to be, viz a cnticalanalysis of 
non-Soviet philosophical thought from a Marxist-Leninist point of view 7 2 2 Of course, such 
was the outer form, as well as the tenor of much of, esp earlier Soviet production in this field, 
which, however, can be regarded as the nearly mechanical application of schemes outlined by 
Lenin 7 2 3 This was an ideologically important, but intellectually neither rewarding nor 
respected affair KSBF was more important as a means to appropriate present non-Soviet 
philosophical theory [function lb (Ch 10 ш)], and to initiate discussion within Soviet philosophy 
itself 
In view of the first aspect, the typical format of recent work in KSBF is not a critical 
discussion, but a mere exposition of some non-Soviet philosopher's views, nested between a 
highly critical -in the Marxist-Leninist sense- introduction and an equally critical conclusion 
Of course, this gave the reader a clue as to the refutation from a Marxist-Leninist point of view 
of the bourgeois philosopher in question, too With respect to the second aspect, philosophical 
critique potentially leads to change of the initial position Consequently, any serious critique of 
"bourgeois" philosophy could not but lead the "kntik" away from the official version of diamat 
and istmat, irrespective of whether (s)he understood him- or herself as a MarxisM-Leninist) 
As Vasil'ev pointed out, the public image of KSBF was "a model of the goals and 
principles of the critique of bourgeois philosophy and sociology, given by the bureaucratic-
ideological authorities in the USSR," whereas "the real state of affairs in this branch is the 
result of the combination [socctdme] of the demands of power and the interests of the very 
people who work in that branch " 7 2 4 And although "the overwhelming majority in the field of 
the critique of contemporary bourgeois philosophy and sociology are people who make the 
principles of the official programme the principles of their own work ," 7 2 5 there were people 
working in this area with different interests, too 
In the first place it is the interest in a correct adequate account of sources of the course of formation and 
problematic of this or that trend in philosophy and sociology in the West In the second place it is the attempt 
to bring out the positive results of theoretical and empirical knowledge in western philosophy and sociology In 
the third place it is the aspiration to participate with the help ot a discussion of questions, raised in western 
philosophy and sociology in today s united spiritual life ot the world ' 7 2 6 
The field of KSBFwds a highly specialized area, with an extreme division of labor 
Since it was supposed to be not an unprejudiced study, but a Marxist-Leninist critique of 
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foreign philosophy, there was no good reason why many people should deal with the same 
author. The results would in principle be the same, being the outcome of an application of a 
shared philosophical position. There were Soviet specialists on a wide range of non-Soviet 
philosophers and currents, but there were only a few specialists for each subject. For example, 
I know of only two Soviet authors on Collingwood, Kissel' and Eeru N. Lóone, in spite of the 
fact that Collingwood's The Idea of History appeared in Russian translation in 1980. Both 
Kissel' and Loone were "specialists" who attended international conferences on Collingwood 
etc., and who were, within the USSR, virtually the only people who knew something about 
his views. 
As a result, there could not be a discussion of recent developments in non-Soviet 
philosophy, something akin to, e.g., a discussion in (West-) Germany about developments in 
French philosophy. As a matter of fact, Western philosophers were in a far better position to 
know something about Soviet philosophy than the other way around: a book like Scanlan's 
Marxism in the USSR or Jeu's La Philosophie Soviétique et l'Occident did not and could not 
have its Soviet counterpart. 
There probably was no field where the different, potentially conflicting functions of IFN were 
more manifest than K(S)BF. The ideological function was the primary one, but in order to 
perform this function convincingly the krìtiki had to study the works of the bourgeois 
philosophers, preferably in the original, and in order to demonstrate the reactionary nature of 
their views they had to recognize their complexity and "seriousness". This inevitably led to a 
sophistication of the "critique" and to an increase of professionalism. Moreover, since Western 
philosophy contained valuable material for the improvement of Soviet philosophy, a profes-
sional approach was required as well. Further, K(S)BF offered excellent possibilities to 
discuss philosophical topics, esp. in such relatively neutral fields as philosophy of science and 
philosophy of language, but also in relation to psychology or psycho-analysis. Here, K(S)BF 
merged with such fields as fílosofskíe voprosy estestvoznanija and filosofskie voprosy 
psichologii, and critical discussion of Western theories was one of the ways in which more 
sophisticated positions, departing from diamat, could be developed. 
This explains the development of the (post-)positivist stance of many Soviet 
philosophers of science. An example is Priroda nauki [The Nature of Science] (1985) by 
Viktor Vasil'evi6 ΙΓίη (b. 1952) and Anatolij Terent'eviC Kalinkin, in which the authors make 
wide use (81 out of 196 entries in the bibliography) of Western literature in history and 
philosophy of science. To quote a Western reviewer, it "really offers some interesting ideas, 
particularly concerning the dynamics of science" to "the unbiased, critical and patient reader, 
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not repulsed by frequent assurances that any non-Marxist attempt to create an acceptable model 
of the scientificity of knowledge must fail due to the inadequacy of its philosophical-
methodological foundations."727 As Graham and Scanlan have shown, there was no ban on 
Western literature in Soviet philosophy of science. In systems theory, for example, key texts 
by Western authors were available in Soviet translations,728 and the "positive rage" in 
cybernetics, condemned until the mid-1950s as a "bourgeois science",729 but "endorsed in 
1961 by the Communist Party itself as one of the major tools for the creation of a communist 
society,"^ was accompanied by unbiased and serious discussion of and with Western 
theorists — even if much energy was spent on integrating systems theory and cybernetics into 
the framework of diamat and istmat, thus demonstrating their superiority.731 
As to philosophy of language, there were, for example, a few Soviet authors on 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951).732 One of them was Marija Semènovna Kozlóva (b. 1933). 
Part of her Fílosofija i jazyk [Philosophy and Language] (1972),™ was found worthy of a 
German translation in 1986. It shows complete absence of "militant partisanship", a sound 
knowledge of Western literature, and philosophical criticism instead of Marxist-Leninist 
kritika, and "it is hard to avoid the impression that most of these [contributions to the book in 
which the translations appeared, EvdZ] could have been written in our country as well."734 
An example from the field of "philosophical questions of psychology" is the article by 
Natalja Sergeevna Avtonómova (b. 1945) on French structuralism and psycho-analysis (C. 
Lévi-Strauss, J. Lacan), "Das Unbewußte: epistemologische Aspekte," published in German in 
1986, but based on a book that appeared in the USSR in 1977.735 This text shows the desire 
and capacity of a Soviet specialist in "bourgeois" philosophy to focus on philosophical content, 
to link Western theories to developments in Soviet philosophy -MamardaSvili, Vygotskij, 
Il'enkov736_ and to give an "objective" account of developments in the philosophical world of 
the "ideological opponent". 
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ll.iii.d Milestones and Obstacles on the Highway to Truth: Istorila 
Marksistsko-Leninskoi Filosofii 
Another important area of IFN, was the historiography ot Marxist and Soviet philosophy, "the 
most important period in the history of mankind "737 This area was the most strongly 
"ideologized" part of IFN Any philosophical position that writes its own history will present 
itself as somehow the supreme, or at any rate an important "result" of that history Such a 
"proper history" -as for example the one contained in Hegel's philosophy- usually takes the 
form of a reconstruction ot the pre-history of a presently developed philosophical system or 
position In the Soviet case, however, Marxist and Marxist-Leninist philosophy were 
themselves supposed to have a history of more than a century Instead of a rational reconstruc-
tion of the prehistory of Marxism, we thus see here a permanently (re)wntten inner history of 
one philosophical position or trend, in which the actual stage of development necessarily 
determines the interpretation and valuation ot the recent and the more distant past 
Given this subordination to an ideological function, it is not surprising that the 
historiography of Soviet philosophy was a permanently adapted, "ideologized" chronicle, 
singing the praises of its successes, presenting the "party-philosophers" as its figure-heads, 
reducing controversy to creative development, and inflating dutiful production as profound 
discussion ™ As a matter of fact, the production of a running historical account of Soviet 
philosophy as Marxist-Leninist, reinforcing the ideology of Soviet philosophy from an 
historical angle, could not but eclipse what was really done of philosophical substance It 
seems doubtful whether this permanently adapted account was very much believed in by its 
authors But the point is that the existence of an official historiography etfectively prevented 
accounts of and research into ' real" history Moreover, this official account was the only 
information accessible to larger audiences, and thus contributed to the public image of Soviet 
philosophy 
History of Marxism-Leninism was divided into two main periods the formation of Marxism, 
and the "Leninist stage [lemnskij ctap]", corresponding historically to the division of post-
Marxian bourgeois philosophy Just like philosophy before and after Marx were incomparable, 
so were Marxist philosophy before and after Lenin Ever since, Marxism was divided into two 
parts the right, Leninist line, and a variety of wrong, non-Leninist lines As we have seen, 
Soviet philosophy did not distinguish between Marxism and Marxism-Leninism [Ch7m] 
Hence there was no distinction of historiography of Marxist-Leninist philosophy and the 
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critique of revisionist positions. Still, attempts to engage in serious study of Marx and Engels 
themselves were made, partly in connection with attempts to reform Marxism itself [Ch.5.ii]. 
One of the products in this field was Ojzerman's Formirovaniefilosofiimarksizma [The 
Formation of the Philosophy of Marxism], published for the first time in 1962 and twice 
republished, translated in several languages, awarded the Lomonosov-prize of MGU and the 
State-prize of the USSR, and reviewed rather favorably by Nemeth as "especially useful" to 
"those who would welcome a refresher course with time in short supply."739 Ojzerman's book 
deals with the period until 1848 (the year of the transition, according to Lenin, of the period of 
genesis to the first period of development of Marxism),740 and is the first Soviet specimen of 
an investigation of "the whole period of formation of the philosophy of Marxism."741 It is to 
the point, informative, and pays due attention to biographical and bibliographical questions 
such as the period of writing of Marx' "Zur Kritik der Hegeischen Rechtsphilosophie", which 
he regarded as a "patchwork" that contained both idealist and materialist positions, written 
partly in 1842, partly in 1843, thus testifying the rapid development of Marx' philosophical 
conception.742 
The main shortcoming of this book is that it takes for granted Lenin's interpretation of 
the development of Marxist philosophy. This "more than slightly irritating" (Nemeth) feature 
belonged to the Soviet preconditions of this kind of work. The very idea that Marx' and 
Engels' doctrine would not constitute a coherent whole in every respect, or that there were 
"unsuperseded" remnants of Hegelianism in it,743 could not be acceptable in view of the 
official status of that doctrine. The chief merit, therefore, of books like this was that they 
presented the historical material, and offered the Soviet reader access to the main ideas of "the 
real Marx", and to Western discussions of the development of Marxism both by Marxist and 
non-Marxist authors, however critically it opposed "bourgeois and revisionist interpretations of 
the historical process of development of the philosophy of Marxism."744 
The "orthodox" nature of this area of /FNbecomes manifest from attempts to tum a historical 
study of Marx' thought into an innovation of Marxism-Leninism. Such an attempt is a rather 
famous article by Mamardasvili on "The Analysis of Consciousness in the Works of Marx 
[Analiz soznanija ν rabotach Marksa]", in which he discusses Marx' conception of human 
consciousness as contained in Das Kapital. In his opinion, "Marx was the first to place 
consciousness into the domain of scientific determinism, and to reveal its social transformation 
and social mechanisms."74^ He labels this approach "the impersonal, or (reductive-objective) 
analysis of consciousness and culture,"746 departing not from the perception by the subject, 
but from the mechanisms that form the ways social relations are perceived as being objective 
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(e g as "commodity form [ Warenform]")747 This approach "reveals the phenomenological 
nature of consciousness (its quasi-objective character) and introduces an abstraction that makes 
it possible to analyze consciousness objectively as a transformation of objects into quasi-
objective forms, derived from processes occurring in the internal world of the subject," making 
clear that "to go "beyond the phenomenon" means to explain the social system of communica­
tion that supplies the phenomena to consciousness "748 
In fact, Mamardasvih excludes a dualist understanding of Marx' famous dictum that "it 
is not people s consciousness that determines their being, but on the contrary their social being 
that determines their consciousness " 7 4 9 Official Soviet Marxism-Leninism adhered to such a 
distinction between "consciousness' and "social consciousness", but Mamardaivili's point is 
that all consciousness is social consciousness, not that social consciousness, as a different kind 
of consciousness, would determine individual, non-social consciousness 
This was indeed a contribution to Soviet theory of consciousness, but it is clear that this 
conception was unacceptable for official Soviet Marxism-Leninism In the first place, it clearly 
contradicts Lenin's naively realistic "reflection theory", and, secondly, it stresses -explicitly by 
quoting Marx 75°- the fact that the human beings that live in society are, in their way of 
understanding reality the objects rather than the subjects of ideology, its product rather than its 
producer Worse even, the two points are related Lenin's epistemological realism is a 
necessary condition for his scolding the lackeys of bourgeoisie and imperialism If Marx is 
"merely" analyzing a historically developing social mechanism, there is no ground for any kind 
of "conspiracy" If, by contrast, consciousness as such is a reflection of objective reality, then 
already to say that consciousness is nor the reflection of objective truth is "malicious" The 
point is that the "structural analysis" that Mamardasvih derived from Das Kapital, and that 
focuses on "systemic causation",751 indeed leads to conclude that "man as a reflective and 
intentionally oriented being is not master of his own ideological house "752 The resulting 
deterministic account of consciousness is incompatible with Leninist voluntarism 
A further question might be whether Mamardasvili's analysis does not equally apply to 
socialist, ι e Soviet society in its transition to communism If there, too, forms of "objectiviza-
tion [ Verdmghchung]" and "alienation [ Entfremdung],* are essential to the functioning of 
social structures and determine the way people perceive social reality, the "transparency" of a 
society in which a vanguard Party leads the Soviet people in full awareness of the relations that 
constitute the social system, disappears One could even argue that in Soviet society, the 
*In Soviel sources the two are usually identified as otíuídeme (which literally means to become or to make 
alien, whereas objectivization is russified as oh cktivjcija b\ Mamardaävili), an identification lor which 
Overman was criticized, but which he retained in later editions (cf Nemclh 1983, ρ 207) — Mamardasvih does 
make this distinction 
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continued existence of the "commodity form [ Warenform]" etc. led to an even worse 
"alienation" of consciousness, since in "socialist" economy the form was retained, but the 
content disappeared. "Price", "labor", "wage" reflected objective social relations, but no longer 
economic relations: they "reflected" the decision of the Party-apparatus to keep the population 
at a certain level of existence. The price of labor force, for example, was fixed regardless of 
any market mechanism, nor was there free trade of labor force, given the legal obligation to 
have a job. As we see, Mamardasvili's attempt to address basic issues of historical materialism, 
it eo ipso touches upon the ideological limitations of official istmat. 
Just as in the case of studies into "original Marxism", some discussions of contemporary non-
Soviet Marxism seem to have been attempts to start discussions in Soviet philosophy itself. 
This is strongly suggested by Grier's discussion of the critique by Otar Ivanovic Dzióev of 
Althusser's anti-humanist Marxism: 
". .a number of the tendencies of the French structuralist movement which Dïioev opposes are also characteris-
tic of Soviet structuralism That the dominant Soviet position has not received such a description is probably 
due more to the fact that the Soviet writers . seldom or never have that courage of consistency . to eliminate 
humanity as a significant term in the discourse. (. ) The affinity between recent French structuralist Marxism 
and certain tendencies... in Soviet historical materialism leads me to suggest that in criticizing the French work, 
D/ioev may well be attempting to initiate a discussion within the Soviet Union which would renew the 
development ot philosophy of history which has in many respects been arrested since the 1920s .."753 
Given the alleged scientific status of Soviet Marxism and the exigency not to contradict 
an official ideology, it comes as no surprise to find a "standard Soviet work by Kelle and 
Koval'zon, in which the 'objectivist' view of history as a process analogous to natural history 
and obedient to natural laws is enthusiastically expounded for more than 100 pages, only to 
reach the conclusion that actual history is 'the result of the activity of man'."754 Rather than a 
case of lack of "courage of consistency to draw the conclusions toward which their analysis 
inevitably moves,"755 this seems to be an instance of ritual invocation of safe tenets of official 
istmat. Western commentators, tending to interpret ideological requirements in terms of a 
shared conviction of Soviet philosophers, could not but ascribe the disappointing results of 
Soviet philosophical work to lack of courage or capacity. "Intellectual Marxism" (Kolakowski) 
being a largely illegitimate affair, historical investigation could partially offer an alternative. As 
appears from the examples just given, it did to some extent, but it is obvious that there was no 
field of IFN'that ran against the ideology of Soviet philosophy more easily. 
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ll.iii.e Outside the Western World: the Limitations of Antl-Eurocentrism 
One of the effects of linking philosophy's historical development to the succession of socio­
economic formations was the universalem of /FN [Ch 10 и dj Generally speaking, every feudal 
society would have its corresponding "feudal philosophy", capitalism would be accompanied 
by bourgeois philosophy in every part of the world, and the global victory of communism 
would go along with the world-wide development of a single "philosophy of Marxism-
Leninism ' Conversely, the fecundity of such a "universalist" approach would be a major 
argument m favor of a link between philosophy and socio-economic formations Conse­
quently, two fields of interest of IFN were the great philosophical traditions of the Far East 
(India, China, and Japan), and philosophy in the rest of the world To begin with the latter, it 
was largely left to scholars from developing countries, staying at Moscow's Umversitet 
Dru¿byNarodov¡memPatrisaLumumby [University of the Friendship of Peoples named after 
Patrice Lumumba], to study ' the development of progressive philosophical and social thought" 
-to use a standard phrase- in their respective countries of origin 
However sympathetic the declared anti-eurocentnsm of IFN may sound, it did not lead 
to the study ol non-Western philosophical traditions (African philosophy, Aboriginal thought, 
etc ), but to a study of the spreading of European thought through the dogmatic funnel of 
Marxism(-Lenimsm) The basis for serious investigation of philosophy in subsequent 
historical stages was precluded by the fact that Marxism itself was a product of European 
thought, and Marxism-Leninism its continuation by the Soviet peoples In this respect, Soviet 
historians of philosophy even were in a worse position than their Western colleagues, since 
there was no place for the kind of cultural pessimism and relativism that feeds interest in the 
philosophy of "primitive cultures" Moreover, there could not be, according to the general 
periodic scheme of IFN, philosophy in societies that had not yet entered the stage of slave-
holding 
The situation was different with respect to the philosophical traditions of the Far East These 
were taken quite seriously anthologies of classical Indian and Chinese philosophy appeared in 
the FN series, classical histories of Indian philosophy existed in Russian translation,^ there 
were specialists in these fields, and courses and seminars were offered to future Soviet 
historians of philosophy (which is more than can be said of, e g , the Dutch situation) There is 
ample foundation in the general Marxist(-Lenimst) account of human history for interest in 
these philosophical traditions If the struggle between idealism and materialism is universal, 
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"accompanies" the sequence of socio-economic formations, and is "ra the final analysis" 
determined by it, then there must be parallel developments of philosophy in, say, feudal 
Europe and China 
Soviet studies in this field moved far from early attempts to reconstruct these 
philosophical developments exclusively in terms derived from West European philosophy 
Instead, one finds sophisticated attempts to explain the differences between the philosophical 
traditions of the West, the Middle, and the Far East out of the different (revelationist versus 
non-revelationist) religious traditions,757 linked with an attempt to replace the Hegelian 
reduction of Oriental philosophy to religion758 by a differentiation of ways in which both 
philosophy and religion emerge from mythology 759 More importantly, these studies regard 
such differentiations (including the link with scientific knowledge), rather than the connection 
with socio-economic formations (which is judged to be too general), as decisive 
"As regards the socio historical conditions, that form a type of philosophical thought, it is, when we arc dealing 
with materials from the bast highly difficult to single out a specific one to earmark the intermediate links 
between social groups the productive process and the spiritual life of society, that would possess an exit lo 
philosophy ( ) The currently accepted stage approach to the clarification of the socio historical factors of the 
histórico philosophical process of philosophy in the East though undoubtedly truc as a whole at the same time 
proves to be too general, offering little for the analysis of philosophy as such, as a result of the extraordinary 
diversity and differentiation of the concrete regional material [italics mine, EvdZ] '7*>0 
Here, as elsewhere, Soviet historians of philosophy were at pains to evade the 
application of the abstract schemes of orthodoxy, not because they were anti-Marxists, but 
because they were historians Although authors in this field complained about the relative 
underdevelopment of their field,761 they certainly had their place in Soviet academic 
philosophy — one of the few advantages of the "division of labor' It remains to be seen what 
will be left of the efforts of Soviet historians of philosophy, and whether or not the ex-Soviet 
republics will continue to afford themselves this type of specialists, who have the material basis 
to contribute to comparative analyses of Western and Eastern philosophy 762 
453 
Chapter 11 Soviet History of Philosophy Histonographical Practice 
ll.in.f Between Patriotism and Nationalism: Istorila Filosofi! Naiodov 
SSSR 
A most important part of IFN was the history of the philosophical traditions of the nations that 
constituted the "one [edmoe] unified [wjuznoe] multinational state, formed on the basis of the 
principle of socialist federalism as a result of the free self-determination of the nations,"76'' ι e 
the USSR This ìstonja filosofa n.vodov SSSR [History of the Soviet Peoples] included not 
only the history of Russian philosophy -certainly its most important part- but also the Islamic 
philosophy in Central Asia (Ibn-Sina, al-Farabi) and the independent philosophical traditions in 
Transcaucasia The main results of the work done m this field as a whole were united in a 5-
volume htonja filosofa ν SSSR, appearing 1968-1985, edited by Vasihj Evgrafovic Evgráfov 
(1918-1982) e a 
Cuddling Russian Philosophy to Death 
The historiography ol Russian philosophy was strongly politicized, focusing on social and 
political thought, and ideologized through the notion of revdemokratizm [Ch 10 и b] 
Moreover, there was the presence of a number of works on Russian thought by Plechanov and 
Lenin In this field any approach that might indeed be called historical-materialist was eclipsed 
by the requirements to present the history of philosophy as the prehistory of Marxism, and 
Marxism-Leninism as the proper outcome of Russia s philosophical development rather than as 
European import 764 Further, ever since the merging of Soviet patriotism and Great-Russian 
nationalism, an unholy alliance has come into existence between the hagiography of Russian 
"progressive thought and the veneration of Russian philosophy, an alliance that is less absurd 
than it might seem, given the actual bond of Marxist and non-Marxist strands in Russian 
Marxism the messianism, the collectivism,76^ the anti-formalism, the egahtananism [ urav-
mlovka] belong more to Russian traditions than to European Marxism This explains why the 
attempt to legitimize Soviet Marxism-Lenimsmby means of the Russian philosophical tradition 
easily merged with the attempt to use Soviet Marxism-Leninism as a legitimate means to 
rehabilitate Russia's philosophical past Both attempts served primarily an ideological function, 
which is why the professionalist trend in this field of THVconsistcd in a struggle to move away 
from revdemokratizm and "philosophical nationalism ' 
One of the veterans of this struggle was Kamenskij, [Ch 10 u b], and another example is 
Aleksandr І апо іб Volodin (b 1933),766 who wrote some strictly histonographical studies on 
454 
Part Four: Soviet Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 
the influences of German on Russian philosophy.767 As Volodin pointed out, there were two 
tendencies in the historiography of Russian philosophy (called "home thought [oteäestvennaja 
mysl]" by Russians), that remind us of the traditional "Slavophiles" and "westernizers". 768 
One tendency is to reduce Russian philosophy to its European sources, the other is to treat 
Russian philosophy in splendid isolation from Western Europe.769 Rejecting both tendencies, 
Volodin tried to establish more exactly who was influenced by whom, when, and in which 
way. He also pointed to a discussion as to whether the main influence on Russian philosophy 
in the 19th-century came from Schelling, as Gulyga was said to hold,770 or rather from Hegel 
and Feuerbach, as Volodin himself contends. This discussion is based on conflicting interpreta-
tions of the historical development of Russian philosophical thought: one stressing its 
secularization under the influence of Western philosophy, the other its intimate bond with 
religion in, e.g., VI.S. Solov'ëv (1853-1900), generally regarded as one of the most important 
Russian philosophers. He and his successors were clearly meant by Gulyga, when he wrote 
that "ever since the 1870s... the philosophical center of the world has moved to Russia. And 
this lasted until the 1920s..."77i 
A tension between conflicting ideological functions -the legitimization of Marxism-
Leninism and Russian nationalism- and the requirements of professional historiography also 
marks the fate of the only (!)772 overall history of Russian philosophy to appear in the Soviet 
period, Russkaja fllosofìja IX-XIX vv. [Russian Philosophy in the 9th-19th Century] by 
Anatolij Andrianovic Galaktiónov and Pètr Fèdorovic Nikándrov. In 1961, they published a 
first version of their book under a slightly different title, covering the period from approx. 
1050 until the 1890s — the choice of this latter date being argued from the fact that Leninism 
meant a new stage in the development of Marxism, and of course the end of any national 
philosophical tradition.77^ 
In 1970, a second enlarged version appeared, and for twenty years, the authors were 
not heard of.774 In 1989, a new edition appeared, partly enlarged to include the 9th and 10th 
centuries, partly reduced: the methodological introduction and the discussion of historiography 
of Russian philosophy had disappeared.775 As Galaktionov stated in the preface, the 
methodological introduction "every line of which was polemical, having a concrete address, 
has now lost its significance, either because the very subject of dispute has disappeared, or 
because there is no need to repeat what has once already been demonstrated."776 
The book, in other words, had been controversial.777 But why? Certainly not because 
it did not pay due respect to the importance of Marxism(-Leninism), or to the importance of 
Russian philosophy in its development.778 The authors, rather than being not Marxist enough, 
were too Marxist. Their methodological principles (materialist conception of history, "relative 
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independence' of philosophy, continuity of philosophical problems, and principle of his­
toricity)779 belong to the standard formulations of IFN [Ch 10 u c-d and Ch 12 n] The problem is 
that, applied to the history of Russian philosophy, this approach forces to pay at least some 
attention to the actual historical development of Russian thought, ι e including its idealist 
tradition, which displayed a multitude of forms, "each of which has influenced the spiritual life 
of the country and has linked itself in various ways to scientific and political trends "780 
This point polemically opposed revdemokrdtizm, and one may safely presume that 
Galaktionov's ' concrete address' was the influential school of Scipanov Goerdt qualified the 
book as 'hochverdiensthch [invaluable]",781 which is confirmed by the fact that it was difficult 
to purchase it * Nemeth praised Galaktionov and Nikandrov for their inclusion of a discussion 
of early philosophical thought in Russia, thus correcting "the prevalent if not hegemonic 
Western attitude of treating Russian philosophy as somehow originating out of nothingness," 
but criticizes them tor not paying enough attention to the development of philosophy through 
the dialectic of discussion, as well as for their tendential reduction of philosophical controversy 
to class struggle 7&2 It might well be, however, that to present the views of Russian 
philosophers neutrally, without an attempt at philosophical appreciation, in combination with 
regular display of a "materialist conception of history" was the only way to write a history of 
Russian philosophy at all 
A Patchwork ot Philosophical Traditions 
The investigation of the philosophical past of the non-Russian peoples was largely the affair of 
specialists in and from the respective Soviet republics and autonomous regions Azerbaijani 
philosophy was studied in Baku, Georgian philosophy in Tbilisi, Central Asian philosophy in 
Taskent, Frunze [Biskek], Dusanbe, etc The amount of work done in this area is as impres­
sive as its quality is hard to judge For example, a Soviet bibliography of 1980 listed 128 
publications of works by Al-Farabi and reviews of those editions, and no less than 966 studies 
on Al-Farabi (monographs and articles) over the period 1895-1977 (2/3 of which falls within 
the Soviet period) in Kazakh, Russian, and other Soviet languages 783 These figures are 
impressive, but it is very difficult to get a more precise idea of the extent to which these many 
works might add something to Western, Arabic, or Persian Al-Farabi scholarship 
The least one can say is that most of the work done in this area, with the exception of 
well-known Muslim philosophers, is worth attention for the simple reason that it is not done 
The tirai was small (10 000 copies) and it was sold under the counter a clear indication of public interest 
456 
Part Four Soviet Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 
elsewhere * Of particular interest in this connection is the history of philosophy in the 
Transcaucasian countries -Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and a number of smaller nations-, 
which was investigated jointly in these republics until they liberated themselves from the Soviet 
yoke and engaged in mutual warfare The origin of this branch of ¡FN is to be sought in the 
famous discussion of 1947 about Aleksandrov's Istonja zapadnocvropejskoj filosofa, one of 
the evident shortcomings of which was that it did not discuss the philosophical traditions of the 
various Soviet peoples 784 
Apart from its inclusion in the activities of the centers of Soviet philosophy 
(departments at the IF, rubrics m journals, entries in encyclopedias), there was considerable 
activity in the various republics, editions and publications appearing both in Russian and local 
languages 785 The implementation of the decision to study the development of philosophy of 
all Soviet peoples, in combination with the requirement to focus on progressive thought and on 
the struggle between idealism and materialism, led to titles like From the History of Tatar 
Progressive Social Thought and The Dissemination of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy m 
Latvia,™ but also allowed for serious study of the proper philosophical past in those regions 
with a certain degree of autonomy 
The specific nature of these "local" philosophical traditions could lead, in some cases, 
to critical remarks with respect to the "standard" Soviet conception of the history of 
philosophy Discussing the specificity of Medieval philosophy (in Western Europe and in 
Transcaucasia), the Georgian historian of philosophy § V Chidaseh saw the specific nature of 
philosophy not in its being a form of world-view,787 or in its giving an answer to the "basic 
question of philosophy," but m its being thought that precedes such concretizations 
'Thus in the thesis that the object of history of philosophy is the lawlikc [7akonomernoe] historical 
development of philosophy, the concept of philosophy is concrcticized as a world-view, expressed in ideas 
[туъіі]'*, in concepts, in logical abstractions, as a reflected upon and logically systematized world-
outlook " 7 8 8 
Criticizing the standard Soviet "nihilist attitude" towards "scholasticism" with the help 
of Marx (who regarded scholastics like John Duns Scot and Roger Bacon as progressive 
thinkers), Chidaseh rehabilitated West European scholastic philosophy and the equally 
"scholastic" philosophy of Georgia, Armenia, and the Muslim East Invoking Engels' 
statement that in Scholasticism the "basic question" of philosophy took the form of the question 
*What little is known ot it in the West is due to the work of such self-willed researchers as Bernard Jeu (see 
Bibliography) 
" T h e Russian word 'mysl" is hard to translate into English like the German Gedanke' it has the double 
meaning ot being subjective (thought) and objective (idea) 
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' Is the world created by God or does it exist from eternity9",789 eludaseli cleverly remarked 
that, although it is not difficult to find Medieval philosophers who chose the second alternative, 
and were condemned by church institutions for it, neither answer to this question denies the 
existence of God,™ so that the religious orientation of Medieval philosophers in itself need 
not be seen as a disqualification 
Recognition of the eternity of the world did not express the idea of atheism and the denial of God, but 
nonetheless represented a progressive solution in the conditions of the Middle Ages of the basic question of 
philosophy and significantly altered the notion of an omnipotent absolute Creationism, asserting the absolute 
freedom and consciousness of the creator, gave way to necessananism which interpreted the coming into being 
of the world as the result of a necessity that did not depend upon the absolute and was not controlled by the 
absolute 7 9 ' 
Disregarding the fact that this means the destruction of the very concept of the absolute 
-if there is something independent of the absolute, the absolute is not absolute- it is clear that 
this interpretation gives room for serious investigation of deeply religious pantheists, mystics, 
etc as representing philosophical positions one needed not be against religion in order to be a 
progressive thinker 
The volume just quoted from contains interesting contributions on the intensive contacts 
between Armenian and Georgian philosophers from the 5th century A D onwards,792 and on 
pantheism,791 which is regarded as "that beneficial soil, on which materialism and atheism 
developed," with the assertion that "naturalistic pantheism has played a significant role in the 
history of development of materialism and atheism in the countries of the East, esp in 
Azerbaijan "794 
Likewise, al-Farabi is presented as a progressive thinker because of his rationalism and 
his doctrine of the eternal existence of the world (his 'necessananism' ), and is turned into a 
kind of Oriental Spinoza,795 while Western scholars are criticized for treating him as a Sufi 
mystic 79f> This, of course, is food for specialists, as is the author's complaint that Western 
orientalists tend to underestimate the role and originality of Medieval Arabic philosophy,797 or 
the "theory of Nucubidze-Honigmann, shared by many Soviet and foreign scholars," 
identifying Pseudo-Dionysus with Petr Iver (Petrus Ibencus), a Georgian neo-platonic thinker 
from the 5th century 798 
It could be rewarding to compare the developments in late Medieval and Renaissance thought in 
Western Europe (14th-15th centuries) with those in "Georgian Renaissance" (11 th- ] 3th 
centuries), and to see whether Chidaseli is right to claim that in both Western and Georgian 
Renaissance there was a turn towards recognition of ' this our world", which, in both cases, 
was a reaction to, and a factor in socio-economic developments taking place at that time 
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"The essence of subsequent progress, «of the entire -to quote Hegel- forward movement of culture», the 
outstanding sprouts \jarkic rostki] whereof manifest itself, in particular, in Georgia in the llth-I2th centuries, 
«leads to a restored belief in this our world » "799 
In discussing this Renaissance period in Georgian philosophy, ChidaSeli departed from 
a position that shows remarkable resemblance to the position outlined above in connection with 
the "integral approach" in Soviet studies of Western philosophy [l l.m.b]: 
"Philosophy in Georgia in the 11th-12th centuries was most closely connected with general changes of world-
view [obSHemirovozzrcnCeskie sdvigi), it was at the height of new moods, aspirations and ideas, with which, one 
could say, all forms of social consciousness were saturated This connection had such deep roots, that the key to 
an adequate understanding of Georgian philosophy of the period of developed feudalism is to be found not so 
much in the historical continuity in the development of philosophical thought in Georgia, as in the peculiarities 
of new conceptions of the world, that found their expression in cultural life as a whole. These world-view 
changes were in need of theoretical foundation. And since philosophy is a systematized and logically founded 
world-view, it is precisely Georgian philosophy that takes upon itself this task "800 
Despite the somewhat abstract and substantialist language, this approach points to a 
concrete relationship between changes in the socio-economic and political situation and changes 
in philosophical culture [Ch l.u andCh 2]. Comparable situations do not generate, but fa vor and 
disfavor comparable philosophical positions and theories. A situation does not determine 
philosophy as an intellectual activity, as thinking, but it does determine philosophical culture: 
the conditions of philosophy, the predominance and "Zeitgemäßheit' of positions. 
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ll.iv The Dissolution of IFN 
The period of perestrojka and the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet system meant the end of 
Soviet philosophical culture, too [Ch 6 n] In this section, I shall discuss how these changes 
affected IFN as marked l) by a professionalis trend, n) by a direct and indirect ideological 
function, and in) by being an alternative to margmalization This analysis is confirmed by the 
fact that the late Soviet period shows the disconnection of these three elements of 7RV the 
disappeaiance of the subordination to an ideological function of studies into philosophy's past 
(1), the emancipation of professional historiography of philosophy (2), and the manifestation 
of former historians of philosophy as primarily interested in "systematic" philosophical 
questions (3) My thesis that it was the connection of these elements that made up the Soviet 
nature of IFN, is substantiated by the vehemence of their disconnection in the late 1980s 
The first point appears in the unsuccessful attempt to let IFN play a constructive role in 
the perestrojka program, and in the shift from K(S)BF to an investigation of contemporary 
Western philosophy that does not serve immediate ideological goals To be sure, the disap­
pearance of the subordination of IFN to the ideological function of Soviet philosophy by no 
means implies the end of an ideological function of work in history of philosophy On the 
contrary, it clears the way for a variety of ideological functions with respect to society, politics, 
or the legitimacy of philosophy itself The second point shall be illustrated with the clear trend 
towards a "pure" historiography of philosophy, ι e one that is not linked to a specific 
philosophical position (apart from a historical and meta-philosophical conception of 
philosophy, without which history of philosophy is impossible) The third point, finally, will 
be illustrated with a few examples of (post-)Soviet historians of philosophy who "showed 
their real face" during the peresirq/ia-penod 
IFN and Perestrojka 
The process of reform and decay began for IFN with a large conference on the consequences 
of the 27th CPSU-Congress (1986) for research in history of philosophy 8 0 1 The materials, 
published in 1988, testify of the tension between the 'Sovietness" of IFN and the aspirations 
of professional historians of philosophy 802 A traditional Soviet tone was set by party-
philosopher Fedoseev 
The historians of philosophy are facing important and responsible tasks both in the further deepening of the 
scientific methodology of research into the history of philosophy and in the field of the enrichment of the seien 
tifie philosophical world outlook the struggle against bourgeois ideology and the education of oonscious and 
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active builders of communism Our historians of philosophy must make an adequate contribution to the solving 
of the majestic tasks that the 27th Congress of the CPSU has set before us " 8 0 3 
However, these statements were so general and traditional that it is hardly to be 
expected that any Soviet historian of philosophy would feel tempted to derive from them 
practical guide-lines for his daily scholarly work Nor does one get the impression that 
philosophers were very eager to embrace new guide-lines at all 
During the same conference, one "general" of /FN at the IF, Vladimir Vlasovic MSvemeradze 
( 1926-1990),* made a call for an objective study of philosophy's past 
"The classics of Marxist philosophy were not afraid of the truth ( ) Only what is veracious [pravdivo] can 
be patriotic [patriotiäno] "04 
A half truthful account [polupravdivoci/obrazeme] of the history of philosophy leads to the rise especially, 
but not only, among the youth, ot an unhealthy, ι e uncritical [sic1, FvdZ], interest in religion and mysticism, 
in philosophical idealists such as., с g , Schopenhauer or Niet/.sche, Berdjaev or VI Solov ev, or contemporary 
Western philosophers " 8 0 5 
Further, MSvemeradze lamented a "peculiar paradox" in IFN the number of specialists 
on individual philosophers and schools is growing, but the number of "professional historians 
of philosophy" who study "the actual and concrete objective regularities of the historical 
process of philosophy" declines806 In fact, MSvemeradze is here pointing to the tension, 
peculiar nor paradoxical, between professional but "local" and limited studies on the one hand, 
and more generalizing, "synthetic" work, which was problematic because it was inevitably 
bound up with "official" philosophy This left little space for alternative "grand perspectives" 
on philosophy's past 
Matters became more concrete in 1988 with the production of a new uöebmk for 
vuzovskajafìlosofìja First of all, the presentation of Marxist-Leninist philosophy as a basically 
true doctrine, was dropped, yielding to stress on the development and openness of Marxism 
All along this book, the authors have tried to show that Marxism is not at all a finished doctrine [zakonlcnnoe 
uCenie], in which answers to any question that arises or may arise in the future would be given beforehand, on 
the contrary Marxist philosophy is an open, developing system "807 
No fixed answers were to be expected from this new ucebmk, on the contrary, students 
were cordially invited to think independently 
"Thcrctore this textbook is only an invitation to arduous independent work, an introduction into the sphere of 
problems of this aged, but eternally young science about the essence of the world and of man in it Philosophy 
elevates man, it will eternally affirm this strife forward and upward'"808 
'Mamardasvili lovingly called MSvemeradze Mein Schwein Vcnicradzc (interview with G Batygin, 
17/12/1993) 
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With respect to the history of philosophy, the authors of Vvedenw clearly tried to 
learn from the past 809 The new ucebmk contained a chapter of close to 150 pages on "The 
origin and the historical forms of philosophy",810 ending with German idealism and Russian 
philosophy, and another of 85 pages on "Twentieth-century non-Marxist philosophy" 811 The 
comparison with former textbooks shows a different attitude towards both pre-Marxian and 
bourgeois post-Marxian thought, 
' It may appear as strange to some that in this textbook, the authors whereof declare their attachment to new, 
present day problems, such a large plate is allotted to historical themes in philosophy The point is however, 
that in the critical crucial moments ot its history such as the present it is characteristic of mankind to turn to 
past experience, in order to extract lessons from it and to try not to repeat mistakes once committed And this 
treasure of experience is expressed in the most concentrated, most profoundly reflected way [v ndiboke gluboko 
ounyilennom \ide] by philosophy 
The point also resides in one characteristic feature of the problems that affect philosophy most of all Many of 
these problems are commonly called «eternal» ( ) However from the fact that everybody has to resolve these 
problems independently it does not at all follow that the same person also has to invent the means to do so 
( ) philosophy not only elaborates that kind of means, but also brings before the court of reason the 
proposed variants tor the solution of those problems 
The point finally also is the following The philosophy of Marxism emerged as a criticism of all preceding 
philosophy ( ) From the point of view of reasonable, dialectical thought Ihe excellent philosophers of the past 
are not only our predecessors but also our contemporaries from which we can learn a lot and with whom it is 
possible to have with equal rights, a dialogue and discussion agreeing with some of their views, questioning 
others 812 
From Kntikñ of Bourgeois to History of Contemporary Western Philosophy 
The shift from a KBF to an istorijd burzuaznoj fílosofii could fully deploy itself under the 
newly arisen conditions One former king pin of KBF, Mel'vil', acknowledged that the 
simplistic conception of the attitude of Marxist philosophers towards "bourgeois" philosophy, 
the enforcement of "criticism and exposure [kntika ι razoblaöenie]" along with the "disen-
gagement from international philosophy" were largely responsible for the scholastic and often 
uninteresting nature of Soviet philosophy 8із 
"Such, at first compulsory but then also voluntary, self isolation from both East and West inevitably led to the 
weakening [оЬечкго Іі ате lit blood-draining ] of our philosophical thought and to its sharply pronounced 
provincialism 814 
He called for a new approach of contemporary non-Marxist philosophy, advocating 
dialogue and discussion along with serious analysis, and philosophical instead of "ideological" 
criticism 815 
In Vvedeme we also find a different treatment of contemporary non-Marxist 
philosophy 
' Under these conditions Marxist humanism and the new political thought based upon it take upon themsehes 
the defence and affirmation of values common to all mankind [obsteCeloveieskie cennosti] In its tum this 
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compels in many respects to a new approach of the interaction of the philosophy of Marxism with other trends 
of contemporary philosophy " 8 1 6 
The most immediate sign of this different treatment of "contemporary bourgeois 
philosophy" is a general change in terminology in the second half of the 1980s, this label 
disappeared altogether817 This is shown most clearly in the opening statement of a round-table 
conference on phenomenology by Motrosilova, the senior Soviet specialist in phenome­
nology,818 who begins by calling Husserl "one of the classics of 20th-century philosophy,"8'9 
to which she adds 
"I am not accidentally saying one of the classics of 20th-century philosophy, instead of classic of "contem­
porary bourgeois philosophy ', as was usual I assume that phenomenology is common property I obSiee 
dostojame] of contemporary philosophy And not only Husserl ( ) is a classic of the 20lh century Some other 
philosophers that emerged from the phenomenological school and then became independent philosophers, also 
may be counted among the classical thinkers of our century M Heidegger, N Hartmann, M Scheler, M 
Merleau-Ponty, J -P Sartre and, possibly other philosophers ' 8 2° 
These remarks surprise anyone who knew the ideological pregnancy of the qualification 
"кіаччк" ICh 7 ш] Also, the definition of phenomenology as "common property of 20th-cen­
tury philosophy" denies the fundamental gap that used to separate Marxist-Leninist from 
bourgeois philosophy After criticizing the fact that there are hardly any recent Soviet studies 
on, or translations of contemporary phenomenological thought, and complaining about "the 
opposition and restraint from the side of the bureaucrats who "managed" our lively contacts 
with loreign scholars,"821 she discusses some recent developments in phenomenology Her 
general attitude is sympathetic, and she concentrates on those topics (intersubjectivity,822 
mind-body problem^) that do not, in her opinion, receive due attention from Soviet 
philosophers 
Motrosilova concluded by stressing the importance of contacts between Soviet 
philosophers and foreign phenomenologists and criticizing the people (without naming 
anybody) who used to frustrate an objective and vigorous analysis of phenomenology 8 2 4 
' Now we can honestly and well foundedly study phenomenology, too, one of the most outstanding philosophi­
cal phenomena of the 20th century Of course, this has to be a critical and independent exploration " 8 2 5 
Another example is an article by Nina Stepanovna Júlina (b 1927), "Popper and Classical 
German Philosophy [Popperi nemeckaja klassiëeskaja fìlosofija]" (1987) 826 Julina defends 
the thesis that Popper's attitude towards Kant and Hegel is not in line with the actual relation of 
his philosophy to theirs,82? and tries to show that Hegelian elements more and more came to 
the fore in Popper's philosophical development, in spite of his explicit praise for Kant and 
loath of Hegel, and that Popper comes much closer to Hegel than he is willing to ack-
nowledge 828 
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This text is representative for many Soviet studies of contemporary Western 
philosophy Julina clearly knows what she is talking about, she uses original sources in 
English,829 and gives an objective account of Popper's philosophy. Dialectical materialism is 
present only as a broad background. Julina criticizes Popper for "in an idealist manner 
hypertrophying" his "World 3", a criticism that would presumably be shared by many Western 
philosophers 83o On the other hand, she praises his evolutionist approach to theory, which she 
interprets as a dialectical approach even though it is not recognized as such by Popper, and 
again one does not have to be a diamatcik to appreciate this point These elements were also 
present in a text by the same author, published during the high-tide of "stagnation" (1983).83' 
Two other elements, however, were new One is the positive attitude towards this 
bourgeois philosopher which is made explicit in Julina's remark that The Open Society and its 
Enemies, which had often served as an easy target for Soviet authors,832 should be left out of 
account, because "one must appreciate a serious philosopher, to which category I reckon 
Popper, by his strong and mature works, not by his weak ones."833 The other new element is 
the use Julina makes of her discussion of Hegel and Popper to stress the social function that 
philosophy should fulfil. 
The smooth transition from kntika to istorija of contemporary Western philosophy is also 
illustrated by Aleksandr Feodosieviö Grjaznóv (b 1948), MGU's specialist in contemporary 
analytical philosophy. His introduction to the translation of Wittgenstein's "Lecture on 
Ethics"834 is m no way recognizable as "Russian", "Soviet", or "Marxist(-Lenmist)". In 
another article, Grjaznov pays special attention to Wittgenstein's "Remarks on Frazer's 
«Golden Bough»", which, according to him, is of great importance for Wittgenstein's concept 
of Lebensform as a key to the understanding of the mutual non-comprehensibihty of cul-
tures 83S Frazer's Golden Bough was translated in 1980,836 and Wittgenstein's "Remarks" 
appeared in 1989 with an intelligent commentary by Zinaida Aleksandrovna Sokuler (b. 1950), 
who proves to be well aware of the many difficulties involved in interpreting Wittgenstein's 
remarks 837 
In fact, Soviet philosophy disposed of a large number of highly-specialized scholars in a 
variety of themes, tendencies, and philosophers in 20th century Western philosophy [11 ш с] 
Their knowledge could not be made productive within the context of Soviet philosophy, and 
thus remained limited to the presence of a number of experts Only very recently, in 1991, an 
attempt was made to unite their competencies into a Sovremcnnaja zapadnaja fìlosofìja; slovar' 
[Dictionary of Contemporary Western Philosophy], in which we find Kissel' writing on 
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Colhngwood and Croce, Vladimir Sergeevi6 Maláchov, the translator of Gadamer's works, on 
Gadamer and "Hermeneutics", Grjaznov on Wittgenstein, Austin, Kripke, Ryle, and 
Strawson, Julina on "Analytical philosophy" and on Popper, Avtonomova on Foucault, Lacan, 
and Althusser. 838 The book, mainly written by former "critics of bourgeois philosophy", 
offers, now that every trace of "Marxist-Leninist critique" has disappeared, adequate surveys 
and accurate accounts of a vast number of philosophers, tendencies, and schools in 20th 
century Western philosophy. It is one of the very concrete ways in which what was done m 
Sovict philosophy can be made to work for post-Soviet philosophical culture, and it testifies of 
the fact that KBF often was an external composition of neutral summary and dutiful commen-
tary, of objective content and critical form, which, on the one hand, favored the appropriation 
of non-Soviet philosophy within Soviet philosophical culture, but at the same time impeded its 
philosophicalassimüation 
Towards a "Pure" History of Philosophy 
As the crisis of official Soviet philosophy deepened, and the Marxist-Leninist character of IFN 
became less than evident, historians of philosophy called for a separation of philosophical 
theory and "pure" historiography of philosophy As Ljubutin and Percev remark in a review of 
two collections of historical studies in philosophy, there was no room for "non-partisan" 
studies of the history of philosophy. 
In those recent days, when the role of anulla to contemporary philosophy was still simply assigned to history 
of philosophy as a science, she got used to feel in constant debt A distinctive guilt complex arose in her, The 
history of philosophy got used to being an ' applied science The idea of a proper value of research into the 
history of philosophy was even more audacious than the idea of a proper value of philosophical research as such 
This idea was almost as enormous as the assertion of the possibility of "l'art pour l'art" ( ) The moment has 
come to speak out in defence of ' pure' investigations into the history of philosophy "839 
At the same time, however, philosophical journals started to publish less on history of 
philosophy, as they adopted a more "popular" editorial policy, focusing on actual problems. As 
a result, historians of philosophy complained about the limited possibility to have their 
materials published,840 and some even "fled" to newly emerging sam/zcter-joumals 841 
Though the results of the Soviet period with regard to classical philosophical texts were 
quite impressive [111], there were many "white spots", esp in Russian idealism, religious 
philosophy, and emigre philosophy after 1920, notably Berdjaev, and in idealist, "lr-
rationalist", positivist, phenomenological, or hermeneutic Western philosophy after the rise of 
Marxism Authors like Nietzsche or Schopenhauer, Berdjaev or Losskij, Heidegger or 
Gadamer, not available, or only m antiquarian editions until then, now were published by 
Soviet publishing houses 842 These translations appeared as separate publications, but also in a 
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variety of journals, and in the newly established series Istonko-filosofskijezegodnik [History 
of Philosophy Yearbook IFE\, appearing since 1986,843 and dedicating an increasing 
proportion of its pages to the publication of primary sources, either m translation from a wide 
range of languages or in the Russian original m 1986 16 4% (49 pages out of 298), in 1987 
33 5% (114 out of 340), in 1988 25 5% (97 out of 380), in 1989 40 6% (145 out of 357), in 
1990 55 6% (203 out of 365), and in 1991 57 6% (207 pages out of 359) 
The appearance of IFE was largely independent of political change, and marked, by its 
existence and by its contents, the transition to a new phase This liberation of IFN had to be 
clothed, at first, in clear demonstrations of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy the "Introduction" to 
the first IFE was a vigorous demonstration of the superiority of dialectical materialism as the 
"revolutionary-critical outcome of the two and one-half millennia old development of 
philosophical thought,"»44 written by Ojzerman, Academician and head of the department of 
history of philosophy of Western Europe and America in the IF, and it was followed by an 
article from the hand of the director of the IF, Lapin, on ' The Rise and Development of 
Marxism as an Integral [celnyfl Doctrine", an equally heavy piece of self-defence of Marxism-
Leninism 8 4 5 
Editor-in-chief of the IFE is Motrosilova, a leading personality in (post-)Soviet 
philosophy anyway, and the board of editors includes many big names in history of 
philosophy (Dobrochotov, Sokolov, Ojzerman, Kissel, and others) The IFE reflects the main 
results in the field, and with its selective bibliography it is the best entrance to the field The 
contributions to the subsequent IFE show great variety in subject and approach М 6 As a whole 
they testify of the desire to make the entire philosophical heritage of human culture available 
and of the capacity of post-Soviet historians of philosophy* to fulfill this desire 
West European philosophy, from Renaissance to Hegel, and esp classical German 
philosophy Ml continued to be of special importance In the second half of the 1980s, thematic 
historical studies appeared that were both a continuation of and a break with earlier work in 
IFN An example is Problema sawosozndnija ν zapadnoevropejskoj filosofa [The Problem of 
Self-Consciousness in West European philosophy] (1987) by Michail Anatol'eviô Gámcev, a 
specialist in Medieval philosophy at MGU 848 This book, discussing Aristotle, Plotinus, 
Augustine, Scholasticism, and Descartes, is mainly based on Western literature (only 3 Soviet 
sources are mentioned, and Marx and Engels appear only ntually), and there is nothing 
particularly Marxist or materialist in it, neither in the historical approach, nor in the interpreta-
tion of conceptions of self-consciousness 
'With a remarkably high proportion of women 25 women to 38 men among the authors of the first six IFE 
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Another example is Dobrochotov's Kategorija bytija νklassiceskoj zapadnoevropejskoj 
fìiosotìi [The Category of Being in Classical West European Philosophy] (1986).849 For 
Dobrochotov, "classical philosophy" means philosophy for which such principles as the 
recognition of reason as the highest authority (at least within philosophy) have preserved their 
normative nature, regardless of the pretensions of science or theology,850 and this classical 
philosophy ends, according to Dobrochotov, with Hegel.851 Of course, Marxism also situated 
the end of classical philosophy near Hegel, but it claimed to have surmounted and sublated it, 
whereas Dobrochotov holds that the "philosophical results of the evolution of the category of 
being" as they were formed during the classical period, should be retained.852 In this book, 
just as in his detailed study of the B-52 fragment of Herakleitos,853 Dobrochotov displays a 
combination of precise scholarly work and philosophical commitment, his main objective 
being, it seems, to restore the bond between the great metaphysical tradition of the West and 
present, post-Soviet philosophy. His aim is not so much to write the history of the concept of 
being, as to investigate the logic of its development, thus regaining it as a category.854 
This book thus evades the "basic question of philosophy" by supposing that the 
concept of Being, introduced by Parmenides, is the fundamental concept of philosophy. A 
question about the relation between thought and being, i.e. the "basic question" that haunted 
Soviet philosophy, only emerges after a determination of being as thought, matter, substance, 
or any other. The consequence of this reintroduction of the category of being means a 
restoration of metaphysics as preceding any opposition of metaphysics and dialectics. Shortly 
after the publication of Dobrochotov's book, and reportedly after a lot of discussion,855 a 
chapter, written by MotroSilova, of the second volume of the new ucebnik in philosophy 
discussed the category of bytie [being], and preceded the chapters on materija and dialek-
tika.Mb Apart from Marx, Engels, Lenin, Kant, and Hegel, MotroSilova's main reference in 
this chapter was Dobrochotov.857 
One of the effects of the special interest of Soviet philosophy in Hegel was that it 
"associated" him with Marxism(-)Leninism, which explains his sharply decreased popularity 
since the end of the Soviet era in Russian philosophy. During the years of perestrojka, Soviet 
philosophers began to reach beyond Hegel to Kant in order to foster humanistic ideas.858 As a 
matter of fact, Kant had already been cautiously "rehabilitated" in recent years through the 
works of, e.g., Asmus, and the Georgian historians of German idealism (Tevzadze and 
others). № 
Themes in Hegel's philosophy that could not be fully elaborated in the Soviet period 
became the subject of "post-Soviet" studies. One such theme is the Hegelian concept of 
thought, and another is that of absolute spirit. These themes testified of Hegel's allegedly 
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mistaken, idealist answer to the basic question of philosophy The Hegelian conception of 
thought was the subject of a monograph by Manna Fedorovna Bykova, praised by Kanmskij 
for being the only person to investigate Hegel's Philosophy of Spint in its entirety in her disser-
tation "6° This book is remarkable for its clarity and mastery of literature, and telling about the 
past in its stress on the need to turn to original texts instead of not always reliable (Soviet-)Rus-
sian translations 8&i Bykova systematically investigates the Hegelian concept of "thought" 
[mysleme, German " das Denken"], in close relation with the concepts of "reason" [razum, 
" Vernunft'] and "spirit" [duch, " Geist"] M2 taking Hegel seriously as the idealist he was, and 
not trying to point out the "materialist elements" of his philosophy And the same applies even 
more strongly to the recent work of Aleksandr Vladimiroviö KriCévskij, who discusses and 
appreciates the theological aspects of Hegel's thought 863 Bykova and KnCevskij recently 
combined their interest in Hegel with a joint publication, Absol/utnaja ideja ι absoljutnyj duch ν 
filoso fu Gegeljd [Absolute Idea and Absolute Spirit in the Philosophy of Hegel] (1993), in 
which they make use of both Soviet and Western scholarly literature, and aim at an "immanent 
examination of the problems contained in Hegels system [immanentnoe problemno-
soderzatel'noe rassmotreme sistemy Gegelja]" from a logicisl [Bykova] and a speculative-
theological [Knôevskij] perspective864 
Studies like these are important in that they present a text-based and content-oriented 
study of a philosopher who was, for a long time, "caught" in the exigencies of Soviet 
orthodoxy Here, Hegel is studied as an important philosopher in his own right — Bykova 
largely refrains from any sort of "criticism" or 'interpretation", Marxist or other It is important 
to note that this trend has its roots in the Soviet period Bykova is doing, in a sense, what her 
teacher, Motrosilova, whose approach she explicitly embraces,8*'5 has been trying to do for 
some 30 years, namely a combination of textual scrutiny and philosophical commitment The 
same approach was present in Chandruev, Kissel', and Kanmskij, who also warned against 
simplification of Hegel's thought, and made a plea for a ' Hegel-exegesis" and "Hegel-
hermeneutics" 866 
From Philosophy to IFN and Back Again 
In the criticism of the state of affairs in Soviet philosophy [Ch 6 и], IFN was not spared, but it 
was often pointed at as a field of relatively high quality 8 6 7 A collection of articles on the 
history of Western philosophy, selected and edited by Motrosilova, that appeared m Germany 
in 1986, received positive reviews 8 6 8 Philosophers working in IFN were often judged 
favorably In 1988, for example, Ρ V Tulaev, an "amateur-philosopher" from Moscow, 
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mentioned five philosophers whose works, in his opinion, should be published more often — 
four of these were historians of philosophy (Losev, Gulyga, Gajdenko, and MotroSilova), the 
fifth a 'critic of contemporary bourgeois philosophy and sociology" (Davydov) 869 in the late 
1980s, all five completed a shift from historiography and "critique" to historically oriented 
philosophizing 
Losev not only completed his Istonja antiönoj estetiki, but also posthumously showed 
his "real face" with a voluminous and sympathizing study on VI Solov'ev in 1990, thus 
"symbolically completing his path of encounters with a philosopher whom he loved in this 
youth," having already published, in 1983, "a book, small but with an enormous echo VI 
So/ov'ev,"870 m which he had urged the Soviet readers "to put Solov'ev upside down as Marx 
had done with Hegel" — an instruction to "read between the lines"9871 
Gulyga summarized his earlier studies in classical German philosophy, 872 and turned 
his historical interest into a contemporary one with a collection of essays on subjects ranging 
from the Russian nationalist writer Valentin Savvic Pikul' (1928-1999), whose popularity 
knew no limits in the late 1980s,873 to the question "What is Post-Modemity [Ûto takoe 
posfsovreniennost]9", a text in which he not only condemns "post-modernism" as he sees it 
in, e g , contemporary art,874 but also explicitly turns from history to the present 
History, understood as the investigation of the past, I said must answer three questions The oldest of them 
«What was it like ¡как bylo delo]')» ( ) Also of vital importance is another question «Why did it happen that 
way '» ( ) But most important of all is the third question «What to do [Cto de/af'P» At this point, history goes 
beyond its immediate proper limits, turns to the future, becomes super history, accomplishing a synthesis of 
knowledge and behavior, a transition to practice If modernity loses in the process, the consciousness of its own 
superiority over previous epochs, turns to the past in order to learn, than it can be praised as post-modemity, as 
wise and highest modernity '875 
Davydov republished his earlier, controversial Ëtika ljubvi [11 ш с], and "actualized" 
it with a protest against the publication, under the conditions of glasnost', of a Russian 
translation of Lolita by Vladimir Nabokov, an author slightly less popular than Pikul' 876 He 
and his spouse Gajdenko also turned their earlier, "critical" investigations of the work of the 
"bourgeois" sociologist Max Weber into a plea to use his theory of bureaucracy in the creation 
of a ' work ethic [trudovaja etika]' in the era of perestrojka877 
MotroSilova applied her conception of philosophy, developed in historical studies, to 
the practical situation of the disintegrating USSR it is the "moral responsibility of the historian 
of philosophy"878 that urges her to use great ideas about humanism and civilization from the 
(West buropean) past -Classical Greece, G Bruno, Kant- in an edifying plea for "civilization" 
in the present world [Ch 12 iv] 
Another sestidesjatmk who turned from history of philosophy to actuality is E 
Solov'ev, who published a collection of articles from earlier years under the title Prosloe 
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tolkuet nas [The Past Speaks to Us] Here, it says in the colophon, "in the life and work of 
excellent thinkers of the past .. the author tries to find parallels and prophesies of those acute 
social problems, that were, m the period of stagnation, closed for direct theoretical discus-
sion "879 
What is interesting about this phenomenon is not so much the tum from past to present-
that is what one could expect in the post-Soviet crisis What is significant is that, in each of the 
cases just cited, there is a continuity with their previous work, which substantiates the 
conjecture that these "actual questions" were what their work had been about all the time 8g0 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, "mature" IFN has been analyzed in terms of the conflicting features of 
professionalism, ideological function(s), and of being a "niche" for philosophers who sought 
to address philosophical issues in a historical way. We have seen, first of all, a broadening of 
the material basis, giving access to original sources, limited largely to pre-Marxist philosophy 
and certain ideologically less sensitive areas of "bourgeois" philosophy [ll.i]. Secondly, we 
have pointed out a growing discrepancy between the ideologized official account of history of 
philosophy in vuzovskajafilosofija, and the professionalism and traditionalism of the historical 
instruction of future historians of philosophy [l l.ii]. Thirdly, we have seen the differences in 
quantity, quality, and approach of work in IFN in the six different fields of research [11.iii]. 
And finally, in the period of dissolution of Soviet philosophical culture we have seen the 
disconnection of the features that made IFN [1 l.iv]. As a whole, the historiography practiced 
within IFN displays a mixture of an epistemic and an ideological function that do not forcibly 
exclude each other, but contain a potential conflict. 
With respect to West European pre-Marxist philosophy, there was little occasion for a 
direct ideological mobilization, with the exception of the overall rejection of religiously oriented 
philosophy f 1 l.iü.a]. The indirect ideological function of IFN made the whole historical develop-
ment of Western philosophy until Marx a legitimate field of study [ll.iii.a-b]. Modem, post-
Medieval philosophy offered ample occasion to arrive at a more positive, anti-reductionist 
appreciation of philosophy as it concretely exists and works in a historical situation, and to 
develop Marxist(-Leninist) philosophy through a discussion of its immediate predecessors, 
notably Hegel [ll.iii.b]. The horizontal dichotomization of the history of philosophy into 
philosophy before and after Marx led to a radical opposition of the fields of kritika of bourgeois 
philosophy [ll.iii.cl, and history of Marxist(-Leninist) philosophy [ll.iii.d]. Both fields 
performed primarily an ideological function, and both did so directly and indirectly. The univer-
salism implied by istmat harmonized badly with the ideologically important leading role of the 
Soviet, esp. the Russian people, in the historically inevitable march towards communism. In 
the field of "world philosophy" this tension came to the fore in the contrast between a positive 
appreciation of the philosophical traditions of the East and perfunctory investigations into the 
development of "progressive social thought" [ll.iii.e]. In the field of history of philosophy of 
the Soviet peoples, this tension was heightened by the need to show that all national traditions 
on the territory of the USSR had merged into a single, Soviet philosophy [U.iii.f]. In cases 
where the idea of a parallel development of philosophy in a sequence of historical stages was 
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seriously applied to a local philosophical tradition, as in the example of Georgian Renaissance, 
it immediately showed its critical potential in relation to the "official" Soviet version of 
philosophy's history 
With the exception of philosophical traditions that simply are not studied in Western history of 
philosophy, work in ¡FN may not be taken into serious consideration by Western historians of 
philosophy It is tempting to ascribe this to incapacity on the part of Soviet historians of 
philosophy, or to their being Marxists-Leninists A more balanced judgment, however, must 
recognize that what historians of philosophy produce depends, to a large extent, on their access 
to primary and secondary sources, and m general on their working conditions, and, as a 
specifically Soviet element oí those conditions, on the fact that IFN was supposed to yield 
work that was by definition "Marxist-Leninist" This was a foimal condition of legitimacy, and 
to the extent to which it is easier to determine what is nor Marxist-Leninist, but "bourgeois-
objectivist", ' metaphysical ', "revisionist", "relativist", or "irrationalist", etc , Soviet historians 
were essentially blocked in their work 
The question of the importance of Soviet work in the field of history of philosophy 
should not be judged with regard to its possible contribution to Western philosophy, but 
mainly with respect to its value withm Soviet philosophical culture One should not disregard 
as unimportant works by Soviet historians of philosophy because they fall short of Western 
standards Conversely, one should not, from the Soviet reputation of a given author, jump to 
the conclusion of its universal value If, for example, Bakradze's Sistema ι metod ν filosofa 
Gegelja is, by Western standards, a merely adequate account, heavily drawing on German 
sources, this does not exclude the enormous importance of such an account, esp on Hegel, in 
the Soviet context By the same token, one should be careful in inducing the universal value of 
Losev's studies into classical Greek philosophy from his formidable status in the USSR it will 
only be after his works are carefully read by specialists that a well-founded scholarly apprecia­
tion can be given Which, again, does not alter his significance within Soviet philosophical 
culture 
The importance of IFN comes to the fore at three points In the first place, in the 
increasing familiarity with philosophy's past and with contemporary non-Soviet 
philosophy 8 8 1 Secondly, in the sophistication of elements of diamat and istmatvia a historical 
discussion of, e g , Hegel, West European philosophy in "the epoch of early bourgeois 
revolutions," Georgian Renaissance philosophy, or Karl Popper Thirdly, in a tendential 
relativization of main tenets of the "ideology of Soviet philosophy inasmuch as it was 
buttressed by a story about the history of philosophy All three points must be seen as cases of 
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the inner development of Soviet philosophical culture, taking place to the extent to which the 
situation of Soviet philosophical culture allowed their development. A permanent factor in that 
situation was, as I have shown, the "ideology of Soviet philosophy" [Ch. 8 and Ch.9]. 
Consequently, the developments just indicated had to be accounted for in terms of the 
ideology of Soviet philosophy (including IFN), which implies, among others, that its 
differentiation and potential conflict with official philosophy had to be systematically blurred. 
IFN was a place where the dogmatic foundation of the philosophy of Marxism(-Leninism) 
could be and was loosened up: the basic question, touching at the very heart of diamat, the 
concomitant dichotomization of philosophical positions into two "camps", the opposition of 
"system" and "method", received a serious relativization in the hands of Soviet historians of 
philosophy. At the same time, these dogma's could only be relativized by being simultaneously 
stressed. Maggots eat on the inner, not the outer side. This explains the ambiguous nature of 
Soviet theory of the history of philosophy, the primary function whereof was to accommodate 
the different and conflicting functions and features of IFN into the framework of Soviet 
philosophy. 
The fact that Soviet philosophy conceived of itself as the result of the development of 
philosophy, understood as a single process, led to a "Hegelian" view of philosophy's past. 
This "totalizing trend" regards all philosophy as the genesis of a single philosophical truth 
(diamat and istmat). This urged IFN to yield a complete account of that genesis, which led to a 
legitimate investigation of all past philosophy, which, due to the level of facticity and 
complexity of the historical material, stimulated the development of historiography as a 
professional discipline. In this sense, in the development of IFN as a specialist, professional 
discipline within the framework of Soviet philosophy, three interests came together: the interest 
of "official" philosophy in a historical reconstruction of philosophy's past, the interest of 
professional historians of philosophy in studying the past irrespective of possible present use, 
and the interest of Soviet philosophers who "escaped" to IFN because here they could address 
issues that were colonized by official philosophy. As has become clear, the coincidence of 
these three interests was not without tension. To control this tension was a main task of the sub-
discipline of IFN that I shall discuss in the next chapter: Soviet theory of the history of 
philosophy. 
*** 
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CHAPTER TWELVE 
Soviet Theory of the History of Philosophy: The Hegelian Turn 
" involvement with Hegel is the best cure for the hereditary weaknesses of 
Soviet philosophy 882 
Τ J Blakeley, 1975 
This last chapter brings together lines from the preceding chapters in a critical analysis of 
Soviet theory of the history of philosophy Two questions organize this chapter The first is 
about the merits of the positions under discussion, both their "purely theoretical" contribution 
to an understanding of philosophy's historical nature, and their "applied" value with respect to 
an understanding of the 'Soviet philosophical phenomenon" The other question is why theory 
of the history of philosophy was such an important part of Soviet philosophical culture and 
why one position, viz the theoretical conception of Ojzerman and Bogomolov was favored by 
the situation ofthat philosophical culture 
With respect to the first question, the feature that makes these Soviet theories interesting 
is that they departed from a philosophical position -historical materialism- that robs philosophy 
of its proper history [Ch 8 >1, and that further, in its Leninist politicalization, treats philosophy 
as a main ideological battleground [Ch 8 и] At the same time, these conceptions existed in a 
situation that assigned prime significance to diamat and ïstmM as true philosophical theory 
[Ch 7 m, and Ch 8] This explains why the tension within the heritage of the klassiki with respect 
to the history of philosophy [Ch 101] was tendentially resolved m favor of a totalizing view 
Western conceptions of the history of philosophy tend to depart from a notion of 
philosophy as "pure" theory, dealing with the absolute or eternal problems, concreticized, 
histoncized, and individualized in a multitude of systems and positions, ι e they move from 
the universal to the particular, or to stick to a reduction of the concrete nature of philosophy to 
some particular characteristic From both perspectives, history of philosophy does not really 
present an inteiest from the first perspective, philosophy's history is merely its outer 
appearance in time and space, and from the second perspective it is not the history of 
philosophy itself, but, e g , the history of ideas, class-struggle, psychology, libidinal 
economy, sexual difference, or world-views Soviet theory of the history of philosophy did 
not escape this dilemma either, but it is theoretically interesting because it moved from a simple 
reduction to a fuller appreciation of the concrete nature of philosophy The sophisticated 
mainstream position recognized that it must, after all, be philosophy that exists concretely, and 
so it elaborated an understanding of the relationship between the "inner" and 'outer" history of 
philosophy — the problem Hegel was dealing with [Ch 2 м ш] 
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As to the second question, the answer is twofold On the one hand, any philosophical 
culture, as it exists through a stretch of time, will develop a historical awareness and contain, 
as one of its component parts, a history of philosophy, and some theoretical conception of 
philosophy s history [Ch 2 ш] On the other hand, such a theoretical conception can perform an 
ideological function in motivating people's actions (telling them, e g , that they continue a great 
tradition) or legitimizing a status quo (e g, the place occupied by philosophy in society) 
[Ch ι M] As shall become clear, Soviet theory of the history of philosophy did perform this 
ideological function 
Soviet philosophy was the result of a gradual process of subordination of philosophy to 
its ideological function [Ch 4| Once established, Soviet philosophical culture improved through 
the "declassification" of certain fields of theoretical work and the development of relatively 
independent philosophical disciplines, one of them being IFN [Ch 5] This development took 
place within the framework of Soviet philosophical culture, which favored theories that could 
accommodate and keep together its different parts the 'sophisticated mainstream" position was 
successful because it performed these tasks, which also explains why it lost its central position 
when Soviet philosophical culture dissolved [Ch 6, Ch 11 iv, and 12 iv] 
All Soviet theories about philosophy's history were by definition Marxist-Leninist As I 
have argued, Marxism-Leninism was the universal medium of legitimacy in the USSR, and for 
that reason it comprised a ' meta-ideological" theory about Marxism(-Leninism) that claimed 
that the philosophical system of diamat and istmat was its theoretical foundation [Ch 7] 
Consequently, an important element of the Soviet system was an "ideology of Soviet 
philosophy", based on the notions of partijnost', naucnost' and sistemnost', related, in 
historical perspective, to the "basic question of philosophy" and the "revolution" in 
philosophy's history [Ch 8] As we shall see, one way to give the resulting simplification of 
philosophy's history a less absolute and dogmatic status was to show the historical nature of 
these very notions This was a way of addressing the "basic question ' colonized by official 
diamat and istmat, as well as the primary meta-philosophical question "What is philosophy1" 
[Ch9] 
Coming to IFN proper, the task of theory of the history of philosophy resided, first of 
all, in the accommodation of the threefold classical heritage [Ch 101] In the second place, it had 
to reduce the tension between the reductionism implied by istmat and the actual importance 
ascribed to philosophy as a "productive force" m shaping history and as an ideological 
battleground, a tension that found a first expression in the "double statement" [Ch 10 n] In the 
third place, it had to account for the place of IFN as part of the Soviet system of philosophical 
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disciplines [Ch.lO.iii]. The main task of this theory, finally, was to mediate between Soviet 
philosophical culture as a whole and IFN as it actually existed [Ch. 11]. 
Soviet theory of the history of philosophy thus serves as a key to understanding Soviet 
philosophical culture as a whole. To this end, the present chapter is divided into four sections: 
the first section sketches the evolution of this sub-discipline of IFN [12.i]; the second section 
offers a systematic exposition of Soviet theory of the history of philosophy, based on the 
dominant sophisticated mainstream position of Ojzerman and Bogomolov [ 12.Π]; a third section 
shows how this position meant a return from Marx to Hegel, and answers the obvious question 
why that turn took place [I2.iii]; the fourth section, finally, discusses some "alternative" 
conceptions of philosophy's history in the period of perestrojka and glasnost', partly compen­
sating for the flaws in the sophisticated position, partly drawing its implicit consequences 
[12.ivl. 
12.i Development and Differentiation of Soviet Theory of the History of 
Philosophy 
The "official position" present in the intervention by ¿danov in 1947 could not provide the 
basis of a historiography of philosophy with a sufficient level of professionalism and 
adequacy, as is testified by the actual failure to yield such a history in the following period 
[Ch.lO.ii.d]. Given the need to improve the quality of Soviet philosophy and the urge among 
philosophers to engage in philosophical discussion [Ch.9.iii], part of the activity of Soviet 
historians of philosophy had to consist in "loosening up" this initial position, either by 
elaborating alternative positions, evading the official one as far as possible, or by relativizing 
elements of the classical heritage or the connection between them. 
I venture the hypothesis that many Soviet historians of philosophy did indeed probe 
these possibilities, and that such attempts were limited not by their intellectual capacities or their 
competence as historians, but by the very nature of "Soviet philosophy". Whether or not these 
historians were "convinced Marxist" is a question of secondary importance: those who were 
would choose the second road, those who were not would follow the first possibility. In either 
case, however, they had to act as Marxist-Leninist historians of philosophy, i.e. they had to 
legitimize their own activity in terms of the "ideology of Soviet philosophy" fCh.8.iii]. 
The "classical" dichotomization of the history of philosophy into two camps can not 
serve as a basis to write an account of the history of philosophy as a whole. The opposition 
idealism-materialism is not void of meaning — what is wrong is its inflation into the sole 
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opposition that governs the entire history of philosophy. As the subsequent attempts at a 
universal Istorija filosofii show [Ch.IO.ii.b-d], the result is inevitably one-sided and artificial. 
The same applies to the division without remainder of philosophy into progressive and 
reactionary positions. It is not at all absurd to hold that philosophical controversies are related 
to social and political struggle, nor is it absurd to hold that this relation is a "determinant" in the 
historical development of philosophy: what is wrong is to claim that philosophy's history is 
ultimately explicable in such terms. Thus, Soviet historiography of philosophy, in its practical 
execution, was hindered rather than helped by the "official position", and attempted to evade 
the latter as much as possible [Ch.lO.ii.e, Ch.l l.ii, and Ch.l l.iii.a-c]. 
From the early 1960s onwards attempts were made to develop a more sophisticated and 
workable conception of the history of philosophy. This rather specialist field of philosophical 
work has been quite productive: a bibliography of 1983 of "Soviet literature on theory and 
methodology of investigations in history of philosophy" lists 311 entries, and the number of 
publications has grown considerably over the following decade.g83 In this development, two 
lines can be discerned. One line was to sophisticate the "official position" into a theory that at 
the same time i) would be philosophically plausible or arguable, ii) would do justice to the 
relative independence of 1FN, and iii) would be compatible with the "ideology of Soviet 
philosophy", substantiating the subordination of philosophy to its ideological function, or at 
least not challenging it. The other line was the attempt to found IFNtheoretically as a discipline 
in its own right, with its own status and its proper history, rather than as a branch of an 
allegedly systematic Marxist-Leninist philosophy. 
Since history of philosophy is both a philosophical and a historical discipline, the first 
line is an attempt to establish IFN as a philosophical discipline, the second a stress on its 
historical nature. Both try to remedy or counteract the "ideologization" of IFN as part of Soviet 
philosophy. This, however, does not exclude that they both performed an ideological function 
in legitimizing IFN as a part of Soviet philosophical culture. The first attempt can be associated 
with the name of Hegel, and meant a return to the philosophical roots of Marxism. In the 
present chapter, Ojzerman and Bogomolov represent this trend. The second can not so easily 
be associated with a single name: it must rather be seen as the striving to "do" history of 
philosophy without embracing a particular philosophical position, and in this sense it is 
opposed to the hegelianizing trend. It is exemplified by, e.g., Sokolov, who in 1969 professed 
his opposition to the "hegelianizing" tendency ,884 and to the "official position": 
"The analysis of ihe mutual relation of philosophy and ideology is one of the most complicated tasks of the 
historian of philosophy. It has to be partly recognized, that philosophical doctrines, in the period of their 
genesis, as well as in their later functioning in the epoch of Marxism, are on the whole rarely connected with 
one specific class.'*885 
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The two lines can be traced through the development of theory of history of philosophy 
from the 1960s onwards A complication is the fact that the two strands could not develop 
freely within the framework of Soviet philosophy Theory of the history of philosophy had to 
be "collectively and creatively developed" The contrast between the two lines became manifest 
during the period of decay and dissolution ot Soviet philosophy [12 iv] Both lines conflicted 
with the "official' Marxist-Leninist conception, but both had to obscure that conflict in order 
not to destroy the unity of Soviet philosophy In what follows, I shall distinguish an official, a 
sophisticated, and a professionals position 
These three positions are token positions rather than "schools", because they ensue from the 
position of IFN within Soviet philosophy The official position reflects the subordination of 
philosophy to ideology, the professionalis! position stands for the attempt to evade that 
subordination in order to render Soviet philosophy, including its account of philosophy's past, 
more credible and teachable, and the sophisticated position reflects the tension between 
subordination and professionalism Although the official position remained intact m textbooks 
and the like, the sophisticated position gained the upper hand, thus becoming a "sophisticated 
official position" or "mainstream position" In this respect, the "sophisticators" (Ojzerman in 
the first place) were successful, but they had to take into account the tension between the 
official and their own position The professionals position, finally, was about as implicit in 
histonographical practice, as the official position was intellectually sterile Therefore, the 
present chapter concentrates on the sophisticated position, set off against the official position 
and against the background of increasing professionalîsrn 
Soviet theory of history of philosophy performed the following functions in Soviet philosophi-
cal culture [Ch 1 in, Ch 8 ι, Ch 9 i, and Ch 10 ι] 
1 an epistemic function [Fl], namely the development of a theory of philosophy as a 
historical phenomenon, which included 
a a historiography of the history of philosophy as a discipline, 
b an appropriation of non-Soviet theory of the history of philosophy in the form 
of a kritikd bur/uaznoj ¡stoni filosofa, 
с a systematic historical self-conception of Soviet philosophy, explaining the 
emergence of a true philosophical system out of history, 
2 an ideological function [F7], in developing a "story" that shows the superiority of 
Marxist-Leninistphilosophy, 
3 a technical function [F5], in the sense of a methodology, didactic, etc of IFN as a 
discipline, 
4 an infra-ideological function [F7], legitimizing the actual state of IFN\n terms of the 
ideology ot Soviet philosophy, and accounting for its various functions 
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Three of these functions were performed by recognizable subdisciplines within the theoretical 
part of IFN[la, lb, and 3 (Ch.lO.iii)], which means that the remaining actual theory of the 
history of philosophy presented a combination of the remaining systematic, ideological, and 
infra-ideological functions [lc, 2, and 4]. Being functions, and not subdisciplines or currents 
within IFN, they could be performed simultaneously by one and the same text, discussion, or 
author. They are of prime importance, however, as they can help us understand why this field 
of Soviet philosophy could be both prosperous and ambiguous, not only at the same time, but 
even for the same reason, namely because it was situated between historiographical practice 
and the "system" of Soviet philosophy. Force is weakness: the reason why IFN was one of the 
most prosperous parts of Soviet philosophy is the reason why theory of the history of 
philosophy reached its limit of development. To make this sound less dramatic: the same 
paradox will arise in any case where history of philosophy is approached from a specific 
philosophical position without that position itself being allowed to develop. But, to make it 
sound more dramatic: in the case of IFN the development of the philosophical position from 
which it originated was limited by its linkage to a political system in which ideology was 
compensatory for force [Ch.S.iii]. 
The Beginnings of Soviet Theory of the History of Philosophy 
The early history of Soviet theory of the history of philosophy 886 was briefly sketched by 
Viktor Arsen'eviô Malínin (b. 1921): 
"In the 1920-30S, history of philosophy was usually treated as the history of the most essential questions of 
knowledge in the struggle of materialism with idealism. In 1946, G.F. Aleksandrov... proposed... that «the 
history of philosophy is the progressive, rising development of man's knowledge about the world surrounding 
him». This definition was, at the time of the philosophical discussion of 1947, criticized by A.A. Zdanov, and 
rejected, Zdanov proposed a definition of scientific history of philosophy as «the history of the origin, rise, and 
development of the scientific materialist world-view and its laws. In so far as materialism rose and developed in 
a struggle with idealist tendencies, the history of philosophy is the history of the struggle of materialism with 
idealism, too». (...) In the 1950s it was noted, that... on a more precise meaning of this definition, the history 
of idealism, of positivism, of religious-philosophical tendencies and the like in itself does not interest the 
history of philosophy [as a discipline, EvdZ], and the latter is only interested in these forms in as far as 
materialism struggles with them. At the end of the 1950s - beginning of the 1960s other interpretations of the 
subject-matter of philosophy acquired right of existence. According to one of them [Ioviuk, EvdZ], «the subject-
matter of Marxist history of philosophy as a science is the rise and development, in the various stages of the 
history of society, of philosophical doctrines, that consider the general foundations (laws) of being and thought 
and offer one or the other solution of the main question of philosophy.. .».""87 
Systematic interest in theoretical questions of IFN thus began in the early 1960s. At that 
time, there already was an established tradition of Soviet historiography of philosophy 
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[Ch 1011 b-c] 888 There further was an "official position" on the history of philosophy, aptly 
summarized by Ballestrem in 1963 
"Soviet philosophy provides an explicit theory explaining what 'history of philosophy as a science should be 
It should follow the general Marxist Leninist conception of history and of philosophy history mainly 
consists in the evolution of society through the struggle between progressive and reactionary classes, as 
expressed in historical materialism Philosophy is a form of social consciousness To the basic question of 
philosophy only two answers arc possible — materialism and idealism The method of philosophy can be cither 
dialectical or metaphysical Consequently the history of philosophy is the battle between progressive and 
reactionary, materialism and idealism dialectics and metaphysics in the different periods of history ' 8 8 ' 
This conception was not satisfactory, and the beginning of theoretical discussion 
coincides with the establishment of IFN as a distinct, "relatively independent" specialist 
discipline [Ch 10 u d] In 1960, the department of history of Marxist-Leninist philosophy at the 
philosophical faculty of MGU organized a special course and seminar on methodological 
questions of IFN, led by Iovöuk (chairman of the department) and Lev Vladimirovic Skvorcóv 
(b 1931) 
The participants are post graduates [aspjraniy] and students of the fourth and fifth year The task of the 
special course is to prepare students for work as a scientific researcher in the field of the history of philosophy 
and the critique of bourgeois conceptions of the history of philosophy The themes of the special course cover 
the following problems the subject matter, method and significance of history of philosophy as a science, the 
characteristic features of the contemporary bourgeois philosophies of neo positivism, existentialism, neo 
Thomism neo realism critical realism, and phenomenology with respect to the historical heritage of 
philosophy, the critique of contemporary revisionism in the history of philosophy (G Lukács H Lcfèvre, E 
Bloch e a ), the problem of western and eastern thought in contemporary history of philosophy "890 
This in fact is a fairly complete list of the problems that Soviet theory of the history of 
philosophy would be dealing with m years to come The central task, however, was that of 
founding IFN as a specialist discipline within the framework of Marxist-Leninist philosophy 
Here the three token positions, singled out above, appear as a struggle between "party-
philosophers" like Iovcuk, defending the official position, "real historians" like Asmus or 
Kamenskij, defending the professionalise position, and a sop/iiAiJcafed"party-philosopher" like 
Ojzerman, playing an intermediary role in trying to develop the official view 
This struggle must not be "vulgarized" into a mere conflict between interest groups 
Such an element was certainly present, but it arose irom the fact that both "party-philosophers" 
and professional historians of philosophy represented objective interests of Soviet philosophy 
[Ch 9 in] The need to create and improve the historical image of Marxist-Leninist philosophy 
implied the need to investigate the history of philosophy, and thus the establishment of a 
professional discipline, capable of providing the required material This discipline in tum had 
to be demonstrably Marxist-Leninist, both in order to legitimize what was actually done, and in 
order to testify the superiority of Marxist-Leninist philosophy over bourgeois philosophy and 
revisionist Marxism The positive results of IFN had to be the results of its being Marxist-
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Leninist (esp if in fact they were the result of its being as little Marxist-Leninist as possible) 
Soviet theory of the history of philosophy stood between Soviet philosophy as it was 
ideologicallylegitimized, and the historiography of philosophy as it was actually practiced by 
Soviet specialists in that field on the other hand 
The Emergence of Questioni and Positions 
The 1960s showed a growing awareness and explication of a set of questions, in which 
Lenin's Filosofskie tetrady, with their positive appreciation of Hegel's Lectures , played an 
important role 8 9 1 Surveying publications from this period, we can single out the following 
themes, discussed at the large symposium on history of philosophy in 1967,892 and gathered 
in the main result of this first phase, Lenmum ι sovremennye problemy istonko-fìlosofskoj 
nauki [Leninism and Contemporary Problems of Scientific History of Philosophy] 893 
- investigations into the relevant heritage of the klassiki marksizma-lemmzma (and 
Plechanov),894 
- an interest in the history of the history of philosophy as a discipline,895 
- an exploration into problems of methodology^ 
- an initiative towards a "meta-theory" of ¡FNas a discipline,89? 
- exercises in critical assimilation of non-Soviet, esp 'bourgeois" history of philosophy,898 
- attempts at a philosophical conception of philosophy's history 899 
In the 1970s "the need for generalizing work is felt,"900 and these years showed a few attempts 
at a broader synthesis (while more detailed studies continued),90i as well as a beginning 
differentiation of positions 902 As to the 1980s, five positions can be empirically distinguished, 
the first three of which coincide with the "token positions" distinguished above 
ι a dogmatic official position, in which there was little or no development 903 it simply 
repeated the familiar tenets about the "basic question", the principle of partijnost', the 
' revolution in philosophy" etc 904 
u a sophisticated position, having its chief représentants in Ojzerman, akademik and 
director of the sektor of "History of West European and American philosophy" of the 
IF, and Bogomolov, a leading historian of philosophy at MGU,905 and finding its 
expression in a series of publications, esp in a trilogy by Ojzerman and a jointly 
written Osnovy tcoru istonko-filosofskogo processa [Foundations of a Theory of the 
Historical Process of Philosophy] (1983),906 
in a professionahst undercurrent, closely linked to histonographical practice, this line can 
be associated with names like Asmus, Sokolov, or Kamenskij,907 
lv a number of alternative positions on partial questions, not developed into overall 
views,908 
ν one isolated alternative position, viz the position of Losev 909 
Of these five positions, the first was intellectually sterile, and the fifth, though influential, was 
not directly related to the task of developing a defensible Soviet position The following 
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exposition of Soviet theory of the history of philosophy therefore revolves around positions ii, 
iii, and iv. 
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12.Ü Soviet Theory of the History of Philosophy: A Systematic Exposition 
In the 1980s, the sophisticated position elaborated by Ojzerman and Bogomolov acquired the 
status of "received view".9io Their conception represents a synthesis of a "sophisticated 
Marxist-Leninist" conception of the history of philosophy as a process, and a historical and 
methodological foundation of/FN as a discipline: 
"The organic bond of positive philosophical (most of all methodological) elaborations, of A S Bogomolov with 
investigations into the history of philosophy is excellently demonstrated by the book, written jointly by him 
and äkadcmik Τ I Ojzerman, The appearance of this book can be regarded as an event of first-rank importance 
in our scientific history of philosophy, because such a thorough and profound investigation of this theme, of 
utmost importance for the historian of philosophy, had not been done so far " 9 1 · 
In 1969, Ojzerman made the illuminating remark that "the subject-matter of histonco-
philosophical investigations is philosophy, the problems of IFN are philosophical 
problems " 9 1 2 Malinin commented this "probably most concise definition of the subject-matter 
of philosophy in... Soviet philosophical literature" with the remark that "Ojzerman, probably, 
purposely resorted to a tautological form of expression of a generally true idea,"9i3 and 
Ojzerman himself held these theses to be "fully evident, but... nevertheless in need of 
demonstration.. " 9 | 4 According to Malinin the statement was directed against a recent Soviet 
tendency of "boundless broadening of the subject-matter of investigations m history of 
philosophy "915 Malinin and Ojzerman departed from the basic assumption that philosophy 
has, to a certain extent at least, a proper history and that philosophy is historical in some 
relevant sense, and from the assumption that history of philosophy as a distinct discipline was, 
if not already a fact, a desideratum of Soviet philosophy. 
Obviously, any history of philosophy presupposes a conception of philosophy's 
history (as a process). It is equally obvious that such a history only makes sense, if 
philosophy's history to some extent is independent, ι e if philosophy has a specific nature. 
The first question, therefore, of any theory of the history of philosophy has to be, therefore, 
the question "What is philosophy?"91^ The combination with the historical aspect leads to the 
following set of questions-
1 What is philosophy9 
2. Why is philosophy historical? 
3 What exactly is the history of philosophy? 
a What is history of philosophy the history of7 
b. Where does this history begin, and why9 
с Where does it end or lead to9 
4 How does philosophy develop historically: which are the mechanism or determinations at 
play, and how "necessary" is this development9 
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The answer to this fourth question forms a theoretical conception of philosophy as a historical 
phenomenon [philosophy of the history of philosophy], from which a theory of history of 
philosophy as a discipline can be derived 
5 How is history of philosophy to be done, and how has it been done so far (methodology, 
didactic, history of history of philosophy)7 
Finally, the theoretical conception forms the basis of a critique of other rustonographical 
practices and theoretical conceptions 
6 Why are other theoretical conceptions mistaken7 
I will use this scheme of questions m the following analysis of Soviet theory of the history of 
philosophy as a complex of problems Soviet philosophers working in this field had to address 
However, it must be bome in mind that the central problem remained that of founding IFN as a 
specialist discipline within the framework of Marxist-Leninist philosophy 
1 What is Philosophy'' 
The ' meta-philosophical" question "What is philosophy9" is a fundamental and inevitable 
question of philosophy as self-determining thought [Ch 11], that occupies, implicitly or 
explicitly, a central place m any philosophical culture It did so in Soviet philosophical culture, 
where, as we have seen, official Soviet philosophy gave a dogmatic answer to this question 
[Ch 8 i-n] Consequently, it could only be indirectly addressed, e g in the "marginal", 
performative way of Mamardasvili [Ch 9 a], or in a historical perspective It is not surprising, 
therefore, that Ojzerman's first mam publication in this field, РгоЫету ¡stonko-filosofskoj 
nduki [Problems of the Scientific History of Philosophy] (1969, reissued 1982) was welcomed 
as "m fact, the first attempt at a systematic exposition of a Marxist «meta-philosophy» "9 1 7 
A historical conception of philosophy lies at the heart both of "meta-philosophy" and of IFN, 
as Ojzerman made very clear 
' a limitation of the concept of philosophy to its contemporary set of problems can not be the basis of a 
delimtion of philosophy because what interests us as philosophers (and as historians of philosophy) is not only 
what philosophy became as the result of its development but also what it was during all of its history This 
does not mean that we want, so to speak to return in a roundabout way to the idea rejected by us, of an 
immutable essence of philosophy Our task rather consists in dissecting [vyôlcnit'] those fairly numerous in our 
opinion specific characteristics [speci/ices/ae ргі7пакі\ of philosophy that allow to understand philosophy in 
its development 918 
An important consequence of this historical understanding of philosophy is that it 
would be inappropriate to project the main concern of dialectical materialism, through which it 
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determines itself as a position, onto philosophy's history. Hence, the basic question of 
philosophy and the basic question of IFN do not coincide: 
"The fundamental question of philosophy is, in the final analysis, the question of the relation of the spiritual to 
the material. Since by far not all philosophers accept this thesis, it is impossible not to reflect upon [nelVjane 
¿adumat'sja] the question, why precisely this constitutes the fundamental philosophical question. We think that 
the main question of IFN is the question «what is philosophy'» (. .) From this, it seems to us, indisputably 
follows this conclusion, the most important problem of IFN is the problem of philosophy."9'9 
After discussing ten different conceptions of philosophy, Ojzerman first states that it is 
impossible to synthesize them all, but that it is possible to unite several of them, viz. the ones 
indicated with odd numbers, often by combining them with their opposites (indicated with even 
numbers): 920 
1 "philosophy is the doctrine of being as such" 2 "philosophy is a doctrine not of being, but of 
(Aristotle, (Neo-)Thomism, Hobbes) knowledge" (Buddhism, Hume, Kant, positivism) 
3 "philosophy is a doctrine of everything that 4. "philosophy is a doctrine of everything that does 
exists" (Hegel, Feuerbach) not exist, but is opposed to being as an ideal or 
value" (Windelband, Husserl) 
5 "philosophy is a theory, ι e. a system of 6 "philosophy is not a theory, but a practice, that 
representations, concepts, knowledge, or has a function, not a subject-matter" (Witt-
mclhod, related to (some) reality as its genstein, neo-positivism) 
subject-matter" (almost all philosophers) 
7. "philosophy is a science, or at least can and 8. "philosophy is not, nor can or should it be a 
should be one" (Aristotle, Descartes, science" (skepticism, Popper, Ayer, irrationalism 
Hobbes, Kant, Hegel, Husserl) (BerdjaevMarcel)) 
9 "philosophy is a world-view" (Dilthey, 10. "philosophy is not a world-view, either because 
Jaspers) it is a science, or because science should found 
world-view" (Vienna Circle) 
Behind this "limited diversity of definitions" Ojzerman perceives an "unlimited diversity of 
philosophical doctrines."921 Although some of these conceptions may "be approaching 
objective truth, while another (or others), on the contrary, move away from it," truth, 
Ojzerman recognizes, "does not, in philosophy, enjoy unanimous recognition, which is 
explained by many causes, including epistemologica! ones: this truth can not be verified by 
experimental or any other relatively simple means."922 Therefore, the "crying pluralism of 
definitions of the concept of philosophy"923 must be seen as an effect of the "increasing 
divergence of philosophical conceptions," as a "historically limited form of coming-to-be 
[stanovleme], of the development of philosophy," and it is only if we recognize "the possibility 
and necessity of overcoming it," that we can "arrive at such an definition of the concept of 
philosophy... that expresses the perspectives of development of scientific philosophy."92* 
Thanks to these perspectives, the problem finally is resolved vigorously: 
"Leaving the motley diversity ¡pestroc mnogoobrazie] ot incompatible philosophical doctrines behind, Marxist-
Leninist philosophy opposes to the pluralism of speculative conceptions the all-sided [ vsestoronnee] 
development of philosophical positions, corroborated [podrver/daemye] by life, practice, and science " 9 2 5 
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Ojzerman thus manoeuvred himself into a position that obliged him to develop a brodd 
conception of philosophy as it develops historically, while at the same time it had to account for 
the alleged superiority of the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism Ojzerman's solution was, to 
say the least, cunning His definition consists of several layers, and with each new layer he 
gets closer to his goal bach philosophy is, first of all, a form of world view, playing an 
integrating, orientating role 92f> But in contrast with a religious world-view, it is a "general 
theoretical world-view, founded by means of fundamental, generally scientific [оЬЧёепаиспуё\, 
most general categories "927 it is marked by "bipolarity [ bipolar'nost] ', viz a position 
between "on the one hand, the world and, on the other, man himself, who does not exist 
outside the world and perceives it as an outer world only because he distinguishes it from 
himself as a reality that exists independently of himself, realizing at the same time that he 
himself is part of that world "928 The relation man-world is a restatement of the "basic 
question" about the relation of the spiritual to the material, both as the "psycho-physical 
problem [the first aspect of the basic question, EvdZ]" and as the question whether "man, 
mankind can know the world [the second aspect]," and "philosophy as a particular kind of 
world-view is equally a conception of the world and a conception of man, knowledge of one 
and of the other, and a particular means of generalizing that knowledge, which has the meaning 
of a social, moral, theoretical orientation m the world outside us, and m our own world "929 
When he adds the orientation on science and on historical experience and social 
practice, and stresses their unity, Ojzerman already is speaking of Marxist philosophy, as is 
perceptible in a shift to characteristic langue de bois 
"The scientific philosophical world view develops through a theoretical synthesis of scientific data and the 
historical experience Irom determinate social partisan [partijnye] positions, which enter the content of the 
philosophical world view, (orm its social pathos, its moral ideal This world view is a critical summing-up 
[кгшёс кое podytoZcnie] of scientific data which allows to draw conclusions not immediately contained in any 
particular science 930 
In this manner, Ojzerman arrived at a conception of philosophy broad enough to 
include everything philosophical within the scope of IFN, yet allowing to assert the qualitative 
difference between philosophy before and after Marx 
"The scientific philosophical world view of Marxism is d radical dialectical negation of philosophy in the old 
meaning of the term, ι e of that philosophy which could not find the ways of rational comprehension of the 
facts of science and practice in order to serve with rights equal to those of the sciences not pretending to any 
privilege the theoretical knowledge and practical transformation of the world 911 
Regardless of the display of orthodoxy, Ojzerman's definition clears the way for a 
study of philosophy's past (at least until the rise ot Marxism) that regards it as a both practice-
oriented and theoretical field of human activity, yielding knowledge, and not as a mere 
487 
Chapter 12 Sov¡et Theory of the History ot Philosophy The Hegelian Turn 
battlefield of ideological struggle Science was, in the Soviet perception, not a form of 
ideology, but an increasingly important productive force [Ch 81] Consequently, to the extent to 
which philosophy is scientific, it is ideologically "neutral" Thus Ojzerman's definition 
legitimizes IFN as a discipline that is about philosophy It became the mainstream position 
because it did so while staying in tune with the ideology of Soviet philosophy 
Yet, this position was not unchallenged In a survey of 1986, it is mentioned along with 
several alternative positions 932 
ι philosophy is a general (as opposed to specific), theoretically founded (in contrast with 
non-theoretical) world-view (Overman, Bogomolov), 
и philosophy is a systematic rational world-view, having both an objective (the historical 
process of philosophy) and a subjective (its description and investigation) side (Arsenij 
Nikolaeviö Canysev (b 1926))933, 
in philosophy is the science of the universal [vseobscee], of uni versais and general laws 
(Kamenskij)9345 
IV philosophy is the science about "the dialectic of the subjective and the objective, 
consciousness and being," or about the relation man-world (Mark Vasil'eviC ¿elnov (b 
1927))935 
ν philosophy, or in any case its 'logical core [sterzen] ' is "the history of knowledge, 
summarizing itself in the development of categories" (M G Makarov)936; 
vi the position of Losev 937 
With the exception of Losev's position, the others were not incompatible with the mainstream 
position of Ojzerman and Bogomolov, but either not fully elaborated (positions и and ш ), or 
only partial, highlighting aspects or elements of the mainstream position (positions îv and 
ν ) 938 As ztelnov said in his survey of Soviet positions 
The conceptions of Soviet philosophers of «ihc subject matter of philosophy» can be conditionally subdivided 
into three or four groups We say conditionally because the représentants of different views themselves as a rule 
do not want to be «subdivided» at all and will doubtless protest against such attempts ( ) Therefore we make 
the proviso that the subdivision proposed is conditional and sees as its task only to bring out theoretically the 
inner potencies, the hidden tendencies,, manifesting themselves in Soviet philosophical literature lately "939 
¿elnov himself explicitly presents his conception as an elaboration of the position of 
Ojzerman, who had singled out three fundamental themes of philosophy "that of the object-
substance, that of the subject, and the relation subject-object,"940 and then develops his own 
conception of the subject-matter of philosophy, according to which philosophy is basically 
about the subject-object relation "the «subject-matter of philosophy» is the objectivelyexistmg 
relation of the subjective and the objective "Mi 
What is noticeable in these alternative positions is the fact that they all mtensifíed Ojzerman's 
stress on the epistemic function of philosophy, on its being a form of knowledge with its 
proper subject-matter, at the expense of the ideological function included in the definition of 
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philosophy as a form of world-view Further, they returned with Ojzerman to a fairly 
traditional conception of philosophy the main metaphysical tradition in European philosophy, 
including its "epistemological tum in Descartes and Kant 942 In presenting the "problem of 
subject-object reality" as "in our opinion, the most important theme of philosophy",943 
Ojzerman came as close to German idealism as a Soviet philosopher could get944 
In the survey just referred to, Kamenskij's distinction of history of philosophy as, a) a process 
(the objective history of CanySev), b) a historiography, and c) a science, also is mentioned 
[Ch 10 m] 941 Here we touch upon the professionahstundcrcuirent in IFN If it is possible to 
distinguish between a historiography of philosophy and a science of the historical process of 
philosophy, it is clear that only the second has to be part of the framework of the "scientific 
philosophy of Marxism Leninism Historiography can become a philosophically neutral affair, 
or at least one that is not permanently required to testify its Marxist-Leninist nature The 
undercurrent was represented by those Soviet historians of philosophy whose main activity 
was, indeed, historiographie Their conception of the ' historical process or philosophy" thus 
remains implicit, e g in Sokolov [Ch 11 u], who stressed the autonomy of "spiritual culture" and 
regarded science, theology, and philosophy as ' the three fundamental cultural forces", together 
determining the history of 15th, 16th, and 17th century philosophy 946 
2 Why Does Philosophy Hdve a History? 
The existence of history of philosophy as a distinct field of philosophical activity presupposes 
that philosophy's history is the proper history of philosophy This raises the question why 
philosophy has a history, or is historical at all [Ch 2 ml From the official view two answers 
could be derived one is that only a proletarian revolution and the emergence of a socialist, later 
communist society creates the conditions for the development of true philosophy, the other is to 
point out the genius of the klassiki While both answers had their ideological value, both are 
unhistoncal, and neither of them answers the initial question Overman's solution was rather 
more subtle, laying stress not on social or political factors, but on factors proper to philosophy 
as a cogniti ve activity 
"It goes without saying that the recognition of the historically transient nature of the pluralism of philosophical 
doctrines has nothing in common with a denial ot its necessity and of Us progressive significante for certain 
historical periods In other words this increasing divergence of philosophical opinions [vozzrenija the Russian 
equivalent ot German Meinung EvdZ] the polarization of philosophy into irreconcilably opposed systems of 
views has played its positive part it was necessary in as far as mankind had to develop and exhaust all possible 
philosophical hypotheses in order to accept among them the one thai is to the highest degree [v nmbolSej mere] 
confirmed [podlveridaetsja] by experience practice, scientific data [italics mine, EvdZ] 94^ 
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Even though this idea is immediately toned down and limitedhistorically by Ojzerman 
when he argues that "this divergence of philosophical opinions had a certain justification until 
the development of science and practice realized the necessary pre-conditions for the develop­
ment of scientific philosophy [i.e. Marxism, EvdZ],"948 it nevertheless opens the whole field 
of pre-Marxist philosophy to historical investigation. 
Equally concentrating on philosophy as a form of knowledge, Zelnov agrees with 
Ojzerman that the contradiction between objective content and subjective form of expression is 
overcome, in principle, by Marxist-Leninist philosophy, which "has found its fullest expres­
sion in the works of the klassiki of Marxism-Leninism, and is permanently implemented in the 
works of the leading theoreticians of the Party, works that constitute the creative thought of its 
[the Party's, EvdZ] collective reason [tvorceskoe osmyslenie её koHektivnogo razuma]."949 
3 a. Of Camps, Problems, and Ideas 
At the heart of Soviet attempts to interpret philosophy's past lay the notorious "basic question" 
of philosophy with the concomitant idea of "philosophical camps". And indeed the official 
position defined the subject-matter of Я-Nas "the rise and development of doctrines about the 
general foundations of being and knowledge, offering this or the other solution [геЗепіе] of the 
basic question of philosophy."950 
This dichotomization of the history of philosophy into two camps clearly does not 
provide an adequate set of instruments for historians of philosophy. A main objective of Soviet 
theory of the history of philosophy, therefore, was to transform this basic dogma into a 
workable theoretical basis of actual historiographical practice. Historical relativization of the 
basic question was already urged by Ojzerman in 1967, when he, reportedly, objected to an 
unhistoricalapproach of it: 
"One of the manifestations of such an approach in Soviet literature on history of philosophy is that it is often 
not taken into consideration that the formulation of the basis question as the question about the relation of 
«thought» to «being» was given by Engels in connection with an analysis of classical German philosophy of 
the end of the 18lh - beginning of the 19th century. In fact the basic question of philosophy is the question 
about the relation of the material to the spiritual [duchovnoc], but the forms of the material, like those of the 
spiritual, are very different (forms of matter is not the same as «being», and the spiritual is not only «thought»), 
T.I. Ojzerman raised an objection against L.Ja. Ljachoveckij, who insisted that the antagonism of materialism 
and idealism runs through the whole history of philosophy from its very origin. In the initial period of 
development of philosophy, T.I. Ojzerman said, there was not such a clearly expressed opposition of 
materialism and idealism."951 
Ojzerman's GlavnyeFilosofskienapravlenija [The Main Trends in Philosophy] of 1971 
(reissued 1984), is an attempt to make the "basic question" a viable basis for IFN. He made 
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three moves towards this end 1) a shift from the "ontological" to the "epistcmologtcal" aspect, 
n) a preference to the term trend or tendency [парта vlenie] over the Engelsian camp [lager], in) 
a reduction of the significance of the basic question by regarding it as a historical product 
1) In its original formulation by Engels, the "basic question" about the relation of thought 
and being had two sides the "ontological" question as to what comes first, spirit or nature,942 
and the "epistemological" question whether the human mind is capable of grasping the "real 
world [die wirkliche Welt]" 9 5 3 According to Ojzerman, the first question "for a long time 
already does not form a problem, if we call problems questions that are unresolved under 
investigation " 9 5 4 The second is also resolved by dialectical materialism, but "the epistemology 
of dialectical materialism must not be reduced to its necessary point of departure — the 
materialist solution of the second aspect of the basic question of philosophy " ^ 5 The ontologi­
cal claim of dialectical materialism is tantamount to the claim that matter exists objectively, as it 
"excludes from the philosophical definition of matter all its distinguishing marks except one, 
which epistemologically [italics mine, EvdZ] makes up the differentia specifica of matter "956 
This means that the basic question is an epistemologica! rather than an ontological question-
"In our opinion, Ihc actual [faktiCeskaja] basis ot (he question about the relation of the spiritual to the material 
is formed by one of the most essential [neobchodime^Cié] conditions of all conscious and expedient 
[eclesoobra/naja] human activity the distinction of the subjective and the objective ' 9 5 7 
As we saw above, the subject-matter of philosophy, according to Ojzerman, turns 
around the subject-object relation, and at this point, there are a lot of unresolved problems The 
correct answer to the "basis question" merely realizes a necessary condition for their resolution, 
but does not provide an answer Idealist and materialist philosophy can both be valuable 
sources the development of dialectic, for example, has been the affair mostly of "idealists", not 
of "materialists" When Ojzerman says that "concrete and, consequently, many-sided objects 
can be defined only in a logically concrete manner, but the logically concrete is formed as a 
result of the well-founded transition from one determination to the others, the result of which is 
a system of determinations," his inspiration is obvious 958 
n) What, then, exactly are the "main trends" of philosophy7 According to Ojzerman, 
trends should not be identified with philosophical doctrines [ ucenija] or "systems", schools 
[Skoly], grouped around the development of an initial doctrine, or currents [tecenija] or "isms" 
"A trend is an aggregate [sovokupnosf] of philosophical currents (and consequently, of doctrines), which, 
notwithstanding all their divergences from each other defend some common tenets of fundamental importan 
ce"-* 9 
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There are many trends in the history of philosophy, but two of them are main trends 
"It does not require great acumen to detect, within empiricism, sensualism, anthropologism, naturalism, 
rationalism, and other philosophical trends the opposition of materialism and idealism This testifies to the 
fact, that all the trends just indicated are specific forms of materialism and idealism Consequently, materialism 
and idealism are indeed the main philosophical trends ( ) It must, however, be borne in mind that by far not 
all enumerated trends роіапге into the oppositcs ol materialism and idealism ( ) Irrationalism, intuitivism, 
phenomenalism are varieties of idealist, and only of idealist philosophy Mechanicism, atheism, hylozoism, on 
the contrary, characterize chiefly particular historical forms of materialism "9 6° 
The main trends thus appear as a first classification of philosophical positions, since 
every philosophical position has to contain an answer to the "basic question", if it really is to be 
basic But to which question are these trends an answer9 Engels had it that the basic question, 
with respect to its first, ontological aspect, divided philosophers into "two big camps," but 
with regard to the second aspect, the "vast majority of philosophers" gives an affirmative 
answer
961
 Lenin did not clearly distinguish the two aspects in his Materidhzm ι empmok-
nticism, and in fact identified the opposition of materialism and idealism with that between 
realism (including objective idealism) and subjective idealism 9 6 2 
Ojzerman, by contrast, cares to distinguish the two aspects He affirms that "the 
investigation of the relation between the two main trends in philosophy, materialism and 
idealism, is the most important task of 7FN"9 6 3 But if the "basic question" is mainly an 
epistemological question, "the vast majority of philosophers" belongs to the realist camp 
Therefore, either the opposition materialism-idealism has to do with the first side of the basic 
question, in which case most "idealists", being epistemological realists, would be "materialists" 
with respect to the second aspect, or it has to do with the second side, in which case many 
epistemologica! "materialists" would be ontological idealists A third possibility is that the 
opposition does refer to the first aspect, but that this aspect has only limited importance, which 
means a shift from Engels' camps in philosophy to two trends in epistemological questions, 
each of them with its "epistemological roots [gnoseologiöeskiekomi]" 
This, in fact, appears to be Ojzerman's solution 
"The elucidation of the real significance of the basic philosophical question requires, in our opinion, an 
investigation of its epistemologica! inevitability"964 
in) Finally, the "basic question" does not constitute or organize the subject-matter of 
philosophy 
The expression «basic question of philosophy» indicates that there are other philosophical questions, too, which 
also constitute the subject matter of philosophy But can they be regarded as merely derived from the basic 
philosophical question9 The problem of particular and general essence and appearance, change and development, 
all these problems, it goes without saying, do not logically follow trom the content of the basic philosophical 
question the problem of man the problem of the unity ot the world In which relation does the basic 
philosophical question stand to these problems'' This is subject lo a special investigation, which, it may be 
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hoped, will show, that the concept of a basic philosophical question has a specific meaning, that docs not in any 
measure lessen the significance of other philosophical questions " 9 6 5 
The "basic" question has basically been resolved, and "in philosophy, as m any other 
science, the researcher is dealing with problems As for already resolved questions, they find 
their rightful place in the textbooks "^66 It is not, therefore, a problem of contemporary 
philosophy, since "to identify the subject-matter of philosophy with the basic philosophical 
question is to conceal the qualitative difference between the philosophy of Marxism and 
preceding philosophy "967 
The basic question, Ojzerman concludes, is a problem with respect to the history of 
philosophy 
"It has been said above that the basic philosophical question is resolved by the whole development of 
materialism and [hat there is no foundation for a reconsideration of that solution And yet in one, highly 
essential respect this question continues to be a problem a problem of the history ot philosophy "968 
At this point further amendments find their place Rejecting the thesis of Aleksej 
Vasil'evic Potemkin (b 1924) that "to point out the fact that the question about the relation of 
thought to being is the great basic question of all philosophy, is a consistently scientific general 
definition of the subject-matter of philosophy from the moment of its origin,"969 Ojzerman has 
it that "its [of the basic question, EvdZ] origin does not coincide with the origin of philosophy, 
its history, that spans thousands of years, (and) characterizes in a specific manner the 
development of philosophical knowledge "97° The history of the "basic question" is a 
dialectica] process The issue existed "objectively" long before the rise of philosophy, but it 
could only be consciously stated "when the development of the capacity of abstraction, 
introspection, analysis reached a sufficiently high level "971 
In Greek philosophy, "there was no conscious raising of the basic philosophical 
question," and with respect to later, Medieval philosophy, Ojzerman argues that "it would be 
naive to suppose that a correct theoretical understanding of the basic question of philosophy 
took shape (and was generally accepted) in philosophy from that time "972 Although "in the 
course of many centuries, philosophers have departed, in their theoretical self-determination 
[sdtnoopredeleme] and without being aware, from one answer or another to the basic philoso-
phical question,"973 it was "only the creation of a dialectical-materialist conception of the 
historical process of philosophy (that) made it possible to fully reveal the real sense and 
significance of the basic question of philosophy "974 
In Hegelian terms the basic question was contained [an sich] in the very origin of 
philosophical thought, but it took a long historical development before this question appeared 
as a basic question [fur sich], viz as "the realization [osoznanie] of the radical opposition of 
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materialism and idealism, the conscious setting off against each other of the main philosophical 
trends, that is characteristic of classical bourgeois philosophy,"975 before it could, with the 
development of dialectical materialism, be fully understood [an und fur sich] and thereby 
sublated, henceforth existing as the core of the historical self-conception of dialectical 
materialism So, the 'basic question", as soon as it appeared in history as a problem for 
philosophy (1 e with Marx), was resolved (by Engels) 
Pax Sovietica m Pre-Marxist Philosophy 
How remote this conception is from the idea of a permanent "struggle" between an idealist and 
a materialist 'camp" becomes clear from Ojzerman's discussion of the classical opposition of 
the "line of Democntus" and the "line of Plato ' He treats both lines as answers to the second 
aspect of the basic question Democntus' doctrine of the eidolon formed "a first, naive variant 
of the theory of reflection," whereas Plato s doctrine of eidos was its first rejection, claiming 
that our ideas do not reflect things as they exist, but things reflect transcendental ideas 9 7 6 The 
opposition thus is a conflict between epjstemo/og/ca/conceptions 
The opposition belween Pialo and Democntus brings out particularly sharply the main epistemologica! 
alternative What forms the source of our knowledge ' Nature or the supernatural'1 Matter or spint r 9 7 7 
Likewise, Avtonomova, m her interesting study of the concepts of reason and 
rationality (1988), concentrates on the epistemological aspect of the basic question, and in fact 
arrives at a rationalist interpretation of the positive answer to the question whether "our thought 
is capable of knowing the real world " 9 7 8 
'Rationality is the understandabihty ofthe objective universal [umopostigaemost ob ektivnogo vseobSCego], 
in whatever field wc may run into it 9 7 9 
Whether these "sufficiently well-known tenets of Marxist theory of knowledge"9^ are 
not, in fact, much closer to Hegel is another matter, what is significant, again, is the exclusive 
stress on the epistemological ' aspect" 
It turns out that the real "enemy" of dialectical materialism is not idealism, but skepticism 
[Ch 11 m b] If the "basic question" is narrowed down to its second aspect, ι e to the question 
whether the human mind is capable of grasping the "real world", it is clear that both materialists 
like Democntus or Hobbes and idealists like Plato or Leibniz give an affirmative answer to that 
question In fact, Ojzerman agrees with Kant that both answers are dogmatic and arise from a 
refusal to submit one s very principles to epistemological scrutiny 9 8 1 With Kant and Hegel, he 
holds that skepticism has to be overcome, and that it was the necessary counterpart of dogmatic 
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metaphysics 9 8 2 However, as might be expected, it is dialectical materialism that is finally 
capable of doing so, making dogmatism and skepticism things of the past, since they are both 
"diagnosed" as being metaphysical 9g3 
At this point we perceive the impact of the Marxist and Soviet use of the term 
"metaphysical" as opposed to "dialectical" 9 8 4 It is grounded in the Hegelian distinction of 
understanding [ Verstand, in Russian lassudok] and reason [Vernunft, razum] 
'The metaphysician imagines the aggregate of the objects of cognition as a definite sum or set, part of which is 
already known, so that further development of knowledge is reduced to all that remains unknown The 
inadequatcness of that view is that it replaces the infinite by the finite ( ) Not only is the whole set of 
phenomena of the universe infinite, but аіьо the subsets of that set Lenin s remark about the inexhaustibility of 
the electron must be understood, above all, in the epistemologica! sense " l · * 8 5 
In this manner, then, the "basic question", itself a historical product, loses much of its 
status It does retain its ideological importance, because it provides the point of self-
determination of dialectical materialism, but it can not be seen as making up the subject-matter 
of philosophy, nor as the line dividing past philosophers into two antagonistic camps, for 
contemporary philosophy, it is a problem of the pasf, whereas with respect to philosophy's 
past, it is applied with enough subtlety and precautions to preclude any "mechanical" ap­
plication, and to turn past philosophy into one dialectical development of knowledge 
3b The Genesis of Philosophical Thought 
The question about the origin of philosophical thought is immediately linked with the question 
of the status of Chinese and Indian philosophy, and of the possible reduction of philosophy to 
Western philosophy With respect to the beginning of philosophy, (at least) two different 
positions can be discerned in IFN one is defended by CanySev, the other by Bogomolov 
According to CanySev there are three ways to approach the problem of the genezisfilosofir 
"Until now we have been speaking about the genesis ot philosophy in one sense It was explained that 
philosophy arises out of mythology through transitional forms and thanks to the rudiments of science and 
thought, by means of a spreading ot the latter to the sphere of world-view, in China, India, and Greece ( ) 
This sense of the problem of the genesis of philosophy can be called absolute philosophy emerged without the 
presence ot either an inner or an outer philosophical tradition 
But one can also speak of the genesis of philosophy in a second sense ( ) It takes place on the basis of an 
inner philosophical tradition the gap between philosophical epochs, and within them between original 
philosophical systems is so great, that to present the objective history of philosophy as a purely logical process 
is impossible The objective history of philosophy is a process ot periodic genesis of philosophy out of para 
philosophy on the basis ot an inner philosophical tradition 
in a third sense (this) genesis is observed in presently developing nations, for example in some African 
nations In these nations a developed pre-philosophical world-view [mirovozzrenicskaja predfìlosofìja] existed 
from time immemorial ( ) For philosophy to arise among these developing nations, mere influence from 
without is not sufficient These peoples must go through their own genesis of philosophy out of their own 
pre-philosophical world-view under the influence of already developed science and an outer philosophical 
tradition "986 
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In this third sense, CanySev argues, the problem of the genesis of philosophy has an 
actual importance, and not only in Africa, since "the same relates to the major layer of believers 
in developed countries," and "in the atheistic education of believers it is essential to take into 
account that they actually still are in the lowest, first level of world-view, that their spiritual 
world is the world of the artistic-mythological-religious complex "987 τ
η
 analyzing this 
problem, Canysev develops a set of concepts that might together be called ' pen-philosophy" 
predfilosofijd, protofilosofija, and para filosofi] a, the first denoting "the totality of spiritual pre­
conditions of philosophy, created by a cultural development that preceded its genesis," the 
second "the immediate result of that genesis,"988 and the third what becomes of "pre-
philosophy" after the emergence of philosophy 
" one can only speak of para philosophy when philosophy has taken shape Then philosophy is the core, and 
para philosophy the cover But if the core is not yet there, then para philosophy is pre philosophy - just the 
cover within which the core is yet to arise 989 
With the rise of philosophy pre philosophy does not disappear In relation to philosophy it becomes para 
philosophy 990 
In this "gnoseogenetic-mythogenetic" conception of the genesis of philosophy, 
philosophy has two sources, namely the "totality of developed mythology," a product of the 
imagination, and "the rudiments of some sciences," which are a product of thought and precede 
philosophy 991 As a result, proto-philosophy, can already be defined as a "systematic rational 
world-view,"992 \ e "the highest kind of world-view "993 
This definition comes close to Ojzermans definition of philosophy as a "scientific-
philosophical world-view ' World-view and science continue, of course, to exist they 
"surround" philosophy as "para-philosophy", and they each drag philosophy to their side As a 
result, philosophy can become "one-sided [odnobokaja]", and then turns into either a 
"handmaid of science," or yields "at best philosophical irrationahsm, and at the worst -
totally dissolves philosophy into art, mythology, and religion "994 
This conception of philosophy s genesis accounts for the emergence and reemergence 
of philosophy in different places and times It also implies a critique of eurocentnsm, of which 
Canysev accuses Hegel 995 Hegel excluded Oriental philosophy from his history of 
philosophy because it was not distinct from religion, but he was, as Íanysev notes, one of the 
first to pay serious attention esp to Indian philosophy 996 Hegel held that in Indian 
philosophy, like in Medieval Western philosophy, "in more recent times truly philosophical 
works have become known "997 Therefore, it may well be questioned whether his decision to 
limit the history of philosophy to Western Europe, beginning in Ancient Greece, was 
consistent with his conception of the emergence of philosophy under specific historical 
496 
Part Four: Soviet Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 
circumstances, viz. the existence or emergence of a "free constitution". Put more strongly: even 
if the development of philosophy actually took place only once, are there any a priori reasons 
why it necessarily took place only once? The only pertinent reason, in Hegel's case, is that 
both the one historical development of philosophy and world history together make up the 
process through which the "world-spirit" [Weltgeist] arrives at an adequate self-
understanding.9^ 
A materialist interpretation of the Hegelian conception would not lead to such a 
conclusion: why should the highest form of (social) consciousness not be plural? As 
Bogomolov rightly stresses, the striking thing is not so much that philosophy came into 
existence in several regions at the same time, but that it did so at a comparable stage of socio-
economic and cultural development.9" Philosophy can, apparently, originate wherever its 
necessary pre-conditions are fulfilled, and it can reemcrge wherever it has disappeared, e.g. 
when, in Hegel's words, "philosophy had to repair itself out of Christianity" in the Middle 
Ages.iooo 
The mainstream position of Ojzerman and Bogomolov was eurocentric, and followed Hegel's 
footsteps. Canysev stressed the existence of "pre-philosophy" in the Near East (Egypt, 
Babylon, Persia), and the simultaneous genesis of philosophy out of that "pre-philosophy" in 
Greece, India, and China, l001 and although Bogomolov agrees on this triple emergence, even 
adding to this list "pre-colonial Mexico, where the process was interrupted (like the whole 
development of Mexican culture) by the Spanish conquest,"1002 he insists that philosophy as 
such began with Thaïes: 
"Without in any way opposing Greek and Oriental cultures, we nevertheless have the right - not on the level of 
empirical (historical) study, but on the level of theoretical (logical) examination, which naturally takes priority 
in these matters- to take Greece as the «purest» form of the social development within which philosophy was 
born, and the origin of Greek philosophy as the most general model of that process [italics mine, EvdZ]."'°°3 
He warns that exclusive stress on Ancient Greece "calls for certain corrections or 
amendments when we come to approach Oriental philosophy,"1004 but only briefly discusses 
Indian and Chinese philosophy, attributing the non-emergence of "genuine" philosophy in the 
Far East to the "asiatic mode of production". i°05. His reluctance to regard "free thought" as a 
major condition of philosophy's origin,1006 forces him to stress on the development of 
colonies as a distinctive feature of the situation in Greece as opposed to that in China or India: a 
transition from early to developed slave-owning society.!007 While it is indeed striking that 
virtually all pre-socratic philosophers came from the "colonies", it seems less evident that this 
is due to some change in the "mode of production", rather than to a combination of economic 
(foreign trade), cultural (contact with other civilizations), and political (the free politès) factors, 
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and even then, these do not make up a sufficient condition some individual also has to start to 
do philosophy 
Comparing the explanations of the historical emergence of philosophy of Bogomolov and 
Canysev with the solution proposed by Hegel, it is clear that the notion of freedom is missing 
in both Canysev and Bogomolov Even if one agrees with Canysev, that "mature mythology" 
and "rudiments of science" are necessary conditions for the emergence of philosophy, they do 
not constitute its sufficient condition Canysev does ïefer to Hegel's insistence on "intellectual 
freedom [myshtelnaja svoboda]™0»" as the main condition for philosophy, but he stresses the 
connection of intellectual freedom to political freedom l009 
What is missing in Canysev's conception is the subjective side of this condition, the 
fact that freedom exists as the freely acting individuals within a free constitution, and that 
philosophy exists as the free thought of an individual The answer to the question "why did 
philosophy arise ' can not be answered by saying "because it developed out of mythology and 
science as soon as certain socio-political conditions were fulfilled", not because it did not do 
so, but because that is not an answer to the question why it developed 
3c The Result of Struggle 
The reason why, in Soviet philosophy, the history of philosophy had to be regarded as one and 
a single historical process, was that Soviet philosophy had to appear as its final result, ι e as, 
to quote Lenin, ' the only true road" towards objective truth [Ch 8 и] юш The mainstream 
position did not and could not develop a pluralist conception because it departed from an 
entelechy With regard to Hegel one might well argue that the entelechy present in his 
conception of the history of philosophy was a consequence of the very idea of "true 
knowledge ' in the strong sense of episteme and in that respect concluded a far-reaching 
Western tradition in philosophy The Soviet case was partly different here, the truth of an 
existing philosophy was dogmatically given and unquestionable, but in elaborating a historical 
conception of philosophy in order to explain the existence of that truth, one came very close to 
the Hegelian conception indeed Thus we find Ojzerman saying 
The aim of this book is ihe investigation of starting tenets [otpravnye polo¿emja] of ¡FN the basic 
philosophical question the main trends in philosophy which [investigation EvdZ] allows to understand 
philosophy as a form of knowledge that develops according to laws ¡zakonomemo razvivajuSCeesja ¿плте] the 
result of which is dialectical and historical materialism '0' ' 
This theory of the history of philosophy, as both a 'meta-theory" of philosophy and a 
historical self-conception of dialectical materialism, thus inevitably moved towards a totalizing 
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vi'ewlCh.lO.i, and Ch.10.iii] on the history of philosophy, and a historical understanding of 
philosophy itself. It therefore is appropriate to speak of the Soviet conception of philosophy's 
past as the tailpiece of a philosophical system, a position announced by KantJO'2 elaborated 
by Hegel,1013 and resumed by Ojzerman and Bogomolov: 
"The superiority of dialectical materialism over all philosophical systems existing in Ihc past (and present) lies 
in its inherent unity, and the interpénétration of materialism and dialectics. (...) A scientific understanding of... 
the historical process in philosophy... only became possible from the standpoint of dialectical materialism. 
Dialectical materialism is not only based historically upon mankind's preceding philosophic development, which 
it sums up critically, but it also logically presumes a science of the history of philosophy, which formulates its 
fundamental concepts through the Marxist analysis of the development of philosophies. But a scientific history 
of philosophy... also is based on dialectical materialism, which organically combines scientificity [naucnosi] 
and partisanship, the categorical imperatives of the study of philosophy's past."1014 
"Here, too, it comes to light, that dialectical materialism, in contrast to other philosophies, is a system that 
theoretically ensures all-round, fruitful, and at the same time consistently critical inheritance."101^ 
This totalizing conception leads to an appreciation of the "whole history" of philosophy: 
"The development of the dialectical-materialist world-view is, at the same lime, the scientific comprehension 
[osjnvs/enje] and critical appropriation |tisvoen;e] of the whole history of philosophical thought, in which, to 
our deep conviction, there are no empty pages [italics mine, EvdZ]."101f> 
At this point the principle of objective content comes to the fore, which eminently 
serves two goals. In the first place, the presupposition that there is some valuable philosophical 
content in every philosophical position is a legitimization for historians of philosophy to study 
virtually everything philosophical. Secondly, it gives a warrant that whatever Marxist-Leninist 
historians of philosophy find of value, ipso facto, i.e. because it is found and appropriated by 
them, constitutes a contribution to the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism, and supports its 
ideological self-defence. This "principle of objective content" thus fulfilled a major role in the 
"critical appropriation" of past philosophy and contemporary non-Soviet philosophy. It is, 
however, at odds with another major principle of Soviet philosophy, the principle of partisan-
ship [partijnosf], and presupposes a relativization of the latter, as will become clear when we 
turn to the principles that guided IFN in its search for the laws that govern philosophy's 
development. 
4. Of Laws, Trends, and Principles: The Dynamics of the History of Philosophy 
IFN claimed to be a scientific history of philosophy, which meant in the Soviet context that it 
claimed to discover the laws of historical development of philosophy.'017 This meant that in 
order to be scientific, IFN had to depart from the formulation of the " most general laws of 
movement and development of nature, society, and thought", i.e. from diamat, and istmat. In 
Ojzerman's words: 
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"And ihe more thoroughly and profoundly, scientifically, the real historical process of philosophy is grasped, the 
more it becomes evident that a scientific theory of the development of philosophical knowledge is possible only 
on the basis of dialectical and historical materialism ' 1 0 1 8 
At the same time, philosophy, as a form of social consciousness, was relatively 
autonomous As two Soviet reviewers of Bogomolov and Ojzerman's book highlighted this 
aspect 
"The authors of the book disclose the existence of inner regularities [vnutrenme zakonomernosti], relatively 
independent of social regularities Consequently, they also found the existence of history of philosophy as a 
special sciente, having its proper theory that investigates and formulates the regularities of the historical 
process ot philosophy The history of philosophy appears as a developing organism, determined m the final 
analysis by the material development of society itself, but also relatively autonomous ' Ю19 
As a result, philosophy was subject to the laws of diamat, to the laws applying to forms 
of social consciousness, and to its own "regularities" The dialectical nature of the theory 
developed by Bogomolov and Ojzerman is manifest in the idea of a dialectical historical 
development, and its materialist character is present in the conception of this development as an 
objective process, ι e as existing independently of its being known 102° 
The three universal laws of materialist dialectic, viz "[1] the unity, the mutual transmuta­
tion [v7dimoprevraSceme], struggle of opposites, [n] the transition of quantitative changes into 
qualitative ones, [in] negation and negation of negation,"1021 apply to philosophy as well At 
the same time, they are too general to be specificata and therefore have to be specified into a 
special theory of development,1023 which of course does not contradict the general theory 
"From this it is clear not only that a general conception of development is inadequate for understanding the 
development of philosophical knowledge, but so is the special concept of the development of knowledge, too 
The historical process of philosophy differs essentially from the development of natural science and social 
science One must not absolutize this difference, as is usually done by contemporary bourgeois philosophers and 
historians of philosophy, but to ignore it would be a no less serious error The elaboration of a theory of the 
historical process of philosophy is thus not reducible to an application of the general concept of development (or 
of a concept of its specific forms) to the development of philosophy The job is to bring out the pattern 
specifically characterizing philosophical development, departing from the general theory of development, ι e 
materialist dialectics [italics mine, EvdZ] " 1 0 2 4 
Thus, in addition to the universal laws of dialectical development, more "local" laws 
can be distinguished In the first place, laws applying to all forms of social consciousness- the 
relativemdependence, and the succession [ preemstvennost'] of forms of social consciousness 
(1) In the second place, specific laws or regularities of the historical process of philosophy-
differentiation, divergence and (radical) polarization of philosophical doctrines (n) '°25 In the 
third place, two fundamental principles of historical materialism partisanship, and historicity 
(in) To these one can add, finally, an implicit fourth element, viz the principle of objective 
content (IV) 
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4i Continuity and Progress Evolution or Revolution"* 
The relative independence of philosophy comes to the fore in historical succession 
[preemstvennost'\ Every philosophical doctrine is based on preceding philosophical thought, 
though not necessarily immediately preceding, not necessarily aware of its dependence, and not 
necessarily on all preceding philosophy Very often, philosophers reach back across their 
predecessors to earlier philosophy, which is "possible thanks to the various forms of 
objectivization " 1 0 2 6 They further tend to ignore their tribute to earlier philosophy, and they 
carry on some strands, leaving aside others Ю27 
Stressing the difference between a "nihilistic" negation and a "concrete, positive 
negation, which dialectics characterizes as sublMon [snjatie, Aufhebung]," М2% and giving full 
credit to Hegel as "the first great philosopher of the pre-Marxian epoch, who adequately 
valued the phenomenon of succession in the history of philosophy,"'029 Qjzerman and 
Bogomolov point out that "the dialectical-materialist understanding of succession, critically 
accepting all that is valuable in the Hegelian characteristic of the process, goes incomparably 
further " l ü 1 ü They accuse Hegel of "absolutizing the process of succession, since according to 
his doctrine all philosophical systems are logical steps in a single hiciarchie whole, "1 0 3 ' and 
argue that "logical, theoretical succession is only one of the sides of succession [italics mine, 
EvdZ]," the other being "historical choice ' 1032 The latter, based on the principle of partisan-
ship, presupposes a specific social position, and also presupposes that "the philosophical 
heritage constitutes a diversity [mnogoobrazic] of ideas, theories, doctrines "іозі His stress on 
the epistemic function of philosophy, ι e on its being a form of knowledge allows Ojzerman to 
put philosophy on the level of productive forces 
' The inheritance of acquired productive forces and the achievements of knowledge make up the basis of progress 
in material and spiritual production The history of science is completely inconceivable without this handing on 
of the torch of knowledge trom one generation to another Also development, and even more progress in the 
field ot philosophy are possible only to the extent to which there is historical inheritance "1044 
The criticism of the absolutization of the logical side of the historical succession of 
philosophical theories, which would lead to an emergence of philosophical theories out of 
earlier theories alone,'O^ may not come as a surprise, but the full recognition ofthat aspect is 
significant, as it includes a distinction between philosophy as knowledge and philosophy as 
ideology 
' The progressive development of knowledge, in contrast to the development ol antagonistic social relations and 
the ideological lomis corresponding to them is characterized by a specific link ot discontinuity and continuity, 
since the revolutionary negation ot the reactionary past is not a rejection of preceding productive forces and 
achievements of knowledge '036 
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This distinction is needed and used by Ojzerman to account for the emergence of 
Marxism itself out of classical German philosophy, French Utopian socialism and British 
political economy. It also precludes a deterministic interpretation of that emergence: because the 
progressive development of philosophy is a "unity of discontinuity and continuity, of 
reiteration and uniqueness," and, "consequently, must by understood as a creative process, 
characterized by the contradictory unity of the continuous and the discontinuous," it presup­
poses both choice and creative work as "the decisive factor in realizing historical con­
tinuity... "1037 
Again, this is reminiscent of Hegel in the introduction to his Vorlesungen...,юзе 
including the notion of historical choice, Ю39 which, according to Ojzerman, decides whether 
the succession that takes place is progressive or regressive: 
"Historical succession is an indispensable, but at the same lime insufficient condition for progressive 
development. For it also exists where development occurs as regress."1 0 4 0 
For a progressive development in philosophy, the principle of partijnost' is invoked, 
but with an important precaution. What is progressive is not necessarily what is on the side of 
the progressive class(es) at any given stage of history, but what fosters the development of 
philosophy itself, i.e. brings it nearer to its final goal: 
"Dialectical materialism regards as the prime indicators of progress in philosophy the development of materialist 
and dialectical views."'0*1 
Of course, philosophical and socio-political progress in the end coincide, but Ojzerman 
warns against any immediate association: 
"It would be a mistake, for example, to suppose that idealism by ils very nature constitutes the world-view of 
the conservative or reactionary classes. The opposition of materialism and idealism pretty often exists within 
one and the same, e.g. bourgeois ideology. To suppose that the opposition of progressive and reactionary in 
philosophy directly coincides with the antithesis of materialism and idealism, dialectics and metaphysics, would 
be an overt simplification of the tasks of research into the history of philosophy."104^ 
A dialectical approach is indispensable, because "progress, whatever its forms, is a 
profoundly contradictory process."1043 Thus, the transition from "the naive dialectics of 
antiquity to the metaphysical mode of thought that played a leading role in the development of 
empirical natural science in the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries" was just as "undoubtedly 
philosophical progress" as "the transition from the metaphysical materialism of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries to dialectical idealism."1044 Rousseau, "the most revolutionary 
representant of French Enlightenment,"1045 was an idealist, who "sees his ideal in the past, 
condemns civilization, the development of culture, and progress."1046 A reactionary idealist, 
and not a dialectician, and yet the most revolutionary representant of Les Lum/ères?1047 The 
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answer to this kind of paradox is, of course, the "profoundly contradictory nature of 
progress",>048 and the solution is d dialectical approach 
' Only a dialectical more precisely a dialectical-materialist consideration of separate philosophical positions and 
s)stems allows to single out the truth contained in them and to evaluate their trac social -progressive or 
reactionary- content and significance And this evaluation as a rule, requires differentiation concretization, since 
in one and the same philosophical doctrine, due to qualitatively dilfcrent historical circumstances, pretty often 
interwoven with each other, both progressive and reactionary views are contained ''049 
Philosophical progress is marked by "qualitative jumps" of a special kind, philosophical 
revolutions, initiating new epochs in the historical development of philosophy These 
philosophical revolutions include, according to Ojzerman, the "reform" of philosophy in the 
period of early bourgeois revolutions, French Enlightenment philosophy, and German classical 
philosophy from Kant to Hegel and Feuerbach '050 Striking about these "philosophical 
revolutions" is the fact that they, as Ojzerman states explicitly, preceded social and political 
revolutions -the English revolution of 1648, Ю^ 1 the French revolution of 1789, and the 
German revolution of 1848- preparing for them ideologically, rather than being their effect or 
result 1052 
The revolution performed by Marx and Engels is called the great philosophical 
revolution [vehkaja filosofskaja revoljucija],i0^ because it "essentially distinguishes itself 
from all preceding philosophical revolutions " 1 0 5 4 Yet it shares one characteristic with earlier 
philosophical revolutions dated 1848, '055 it preceded the corresponding social and political 
revolution the equally great October revolution of 1917 
The result of this great philosophical revolution makes a crucial difference 
' Marxist Leninist philosophy, by the very fact of its existence and development means the beginning of a 
new era in the philosophical development of mankind [italics mine EvdZ] "Ю56 
The qualitative difference between philosophy before and after Marx thus becomes even 
greater ¿elnov, m an explicit analogy with Marx' statement about bourgeois society con-
cluding the pre-history of human society, even qualified the development of philosophy until 
Marx as the pre-history of philosophy, reserving the term history for the development of 
Marxist(-Lenmist philosophy '°57 With respect to pre-Marxian philosophy, the least we can 
say is that Ojzerman's and Bogomolov's conception is sophisticated and complicated enough to 
legitimize the study of even the most reactionary philosopher, and to preclude any precipitate 
conclusions At the same time, the superiority of Marxism(-Lcninism) gains force, since 
anything from philosophy s past that is found to be progressive is assimilated by IFN 
the dialectical materialist summing up of the historical process of philosophy is its adequate, scientific In-
terpretation capable of really expressing the wealth of ideas [bogjtslvo idej] the diversity of content and the 
ideological theoretical orientation [ideino teorctiöeskajanjprjvlenno'it'\ inherent in it 1 0 5 8 
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4.Ü The Proliferation of Philosophical Doctrines 
Given the clear distinction between "logical, theoretical succession" and "historical, socio-
economically based choice", and their stress on the "diversity of ideas, theories, and doctrines" 
that make up the philosophical heritage, 1059 it is interesting to see how this diversity comes 
about. At this point, again, we come across the relative independence of philosophy: the 
diversity is produced by philosophy itself. Drawing an analogy with Darwin's analysis of the 
differentiation of natural species,'Обо Ojzerman and Bogomolov distinguish three "modes" of 
diversification:1061 
a. differentiation against the background of "an essential conceptual identity."1062 
Examples are the sequence of determinations of a "primary substance" [arche] by the 
Presocratic philosophers,1063 or 18th-century French materialism;1064 
b. divergence, "a tendency to theoretical development of ideas in various directions, 
including mutually exclusive ones."1 0 6 5 Divergence differs from differentiation in that 
it presupposes the negation of at least one fundamental principle of the initial 
doctrine.1066 Ojzerman's example of divergence is the opposition of rationalism and 
empiricism in West-European philosophy (whereas within each of them there is 
differentiation);1067 
с polarization, "the inevitable result of historically progressing divergence of philosophi­
cal doctrines... the formation of fundamentally incompatible philosophies,... the 
negation of a whole system of principles and of the conclusions following from it." 1 0 6 8 
An example is the opposition of rationalism and irralionalism, although, Ojzerman 
argues, these still contain common elements, "conditioned by an idealist solution of the 
fundamental question of philosophy." They point the way to the sole radical 
polarization, "the opposition between materialism and idealism," "the final delimitation 
and confrontation along all lines."1069 
With the last statement, we are back on familiar ground, but it is important to note that 
Ojzerman here founds the relative independence of philosophy as a form of cognitive activity. 
Even if "the forms of development of philosophy are not, of course, the motive forces of that 
process" (as if "the transition to new positions takes place owing to a divergence that is 
immanent to philosophical thought," which would lead to a conception, like that of Hegel, that 
sees "the development of philosophy as an autonomous process, the self-development of 
reason"
 107
°), any "underestimation of the subjective factor in the development of knowledge... 
is particularly harmful, since it is a matter of the knowing subject's activity..."1071 Due to an 
increasing social need for knowledge, and to progressive division of labor, specialized forms 
of knowledge, including philosophy, gain "relative independence", as do the "motivating ideals 
characteristic of those forms."1072 
504 
Part Four Soviet Philosophy and the Hiitory of Philosophy 
In sum, we see how far Ojzerman and Bogomolov have moved away from any "reductionist" 
conception of the history of philosophy Still their theory leaves open a number of questions as 
to the origin of all those differing, diverging, and polarizing positions Where do they come 
from, if not from the minds of individual philosophers9 As we shall see, the "personal origin 
[IiCnostnoendCdlo]" was brought to the fore in later years [12 iv] 
4 in From Struggle to Synthesis the Neutralization of the Principle of Partijnost' 
1FN was guided, according to Ojzerman, by two main principles of istmat, viz those of 
partynosi' and of istorizin [Ch 10 in] 
The principle of partisanship is an essential expression of the materialist understanding of history the 
theoretical basis of the scientific history of philosophy created by Marxism The partisanship of philosophy is 
Us objective sociological and epistemologica! determination [gnoscoiogiöcskaja oprcdelennost ], a correct 
understanding whereof puts an end to the idealist opposition of philosophy or philosophizing to both non 
philosophical investigation and to practical activity A fundamental principle of Marxist history of philosophy 
further is the principle of historicity proposing a concrete historical evaluation of every philosophical doctrine 
within the context of a historically determinate social formation an epoch taking into account the specific 
conditions of development of philosophv in the given country at the given level of economic, political 
scientific and ideological etc development of society "'71 
Both principles were relativized by means of an application of the second principle on 
the first As we have seen, the partijnost -principle was relativized in the sense that philosophi-
cal doctrines ' were no longer primarily seen as expressions or mere legitimizations of class 
positions The historical development of philosophy is partly determined by its ideological 
aspect, partly by its being a form of knowledge, not immediately connected to class strug-
gle '074 in practice, the principle of pjrtijnost' served to reject any supposed impartiality 
[betpartiinost] or supra-partiahty [nadportijnost'] of philosophy l075 
At this point, again, Soviet historians of philosophy found an ally in Hegel, who rejected the 
idea of impartiality in history of philosophy, as much as he did in public law,W76 a partisan 
attitude being an explicit interest in content, ie philosophy'077
 0r law,'078 as opposed to 
'subjective partisanship" 1079 Mahnm, after making the point, hurries to stress that "the 
supreme virtue [velicajsee dostomstvo] of the Marxist Leninist principle of partisanship is 
based on its scientificideologicdlnature [nducnajd ideologicnost'\ "Ю80 Likewise, Bogomolov 
hastens to add, after agreeing with Hegel that one should have a purpose in history of 
philosophy, that this purpose is not «pure, free thought» 
' Partisanship in the history of philosophy means to take the social tendency of the investigated doctrine fully 
into account and to put it into the context ol the progressive development of society into a social class 
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struggle, the struggle of parties in philosophy, which, in the final analysis [ ν koneínom siete] reflects the 
tendencies and ideology of hostile classes "1081 
But it is clear that the equation "partisan = objectively true" can be read two ways -what 
is partisan is true, or what is true is partisan- and that here it is read in the second way, thus 
making objective knowledge of "the history of thought in particular" a legitimate goal for 
historians of philosophy 
"The goal of a scientific history of philosophy does not consist in the elimination of idealism from 
philosophy s history Its goal is the concrete historical reconstruction of the historical process of philosophy, 
ι e of the process of development of humanity's knowledge such, as it has in reality been [italics mine, 
EvdZ] '1082 
In the "mainstream-conception" the "basic question" no longer serves as an immediate 
basis for the classification of philosophical doctnnes,'083 materialism and idealism are no 
longer treated as "camps", but as "trends" or "tendencies",1084 the genesis of Marxism is not 
the only revolution in philosophy's history, and there is no direct linkage of philosophical 
doctrines with either historical epochs and / or socio-political positions 1085 As a result, the 
principle of historicity acquires a different meaning It becomes an independent principle of 
historical research, and it is applied to Marxist(-Lenmist) philosophy itself, though very 
cautiously,1086 and indirectly, for example by Ojzerman when he wrote-
"Philosophy, Hegel asserted, is a developing system, and so is the history of philosophy ( ) However, the 
philosopher did not apply this principle to his own system, in which he saw the absolute perfection of 
philosophical development This anti historical view was conditioned by Hegel s idealism, which interpreted 
philosophy as the self comprehension [samopostúenic] of ' absolute spirit , [italics mine, EvdZ] "1087 
Whether or not this interpretation of Hegel's position is tenable is another question (it 
was challenged by Ма1іпіп),Ю88 but Ojzerman clearly rejects such an a-histoncal approach, 
demanding the application of the principles of/FN to its own position, too 
4 ι ν The Principle ofObjecti ve Con ten t 
Of perhaps greater significance than the sophistication and relativization of these two principles 
is the introduction of the principle of objective content 
" the differentiation of the oryect;ve content and the subjective form of philosophical doctrines is a dialectical-
matcnalist principle of their scientific investigation К Marx and F Engels permanently applied and developed 
this principle Their relation to Hegel is especially revealing, because there is, probably, no other philosopher 
whom they appreciated so highly and at the same lime criticized so sharply [italics mine, bvdZ] "1089 
The idea behind this principle, which in a more popular form is present in Soviet 
philosophical texts as the notion of a "rational kernel [гасіолаілоегегпоі" in otherwise rejected 
theories, is that the content of any form of knowledge, however distorted or "upside down" it 
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may be, must be objectively related to reality all forms of consciousness reflect, one way or 
another, objective reality This principle picks up Lenin's "theory ' of the "epistemic roots 
[gnoseologiceskiekomi] of idealism' 
Philosophical idealism is nonsense [Heputha] only from the point of view ol rude simple metaphysical 
materialism By contrast from the point of view ol dialectical materialism philosophical idealism is a one 
sided exaggerated development (blowing up, swelling up) of one of the minor traits [HertoCki] aspects facets 
ol knowledge into the absolute cut off from matter from nature deified Idealism is religious superstition that 
is true But philosophical idealism is ( more truly1 or moreoitr1 ) the road to religious superstition through 
one of the nuances of the eternally complicated (dialectical) knowledge of man , ( W 0 
The principle was already formulated by Pozner in 19T7,io9i and used by Bogomolov 
and Ojzerman in 1983 1092 It justifies a positive appreciation of ' idealist and 'metaphysical" 
philosophical positions or theories A clear example is Ojzerman s solution of the notorious 
qualification of Spinoza as a materialist 
If one had said to Spinoza that the theoretical starting point of his system was a materialist answer to the 
question of the relation of the spiritual and the material he would not have agreed Neither matter (extent) 
nor the spiritual (thought) were in any causal relationship according to his doctrine they constituted attributes 
of a single (and sole) substance ( ) In delimiting the objective content and subjective mode of expression in 
Spinoza s doctrine Marx stressed the need to differentiate between «what Spinoza considered the keystone of his 
system and what in fact constitutes that keystone» The objective contení of Spinozas doctrine is incomparably 
richer more significant, and more original than what he consciously formulated as his basic conviction , 0 9 3 
Other examples of the application of this principle are the "critical" assimilation of 
contemporary "bourgeois" philosophy [Ch 11 ш с], and the attempt, by Bogomolov and 
Ojzerman, to "rob" everything useful from Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy for 
the elaboration of a palatable theory to accompany ΙΓΝ as a branch of Soviet philosophy, as 
discussed in this chapter 
In sum, the "mainstream position" of Ojzerman and Bogomolov developed a conception of the 
"historical process of philosophy" that retained the laws, regularities, and principles of diamat 
and istmat, and in that sense was demonstrably Marxist-Leninist At the same time, the 
interpretation of these elements, and their supplementation with the principle of objective 
content were a significant sophistication in comparison to the official position [Ch 10 ш] 
5 From Aristotle to Hegel and Beyond the Historical Self-con sciousness oflFN 
The importance of Hegel in the shaping of the "sophisticated mainstream position" has been 
indicated at several points The indebtedness to Hegel became explicit in Soviet "history of the 
history of philosophy (as a discipline)" While Soviet authors agreed on the longstanding 
tradition of studying philosophy s past, dating it back to Aristotle (esp Metaphysics A),1 0 9 4 
507 
Chapter 12. Soviet Theory of the History of Philosophy The Hegelian Tum 
there was considerably less agreement on the beginning of scientific history of philosophy. The 
disagreement stems from the сішт of Marxism to accomplish the transition from philosophy to 
science Mahnin, for example, is orthodox on this point- he insists on the importance of 
studying "pre-scientific [donaucnye]" forms of the theory of the history of philosophy,1095 
which includes everything from Plato to Herzen, '096
 an¿ 0f a comparison of these with the 
"strict science [strogaja nau£a]"W97 that is possible only on "the sound basis of a dialectical-
materialist understanding of history "1098 In other words, IFN is one of the fields of applica-
tion of historical materialism, and Mahnin develops his theoretical conception of history of 
philosophy out of a theory of the relative independence of forms of social consciousness. • ° " 
Other historians of philosophy tried to make IFN less directly dependent upon the 
"revolution in philosophy". The obvious way to do this was to stress the value of Hegels 
conception of the history of philosophy, relying on the positive appreciation ofthat conception 
by the klassiki, and to tum Hegel into a klassik istori ko- filosofskoj nauki David Viktorovic 
Dzochadze (b 1935), for example, wrote that "the first to try to bring out the inner logic of the 
historical process of philosophy, and, in connection with it, to create a history of philosophy as 
a science, was Hegel "uoo He mentioned three Hegelian theses that "from the perspective of 
our investigation appear to us to be exclusively valuable [ïskljuöitel'nocennymi]" viz.: 
" I The Hegelian method of interpretation ot the historical process of philosophy as the dialectical self-unfolding 
of philosophical systems, and, on that basis, the affirmation of the history of philosophy as a developing 
scientific system ( ) 
2 Hegel's thesis about the dialectical unity of the historical process of philosophy, about the progressive 
development ot truth and the reflexive, stage by-stage movement [vozvratno poîtupatel'noe dvizeme] of 
philosophical knowledge ( ) 
3 The Marxist Leninist solution of the basic central idea, stored in the Hegelian conception of the history of 
philosophy, vi/ the reconstruction [ оччо/danie] of the preceding course of history of human thought in 
general, and of philosophy in particular, in its necessary consecutive connection in time [neobchodimaja 
poslcdovatelnajd tvjaz' vo vremeni] " ' '01 
This appreciation was certainly not generally shared, ι | 0 2 Bogomolov and Ojzerman 
were criticized for excessive Hegehanism when they had it that Hegel "always was a dialec­
tician," or qualified Hegel as "the only great philosopher of the pre-Marxian epoch who fully 
appreciated. . the phenomenon of continuity in the history of philosophy "4° 3 
The approach adopted by Bogomolov and Ojzerman was beneficial to a "rehabilitation" of the 
"proper history" of philosophy It was an emancipation of IFN through its hegehamzation, 
presupposing a close connection between general philosophical development, and the 
development of history of philosophy. In contrast with this, others have attempted to found the 
independent disciplinary status of /RVupon its historical development as a separate discipline, 
ι e upon a history proper to this discipline. Such an attempt was made by Arzakanjan in 1962, 
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who rejected the idea that "the history of philosophy as an independent branch of philosophy... 
supposedly emerged only in the 17th century, and only became a science with the appearance 
of Hegel's «History of Philosophy»."1104 But, Arzakanjan argues, "mature features of history 
of philosophy as a science did exist both in Antiquity, in the Middle Ages and in Modern 
Times." nos 
An interesting feature in this connection is the stressed critique of eurocenlrism. Soviet 
authors often referred, for example, to the work of a 12th-century Arab historian of 
philosophy, Mohammed al-Shahrastani (1086-1153). In his Religious Sects and Philosophical 
Schools (± 1100) he "consciously set himself the task of creating a universal [ vsemimaja] 
history of philosophy.""06 According to Malinin he was the only genuine historian of 
philosophy in Medieval times, n°7 carefully distinguishing religion and philosophy, seeing 
philosophers as "those who do not recognize the laws of revelation, nor religion, and in 
opposition to them follow their own judgment and their own reason," and analyzing the history 
of philosophy as an "arena of polemics" between, basically, two trends: materialism and 
theism."08 Bogomolov regarded, with Arzakanjan, al-Shahrastani's work as far superior to 
the "first attempt to create a history of philosophy in Christian Europe,""09 the Liber de vita et 
moribus philosophonim (± 1330) by Walter Burleigh (1275-1357), a "quite uncritical 
compilation, whose 132 chapters treated of philosophers, mythologists, poets, writers, 
dramatists, historians of antiquity, disposed without any rhyme or reason.""'0 More recently, 
Kamenskij praised al-Shahrastani for showing the divergent nature of the historical process of 
philosophy, and opposes him sharply to scholastic treatments, the latter being "mere historical 
surveys, not reflections upon historiography.""" 
6. The Crusade Against Bourgeois Pluralism 
Bourgeois history of philosophy had to be, from the Soviet point of view, basically false as it 
represents the viewpoint of a class that takes an interest in a distorted representation of social 
reality and of history. This explains, Malinin tells us, why materialism is portrayed very 
negatively by idealist historians of philosophy (his example is VI. Solov'èv), whereas a 
materialist like Engels realized a full appreciation of the historical significance of idealist 
philosophers in spite of the fact that idealism is an erroneous philosophical position. ' "2 
However, due to the principle of objective content [see above], idealist history of 
philosophy can be a source of valuable information. As Ojzerman insists, "an integral 
component of Marxist-Leninist IFN is the critical analysis of contemporary bourgeois 
philosophy, including the latest idealist theories of the historical process of philosophy." "13 
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His main target is the "most influential among these tendencies," namely French "philosophie 
de 1 histoire de la philosophie," represented by Gueroult, Gouhier, and others l ' 1 4 Their 
idealist stance is a main flaw, but more important is their subjective idealism (which distin­
guishes them from Hegel), and the resulting plurdhst conception of philosophy in history 
The «philosophy of the history of philosophy» ascertaining the existence of the multitude [тпоіечі о] of 
philosophical doctrines founds a pluralist interpretation of the historical process of philosophy which is joined 
to conceptions of social and political pluralism " '5 
More specifically, Ojzerman shows himself offended by the "crying plurality [vopijusöij 
pljuralizm]* of definitions of the concept of philosophy," and wonders whether it would be 
possible to reduce them to one ] ι '6 The "indisputable merit of Hegel" had been the "theoretical 
overcoming of the plurality of philosophical doctrines, ι e his substantiation of the profound 
dialectical idea that philosophical theories, in spite of their continuous confrontation with one 
another, their mutual negation and incompatibility, are necessary links in a single contradictory 
process of stage-by-stage [postupatelnoe] development of knowledge "iii7 Post-Hegelian 
bourgeois philosophy is evidently "regressive" in this respect One way, for Soviet 
philosophers, to explain bourgeois pluralism was to point to the crisis of capitalist society this 
motive is manifest in Ojzerman s taunt at ' social and political pluralism' as an outright denial of 
class struggle But another way was to point to absolutization of separate aspects of the subject-
matter of philosophy Just as the plurality of contemporary bourgeois philosophy resides partly 
in absolutization of aspects of human knowledge,1 ' is a plurality of conceptions of philosophy 
and of its history might partly be explicable in terms of absolutization of aspects of philosophy 
and / or its historical nature 
This is indeed what Ojzerman attempts to show, distinguishing two forms of ab­
solutization the generalization ot one aspect or feature of philosophy at the expense of other 
aspects, and the "eternahzation ' of one historically determined form and conception of 
philosophy и'9 In such general terms this seems fair enough examples would be the 
reduction of philosophy to conceptual analysis or to worldly wisdom (as opposed to reflection, 
contemplation, or a specific form of knowledge), or the conception of philosophy as essentially 
a system ot knowledge (as opposed to hypothetical theory, position, strategy, or therapy) и 20 
At the same time, it might well be asked whether Ojzerman is not "guilty" of such an ab­
solutization, too In fact, the reason why a pluralist conception of the history of philosophy 
was inadmissible was that it is at odds with the totalizing view Soviet philosophy was, upon 
its own account, but the true result of the 2,500 yearlong development of philosophy, a 
*I translate pljurali/m here as plurality notas pluralism pluralism means the position that there is or 
ought to be plurality, whereas plurality means an actually existing multitude 
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synthesis that, in principle, absorbs any past, present, or future antithesis. It was this 
usurpation of developing truth that excluded any recognition of plurality. Diversity 
[mnogoobrozie], as we have seen above, was recognized by Ojzerman, but plurality 
[mnozestvo] was vehemently rejected. 
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12.ІП The Hegelian Turn Completed: Philosophy as Epochal Self-Conscious­
ness 
One question has been left out of account so far, namely the question about the relation of 
philosophical history to history in general The reason for this is that this question not only 
points to a main problem in Hegel s conception of the history of philosophy, as I have argued 
[Ch 2 и), but also is a question of primary importance to a Marxist(-Lenmist) theory of 
philosophy s history [Ch 10 u с d and 10 in], as well as a central question in theory of the history 
of philosophy tout court It deserves, therefore, to be discussed separately, the more so since it 
demonstrates the shift towards a totalizing and, in fact, Hegelian conception within IFN 
The turn of the dominant, ' mainstream" conception of the history of philosophy to 
Hegel as a main theoretical source raises the following questions 
a) to which extent is this mainstream position indeed 'Hegelian" in some relevant sense9 I 
believe that it is to a large extent, 
b) can this theory still be regarded as Marxist-Leninist, or is it a Hegelian heresy", however 
cunningly disguised, within Soviet philosophy7 In fact, the situation is more complicated than 
that it is via Hegel that the victory of the totalizing position over the economist and the 
dichotomizing positions is taking place, 
c) why did it become the mainstream position in IFN7 The reason is to be sought in the way 
this conception fitted to IFN as it actually existed, ι e as a quasi-independent philosophical 
discipline within the framework of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, 
d) can this conception, resulting from the "Hegelian turn", contribute to problematic aspects of 
the Hegelian conception itself I believe that it does to some extent, but at crucial points it is too 
much Hegelian 
a A Bd sically Hegelian Position ' 
Due to the strong anti-Hegelian attitude during the period 1930-1955, it took a while to restore 
Hegel to the rank of founder of IFN The "official" position departed from the "vulgar" 
position, exemplified by Aleksandrov in 1946 
In their works Marx and Engels Lenin and Stalin opposed to the idealist interpretation of the history of 
philosophy a materialist explanation of the history of ideas according to which the spiritual life of society is 
the reflection of the conditions of its material lite [italics mine Fvd7) "21 
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This reductionist conception was amended by party-philosophers like Iovèuk 
fCh 10 и c] In KIF, Hegel is praised for contributing a "rational kernel" to a scientific history of 
philosophy 
"Marxism appreciates the «rational kernel», contained in Hegel s doctrine about the history of philosophy, 
which consists in that he, although on an idealist, false basis disclosed the regular connection [?akonomemaja 
svjaz] of the various philosophical doctrines and the continuity [ prccmstvennost] in their development, as a 
result of which the history of philosophy appeared not as a chaotic accumulation [íhjotiCeskoenagromoídenie] 
of opinions and conceptions but as the historical process of development of knowledge The contribution of 
Hegel also was that he retraced the development of dialectics in the history of philosophy "1122 
On the whole, the relation of IFN to Hegel was ambiguous When, for example, the 
author's collective of IF6 set out to write the history of all peoples in every phase of socio-
economic development [Ch 10 и d], taking into account "that under the conditions of oppression 
not all peoples could make an equal contribution," but generally aiming to demonstrate the 
"universal character of the philosophical thought of mankind,"1 '23 they were repeating Hegel 
as much as they were rejecting him 
Some Soviet historians of philosophy made a complete Hegelian tum In 1977, for example, 
Dzochadze published a study of Ancient philosophy, written in a clearly Hegelian fashion 
Most striking is his "rehabilitation" of Plato, where he attributes quite a different meaning to the 
famous Leninist opposition of the "line" of Democntus and Plato than the opposition of 
materialism and idealism [Ch 10 и d Ch 11 ш aj 
' The main point in atomism contrary to the Elcatic doctrine, was that for Leucippus and Democntus non-being 
[ncbytic] does not at all exist to a lesser extent than being [ bytie] Here a great advance took place, ι e here the 
beginning of that tendency was laid, which Lenin calls the line of Democntus ( ) Philosophy in the Socratic 
stage of its development obtained an important result especially in the field of dialectical investigation of truth 
This Ime was continued by Pldio [italics mine, EvdZ] ' "24 
By turning the "line of Plato" into the line of dialectic, the history of philosophy is 
transformed into the gradual coupling of the true answers to both sides of the "basic question" 
Both "lines" obtain a positive meaning, and the "revolution" performed by Marx and Engels 
becomes the successful synthesis of these two lines, rather than the final victory of one over 
the other 
'Thus departing from the dialectics of interaction of systems in the history of ancient philosophy, it can be 
concluded that the interpretation of dialectics as the inner logic of the history of philosophy is brilliantly 
illustrated by the development of ancient Greek philosophy, which appears as the first synthesis in the universal 
history of philosophy The second synthesis will be Gemían classical philosophy, the third, the highest and all-
embracing Isamyj vySij ι vseocnvMyvdiusiij] synthesis, — the philosophy ot Marxism Leninism ' " 2 5 
This fully Hegelian view is an extreme example of a general tendency to move away 
from the dichotomization of the history of philosophy in the direction of its totalization Hegel 
was fully recognized as a kldssik of IFN by Ojzerman He called him "the founder of the 
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history of philosophy as a science",1126 referred to his Vorlesungen as to a "turning-point in 
the coming-to-be of /FN,"i12? and argued 
The idea of a necessary connection and contradictory unit) of philosophical doctrines a dialectical conception of 
historical succession which includes the relation of opposition the investigation of philosophical doctrines as 
the self consciousness of historically determined stages in the development of mankind, all these are excellent 
insights [prozrenija] of Hegel s theory of the historical process of philosophy "428 
Like Hegel, Ojzerman regards the history of philosophy as a dialectically developing 
unity, displaying progress, and leading up to a philosophical science (or scientific philo­
sophy) ' 1 2 9 It is evident, for the mainstream position, that "there exists a lawlike relation 
[zakonomemoeotnoSenie] between the fundamental epochs of philosophical development and 
the main stages of universal history "113° What is the precise nature of that lawlike relation? 
The key-notion of the Soviet attempt to deal with this question is the notion of philosophy as 
"quintessence of an epoch" The idea of "philosophy of an epoch" seems to originate in the 
work of Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937) чзі What makes philosophy "epochal", in Gramsci's 
conception, is not so much the fact that it exists m a particular epoch, but that it addresses 
"problems, that emerge at a particular historical stage, problems to which different classes and 
social groups, various thinkers are seeking an answer," and philosophy is epochal "by the level 
of recognition and by its relation to the main questions, posed by an epoch "432 
This idea is reflected in Ojzerman's statement that "we can say that philosophy, as the 
self-consciousness of a historical epoch, takes as its subject the most important, epochal 
questions'Ί133 Here, however, a new element is added, viz the notion of "self-
consciousness" [samosozname] We come across this definition of philosophy in several places 
in Soviet literature in the 1980s "34 In their Osnovyteoru , Bogomolov and Ojzerman state 
that " philosophy at any stage of its development constitutes the self-consciousness of a 
historically determined epoch "1135 in Filowfìja epochi Ojzerman opens the introduction 
with a quotation from Marx 
Philosophy is the spiritual quintessence [duchovnaja kvwt cssencija] of its time ' 4 3 6 
And he paraphrases it as 
In other words sociologically understood philosophy is the self consciousness of a historical epoch which in a 
new way reveals its cultural and historical meaning ' 1137 
Marx indeed wrote that "every genuine philosophy is the spiritual quintessence of its 
time "438 However, Ojzerman disregards the fact that Marx speaks of genuine philo-
sophy,1 '39 and it is only in doing so that he can interpret Marx in such a way that philosophy 
as such, "sociologically interpreted ', ι e as a form of social consciousness ', is the self-con-
sciousness of a historical epoch Further, Marx wrote this sentence in 1842, when he was still 
"a philosophical idealist and a 'revolutionary democrat '," as Ojzerman recognized in Formiro-
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vanie fìlosofìi marksizma [Ch 11 ш d] ' 14° Some five years later, in a chapter of Vvedenie ν 
fìlosofìju (1989) [Ch6u and Chliiv], that strongly appears as written by Ojzerman, the 
qualification of philosophy as "spiritual quintessence of the time, self-consciousness of an 
epoch" is ascribed to Hegel " 4 1 Thus a quotation from the very young Marx is tactically 
employed to drive home a point that is Hegelian rather than Marxist, and that would require a 
lot of further qualification to be compatible with the classical Marxist notion of philosophy as a 
reflection and expression of class-struggle 
b A "Hegelian Heresy " ? 
So, the position elaborated by Bogomolov and Ojzerman can rightly be qualified as 
' Hegelian" Ojzerman rejects Hegel's pan-logism and absolute idealism, but nonetheless states 
that " dialectical materialism, which offered the most thorough, integral critique of Hegel's 
dialectical idealism, continues the main line projected by Hegel of the investigation of 
philosophy as a phenomenon of world history, that is, in a dialectical way, as a single 
phenomenon [как dialekticeski edmyj vsemimo-istonceskij fenomen] [italics mine, 
EvdZ] " 1 1 4 2 According to Ojzerman, Hegel was closer to an understanding of the subject-
matter of philosophy "than those comrades of ours who seek to limit the subject of 
philosophical investigation strictly to one -whichever- domain, theme, or problem " 1143 These 
"comrades" reduce the subject of philosophy to the "fundamental question" of philosophy, to 
human existence, or to "the most general laws of movement" However, according to 
Ojzerman, the subject-matter of philosophy is the historically changing totality of 
non-philosophicphenomena 
"Philosophy docs not study philosophical processes, which do not exist in nature, but the forms of generality 
that belong to nature and society ( ) The subject of philosophy is the totality of non-philosophical 
phenomena which totality moreover changes in the course ol history ( ) Therefore we can say that 
philosophy, as the seit consciousness of a historical epoch, takes as its subject the most important, epochal 
questions In this respect it has a right ot choice, that plays a part m the constant formation of its subject " ' 1 4 4 
Now, if philosophy is a single [edmyfl phenomenon, if its subject-matter is the totality 
of non-philosophic phenomena, if philosophy is epochal self-consciousness, and if the 
"developing system" of diamat and istmat is the sum-total of the whole preceding development 
of philosophy -no empty pages'-, then it is very hard to tell what philosophy is, if not the 
developing self-consciousness of reality as a whole 
In Hegel's conception, the subject of philosophy was "World Spirit [ Weltgeist]", 
' Reason" as it gradually becomes an und fur sich At the same time, Weltgeist exists concretely 
in the successive generations of "finite spirits", ι e human beings, including philosophers, in 
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their "products" and in the institutions they populate In as much as they are the concretization 
or incarnation of absolute spirit, philosophers are the subjects of philosophy every philosophi-
cal position or system has to be thought by some philosopher An individual philosopher's 
thought can only be or approach "absolute spirit ', ι e the adequate self-understanding of 
reality as such because both are "spirit" to begin with That is also the reason why philosophy 
can be epochal philosophy can make explicit what a certain historical era is about because they 
are of one and the same nature, and philosophy can show an epoch to be an epoch, a limited 
stage and in that sense relative, because it is itself absolute spint 
At this point, the analogy between the Hegelian conception and the mainstream position in IFN 
breaks off, because m the latter reality is material the substance of the world is not infinite 
spirit but infinite matter Philosophy, then, is self-consciousness of a material substance, ι e 
that substance must be the subject and object of that consciousness The consequence of this is 
to ascribe "consciousness" to the very nature of matter In the case of Hegel, the reason why 
philosophy comes to exist and develop is that it is the (proper) way through which "substance" 
can acquire a full and adequate understanding of itself, and the reason why it ' wants" to 
acquire such an understanding is because it is "spirit ' [Geist] and 'needs" the whole develop­
ment of nature and spirit (history) m order to become what "spirit" really is, viz " Bei-sich-sem 
im Anderen" If, however, substance is not spiritual, but material, the same process becomes 
either mysterious and simply 'happening to be", or material substance must, in some intricate 
way, be spiritual to begin with absolute materialism then becomes an idealism [Ch 91] 
The philosophy that appears "lastly" in this progressive development, Hegel's absolute 
idealism* and dialectical materialism respectively, necessarily and definitively "sublates" all 
previous philosophy, since there is only one philosophy, a single "developing system" To 
found that thesis, Ojzerman had it, "was Hegel's eminent contribution [vydajuscij vklad] to the 
theory of the history of philosophy "1 1 45 While Hegel reconstructed, in his history of 
philosophy, a presupposed rational structure,1146 dialectical materialism, due to its notion of a 
material substance, abstracted a general development from a history as it actually took place ** 
The subsequent principles ot philosophical systems, appearing in Hegel's conception as stages 
in the developing self-understanding of absolute spirit, and as moments m the "final" 
philosophical system, reappear m the mainstream conception as "rational kernels", carefully 
detached from the distorted forms they existed in, and thus 'critically assimilated" by diamat 
'Soviet authors preferred to call it dialectical idealism omitting the absolute character ot Hegel s idealism 
" I t one regards Hegel s absolute idealism as an actuahsm one might see this as the more consistent position 
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"The klassiki of Marxism subjected Hegel s idealist doctrine to criticism, but dissected [ vyllemli] the "rational 
kernel contained in it, including the brilliant formulation of a scries ot problems of history of philosophy as a 
science Opposing the Hegelian idealist theory they regarded philosophical development as a process, the inner 
motive forces of which are, in the linai analysis, conditioned by socio economic process, by scientific 
achievements and the development ot forms of social consciousness as a whole, and by the struggle between 
progressive and reactionary classes and social groups "1147 
The principle of objective content, enabling the assimilation of everything valuable in 
past philosophy into the proper system, and thus founding a "totalizing" position, is explicitly 
derived from Hegel · I 4 8 The qualitative difference between those philosophical systems whose 
principles are, and those whose are not consistent formulations of moments in conceptual 
development, Ч 4 9 reappears as the evaluation of the consistent or inconsistent nature of 
philosophical doctrines * Finally, the "weak spot" in Hegel's case is the presupposition "that 
the world is governed by Reason [daß es m der Welt vemunltig zugeht]" [Ch2n], and 
dialectical materialism has to resort to an equally weak point the idea of a material substance 
that apparently has produced out of itself the entire development of nature and culture, up to 
and including didmdt itself and its historical self-conception So, the turn to Hegel also meant a 
return of a main difficulty in his conception the "Glaube an die Vernunft" reappears as the 
dogma of the primordial capacity of matter to cause its own development 
с Link and Buffer between Official Philosophy and IFN 
It is a matter of historical fact that the "hegehanizing trend" in IFN became dominant When, 
for example, Soviet philosophers were examining the newly published Vvedeme , Panin 
(dean of the filfak of MGU) in a simplifying manner said 
' I perceive three conceptions of the history of philosophy The first is that of Russell, 1 e all philosophy is a 
footnote to Plato The second conception is the Hegelian conception and we take this view until the present 
day the conception of dialectical sublalion 1 e every subsequent great philosopher takes everything valuable 
from the previous one, and everything non-valuable he discards And the third conception is the conception of 
compleinentarinesb [italics mine, EvdZ] ' ' 5 0 
If the Hegelian conception was dominant, the next question to ask is why IFN moved 
in the direction of this totalizing position at the expense of the reductionist and the 
dichotomizing position The answer to this question is, first, that it fitted best to the various 
functions IFN had to perform simultaneously, 1 e it mediated successfully between the system 
of diamat and istmdt, ideological exigencies, and professional IFN, and, secondly, that it was a 
logicdlconsequence of the very conception of dialectical materialism as a philosophical system 
"The main quality ot Hegel s own philosophy in the eyes ot, e g Lenin, is its consistent nature 
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ι The superiority of Marxism-Leninism was, for IFN, not a conclusion, but a point of 
departure As a result, the Soviet theory of the history of philosophy, guiding the Soviet 
account of philosophy's past (the historiography), had to be a reconstruction of philosophy's 
past as resulting in this supreme outcome There is nothing peculiar about this any philosophi­
cal position, to the extent to which it claims to be true in a strong sense, has to "deal with" past 
(and present) philosophy, for the simple reason that there can not be two truths other 
philosophical positions must be either wrong or only partially true, or the proper position will 
have to be revised The easiest way to "deal with ' the past is to state simply that all previous 
positions were mistaken Another way is to relativize truth by making it the expression of 
something else class-struggle, Wille zur Mdcht, libidinal economy, world-view, struggle for 
life, etc A more "sophisticated" way, that restores the notion of truth, is to construct a 
dominant and a subdominant tradition, a 'mainstream ' and an "undercurrent", and identify 
with either of them (usually with the latter) And a fourth way is to totalize the entire previous 
development of philosophy 
All four ways were recognizably present in the heritage of the klassiL· marksizma-
lemmzma (Ch Ю ι, the 2nd - 5th impulses] IFNdisplayed a clear development towards the last, the 
totalizing position, and this development is due to the dual function of IFN As a theory ot the 
history of philosophy, it had to fit Soviet historiography of philosophy into the framework of 
Soviet philosophy, alleging the superiority of diamat as the outcome of a "revolution" in the 
history of philosophy At the same time, its task was to legitimize IFN as a relatively 
autonomous discipline Soviet philosophy "objectively" needed a defensible history of 
philosophy, which required a professional investigation of philosophy's past, while at the 
same time that investigation had to be demonstrably "Marxist-Leninist" The "mainstream" 
position elaborated by Ojzerman and others thus functioned as a link and at the same time as a 
buffer between official Soviet philosophy and professional historiography of philosophy 
и Apart from functional reasons there are is a systematic reason why IFN developed 
towards a totalizing conception It is a result of the Leninist (and Engelsian) idea that thought 
reflects objective reality If that is the case, then every philosophical theory must, in a however 
distorted way and however distant from diamat, contain a "grain of truth", a "rational kernel". 
This follows from the fact that Soviet Marxist-Leninist philosophy was understood as a 
true "developing scientific-philosophical system "lisi Truth" in this respect means the 
"adequate reflection of an object by a knowing subject, reproduction by the latter of the former 
as it exists as such [sam po sebe, "fur sich , EvdZ], outside of and independently of man and 
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his consciousness"1^2 "Development" means "irreversible, purposeful [парга іеппое], 
lawlike [zakonmemoe] change of material and ideal objects" " 5 1 "Philosophical" means 
dealing with "the general principles of being and knowing [pozname], about the relation of man 
to the world, about the universal laws of development of nature, society, and thought," ' | 5 4 , 
ι e about "matter under the aspect of the unity of all its forms of movement," including, that is, 
Marxist-Leninist philosophy ι '55 "Knowledge" means "result of a process of cognition of 
reality, its adequate expression m human consciousness in the form of representations 
[ptedstavlemja, "Vorstellungen"], concepts, judgments, and theories " 1 1 5 6 "System", finally, 
means "a totality [sovokupnosf] of elements, being in mutual relations and connections, 
forming a fixed whole [celostnosf], a unity [edmstvo] "i ' " 
Consequently, this "developing system of knowledge" can hardly be anything but the 
ever more adequate se/f-knowledge of material substance [Ch 91] And as diamat was claimed 
to be "the highest form of materialism, constituting the result [ltog] of the whole preceding 
history of development of philosophical thought,"115** the task of a Soviet theory of the history 
of philosophy was the reconstruction of that whole preceding history" as the gradual coming-
to-be of the adequate self-knowledge of the substance of the world The totalizing conception 
of Bogomolov and Ojzerman thus expressed the consequence of this Soviet conception of 
philosophy in all clarity 
The philosophy of Marxism is nol чітріу Ihc critical summing up [kntiieikij ¡tog] of the entire preceding 
philosophical development of mankind II is ils developing result, ι e a developing philosophical system, 
which changes its form, enriches Us content in the course of development of society on the basis of new 
historical experience, and the achievements of the natural and social sciences [italics mine, EvdZ] ' '59 
As we have just seen, the Soviet conception differs from the Hegelian one in the speculative 
nature of the latter versus the objectivism of the former A Hegelian might agree with Ojzerman 
or ¿elnov that philosophy is about the relation of the subjective and the objective, but would 
disagree with their "mechanical" application of the subject-object scheme to the history of 
philosophy Philosophy is not just ' about" the relation of subjective and objective, it is itself an 
instance ofthat relation Philosophy exists as necessarily individual, subjective (philosophical) 
thought, as the subsequent objectivization of that thought in 'a philosophy", and as the 
resumption of the content of that objectivation by other thinking individuals [Ch 1 i] The 
concrete nature of philosophy was rightly understood, by the mainstream position, as its 
differentiation into philosophies, but it was wrongly limited to the objective side 
Even if one stresses, with Hegel, that the individual philosopher as such, as this or that 
individual is not important, still it has to be some individual that does the thinking The 
tendency in Hegel's conception towards concentration on positions or systems rather than on 
philosophers is justified only to the extent that it is not about "philosophers" but about the 
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development of Philosophy There is a problem, m Hegel, with individuality as distinct from 
contingency, and Hegel therefore can only think the individual character of philosophy as its 
individuation But Hegel realized that philosophy is not simply "developing", but develops by 
being developed In Russian, the words for "is developing" and "is being developed" are 
identical razvivaetsja[bec Note on Language ) Whether due to this linguistic particularity or not, 
it is clear that Soviet historians saw philosophy as historically developing, not as being done 
and therefore showing development 
This turns philosophy's history into an objective process, but by the same token makes 
it as mysterious as the development of the material substance into ever higher forms, unless it 
already contained [an sich] the seeds of those higher forms It does not help to deny the 
spiritual nature of the Hegelian absolute to replace the absolute idea by infinite matter does not 
preclude the "totalizing" vision of philosophy's history, as both lead to the idea of philosophi­
cal truth as adequate self-knowledge of substance If that substance is mere substance, the 
result is an асшаіічт that is as such incomprehensible, if that substance is a substance-subject, 
the result is an "absolute materialism" Both absolutize philosophy In order to preclude that 
absolutization, and to arrive at a more viable conception of the history of philosophy that 
preserves the strong points of the Hegelian conception, what must be denied is not simply the 
spiritual nature of substance, but its singularity But this means that the very idea of 
philosophical system and of truth in the strong sense become problematic, and these conse­
quences were clearly unacceptable within the framework of Soviet philosophy 
d A Contribution to Theory of the History of Philosophy9 
The 'sophisticated mainstream position" came close to a Hegelian position, acquiring the status 
of a concluding part of a philosophical system It stretched the "official position" to its utter 
limit, ι e to the point were it would show didmatto be, in fact, objective idealism Further and 
corrective development along these lines therefore became possible only after Soviet ideology, 
including the "ideology of philosophy", had lost its significance Although Bogomolov and 
Ojzerman rightly criticized Hegel for "confining philosophy to its own element," making 
philosophy's history "the self-development of philosophy,"1160 it is questionable how 
consistent their critique of Hegel is The main difference with the Hegelian view resides in one 
major point for Hegel, the "highest point" of philosophical development was not so much an 
objectivized philosophical doctrine, but rather the point where "Reason", personified in a 
philosophei, actually thinks, the development of philosophy as "absolute Spirit' (substance-
subject) In the case of Soviet theory of the history of philosophy, because of the rejection of 
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the initial thesis of absolute idealism, the historical process of philosophy becomes an 
objective, "observable" process 
As I have shown, the "sophisticated mainstream position" was as sophisticated as it 
could be within the framework of Soviet philosophical culture and therefore became the 
mainstream position It successfully legitimized IFN as a discipline within the framework of 
the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism The end of Soviet philosophical culture, meant the 
disappearance of the functional and systematic grounds for its predominance As I shall show 
in the next section, it lost its predominant position, and alternative positions came to the fore 
These can partly be interpreted as corrective in relation to the conception of Ojzerman and 
Bogomolov, highlighting aspects that were not and could not be fully appreciated in their 
conception Therefore, I think that the conception of Ojzerman and Bogomolov does contain a 
number of valuable elements, and that the flaws in their theory can largely be ascribed to the 
exigency of presenting the "system" of diamat and istmat as the "developing result" of the 
historical process of philosophy until Marx and Engels In that respect, it can be seen as 
symptomatic' for the conception of philosophy as (necessarily) a system 
The positive elements in the conception developed by Oj/erman and Bogomolov stem from the 
fact that they departed from a reductionist and dichotomizing position, moving "back to Hegel" 
towards a totalizing view This shows the way to an adequate understanding of the concrete 
historical existence of philosophy Philosophy is neither determined -not even "in the final 
analysis"- by socio-economic conditions (including the development of productive forces), nor 
is it explicable in terms of its progressive or reactionary political nature, nor steered by its 
"inner logic" of development, but it is conditioned by these three determinants (plus individual 
thought) in their interplay and interdependence 
Thus, Ojzerman and Bogomolov olfer a number of valuable elements for a realist 
conception of the history of philosophy the differentiation, divergence, and polarization of 
positions, the relative autonomy of philosophy (its partial dependance on science and on socio-
political circumstance), the distinction between an epistemic and an ideological function of 
philosophical theories This contribution, however, is blurred by a pre-ordained monism the 
idea of philosophy as necessarily a single development Although it is understandable that they 
defended such a monism, in view of the ideological function of IFN, it is questionable whether 
it is theoretically inevitable the thesis that all philosophy reflects some reality does not imply 
that the whole of philosophy reflects reality as a whole 
What is elaborated in the sophisticated position, is the individuation of philosophy into 
philosophies, doctrines, not its concrete existence in philosophers, thinking individual human 
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beings, or in philosophical thought as a human activity Of course, as Ojzerman stresses, the 
historical continuity in philosophy "becomes possible only due to the manifold forms of 
objectivization" of philosophical theories чбі This is true inasmuch as objectivizalion is a 
necessary condition for the succession of philosophical positions and thus for the development 
of philosophical culture However, individual philosophical thought is a necessary condition 
for there to be philosophy in the first place The absence, by and large, in the mainstream 
position, of the philosophizing individual, fits remarkably well to the negation of the 
philosopher as a thinking individual in Soviet philosophy — the inadmissibility of Il'enkov's 
"I think" [Ch 9 n) 
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12.І Reactions and Corrections: Perestrojka and (Post-iSoviet Theory of the 
History of Philosophy 
Under the conditions of glasnost' and perestrojka, the official account of the history of 
philosophy underwent considerable change. For example, in the draft version of Vvedeme... 
the "beginning of dialectical materialism" was still announced as the "Great Revolutionary 
Overturn of Philosophy", i ' 6 2 but in the final text this was replaced by a neutral "Formation 
and Development of Marxist Philosophy ".пбз Also, there was a clear break with the tradition 
to make students acquainted with the positions of past philosophers through the commentaries 
made by Marx, Engels and Lenin. The authors of Vvedeme..., by contrast, compiled a 
voluminous reader to accompany the textbook ' 164 As regards the notorious "basic question", 
the fundamental nature of this question no longer was evident, but had to be argued for: 
"It is no secret, that the majority oi philosophers in past and present did and do not consider it as their main 
objective to solve precisely this question ( ) Unwittingly you start thinking is it possible to regard as 
fundamental a question that is not even formulated by the majority of philosophers9 ( ) One thing at least is 
clear the question about the relation of consciousness and being does not rank with the numerous concrete 
philosophical questions, it is of a different nature Perhaps, after all it is not so much a question It is 
important to understand that the poldrity "material-spiritual ', ' objective-subjective" enters all philosophical 
reflections, forms a kind of "nerve-center" of every philosophical question, whether philosophers are aware ot it 
or not"1165 
It certainly makes a difference whether you postulate a fundamental question, or a 
fundamental polarity, at play in concrete philosophical questions. In this respect, the "sophis­
ticated mainstream position" had become the official position ι '66 
However, these substantial changes in the approach of the history of philosophy and of 
contemporary non-Marxist philosophy in "official" vuzovskajafìlosofìja came too late because 
official philosophy had entirely lost its credibility. And the disappearance of an official 
philosophical position made the "covering" theory, developed by Bogomolov and Ojzerman, 
superfluous. "Pure" historiography, and "systematic" philosophy (including reflections on the 
historical nature of philosophy) came to their own as different fields of philosophical work, no 
longer requiring a "link and buffer". IFN fell apart into separate disciplines, each of which 
started to produce its own ideological legitimization, esp. in terms of "national heritage" or 
"return to civilization". 
It is against this background of liberation and emancipation of historiography of philosophy 
[Ch 11 iv], and deepening crisis of Soviet philosophical culture [Ch 6 u], that the present section 
discusses some interesting developments in the field of theory of the history of philosophy. 
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The Limits of Sophistication 
In the epilogue to the first ZFE( 1986), the editors stated that a main objective was "to expand 
the discussion of theoretical and methodological problems of scientific history of 
philosophy "467 However, in the first three issues we do not find any theoretical or 
methodological contribution, and in the subsequent issues they remained very rare П68 In the 
two leading Soviet philosophical journals, VF and FN, the result was zero, too This is not to 
say that nothing happened Since the publication of Bogomolov and Ojzerman's Osnovy 
teoni in 1983, ' 1 6 9 a round-table discussion was held about the methodology of the historio­
graphy of ancient Russian philosophy,11™ and in 1986, a large conference was held in 
Moscow about the methodological and "world-view" [mirovozzrenöeskie] problems of the 
history of philosophy [Ch 11 w] However, while histonographical practice was prospering as 
the subsequent IFEs showed, theory of the history of philosophy remained "stagnant" This 
was related to a tacit victory of the professionalis! position, and to the return to philosophy of 
those who had sought their refuge in IFN 
In 1988, Ojzerman summarized his position He observed that the subject of the two fun-
damental "trends" was hardly dealt with m Soviet philosophical literature, ascribing this 
"deficit" to a "simplified understanding of the substance of the historical process of 
philosophy " , 171 The actual plurality of philosophical doctrines is not a matter of "anarchy of 
philosophical systems," as Dilthey had it, but a complex process of differentiation, divergence, 
integration, polarization, and, finally, radical polarization of the "innumerable multitude of 
philosophical doctrines" into "the fundamental antipodes, materialism and idealism "472 
All these complex processes are materially conditioned", but this does not nullify their 
"relative independence, the significance of which is constantly growing in the course of world 
history [italics mine, EvdZ] "1173 Ojzerman's implicit anti-reductionism becomes manifest in 
his attack on "vulgar sociologism", which disregards the distinction between a philosopher's 
work and the socio-economical conditions and class interest that find expression in that 
work ι '74 He rejects the idea that, in the history of philosophy, materialism was always right 
and idealism always wrong, pointing to a number of instances where idealism was right against 
materialism,11?5 and he also denies that idealists were always "the ideologists of reactionary 
classes, and only the materialists expressed the interests of the revolutionary classes "i 176 He 
thus arrives at a new definition of philosophy 
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"Philosophy is the unity of social consciousness (the expression of social being) and research-activity, the 
subject of which is not only social bul natural reality as well not only being, but also knowledge, logical 
process etc " " 77 
This definition enables Ojzerman to make a distinction between the ideological function 
of philosophy and its scientific, epistemic value philosophy is more than just an instrument in 
class struggle, it is "the self-consciousness of a historically determined epoch "1178 Thus 
Ojzerman restated his earlier position, apparently having reached the limits of its further 
sophistication 
Fed Up With Hegel 
The emancipation of IFN that had been legitimized by that same sophisticated position now 
made it appear outdated and uninspiring During the conference in 1986, the "Hegelian" 
character of the sophisticated position was subjected to severe criticism 
The question of the applicability of the Hegelian scheme of the history of ideas occupied a quite large place in 
the discussion Of course, nobody was defending a Hegelian model of the historical process of philosophy in 
its literal sense its organic flaws are too noticeable, and csp the pretension ol a monopoly of philosophical 
truth, which already includes everything really substantial in the philosophical heritage ' 4 7 9 
All participants agreed that the "linear arrangement of philosophical doctrines," 
proposed by Hegel, "unwittingly impoverishes the substance of the historical process of 
philosophy"1180 But "more powerful stances were expressed too, provoking controver-
sy "liei One of these was a "culturological approach", advocated by a certain M S Glazman, 
who argued that "philosophy ought to be investigated most of all as a cultural phenomenon, 
and not as the process of development of a specific form of scientific knowledge,"1182 and also 
by others (Kamenskij mentions Leonid M Bátkín and Tamara Borisovna Dlugác) 
This trend not only came out with interesting proposals but also with a critique of the Hegelian and the 
closely affiliated Marxist Leninist tradition that dominated Soviet science during the whole nearly seventy 
years I ' 8 i 
As Kissel' rightly comments, such a culturological approach may explain the role that 
certain ideas play within a historical epoch, but it does not touch upon the philosophical 
significance of those ideas 1184 At the same time the trend towards such a "culturological" 
approach is most understandable as an attempt to stress the value of philosophy without 
entering into a discussion of its 'truth philosophical truth had been monopolized by an official 
philosophy for too long 
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New Initiatives m Theory of the History of Philosophy 
Regarded as part of post-Soviet philosophical culture, the work done in theory of the history of 
philosophy presents a combination or reaction and continuity, offering an example of the 
interplay of "inner" logic of development (the negation of elements of an earliei position), and 
'outer', situational logic (the disappearance of Sov/ef philosophical culture) Several 
philosophers have presented radical alternatives to elements of the predominant Soviet theory, 
by denying the idea of progress in philosophy (Dobrochotov), by stressing the individual act of 
thought as the essential moment in philosophy (Mamaidasvih), and by ascribing primacy to 
logic in the history of philosophy (Bibler) Others have developed, in a less radical vein, lines 
that were already present in Soviet times by elaborating a theory of IFN as an independent 
discipline, and by pointing out the determinants of philosophy (Kamenskij), by pointing to the 
prime importance of the subjective strife for truth (Canysev), and by elaborating the notions of 
concrete situation and personal origin [licnostnoe naöälo] of philosophical thought 
(MotroSilova) 
Three Radical Reactions 
In an article with the title "Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die die Metaphysik seit 
Parmenides Zeiten gemacht hat9",1|8, Dobrochotov simply disregarded, as he had done 
elsewhere [Ch 11 iv], the "revolution in philosophy by Marx and Engels" In Soviet philosophy, 
metaphysics was not recognized as a philosophical discipline, but as a philosophical method 
opposed to dialectics Further, the questions that traditionally fell under the competence of 
metaphysics were supposed to be solved, in principle, by diamat For Dobrochotov, by 
contrast, metaphysics is the central discipline of philosophy, and its questions remain 
unresolved,' 186 which is why metaphysics is vital to human culture 
Und wirklich, die Metaphysik hat in der Geschichte standige Frfolge zu verzeichnen, weil sie nicht ins Ziel 
trifft Sie stellt immer wieder die Einheit der Frfahrung her, so, wie das 'ich des Menschen immer die Einheit 
der Persönlichkeit herstellt Indem sie ihre historische Kreise beschreibt, bewahrt die Metaphysik in der sich 
veranderenden Welt die Identität eines gewissen 'ich' in der Wcltkultur Jeder Versuch jedoch, eine gehaltvolle 
Bestimmung dieses 'ich zu geben erweist sich als erfolglos Mit unbedingter Notwendigkeit zwingt die 
Metaphysik zur Freiheit Darin kann man schon jetzt eine Rechtfertigung ihrer Existenz finden, ohne auf eine 
Antwort auf die gestellten Fragen zu warten, auf die Fragen nach dem Sinn ihrer Erfolge "1187 
Dobrochotov's conception of philosophy is strongly historical, but he rejects the idea of 
"linear progress of metaphysics "488 Philosophy exists only as a reflection on its own past, 
and at the same time every attempt to understand, say, Parmenides' system, adds something to 
philosophy 1189 Philosophy is historical, but not in the sense of yielding irreversible results 
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Mamardasvih's thought also was oriented on Western philosophy He incarnated, in a way, the 
idea of the presence of past philosophy in actual philosophical thought Thus, in his contribu-
tion to the "round table" on phenomenology,"90 he expounded his view that the 
phenomenological movement, as it appeared in the 20th century with Husserl and his school, 
represents "a special technique" needed to resuscitate the eternal phenomenological problem of 
the absolute individuality, manifest in every act of thinking Kant's "Ich denke", which must 
accompany all my representations,1191 Descartes' "cogito, ergo sum" 1192 Phenomenology, 
according to Mamardasvili, is a constitutive element of every philosophy, '193 because "for me, 
the problem of phenomenology is the problem of pure thought,"1194 ie of the event of 
thinking, an event that is, evidently, distinguishable from its content '195 
If every philosophy contains these "phenomenological problems", their appearance in 
philosophy does not depend on the historical sequence of philosophies For example, Kant 
took the problem of causality from Hume, not perceiving it in Descartes, "although . it is a 
fundamental Cartesian problem"1196 According to Mamardasvili this "indicates that there 
already exists a cultural code in philosophy, independent of the familiarity with sources, and 
dependent only on the appearance of the phenomenon of the individual, without which 
philosophy is impossible "1197 This is why the role of phenomenology in, e g , Soviet 
philosophy did not depend on familiarity with Husserl 
" lets say that what I know about phenomenology, in the sense ot a problem, did not come to mc from 
Husserl at all [u menja sovscm ne ;/ Gus4crlja\ And it is not important whether I knew that all of it had already 
been done, in other terms, by Husserl It is evident, that the living existence of a thought does not depend on 
whether I know it textologically or not ( ) In general, it seems to me, phenomenological problems came into 
our philosophy independently of our assimilation of Husserl ( ) with me it went via Marx "1198 
Even though Mamardasvih's conception of philosophy is strongly historical, he rejects 
the idea that history of philosophy "is the only philosophical task, attainable for the present 
time"1199 He criticized Karl Jaspers on this point, accusing him of the destruction of 
"whichever representation of a coherent historical process," and of erecting, in Die großen 
Philosophen, "a multitude of isolated (only typologically comparable) spiritual worlds, that are 
personified for him by great philosophers, and have no other significance than to be the code of 
some individual existence [byt' Sifrom nekotorogo mdividual'nogo suscestvovanija] "1200 For 
Mamardasvili, philosophy arises from the "relation of man to the world, to the objects," a 
relation of "astonishment [udivleme]," not just individually, but as part of the "experience of 
consciousness [opyt soznamjd] "1201 
" the essential, constitutive acts of consciousness and of our spirituality always take place against the 
background of what might be named the experience of consciousness Not consciousness of something, but the 
experience of consciousness itself as a particular kind of ontologically implanted being , a certain non verbal 
or tcinunologically indivisible state of «I am I think», which on the verge of utmost individuation continues 
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our (your my), for ourselves indubitable, living existence in the world But here I would like to remark that on 
the verge of that individuation an utmost universah/ation simultaneously takes place "1202 
Speaking about the "infinite duration of conscious life," and "the immortality . in 
thought of the person," '2<H he points to the phenomenon that when we understand, e g , what 
Descartes had in mind when he formulated his famous "cogito, ergo sum", we are, in spite of 
temporal and spatial distance,1204
 m
 touch with what he thought, ι e with a certain grasping of 
an essential feature of consciousness His formulation of that feature is to some extent 
arbitrary someone else might have expressed it in other terms, 1205 as Kant actually did, and if 
somebody thinks today what another philosopher thought 300 years ago, that is a matter of 
plagiarism, but a resuscitation of his thought 
" we are alive in the act that we perform now, if we keep our forerunners alive, and not mortified in text 
(umerfrmi ν tekste] If Kant is alive, then I am alive, too And if the other way round, I am alive, if I am able 
to contemplate something Kantian as a possibility of my own thinking, and not of my erudition, then Kant is 
alive as well ' '206 
Recalling Pascal's expression that "our thinking is one man, eternally and continuously 
thinking,"1207 the personification of "all philosophy,"l208 he sees the history of philosophy as 
not a chronological sequence, but as something like a "fan, the folds of which are not situated 
in a linear way, but coexist [sosuïcesvujut] "1209 
Mamardaävih's view is in some respects reminiscent of Hegel's conception of the 
history of philosophy, which he criticized from a Marxist point of view 30 years ago, 
demonstrating that Hegel did not work out a truly historical method, but "in fact develops a 
way of familiarization, assimilation of the historical heritage by the individual as the subject of 
culture "1210 On this point Mamardasvili apparently has learned a lot from Hegel, but he 
rejects, like Dobrochotov, the idea of progress in philosophy in the Hegelian sense, 1 e the 
"Aufhebung" of all previous philosophy by the latest system, which is what Soviet Marxism-
Lcninism retained from Hegel 1 2" For Mamardasvili, progress in philosophy is not the 
Aufhebung of all previous philosophy, but the assimilation and resuscitation of past 
philosophy by the present philosophizing individual as their own possible thought 12'2 
In my opinion, MamardaSvih is right when he says that to study the history of philosophy in a 
philosophically committed way means to (try to) rethink the thoughts of past philosophers, and 
to treat their thought as "possible thought of one's own", but to say that, therefore, philosophy 
is "one man, eternally and continuously thinking", is, even if you regard it as a metaphor, too 
ready a conclusion The fact that when I read Kant or MamardaSvih, I experience something 
like immediate mental contact across time and space, is a most interesting fact of human 
thinking, well worth psychological'213 or phenomenological analysis, but it is not sufficient 
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ground for any far-reaching metaphysical conclusions. Still, his thought is impressive enough 
as an antidote against the predominant "objectivism" in Soviet philosophy, including the 
position of Bogomolov and Ojzerman. 
In a similar vein, Bibler elaborated the notion of "logical expanse [logiceskoeprostnmstvo]", in 
which "the possible answers of, let's say, Plato to Aristotle's criticism become actual; the 
philosophy of Plato is developing [razvi vaetsja] (develops itself [razvivaet sebja]) not at the 
expense of a transition to another system (not at the cost of the procedure of sublation 
[snjatie]...), but as the infinite development of all potential possibilities of platonism in a 
discussion (about logical principles) with Aristotle, but also with Plotinus, but also with 
Nicholas of Cusa, but also with Kant and Hegel..."1214 Philosophy does not exist in the 
systems themselves, but "«in the interval [ ν promc?.utke]» between" them,1215 it "exists and 
develops in the logical communication [obscenie] (dialogue) between many logically simul­
taneous [logiöeskiodnovremennye] philosophical systems and doctrines:"1216 
"Thus, the profound philosophical meaning of that same Ethica of Spinoza is revealed, if we (the investigators) 
discover (this discovery is also a phenomenon of the philosophical-logical movement of thought), that the idea, 
for example, of Spinozian «substance» is a special relation between the two substances of Descartes (thought 
and extension), that the conversion of the Cartesian substances into attributes (in Spinoza's sense) is at the same 
time a substantial understanding of the notion of attributivity [affrjbufjVnosfl."1217 
Like Mamardasvili, Bibler puts full stress on the act of philosophical thought, when he 
argues that "only what exists on the border of philosophy and philosophy, which unites and 
antagonizes one philosophical system with another, — that is the pure golden sediment [cistyj 
zolotoj osadok] of the activity of the philosophical mind, that is the phenomenon of 
philosophizing [fi/asofsfvovam'e]."1218 This naturally goes at the expense of the products of 
thought, the philosophical theories and systems, usually regarded as the proper subject-matter 
of history of philosophy as a discipline. One may well agree with Bibler that philosophical 
thought exists necessarily as act, but that does not imply that history of philosophy should limit 
itself to an exploration of "the properly philosophical problem-field [sobslvenno Filosofskaja 
problematika]," which can be called "philosophicallogic, i.e. the logical (?) foundation of the 
indivisible principles of thought (which are the same as the principles of being, that can be 
founded by thought)."121^ If we follow Bibler, however, this is what history of philosophy 
should do: 
"History of philosophy is not simply one of the properly philosophical disciplines; it is philosophy par 
excellence, in its pure form, without its (of philosophy, that is) conversion, or more precisely, degenerations 
[vyrozdenija] into metaphysical systems, or into an ontologically enclosed picture of the world, or into a set of 
moral imperatives, or into a scientific (science-like) theory ."1220 
"The truly philosophical logic works at the verge [na grani] (in the dialogue) of the system of Descartes and 
Spinoza, it, as M.M. Bachtin loved to say, docs not have a land, a territory of its own. Only the historico-
philosophical approach is an approach that is immanent to the essence of philosophical thought."1221 
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Bibler's main source of inspiration is Hegel,'222 but with a major correction 
The Hegelian schematism of the identity of «logic and history of philosophy» is an appearance [fenomen] of 
philosophy as true scientific doctrine [ічітпос naukauíeme, in German wahre Wissenschaftslehre , EvdZ] For 
Hegel philosophy is the doctrine of the principles [nacala ι pnncipy] of scientific theoretical knowledge 
[nduino teoretiCeskoe pozname in German wissenschaftlich theoretisches Wissen , EvdZ] Such a 
philosophy is congenial to Modernity, congenial to knowing reason [oznajuSCij razum, in German die 
wissendeVernuntt EvdZ] (beginning with the philosophy of the 17th century -Descartes, Spino/a, Leibniz-
and ending with classical German philosophy of the 19th century, including Neo Kantianism ) '1223 
Modelling philosophy after science, and trying to include philosophy's past in the 
textbook [ucebnik] of present science, Hegel was forced to introduce a quasi-cumulative 
conception of philosophy as the self-knowledge of substantial reality as it gradually, in and 
through history, came into being This implies, within the Hegelian conception, the notion of 
progress ["die letzte Philosophie ist das Resultat aller früheren"], as well as the notion of 
irreversibility ["man kann jetzt nicht mehr Platoniker sein"], notions enthusiastically adopted by 
Soviet philosophy, and just as enthusiastically rejected by Bibler, who stresses the opposite 
tendency in Hegel's thought, that of absolutizing the logic that is ' at work" in the history of 
philosophy 
It is the radical de-histonzation of philosophy that allows Bibler to point out that all 
possible philosophical positions are possibilities of present philosophical thought It is possible 
to be a Platonist or a Hegelian today, and it is possible to defend Plato against Aristotle by 
exploiting hitherto unnoticed logical possibilities of their philosophies 1224 Nor does this 
contradict, as Bibler rightly stresses, the historical existence of philosophy as such, since the 
"logic" at play here "works only di the verge of historically present philosophical doctrines, 
permanently has to return to «the origin of origins», exists freely (creatively) only at the point 
of their (of those systems) mutually giving birth to each other [vzaimoporozdeme] and mutually 
founding each other [ гашюоЬоспо аше],"1225 but this nevertheless means that the existence 
of philosophy in history is contingent (in Hegel's terminology the entire history of philosophy 
becomes its outer history) 
Bibler's rejection of key notions of the predominant Soviet conception is an over-reaction To 
deny monohnear development is not to deny all development, and to agree that a Hegelian 
position is a real possibility of present thought because it is a logical possibility of thought as 
such, and in that sense "eternal", is not to deny that the Hegelian position could only be 
developed because and after Kant had developed his position And not only had it to be 
thought, but also fixated as a theory and objectivized as a fexf We can only "reach" Kant's 
thought through objectifications of his thought,'226 and the "logical expanse" that we enter 
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when we "think what Kant thought" is always a partial reconstruction of that expanse, taking 
its departure from a particular position within it, generated by problems that occupy us today. 
Finally, philosophy is historical in an important, "epochal" sense that seems to be excluded by 
Bibler's conception. Platonism remains a possibility of present thought, but not a possibly 
predominant philosophy: it can not be the philosophy of its time, because its time is past. 
In sum, the three contributions just discussed can be seen as radical reactions to main elements 
of Soviet theory of the history of philosophy. As such they were not only "critical" but also, 
and more importantly, they reopened a field of discussion that had been fixated in connection 
with the "ideology of Soviet philosophy". By the same token, they were "one-sided" in that 
they made visible the blind spots of the position they reacted to. In contrast with these, other, 
more "synthetic" corrections can be perceived as well, that bring out elements that were present 
but underexposed in Soviet theory. 
Three ValuableCorrections 
Kamenskij, in a book that has not received due attention,1227 makes an attempt to develop a 
"system of historical knowledge of philosophy,"1228 i.e. a theory of the objective historical 
process of philosophy and a theory of history of philosophy as a discipline. He thus continues 
his earlier work ICh.lo.iiil and a line present in the mainstream position, but without the latter's 
absolutization of the philosophy of Marxism-Leninism. Kamenskij stresses the opposition 
between the idea of history of philosophy as primarily a philosophical discipline, which was 
fully elaborated by Hegel,1229 and the idea of history of philosophy as primarily a historical 
discipline that should be practiced independently of "systematic" philosophy. 
Thanks to his clear distinction of a (philosophical) theory of the historical process of 
philosophy, and a theory of IFN as a discipline, which is a major improvement over the 
identification of the two in Soviet conceptions [Ch.lO.iii and I2.i], Kamenskij is able to trace back 
"history of philosophy as the reproduction... of the historical process of philosophy" to 
Aristotle as its founder.1230 In Kamenskij's terminology, this is the second history of 
philosophy, the first being the historical process itself. He divides the development of the third 
history of philosophy, i.e. the theory of the first and the second history of philosophy, into 
three periods: a period of sporadic reflection (from Aristotle until the 17th century), a transitory 
period (until Kant, the first to formulate a theoretical conception,1231 and from Kant to Hegel), 
and, finally, "the period of the development of conceptualized reflection — of a particular field 
of knowledge,... a special discipline (from Hegel to the present day)."1232 
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Kamenskij elaborates the notion oí a triple determination of philosophy with respect to 
its emergence and development Philosophy is determined, first of all, by a "subject-matter 
determinant [predmetna/a determinan ta}", ι e by "what it is about", being, according to 
Kamenskij, "the forms of universality," secondly by "the socio-histoncal conditions, in 
which a thinker lives and works," and, thirdly, by the tradition from which every philosopher 
departs '233 Kamenskij's distinctions are clear and illuminating, and his discussion stays clear 
from the "chronic disease, nested in [gnezdjaScajásja] the Marxist tradition itself," to wit 
"vulgar sociologism "1234 However, in his conception as much as in the one developed by 
Bogomolov and Ojzerman, the individual philosopher, though of course the "author", appears 
only as the contingent individuation of philosophy as governed by the interplay of three 
determinants 
Another traditional flaw of Soviet history of philosophy was its tendential identification of 
philosophy as part of ideology One Soviet specialist in philosophy of Antiquity, Canysev, in 
reaction to an article that was highly critical of the official Soviet account of the history of 
philosophy,'235 arrived at a separation (instead of a distinction) of the epistemic and the 
ideological function of philosophy, and a denial of the partisan nature of philosophy 
to reduce the objective historical process of philosophy only to this ideological function is incorrect The 
moving force [dvifuSSaja sua) of philosophy as an objective rational world view process was not struggle for the 
sake of struggle but striving lor truth [strcmlcme к istine] tor an understanding of the world in which people 
live ( ) Philosophy is essentially impartial '236 
In passing, and slightly exaggerating (after all, neither Lenin nor the official Soviet 
philosophy regarded "struggle for the sake of struggle" as the motive force of philosophy's 
development), CanySev put all blame for the notion of partisanship on Lenin 
"Declaring that philosophy always has been partisan, V I Lenin prepared a sad and disgraceful future for 
philosophy and the philosophers for philosophy the lot to be exclusively ideology, ι e a handmaid of politics, 
and for philosophers the lot of being the certified lackeys of partocracy [diplomirovannych lakeevpartok 
ratii) "1237 
¿anysev, however, rightly recognizes that both the epistemic and the ideological 
function of philosophy are present in "the objective historical process of philosophy " 1238 The 
separation of the two does not imply that history of philosophy should completely disregard the 
ideological function Still, ¿anysev points out an important aspect, largely neglected in Soviet 
conceptions of the history of philosophy, namely that for there to be philosophy it takes 
individual human beings who try to reach a true understanding of the world, and who, m doing 
so, disregard the eventual ideological function ot the results of their strife The fact that this 
recognition appears, in fanysev and others, '239 as a critique of Soviet philosophical practice, 
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shows that theoretical truth was seen as an automatic product of the development of 
philosophy, and not as the aim of an individual endeavor 
A similar "individualist" amendment was made by MotroSilova, who linked it to the notion of 
concrete existence of philosophy in history In her earlier studies on 17th century philosophy 
of man, MotroSilova attempted to solve the old question of how social and political history 
determines philosophy's history and to what extent philosophy is autonomous [Ch 11 ш b] 
Explicitly refusing to regard great philosophers as "straightforward and conscious partisans of 
revolutionary socio-political reforms of that era," 124° she interpreted 17th century philosophy 
of man as a reaction to rapidly changing social and political conditions and as a conscious 
assimilation by the people involved of their own objective position within those conditions 
This notion of the importance of individual philosophers in a given epoch is, in a very natural 
way, linked to the ideological self-defence "from below" of post-Soviet philosophers like 
MotroSilova 1 2 4 1 
In 1990, MotroSilova investigated the ways in which classical German philosophy was 
conditioned by its epoch and the ways in which that philosophy, by virtue of its understanding 
of its epoch, was one of the factors in making it She tried to develop a theory of the "general 
mechanisms of the socio-histoncal conditionedness [social'no-istoriceskajaobuslovlennost] of 
philosophical knowledge"1 2 4 2 The important new element in comparison with the "sophis­
ticated" position is the role of the philosophers themselves as a necessary condition for 
philosophy their tenacity, their far-reaching vision (beyond their own epoch), their courage to 
defend their positions becomes a factor in the historical development of philosophy itself As 
we read in the concluding lines of Motrosilova's contribution to Filosofijd epochi · 
'It so happened, that those rights and liberties, that allegedly in an abstract manner (in abstraction from 
historical development and its changes) were deduced from immutable human nature, were precisely historically 
conditioned, moving to the front [ vydvmuvSiesja napervyjplan] in the epoch of early bourgeois revolutions 
Here also lies, from our point of view, the fundamental value of the philosophy of man of the I7th century it 
«expressed m thought [ vyrazila ν mysljdth an allusion to Hegel s in Gedanken erfaßt , EvdZ]» the epoch of 
earlv bourgeois revolutions, and at the same time sought to stand up for the unfading values [петегкпиьСіе 
cennosti] of humanism, continued the even today incessant struggle of ideas [ne prekrascajuscajasja ι scgodnja 
borba idej], coming out on the side of science reason peace, and progress ' ' 2 4 3 
In 1991, MotroSilova turned her theory into practice, trying to make ideas, taken from 
the history of philosophy, work in the actual historical situation, departing from her historical 
understanding of how ideas have been working, a turn already announced m 1990 ' 2 4 4 She 
not only resumes her theoretical model in a discussion of selected chapters from the history of 
philosophy,i245 but also includes it in an awareness of what she herself is doing, including the 
"otsebjatma' [Ch 5 ι and Ch 8 in] involved 
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"...to the answer, given earlier, to the question: what is this book about? — I should like to add the following: 
it is about the role o f the personal beginning in philosophy. The search of creative, humanist spiritual structures 
of the person, oriented towards universal human ideas and values, that is perhaps the main requirement of our 
lime and of the coming epoch. (...) It is mc that is appealing to the readers, appealing to them directly, «from 
myself [oí sefy'a]»..."1246 
MotroSilova's theoretical model of the interrelation [vza/'mosv/'az] of philosophy and the 
historical development of society, distinguishes three levels: civilization - epoch - historical 
situation.1247 This model is illuminating, and shows how she -rightly, I believe- adopts a 
realist interpretation of the Hegelian concept of epoch as a stage in the development of World 
Spirit, renamed "civilization". The most general level is that of civilization, "the dimension of 
the contradictory, spasmodic development of mankind since barbarianism,"1248 a universal and 
generally progressive movement. This development takes place as a succession of epochs, 
"large-scale stages in the development of human civilization."1249 Although the division of 
civilization into epochs is not strict, depending as it may on a choice of perspective (socio-
economic formations, cultural eras, stages of technical development), these concepts are rather 
traditionally Hegelian. However, Motrosilova introduces a third level, implied by Hegel's 
notion of concrete existence, but hardly elaborated in his philosophy, viz. the historical 
situation. At this concrete level of historical existence of philosophical thought, regional, 
national, social, and personal factors come into play. This third level is of crucial importance, 
and at this point MotroSilova's ideas are, I think, a valuable contribution to a realist conception 
of the history of philosophy. 
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Conclusion 
It has become clear in this chapter, first of all, that since the establishment of /FNas a relatively 
distinct discipline around 1960, Soviet historians of philosophy have raised a number of 
"classical" theoretical questions with respect to the history of philosophy [12.nl. They did not, 
however, discuss a question that might seem obvious given their "Marxist-Leninist" back­
ground, viz. the question how exactly philosophy is determined, "in the final analysis", by 
socio-economic conditions, as the standard formula was [Ch.lO.ii.c and lO.iii]. Not only is that 
question difficult to answer if one really takes it seriously, but it also fitted badly to the position 
ascribed to philosophy within the Soviet system. It was incompatible with the dominant 
"ideology of Soviet philosophy [Ch.SJ, as well as with the actual state of affairs in IFN [Ch.l 1], 
and it would, if applied to Soviet philosophy itself, produce a rather critical analysis. 
In the second place, closer investigation of work by Soviet theoreticians of the history 
of philosophy has shown some differentiation of positions. The development of one overall 
"sophisticated mainstream position" was flanked by a number of alternative conceptions on 
partial issues, as well as by a "professionalist" undercurrent [12.i and ii]. This typically Soviet 
situation relates to the "collectivism" of Soviet philosophy: a tendency to stress agreement 
rather than controversy, and the virtual exclusion of "heresy". The often strikingly traditional 
answers to traditional questions, the toning-down of the "basic question", and the relativization 
of fundamental principles of istmat, all substantiate the conclusion that it was not so much 
"Marxism-Leninism" or historical materialism that was at stake in these theoretical endeavors. 
In the third place, Soviet attempts to address the question about the relation of 
philosophy's history to world history came as close to a Hegelian position as Soviet 
philosophers could get [12.Ш]. This, in combination with a maximum tendency towards a 
totalizing position [12.U1, part of the heritage of the klassikimarksizma-lcninizma [Ch.lO.i], led 
to a conception of philosophy as the "highest" form of (social) consciousness, displaying a 
progressive dialectical historical development, i.e. an inner logic, having as its resu/fdialectical 
and historical materialism, which just stopped short of being declared the adequate self-
knowledge of material substance. The admiration of Hegel's conception of the history of 
philosophy was essential: a "Hegelian" conception fitted best to the ideologically required 
conciliation of the different functions of IFN. 
The subsequent positions in theory of the history of philosophy developed by Soviet 
philosophers -the sophisticated position of Bogomolov and Ojzerman, and the reactive and 
corrective positions of Dobrochotov, Mamardasvili, and Bibler, Kamenskij, CanySev, and 
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Motrosilova- all contain valuable elements that can be included in a realist conception of the 
history of philosophy [I2.iv]. The concept of a concrete socio-historical situation in which 
philosophy necessarily exists, introduced by Motrosilova, yields, I believe, a good point of 
departure for a realistic conception of the history of philosophy, in which the other contribu-
tions can find their place, esp. the point that philosophy is necessarily done by individuals. The 
conception of the historical nature of philosophy that has guided the present study as a whole 
is, among others, an attempt at such a conception, trying to incorporate the contributions made 
by (post-)Soviet philosophers, and partly inspired by them [Ch.l and 2]. 
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Conclusion to Part Four 
Although the pcriodization of IFN corresponds to that of Soviet philosophy as a whole, the 
overall nature of the subsequent periods in Soviet philosophy differs from the same periods in 
IFN. In IFN, the "dead period" was a period of relative bloom, whereas the period after the 
discussion of 1947 showed more life in Soviet philosophy, but less in IFN. From 1956 
onwards, IFN has been constantly expanding and improving, stimulated by the running-down 
of ottepel' and by zastoj. The most recent period, finally, has first showed a bloom of IFN and 
a "crisis" of Soviet philosophical culture, but then the displacement of both by "meta--
philosophical discourse" and "Renaissance" of Western and Russian philosophy. This contrast 
points to the complexity of Soviet philosophical culture, and to the "complementary" role of 
IFN as an area of escape and a "guardian" of philosophical culture [Ch.lO]. 
This occupation of many philosophers in an intensive study of the history of 
philosophy has preserved philosophical culture in spite of the omnipresence of an oppressive 
ideology, and demonstrated the wide gap between Soviet and foreign philosophy. As to the 
teaching of history of philosophy, this irrefutably improved the technical, formal abilities of 
Soviet philosophers, and made students familiar with, and curious about other philosophies 
than official Marxist-Leninist dogma. Soviet historians of philosophy, in their collective effort 
to cover the entire historical development of philosophy, have yielded an impressive body of 
work, limited, in some cases more than in others, by the direct and indirect ideological 
functions of philosophy, but all the same giving access to large parts of pre-Marxist and, to a 
lesser extent, post-Marxist philosophy [Ch.ll]. 
However, if IFN meant preservation, it also meant frustration. The problem of IFN 
was not that there was no access to past or present non-Soviet philosophy. Access was 
incomparably less than what Western philosophers see as normal, but most classical 
philosophers and surprisingly many contemporary ones were present in anthologies or full 
translations. But these source materials stood largely alone: an environment of critical 
discussion and assimilation was eclipsed by obligatory "kritika". If a student in philosophy is 
confronted with a reliable translation of Nicholas of Cusa and fair accounts of his thought like 
the one by Bibichin in the FËS,1250 but is raised within the context of an oppressive 
"philosophy of Marxism-Leninism" that offers no room for a critical appropriation of Nicholas 
of Cusa's thought, what other choice is there but to become a "hidden Cusanean", or limit 
oneself to historical study? 
The fact of the matter is, that the competence built up by Soviet historians of 
philosophy could not be made productive within the framework of Soviet philosophical 
537 
Conclusion 
culture The main flaw of IFN was that, while the material (editions) and the intellectual 
(historical and philosophical competence) basis for an appropriation of past philosophy were 
fulfilled, one further condition was not, namely the legitimacy of the nsk to become a 
convinced 'Platonist' or "Hegelian" [Ch 2 и ш] If an official position is given, entailing a 
scheme of interpretation and critique of philosophical position or theory, the possibility of a 
different position is formally excluded it becomes a deviation This exclusion implies that other 
positions can not be taken seriously philosophically, but only historically 
Soviet philosophy developed a theoretical conception of the history of philosophy that 
was, at crucial points, like the conception of Hegel to such an extent that we can speak of a 
"return to Hegel" [Ch 12 ш] The totalizing view was clearly favored by the situation of Soviet 
philosophical culture It had the salutary effect of making all past and much of contemporary 
philosophy a field of philosophically committed study At the same time, there was something 
fundamentally wrong with Soviet philosophy, and this was not so much the content of its 
theory, nor its systematic form, but its exclusive position as the philosophy of the Soviet 
system, as a politically warranted, and allegedly partisan and scientific true system of 
philosophical knowledge A "Hegelian" view of the history of philosophy, presenting the last 
and "final' philosophy as the result of the entire historical development of Philosophy, fitted 
perfectly to this ideology of Soviet philosophy At the same time, this use of Hegel's 
conception points to a fundamental problem of any philosophy that claims to be a conclusive 
scientific system of philosophy, and overlooks the fact that all philosophy is a claim at 
universal truth trom an individual position Simphstically accusing Hegel of absolutizing his 
own system, Soviet philosophy in fact absolutized itself as a "developing system" 
The conception of the history of philosophy developed by Bogomolov and Ojzerman, 
further amended by MotroSilova and others, can be rightly regarded as an interesting position 
Detached from its Soviet background, it contains several elements that deserve attention from 
the perspective of the theory of the history of philosophy Reduced to its Soviet context, it 
appears as part of an oppressive monologous philosophical doctrine, desperately attempting to 
adapt itself to changing circumstances Viewed from within its Soviet context, it testifies of the 
fundamental tension between the idea of philosophy as a form of true, systematic, and 
scientific knowledge and the idea of philosophy as, in some significant way, historical 
Further, it exemplifies the concrete relationship between the "inner logic" of the historical 
development of philosophy -in this case IFN-, with 'outer ' historical conditions, the first 
filling the space left or created by the second And finally it shows the essential link between 
freely developing philosophical thought and a social and political order that warrants some 
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form of pluralism: not a mere multitude of interests (there was no lack of particular interests or 
inner-Party struggle in the USSR), but a legitimate plurality of positions, parties, or powers. 
It is important to note that both the sophisticated, "Hegelianizing" theory of the history 
of philosophy advocated by Ojzerman and Bogomolov, and the corresponding practical, 
historiographical work, were a result of the development of IFN during the years of stagnation, 
not of the period of perestrojka. The latter of course brought substantial change, offering a 
chance to highlight hitherto ignored aspects. The dissolution of IFN and the evaporation of its 
"Marxist-Leninist nature by definition" went along with the vanishing of the sophisticated 
mainstream position, with a shift from the combination of theory of the historical process and 
of the discipline of history of philosophy (represented by Kamenskij), and with a move to 
"speculative" conceptions of philosophy's history that bore, at least in the cases of Mamar-
dasvili and Bibler, little relation to actual historiography of philosophy as practiced within IFN. 
A more general conclusion is that, within an existing philosophical culture, the official position 
links that culture to the bodies that provide and secure, and thus can limit or nullify, its political 
and economic conditions of existence. Hence, an official position primarily performs an 
ideological function: it is a meta-philosophical theory about the "use" of philosophy, its 
importance in education, its scientific status, its cultural value, etc., that legitimizes, and thus 
secures the existence of that philosophical culture, relatively irrespective of its value as a 
theory, i.e. as an attempt to understand the nature of philosophy. In the Soviet case, there was 
a (supposed) immediate link between political power and a specific philosophical position. 
Consequently, the official position in the case of Soviet philosophical culture was a meta-
philosophical theory as part of'the philosophical system of diamat and istmat. 
The sophisticated position in IFN was the position that mediated between the official 
position and what actually happened within philosophical culture. As such, it had to subscribe 
to, or at least not overtly deny the official position, but at the same time it had to relate in an 
arguable way to IFN as it actually existed. Conversely, for the reason just indicated, the 
"sophisticated mainstream position" could not but touch upon the "system of diamat and 
istmat". It led, as we have seen, to a tendential historical relativization of the very foundation of 
diamat, viz. the "basic question of philosophy". Which, at the same time, meant the objective 
limit of sophistication of this theory within Soviet philosophical culture. Here, as elsewhere, 
we witness the development of philosophical theory according to its inner logic but within a 
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socio-historical situation that determines the limits of that development, and that favors some 
positions while disfavoring others. Changes in that situation lead to changes in the outer, 
situational logic, but do not affect the inner, developmental logic. 
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N O T E S T O PART IV 
llovcuk 1967, ρ 66, refemng to VI Lenin, "Konspekt «Nauki logiki»," \PSS XXIX], ρ 84 Lenin's 
statement, as a matter of fact, is not explicitly about Marxist philosophy, but about logic, understood by Lenin 
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2Kamenka 1963, ρ 7, η 1 
3Ballestrem 1963, ρ 107 
4Rybarczyk 1974, ρ 91, and idem 1975, ρ 2 
5 Ballestrem 1963a and 1963b 
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15 Cf also Kamenskij 1992, ρ 15 
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20 Op cit, ρ 267 
21 Opcit, ρ 261 
22 0pcit , ρ 250 
23 "Solche Konstanz des Urteils ist eigentlich nur auf dem philosophiehistonschen Gebiet zu beobachten" 
(Irrhtz &c 1985 ρ 50 
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und Märtyrer im philosophischen Kalender" [MEWErgänzungsband, 1 Teil, ρ 263] 
32 Cf Irrhtz &c 1985, ρ 42 
33 Marx, MEWErganzungsband, 1 Teil, ρ 261f 
34 Kamenka 1965, ρ 84f 
35 Marx, MEW Ergänzungsband, 1 Teil, ρ 305 
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37 Marx & Engels, Die deutsche Ideologie [MEWIIT], ρ 27 
38 Op cu, ρ 8f 
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statement of historical materialism as a theory of history ", cf also Aleksandrov 1937, ρ 38 
41 Kamenka 1965, ρ 92 
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heir of classical German philosophy "Die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung ist die Erbin der deutschen klassischen 
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51 Kamenka 1965, ρ 92f 
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1947, №2, pp 220-243, discussion in V£ 1948, №1, pp 184-202, cf also Goerdt 1984, ρ 117f " so hatte 
S A Kamenskij sich im selben Heft "Zur Frage der Tradition in der russischen materialistischen Philosophie des 
18 und 19 Jahrhunderts" ziemlich kritisch mit der damals herrschenden patriotischen Auffassung der 
Philosophiegeschichtsschreibung von I Ja Schtschipanow, auseinandergesetzt, die russische Denker nur von 
russischen Denkern beeinflußt sein ließ" (Goerdt 1984, ρ 117), short summaries of the article by Kamenskij, as 
well as generally approving reactions by other historians, and an unfavorable reply by Siipanov, accusing 
Kamenskij of "bourgeois objectivism" and "kosmopohtizm" [the latter being the usual reproach against people 
of Jewish descent, esp under Stalin] (Goerdt 1984, ρ 118), can be found in Goerdt 1960, pp 46ff, 55f, and 
66ff, cf also Wetter 1960S, ρ 220-222 
161 Quoted from Wetter I9605, ρ 221Г, who refers to "Za bol'sevistskuju partijnost' ν filosofii," YE 1948, 
№3, ρ l l f 
162 Interview with Z A Kamenskij on 17/12/1993 
163 This subordination was heralded by KosiCev as the realization of Marx' 1 Ith Feuerbach-thesis (cf KosiCev 
1986, ρ 14) 
164Iov6uk 1967, ρ 70 
165 Cf Wetter 1960S,
 p 214, and Ballestrem 1963b 
166Iovcuk 1985, ρ 5 
167 Cf SCipanov &c 1982, ρ 240 
168 Cf Majorov &c 1979, ρ 46 
169 Cf Volodin &c 1991, ρ 3f, and Ε Ρ Sitkovskij, "Rabotât' sobstvennoj golovoj [To work with one's 
own head]," in op cit, ρ 5f 
170 A V Sccglov, Kmkij oierk ¡stoni filosofa (Moskva 1940), cf Wetter 1960S, ρ 214 
171 Cf Frolov &c 1989, I, ρ 267, Somerville 1943, ρ 509, and idem 1946, ρ 239 
172 Aleksandrov &c 1941-1943, the set-up of the 7 volumes was as follows I - Antiquity and Middle Ages, II 
- 15th-18th century, III - first half of the 19th century, IV - Marxism, V - philosophy of the peoples of the 
USSR, VI - contemporary bourgeois philosophy, VII - development of Marxist philosophy by Lenin and 
Stalin (Aleksandrov &c 1941-1943,1, ρ 3) 
173 Cf Wetter 1960S, ρ
 2 ] 4 
174 Iovcuk 1985, ρ 9 
175 Cf Dynmk &c 1957-1965, 16, к 1, ρ 419 
176D>nnik &c 1957-1965, VI, kn 1, ρ 419, cf Bochenski 1967, ρ 42 
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177Iovíuk 1967, ρ 70 
178 Cf Iovcuk 1985, ρ 9 
179 Cf Ogurcov 1989, ρ 178 "It was met with interest both from scientists and the Soviet public at large 
Thus, Vernadskij, after reading the first two volumes remarked that they were «better and more interesting 
than he had expected»" (reference is to a letter by V I Vernadskij (1863-1945), the famous and "consistently anti-
Marxist" (Utechin 1961, ρ 588) Soviet scientist, to В L Liikov on 22/05/1942) 
180 Cf Majorov &c 1979, ρ 46 " the three-volume «Istonja filosofn» has not lost ils significance as an 
educational supply [uöcbnoeposobie] for the students to the present day " 
181 Cf Somerville 1946, ρ 420, Iovcuk 1967, ρ 70, Majorov &c 1979, ρ 46, Scipanov &c 1982, ρ 137, 
and Kosicev 1986, ρ 14 
182 Cf Jachot 1981, ρ 187 
183 'О nedostatkach ι oSibkach ν osve§6enii istori! nemeckoj filosofn konca ХПІ ι natala XIX vv," Bol'Sevik 
1944, №7-8, cf also Rybarczyk 1975, ρ 46, 52 
184 Cf Iovcuk &c 1958, ρ 46 
185 Cf Kamcnskij 1991, ρ lOf 
186 Somerville 1946, ρ 420 
187 Ogurcov 1989, ρ 179 
188 Cf Jachot 1981, ρ 188 
189 Cf by Ioviuk 'There were some shortcomings and mistakes in this on a whole correct and valuable work" 
(Iovcuk 1985, ρ 9), or by Majorov, Mel'vil, and Sokolov, all of them members of the kafedra izf " the three-
volume «Istonja filosofn» (1940-1943), which, regardless of a series of inaccuracies, modernizations, and 
simplifications, has not lost its significance as an educational supply [ ulebnoeposobie] for the students to the 
present day The authors of «Istonja filosofn» were awarded the State prize An important [nemaluju] role in the 
determination of the scientific-pedagogical interests ot the collective of the department and of the style of its 
work was played by the gifted scholar and organizer В S Cernyäev, " (Majorov &c 1979, ρ 46) 
190 Jachot 1981, ρ 188 "The whole fire was directed against one of those who were not interested in political 
intrigues, but only in science — B S Cemysev He could not endure it, fell seriously ill (a stroke) and died 
shortly thereafter", 1943/4 he was dean of the philosophical faculty of MGU (cf Scipanov &c 1982, ρ 244), a 
function in which he was reportedly "driven to infarct by the first generation at MGU of philosophical «hacks»" 
(Novochat'ko 1991, ρ 9) 
191 Cf Zapata 1988, ρ 107 
192Bogdanov 1971, ρ 125 
193 Dynnik &c 1957-1965, VI, к 1, ρ 419, cf also Bogdanov 1971, ρ 125, Bochcriski 19675,
 p 42, and 
Ballcstrem 1963a, ρ 115 "This work was not found satisfactory, especially its third volume was criticized as 
not being nationalist enough and as overestimating the German classics " 
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194 Cf Jachot 1981, ρ 187. 
195 Kammari 1936, ρ 86 
196 Kamman 1936, ρ 86 
197 Cf Іо бик &c 1958, ρ 46 
198 Cf Aleksandrov &c 1941-1943,1, ρ 3 
199 Cf Jachot 1981, ρ 187 
200 Cf Iovêuk &c 1958, ρ 46, and Iovcuk 1967, ρ 71 
201 Cf Frolov &c 1989, Ι, ρ 267 "After the appearance of this article further work on this edition was 
cancelled" 
202 Ct Mitin 1944, ρ 77 
203 Ct Ballestrcm 1963a, ρ 115f 
204 = Aleksandrov 1946* 
205 Frolov &c 1989,1, ρ 267 
206 Cf Il'icev &c 1983, entry "Aleksandrov," ρ 19 
207 Cf Ballestrem 1963a, ρ 116, ІГісе &c 1983, entry "Aleksandrov," ρ 19, and Bochenski 19675,
 p 42 "Es 
ging um das Buch G F Aleksandrovs Dieses Buch war an die Stelle der Geschichte der Philosophie getreten, 
eines Sammelwerks, dessen dritter Band verurteilt worden war, weil es zu wenig nationalistisch sei und die 
Bedeutung der deutschen Klassiker überbewertete Aleksandrov erhielt fur sein Werk den Stahnpreis, trotzdem 
entschloß man sich bald, ihn und die gesamten sowjetischen Philosophen einer Zensur zu unterziehen " 
208 Bocheriski 1967 s, ρ 43 "Zdanov erklärte, daß er im Namen des Zentralkomitees spreche und im Auftrage 
Stalins selbst (p 267) Die Philosophen übertrafen einander in der Verurteilung Aleksandrovs und der 
sowjetischen Philosophie im allgemeinen Aleksandrov selbst ergriff als Letzter das Wort und hielt eine 
zündende Rede, in der er Zdanov dankte und ihn bat, im Namen aller versammelten Philosophen Stalin zu 
versichern, daß sie ihr Bestes tun wurden, Stalins Verlangen nachzukommen (pp 288ff) " 
209 Bocheriski 1967s, ρ 42, cf equally Kamenka 1972, ρ 165f, and Donoso 1979, ρ 119 
210 Cf Zdanov 1947, ρ 262, cf also Kamenka 1965, ρ 94, and Iovcuk 1967, ρ 71 
211 Cf Zdanov 1947, ρ 268 
212 This definition is indeed absent in Alcksandrov's text, instead he stresses the "contradictonness" of Hegel's 
philosophy "The whole world-view of Hegel is full of doubleness [dvojstvennost^ contradictonness 
[protivoreCivost1]" (Aleksandrov 19462, ρ 401), stating that "Marx and Engels, Lenin and Stalin disclosed two 
sides in the philosophy of Hegel — a progressive side, and a conservative, reactionary side" (op cit, ρ 412), 
meaning by this the famous "contradiction" between system and method (op cit, ρ 416), arguing, for example, 
that "for the beginning of the 19th century, Hegel s doctrine of the development of thought played a basically 
progressive role" (op cit, ρ 404), but he also has it, that "Hegel, as idealistic philosopher, drew conservative 
conclusions from the thesis that «everything that is real is rational» He overtly stood for the defence and 
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foundation of reactionary social order [olkrylo stal na put' zasCity ι obosnovamja reakcionnych social'nych 
porjadkov]" (opcit, ρ 414, on the reactionary character of Hegel's Philosophy of Right and Philosophy of 
Historycf o p e n , ρ 418ff) 
213 Cf Bogdanov 1971, ρ 125, and Frolov &c 1989,1, ρ 267 
214 Kotakowski 1960, ρ 9, here quoted from the edition in Oelmuller &c 1977, ρ 15 
215 Aleksandrov I9462, ρ 261 
216 Cf Aleksandrov 19462, ρ 423 
217 Cf ¿danov 1947, ρ 260, and Blakeley 1964, ρ 77 
218 Aleksandrov 19462, ρ 5 
219 Aleksandrov 19462, ρ 19 
220 Aleksandrov 19462, ρ 4g( 
221 Cf Zdanov 1947, ρ 257Г. and Frolov &c 1989,1, ρ 267 
222 Cf, e g , Aleksandrov 19462, ρ 481 "Guided in its activity by the philosophical science, elaborated by 
Marx and Engels, Lenin and Stalin, our party has, in the years of peaceful development of the Soviet Union, 
achieved the greatest historical results The successful socialist transformation of all fields of social life, the 
conversion of the USSR into a mighty industrial agricultural power [industrialno-kokhoznaja derzava] was the 
best demonstration of the profound truth of the theory of the Bolshevik party " 
223 According to Aleksandrov m the chapter on Hegel, it was Stalin who gave, as early as 1906 in his 
"Anarchizm ili socializm9", "the classical Marxist explanation of the thesis «everything that is real is rational, 
everything that is rational is real»," when he concluded a discussion of the inevitability of development by 
saying "Hence came the well-known dialectical thesis everything that really exists, ι e everything that 
grows from day to day, is rational" (Aleksandrov 19462, ρ 415, quoting from Stalin, PSSl, ρ 299) 
224 Aleksandrov 19462, ρ 8 
225 Ibid 
226 Ibid 
227 The problem was formulated in all clarity by Pozner in 1937 "One of the most important problems of the 
history of philosophy as a science is the question about the connection between the development of philosophi­
cal thought, as it is expressed in the struggle and shift [bor'ba ι smena] of philosophical systems, and the course 
[chod] ot economic and socio-political historical development" (Pozner 1937, ρ 21) 
228 Aleksandrov 19462, ρ 8 
229 Cf, e g , Iovcuk I960, ρ 13, and idem, 19713,
 p 16, Konstantinov &c 1960-1970, II (1962), C G 
Arzakanjan e a , entry ' Istonja filosofi!," ρ 380, and Iliie\ &c 1983, T I Ojzerman, entry "Istonja filosofi)," 
ρ 232, cf also M L Rybarczyk, op cit Sowjetische Historiographie der Philosophie [Diss , Fribourg, 1975], 
ρ 6 "Die Entwicklung der sowjetischen Geschichtsphilosophie [' Philosophiegeschichte" is meant, EvdZ] der 
letzten Jahrzehnte ist vom Kampf um den Vorrang zweier allgemeiner soziologischer Gesetzmäßigkeiten 
geprägt, nämlich der Gesetzmäßigkeit der Bedingtheit der Entwicklung der Philosophie von der Entwicklung des 
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ökonomischen Lebens der Gesellschaft, durch den Wechsel der materiellen Produktionsweise, und der Gesetz-
mäßigkeit von der relativen Selbstständigkeit der Entwicklung der Philosophie Bisher war die erste eindeutig 
dominierend, gegenwartig scheint sich das Verhältnis zugunsten der zweiten verschoben zu haben, und jede 
weitere Entwicklung wird wohl in dieser Richtung gehen mussen " 
230 "Nach materialistischer Geschichtsauffassung ist das in letzter Insunz bestimmende Moment m der 
Geschichte die Produktion und Reproduktion des wirklichen Lebens Mehr haben weder Marx noch ich je 
behauptet Wenn nun jemand das dahin verdreht, das ökonomische Moment sei das einzig bestimmende, so 
verwandelt er jeden Satz in eine nichtssagende, abstrakte, absurde Phrase Die ökonomische Lage ist die Basis, 
aber die verschiedenen Momente des Überbaus und nun gar die Reflexe aller dieser wirklichen Kampfe im 
Gehim der Beteiligten, politische, juristische, philosophische Theorien üben auch ihre Einwirkung auf den 
Verlauf der geschichtlichen Kampfe aus und bestimmen in vielen Fallen vorwiegend deren Form Es ist eine 
Wechselwirkung aller dieser Moment, worin schließlich als Notwendiges die ökonomische Bewegung sich 
durchsetzt" (F Engels, "Brief an J Bloch (1890)," MEW XXXVII, ρ 463, quoted after Irrlitz &c 1983, ρ 89 
and Kolakowksi 1981, Ι, ρ 384), and "Und insofern sie [philosophers and other intellectuals, EvdZ] eine 
selbständige Gruppe innerhalb der gesellschaftlichen Arbeitsteilung bilden, insofern haben ihre Produktionen 
einen ruckwirkenden Einfluß auf die ganze gesellschaftliche Entwicklung, selbst auf die ökonomische Aber bei 
alledem stehn sie selbst wieder unter dem beherrschenden Einfluß der ökonomischen Entwicklung" (F Engels, 
"Brief an С Schmidt (1890)," MEWXXXVII, ρ 492, quoted after Irrlitz &c 1983, ρ 92f), cf also Kolakowksi 
1981,1, ρ 384-389 
231 Aleksandrov 1937, ρ 33, cf also Pozner 1937, ρ 15 "The splendid formulation of the fundamental idea of 
historical materialism, given by Marx in the preface to Zur kntik der politischen Ökonomie, is the first 
fundamental premiss of a Marxist explanation of the origin, the content, the significance and the role of social 
consciousness, social ideology, and, consequently, philosophical views " 
232 Aleksandrov 1937, ρ 37 
233 Op cit, ρ 37f 
234 Aleksandrov 19462, ρ 12 
235 Aleksandrov 1937, ρ 62 
236 Aleksandrov 1937, ρ 41 
237 Kamenka 1965, ρ 93 
238 Rozental' &c 19544,
 e n t r y "btonja filosofn как nauka," ρ 208 
239 As Pozner remarked in 1937 "Just like for general history an adequate subdivision of history into epochs, a 
scientific pcnodization is an indispensable condition for the scientific character of the whole construction, so in 
scientific history of philosophy, too, the solution of the question of the right penodization is one of its 
essential elements" (Pozner 1937, ρ 27) 
240 Marx, Zur Kntik der politischen Ökonomie [МЕІ ХГП], ρ 9 
241 Cf Kolakowbki 1981,1, ρ 395f, cf also Scanlan 1985, ρ 187f, and 194f, and Pozner 1937, ρ 28 
242 Cf Scanlan 1985, ρ 188, and Kolakowski 1981, Ι, ρ 396 
243 Cf Pozner 1937, ρ 28 "A materialist understanding of history is the theoretical basis of Marxist-Leninist 
history of philosophy Indispensable for the construction of such a history is a detailed study of each socio-
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economic formation, ils mode of production, its distinctive forms of class-struggle, the level of development of 
science, and the nature of the social ideology that is proper to it On this basis philosophy can also be properly 
understood as one of the forms of class ideology " 
244 This is esp manifest in Dynnik &c 1957-1965 
245 Cf op cit, ρ 30f "A Marxist-Leninist elaboration of the history ot philosophy shows, that everything 
alive, effective, progressive, that conditioned the historical role of classical philosophical doctrines, can be 
preserved, revived, and developed only by the revolutionary theory of the proletariat The history of 
philosophy provides the historical foundation of materialist dialectics, revealing, in which way materialist 
dialectics, arming the working class in its great struggle for the transformation of the world, was historically 
prepared for [ïstonöeskipodgotovljalas] " 
246 Ballestrem 1963a, ρ 1 И, cf also Rybarc/yk 1974, ρ 91 "One immediately apparent difficulty has to do 
with establishing the division of the history of philosophy into periods On the one hand, the division follows 
that of histomat for history in general, on the other, there is a division in pre-Marxist and post-Marxist Even 
the sub-divisions are not always faithful to the principles we have mentioned " 
247Frolov &c 1989, I, ρ 268 
248 If we base ourselves on the account given by Ballestrem, we find for the years 1931-1940 a total of 59 
translations, an average of 5 9 a year, for the period 1941-1950 a total of 13, 13 a year, and for the period 1951-
1960 a total ot 40, an average of 4 0, the years 1951 and 1952 each yielding only 2, it is only in 1953 that we 
see a yearly production of at least 4 translations a year (4 5 yearly from 1953 to I960 on an average basis) (cf 
Ballestrem 1963b) 
249 "Im übrigen wurden auf Empfehlung der Partei historische Untersuchungen überhaupt beiseitegeschoben, die 
Veröffentlichung von Buchern aus dem Bereich der Philosophiegeschichte wurde fast völlig eingestellt, und 
ahnlich war es mit Übersetzungen von den Klassikern der Philosophie" (Kolakowski 1981, III, ρ 144) 
250 Dynnik &c 1957-1965, VI, kn 1, pp 422ff 
251 Cf Rybarczyk 1973b, ρ 106 
252Rybarczyk 1975, ρ 50, Rybarczyk gives a figure of 300 for the period 1947-1960, but this is almost 
certainly a typing error, since his other accounts always cover the 1947-1970 period (cf opcit, ρ 178), and 
moreover, 280 titles would otherwise fall into the period 1956-1960, which is so spectacular an increase as to be 
totally unlikely 
253 Cf Rybarczyk 1975, ρ 48 
254 "During the Great Patriotic war there was, at the philosophical faculty ot MGU, a successful development 
of the sectors of critique of reactionary bourgeois philosophy and sociology Here the works by A Ρ Gagann 
«Pragmatism in the USA» 1951), and «American bourgeois philosophy and sociology in the service of 
imperialism» (1951) should be mentioned" (Kosiiev 1986, ρ 14) 
255 Cf Ogurcov 1989, ρ 181 
256 Blakeley 1964, ρ 77 "Marxist-Leninist philosophy and history of philosophy are party-minded They serve 
the interests of the proletariat, the most progressive class in the history of mankind, and its vanguard, the 
Communist Party ( ) Marxist-Leninist history of philosophy rejects the Eurocentnsm of bourgeois historians 
of philosophy " 
556 
Part Four: Soviet Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 
257 Cf Kotakowski 1981, Ш, ρ 144 "Bei der Lektüre von philosophischen Publikationen aus diesen Jahren 
erhalt der Leser den unabweisbaren Eindruck, als sei die ganze Philosophie eine unaufhörliche Wiederholung der 
zwei Behauptungen »Die Materie ist pnmar« und »Der Geist ist pnmar«, wobei die Materialisten fortschrittlich 
und die Idealisten reaktionär sind, weil sie reaktinaren Vorurteilen dienen " 
258 ¿danov 1947, ρ 256 "To elaborate a good textbook on the history of philosophy means to arm our 
intelligencija, our functionaries, our youth with a new powerful ideological weapon, and at the same time it 
means to do a big step forward on the path ot development of Marxist-Leninist philosophy " 
259 Lange 1955, ρ 202 
260 Asmus 1947, ρ 276 
261 Asmus 1947, ρ 278 
262 Cf SCipanov &c 1982, ρ 139 
263 Cf Vasil'ev 1984, ρ 52 
264 "Contemporary Soviet philosophy was bom in the discussion of G F Aleksandrov's History of Western 
European Philosophy" (Blakeley 1964, ρ 76, et also Kamenka 1965, ρ 94) 
265 Ballestrem 1963a, ρ 116 
266 Edgerton 1950, ρ 1 
267 Op t i t , ρ 1, footnote 
268 Cf also Rybarczyk 1975, pp 143ff 
269 Cf Edgerton 1950, ρ 2 " there at once arose the question as to which part of the book should contain the 
history of Russian philosophy during the second half ot the nineteenth century This question was of essential 
importance, because it related to the general evaluation of the character and historical significance of Russian 
philosophy ( ) After a full consideration of the question, the authors' collective decided to place the classical 
Russian philosophy of the nineteenth century in the first part of the book on these grounds first, although 
Chernyshevsky's and Dobrolyubov's philosophy was worked out historically after the appearance of Marxist, 
nevertheless, in content and character it belongs to the philosophy of the pre-Marxist period, as the highest stage 
of this development [italics mine, EvdZ], second, to carry over the history of nineteenth-century Russian 
philosophy into the second part would disturb the historical and logically balanced exposition of the history of 
the development of dialectical and historical materialism by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin " 
270 Op cit, ρ 28 
271 Opcit, ρ 2 
272 Cf Edgerton 1950, ρ 20f "The bourgeois-Junker world outlook of Hegel was the systematized ideology of 
the aristocratic reaction and prepared the ground for the "Prussian way" in the later development of Germany In 
Hegel's logic his idealistic dialectics of concepts was worked out with reference to the past and not to the present 
and future Hegel's natural philosophy was hostile to the advanced scientific ideas ot the end of the eighteenth 
and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries Hegel's reactionary socio-political doctrines nationalistically 
exalted the Germans as a "chosen nation," preached scom for other, esp the Slavic nations, and raised the 
Prussian monarchy to the rank of an "earthly divinity " Hegel's idealistic system and his idealistic dialectics 
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make up his doctrine of objective idealism, but Hegel did beyond the dialectic of concepts divine the dialectic of 
things", a contradiction exists between Hegel's method and his system " 
273 Cf Wetter I960', ρ 228 
274 Chapter 8 (chapter 9 in the konspekt (cf Edgcrton 1950, ρ 19)) of vol I ["Razvitie matenahsticeskoj ι 
peredovoj obscestvenno-politiccskoj mysli ν Rossii ν period usilenija krcpostnicestva ι ukreplenija central'nogo 
gosudarstva (XVII vek)," Г 1950, №2, pp 264-295], and chapters 4 [ Razvitie marsksistskoj filosofii ν period 
reakcn ι novogo pod"ema revoljucionnogo dvi?enija," VF 1950, №1 pp 281-308] and 5 [ 'Razvitie Marksom ι 
Engel'som dialckticeskogo ι istonceskogo materialízala роьіе Parizskoj Kommuny (1871-1895 gody)." VF. 
1950, №1, pp 308 356] of vol II (cf Rybarczyk 1975, ρ 146, and ρ 152, η 13) 
275 Cf Rybarczyk 1975, ρ 147 
276 The source of this information was the sociologist Sergej NikolaeviC Plótnikov, privileged owner of a copy 
of the makct (interview on 24/09/1991) 
277 Cf Kline 1956, ρ 127 "The only area in which there has been a significant broadening of permitted 
subject matter is the history of philosophy , and even here the liberalization is thus far chiefly a matter of 
programmaticdeclaration " 
278 Ballestrem 1963a, ρ 116 
279 Cf Rybarczyk 1975, pp 48ff "Erst nach 1956 begann der Aufschwung, der bisher noch andauert", cf also 
Iovcuk &c 1960, pp 422ff, Ballestrem 1963a, ρ 114f, and Blakeley 1964, ρ 78 
280 Cf Bogomolov 1967, ρ 100 
281 In an interview I had in 1986 with Ju К Mel'vil', then chairman of the kafcdra izf, he also dated the 
beginning of ifn 30 years earlier, ι e around 1956 
282 Cf Stïpanov &c 1982, ρ 138 
283 Ibid 
284 Cf opcit , ρ 146 
285 In 1991 I was told, during an interview with the Kirghiz philosopher Anara Abdynasyrova, how young 
philosophers from the different republics were only allowed to write about their own republics, not to study, 
e g , classical or contemporary Western philosophy 
286 Cf §£ipanov &c 1982, ρ 138f 
287Cf O p e n , ρ 156 
288 Cf IovCuk 1967, ρ 71f, and Sdpanov &c 1982, ρ 165 
289 Cf Scipanov&c 1982, ρ Π9 
290 Cf De George 1966, ρ 10, who refers to an article in Kommunist 1956, №17, pp 100-114 
291 Cf Kline 1956, ρ 135, who mention "a senes of relatively "objective" expository and critical articles on 
thinkers long neglected by Soviet philosophers " 
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292 Ballestrem 1963a, ρ 117 
293 Ballcstrera 1963a, ρ 114, quoting A F Okulov, "Nekotorye voprosy razvitija sovetskoj filosofn poslc 
XX s"ezda KPSS," V£ 1962, №1, ρ 26 
294 Kline 1956, ρ 128, quoting VF 1955, №3, ρ 195, and further referring to "NasuSCnye problemy 
filosofskoj nauki," Kommunist 1955, №5, ρ 17, cf also Wetter 1960s, ρ 279, who refers to the same text in 
VF. apparently a survey of philosophical dissertations over the past two years (1953/4), and Kamenka 1972, ρ 
167 
295 Cf Kline 1956, ρ 128, and Kamenka 1965, ρ 97 "The article [the editorial in VF 1955, №3, EvdZ] 
singles out for criticism the philosophers Ζ Ya Beletskii, who had said at the philosophical discussion in 1946 
that 'pre-Marxist philosophy, defending the interests of the owning classes, presented a distorted, falsified view 
of reality' " 
296 Kamenka 1972, p. 167 
297 Kamenka 1965, ρ 97 
298 Cf the "nekrolog" on Scipanov in FN 1983, №5, ρ 189, and in VMGU 1983, serija 7, №4, p. 80 
299 Kline 1956, ρ 135 
300Opcit, ρ 136 
301 Kamenka 1965, ρ 97, referring to "Povyäat' ïdejno-teoreticeskij uroven' issledovanij po istorii filosofn," 
Y£ 1955, № 3, ρ 7f 
302 Ibid , the criticism is pointed against the collective work Dialektiieskij matenalum (Moskva 1953), 
published under Aleksandrov's editorship 
303 Cf Kline 1956, ρ 136, referring to "Povyäat' " " 'most recently there has been a certain spreading of 
an equally erroneous, nihilistic attitude toward the achievements of foreign culture and science, and, related to 
this, the history ot philosophic thought in the West' G F Aleksandrov is explicitly accused of such nihilism -
an opposite extreme Irom his earlier 'error' (for which Zhdanov had chastised him) of 'liberal-vegetanan praise' 
of Western European thinkers The collectively written History of Philosophy (two volumes), of which he was 
in charge from 1947 until late 1953, is described as offensively nihilistic toward foreign philosophy", cf 
Rybarczyk 1975, ρ 73, η 11, who refers to the same text 
304 Wetter 1960^, quoting "Nasuäinye voprosy filosofskoj nauki," Kommunist 1955, №5, pp 10-24 
305 Kline 1956, ρ 136 
306 Kamenka 1972, ρ 167 
307 Kline 1956, ρ 138 
308 Kline 1956, ρ 136, quoting "Povyäat' ," ρ 16 
309 Cf opcit, ρ 135 
5 5 9 
Notes 
3I0Ballestrem 1963a, ρ 116 
311 The 2nd volume was still part of an Istonja filosofa ν 4-ch tomach, from the 3rd onwards it was Istonja 
filosofa ν 6-1 tomach, the 6th volume appeared in two books 
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pride (Pavlov 1966, ρ 135) 
313 Cf Ballestrem 1963a, ρ 116 
314 Cf "К vychodu VI loma «Islorii filosofii»," Ш 1964, №5, ρ 127 
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the field of Marxist-Leninist philosophy in general and of history of philosophy in particular " 
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327 0j7erman 1988, ρ 51, cf also Diochadze 1988, ρ 160 
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337 Kamenka 1965, ρ 101 
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339 Ballestrem 1963a, ρ HO 
340 Cf Dynmk &c 1957 1965, II, pp 427-429 
341 Op cit, V, pp 774-777 
342 IovCuk &c 1960, ρ 15, and IovCuk &c 197P, ρ 14, reference is to Hegel, Werke Х ІП, ρ 122, m the 
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347 Op cit. ρ 135 
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critique is pointed to "the allegation of the «jzidcentristy» to the extent that the most prominent philosophical 
currents of the West (including French materialism and classical German philosophy) and even Marxism have 
their source in Confucianism and other idealist doctrines of the Ancient East" (IovCuk &c 1971, ρ 16), but it 
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352 Ballestrem 1963a, ρ 108f, referring, in that order, to Zdanov 1947, ρ 257, Rozental' &c 19544, ρ 209, 
Dynnik &c 1957-1965, I, ρ 10, and Iovcuk &c I960, ρ 6, I have followed Kamenka in most of his 
amendments of Ballestrem's translation 
353 Iovcuk &c 19711, ρ 6 
354 Kamenka 1965, ρ 99 
355 Iovcuk &c 1960, ρ 5t 
356 Ballestrem 1963a, ρ 118 
357 Cf Op cit, pp 1 lOff, and Kamenka 1965, ρ 101, where many examples of classification of philosophers 
are given 
358 "Therefore, to say that such a concept [i e "matter ', EvdZ] can «become obsolete [ usfarcf]» is a infantile 
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tendencies [napravlenija] or lines [limi] of Plato and Democntus in philosophy9 The struggle of religion and 
science' The denial of objective truth and its recognition' The struggle between the advocates of supernatural 
knowledge and its adversaries'7" (Lenin, PSS Х ІП, ρ 131) 
359 Cf Kamenka 1965, ρ lOOt "There remains, in the Soviet historiography of philosophy, the view that this 
history is to be understood in terms of the struggle between materialism and idealism ( ) there is the danger 
of [101] 'forcing' philosophical views into such a thematic account, and this danger increases sharply if one 
holds that all conflicts can be reduced to one ultimate conflict or if one chooses as one's central issue an issue 
with particularly limited range or limited temporal importance " 
360 The second paragraph of the second chapter of the first volume of IF6 is named "the materialism of the 5th 
century В С and its struggle against idealism (the «line of Democntus» and the «line of Plato»)", and m 
Konstantinov 19826, ρ 11, it reads "The «line of Democntus», as V I Lenin remarked, was in opposition to 
the idealist «line of Plato» " 
361 Ballestrem 1963a, ρ 113 
362 Cf Iovcuk &c 1960, ρ 15 
363Iov6uk&c 1971, ρ 13 
364 Cf on this Rybarczyk 1975, ρ 62 The "vulganzers" are A Bogdanov, В Sulatikov and others (cf also 
Blauberg &c 19824, entry ' Istonja filosofu," ρ 130, where the same vulganzers are mentioned and chastised) 
365 Iovcuk &c 1960, and idem 19713,
 p 16 
366 Ibid 
367 Opera citata, ρ 17 
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368Iov6uk&c 1971, ρ 17f 
369 Based on Rybarczyk 1973a, ρ , 102, and idem 1975, ρ 125f (who refers to Konstantinov &c 1960-1970, Π 
(1962)), C G Arzakanjan &c, entry Istonja filosofii," ρ 380, and Iovcuk &c 19672,
 p 18, cf also Zubaty 
1975, ρ 208, who also uses the article by Arzakanjan, and Ballestrem 1963a, ρ 109, whose source is Iovcuk 
&c 1960, Blakeley gives a more general division into five periods primitive society (no philosophy), slave-
owning society (fight between objective idealism and spontaneous materialism), feudal society (dominated by 
objective idealism of scholastic philosophy), the period of capitalism (the beating down of subjective idealism 
(Descartes, Kant) by mechamcist materialism), the socialist period (dominated by Marxism-Leninism) (Blakeley 
1984, ρ 77) 
370 Cf Ballestrem 1963a, ρ 109 " as philosophy only rose as an expression of the social consciousness of 
classes, there was no philosophy in the times of primitive society " 
371 Ioviuk &c 1960, ρ 18, the formulation in IovÊuk &c 19712, ρ 18, shows important differences, but not 
with respect to the present topic the difference lies in the stress on the scientific character ot philosophy as the 
reason for its relative independence, cf also Ballestrem 1963a, ρ 109 
372 Cf Bogomolov 1967, ρ 100 
373 Over a certain period of time, the second Soviet philosophical journal, FN. has regularly published surveys 
of recent Soviet publications in philosophy In this table, only those years have been included on which 
complete information could be gathered Translations or editions of classical philosophical texts are not 
included 
Monopraphs in ¡FN as listed in FN (1965-1969) 
Field 1961 1965 1966 1969 1974 total average 
Istonja filosofii 20 29 33 23 20 125 25 
Kntika sovr burz filosofii ι sociologa 18 17 18 14 13 80 16 
Total 38 46 51 37 33 205 41 
374 Cf "Kratkaja bibhografija rabot po ìstorii filosofii ι ob5£estvcnnoj mysli za 1972-1976 gg ," in Bogdanov 
&c 1977, ρ 349-358, this bibliography, which includes books in other languages than Russian, some 
republications as well as a few translations into Russian from Hungarian, Polish, etc , lists 285 titles in all, but 
is clearly not complete for 1976 (1972 82, 1973 61, 1974 50, 1975 68, 1976 24) 
375 In 1963 Kamenka stated "Its [of Soviet philosophy, EvdZ] greatest achievements are reasonably scholarly 
works in the history ot philosophy ( ) — works from which one has learned to expect no more than a 
reasonable understanding of the man being discussed, an understanding that is virtually always vitiated, at some 
point or other, by the politically imposed duty of showing that all philosophical conflicts are ultimately 
reducible to the conflict between idealism and materialism Critical, as opposed to expository and historical 
work, is remarkably poor" (Kamenka 1963, ρ 2 ) But in 1972 he added "The serious, unabusive tone of К S 
Bakradze's book on contemporary bourgeois philosophy (Ocherki pò ¡stoni Noveishei ι Sovremennoi 
Bur7huazno¡ Filosofa, Tiflis, 1960), of A S Bogomolov's studies in contemporary bourgeois theories of 
evolution and development, especially his Ideya Razvitija ν Burzhuaznoi Filosofa (Moscow, 1962), and of two 
papers by В V Binukov on Gottlob Frege has no parallel in Soviet philosophy before 1955" (Kamenka 1972, 
ρ 167, the studies on Frege mentioned by Kamenka appeared in English translation, edited by I Angelelli B V 
Birjukov, Two Soviet Studies on Frege [Sovietica 15J (Dordrecht Reidei, 1964)) 
376 Kamenka 1972, ρ 167, cf also Blakeley 1980, ρ 322 "Most recently, contemporary Soviet philosophers 
have devoted themselves to more extensive research on all prc-Marxist and non-Marxist philosophers Instead of 
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Avenncev, entry Epictetus," ρ 263 ) 
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379Solovcv 1991, ρ 8f 
380 Cf Gorbacev 1987 
381 Cf O p e n , ρ 246 
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chapters of classical Greek philosophy to the first volume (cf Siipanov &c 1982, ρ 246, and Aleksandrov &c 
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383 Ballestrem 1963a, ρ 116 
384 Cf Kissel' 1988, ρ 170 
385 Cf also Ignatow 1988, ρ 75, mei η 56, who mentions Davydov, Gajdenko, MamardaSvih, and 
MotroSilova 
386 N V MotroSilova, "Einleitung,' in MotroSilova &c 1986a, ρ 22f 
387Solov'ev 1991, ρ 15 
388 E Ju Solov'ev, NepobeZdennyj eretik, Marlin Ljuter ι ego vremja (Moskva Molodaja gvardija, 1984) 
389 Motroiilova 1993, ρ 11, referring to MamardaSvih 1989a, ρ 29 [MamardaSvih 1990, ρ 28] 
390 Cf Clark &c 1984, pp 27ff 
391 Cf Scipanov &c 1982, ρ 246f 
392 Cf Kamenka 1963, ρ 2, η 5 
393 Cf, e g , Mitin 1974, ρ 363, where he attacks Losev's "overt, papal, counterrevolutionary idealism", and 
Mitin &c 1983, ρ 272, also referred to in Jachot 1981, ρ 73 
394 Cf Goerdt 1984, ρ 80f 
395 Cf Abramov 1986, ρ 33 
396 Cf Goerdt 1984, ρ 80f and 59f, and Scanlan 1984 
564 
Part Four: Soviet Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 
397 Cf A F Losev, Istonja antiino] esteüki, VII (Moskva Iskusstvo, 1988), kn I, ρ 3 
398 Cf "Beseda " 1984, ρ 144, Yearbook USSR '86, ρ 182, Tacho-Godi 1991, ρ 16, and Haardt 1993, ρ 
191 f, al a meeting in 1986 of the kafedra ¡zf of MGU, that I attended, where Losev's nomination for the Lenin-
pnze was discussed, the enormous appreciation of Losev's work by Soviet historians of philosophy was more 
than evident 
399 M M Bachtin, Problemy poetiki Dostoevskogo (Moskva Sovetskij pisatel', (1963, 1972), 1979), revised 
edition of Problemy tvor£estva Dostoevskogo of 1929, translated into French (M M Bakhtine, La poétique de 
Dostoïevski (Pans 1970)), German (M Bachtin, Probleme der Poetik Dostoevskijs (München 1971, Frankfurt 
am Main 1985)), and English (M Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics (Ann Arbor 1973, Minneapolis 
Minnesota UP, 1984)), idem, 7Vor¿csrvo Fransua Rabie ι narodnaja kul'tura srednevekov'ja ι Renessansa 
(Moskva 1965, Moskva Chudozestvennaja literatura, 1990), translated into English (M Bakhtin, Rabelais and 
His World (Cambridge, Mass & London (1968), 1971)), French (M Bakhtine, L'œuvre de Francois Rabelais et 
la culture populaire de Moyen Age et sous la Renaissance (Paris 1970)), and idem, Estetika slovesnogo 
tvorCestva (Moskva Isskustva, (1979), 19862), translated into French (M Bakhtine, Esthétique de la creation 
verbale (Pans 1984)), international, and post-Soviet Russian Bjchtin-scholarship have been booming over the 
last decade now, although the philosophical aspects of his work tend to be underexposed, on Bachtin see Clark 
&c 1984, or (in Dutch) A Simons, Het groteske van de taal (Amsterdam SUA, 1990), both with useful 
bibliographies 
400 Clark &c 1984, ρ 142 
401 Ibid , ρ 145 
402Ibid, ρ 258ff 
403 Ibid, ρ 336ff 
404 Ibid , ρ 326 
405 Clark &c 1984, ρ 332 
406Opcit, ρ 340 
407 Cf Síipanov &c 1982, ρ 247f, and "Pamjati vydajusöegosja sovetskogo filosofa V F Asmusa," VMGU 
1975, №6, pp 93-94 
408 In her "memorial" lo Asmus, Motroíilova tells an interesting anecdote "I remember one of the stones of 
Valentin FcrdinandoviC about how they «worked [proraba/yva/j]» him in the 1930s They imputed him to 
menshevizing idealism, but one of the people who worked him [prorabotòikov], who had decided to «save» 
Asmus, suggested to regard him as a bourgeois idealist Valentin FcrdinandoviC gloomily joked if it suits you, 
contrary to fact, to call me an idealist, let me be a menshevizing idealist — that is dangerous, but, in any case, I 
would be «our [svoj\», and not an «alien [cu?oj]» idealist At that moment V F Asmus did not know yet, 
that after some time the label «menshevizing idealism» would be perilous, but the label «bourgeois idealism», 
dangerous, too, but -paradoxically'- to a somewhat lesser extent" (MotroSilova 1988, ρ 67) 
409 Cf Jeu 1981, ρ 73, and Ahlberg 1960, ρ 103, reference is to Mitin &c 1983, ρ 270 
410 Cf Motrosilova 1988, ρ 67, and Scipanov &c 1982, ρ 247 
411 Gulyga 1984, ρ 301 
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412 Cf Síipanov &c 1982, ρ 142 "An important role in the increase of authority of the department [the 
kafcdraizf, EvdZ] was played by the activity ot the widely known scholar and wonderful teacher V F Asmus, 
who worked at the department from 1954 until the end of his life " 
413 Cf Sêipanov &c 1982, ρ 248, a bibliography of Asmus' works between 1924 and 1982 is included in 
Asmus 1984, pp 312-317 
414 Cf Motrosïlova 1988, ρ 69, and Buchholz 1991, ρ 274 
415 Asmus 1956, ρ 3 
416 Ibid, ρ 19f 
417 К S Bakradze, Sistema ι metod filosofi! Gcgelja (Tbilisi ìzd TGU, 1958), cf Scanlan 1985, ρ 109, and 
esp Kline 1964 
418 Cf Kline 1964, ρ 37 
419 Ibid , ρ 56, refemng to Bakradze 1958, ρ 257f 
420 Which were passed over in silence in Soviet sources "As against contemporary falsifiers of the history of 
Russian and Marxist philosophy, accusing the Bolsheviks ot the «extermination» of Russian philosophical 
professors after the revolution, everybody willing to cooperate with Soviet power was offered the possibility to 
do so As a result of complicated, sometimes agonizing quests, many historians of philosophy (Ρ Ρ Blonskij, 
A F Losev, А О Makovel sky, the historian of logic Ρ S Popov and others) found their place in Soviet 
scientific history of philosophy or other fields of knowledge" (Iovcuk 1967, ρ 670 
421 Motrosïlova &c 1986a, ρ 14f 
422 Motrosïlova 1988, ρ 68 
423 Countless are the times, when students in philosophy told me that their motivation to do history of 
philosophy as a specialization was precisely this opportunity to study and write about non-Soviet (be they pre-
Marxist, "bourgeois", or Russian) philosophers 
424 Another was to become, for example, a specialist in a field like "philosophical questions of natural science" 
or aesthetics, but there the thematic scope was, naturally, strongly limited 
425 An idea of the popularity of IFN can be gathered from the somewhat bloated "group photograph" in the 
introduction by N V Motrosïlova to the German edition of a selection of works into history of philosophy by 
Soviet authors "Gerade die hohe Intellcktualitat der Intentionen, das zuinnerst interessierte Verhältnis zur Sache 
erklärt wohl auch das Geheimnis, warum die Autoren dieses Buches seit ihren philosophischen Anfangen eine 
Leserschaft hatten Dafür gibt es viele Belege Ich konnte zum Beispiel davon erzählen, wie popular ihre Bucher 
sind, man bedenke dabei, daß es sich hier um Spezialuntersuchungen handelt, die durch und durch »professionell« 
sind wenn bekannt wird, daß Werke von Sergej Avenncev, Piama Gajdenko, Erich Solov'ev, Vladislav 
Leklorskij gerade erscheinen, beginnt die Jagd des Leserpublikums Hin und wieder ladt unsere Institutsab-
teilung Avenncev oder Gajdenko zum Vortrag ein Dann wissen wir schon vorher die Nachricht wird sich 
pfeilschnell in Moskau verbreiten, unsere größten Hörsäle werden überfüllt sein wenn Ρ Gajdenko, E 
Solov'ev, M Kozlova, V Lektorskij, G Majorov, N Avtonomova in Moskau oder Leningrad, in Kiev oder 
Minsk, in Rostov oder Riga, in Sverdlovsk oder Novosibirsk Vortrage halten, gilt dies als großes Ereignis" 
(Motrosïlova 1986a, ρ 12) 
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426 Interview with Ojzerman 29/08/1989 
427 Cf Abramov &c 1986 
428 Cf MotroSilova 1986b, pp 288-293 
429 For practical reasons, 1 have taken into account the volumes 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, which together may 
be supposed to yield a fairly representative picture of this period, both original publications by Soviet authors, 
contributions by foreign philosophers -mainly from the Soviet bloc- and materials of discussions have been 
taken into account 
430 Cf Spravofmk dlja postupajuSiwh ν moskovskij umversitet 1986, ρ 57 
431 Information gathered from SCipanov &c 1982, pp 112-203, Spravocmk dlja postupajuSiich ν moskovskij 
umversitet 1984, ρ 28, and SpravoSnik dlja postupajuSiwh ν moskovskij umversitet 1986, ρ 57 
432 Cf Belkina &c 1967, ρ 178 
433 "Ol rcdkollcgu," in Msvemeradze &c 1988, ρ 4 
434 Cf "Tcmatika dissertacij po filosofii " 
435 Ojzerman 1982b, ρ 11 
436II i£ev &c 1983, Τ I Ojzerman, entry "Istonja filosofii," ρ 232f 
437 Cf Lenin, PSS XVIII, ρ 361 
438 Cf Ballestrem 1963a, ρ 109, ρ 113f, and Blakeley 1964, ρ 77 
439 ІГібс &c 1983, A G Spirkin, entry "DialektiCcskij materiahzm," ρ 159 
440 They are comparable to Popper's "trends" as distinguished from "laws" (cf KR Popper, Poverty of 
Histoncism (London 1957), ρ 128) 
441 Today, GureviC is one of Russia's leading "culturologists", and he is the author of a rather well-known book 
on the categories of Medieval culture (A Ja Gurevií, Katcgom trcdnevckovoj kul'tury (Moskva 1972), German 
translation A J Gurjewitsch, Das Weltbild des mittelalterlichen Menschen (Dresden VEB Verlag der Kunst, 
1978, and München С Η Beck, 1986)), in the "structuralist ' tone of which it is difficult not to see an implicit 
critique of the universalist and "teleological" Marxist approach of human history (cf Gurjewitsch (the German 
translation ot 1986), ρ 8f " wir werden in der mittelalterlichen Kultur gar nichts begreifen, wenn wir uns auf 
die Überlegung beschranken, daß in jener Epoche Unwissenheit und Dunkelmännertum herrschten, da alle an 
Gott glaubten ( ) Was von unserem heutigen Gesichtspunkt aus falsch ist, war fur die Menschen des 
Mittelalters nicht falsch, sondern die höchste Wahrheit Die Kultur der Vergangenheu kann man nur durch ein 
streng historisches Herangehen verstehen, nur dann, wenn man sie mil dem ihr entsprechenden Maße mißt 
Einen einheitlichen Maßstab, dem man alle Zivilisationen und Epochen unterordnen konnte, gibt es nicht, da 
kein Mensch existiert, der m allen diesen Fpochen der gleiche ist ( ) Und wenn wir die Vergangenheit, «wie es 
eigentlich gewesen», begreifen wollen, dann mussen wir danach streben, an sie mit den ihr adäquaten Kriterien 
heranzugehen, sie immanent zu studieren, ihre eigene Struktur zu erschließen, und uns davor hüten, ihr unsere 
modernen Auffassungen und Einschatzungen aufzuzwingen") 
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442 Scanlan 1985, ρ 207f, referring toan article of 1965 A Ja GureviC, 'General Law and Concrete Regularity 
in History ' 
443 Cf Scanlan 1985, ρ 208f, and Scanlan 1983 
444 For example in Bogomolov &c 1983, we have a hard lime finding the notion of zakonomemost' at all 
445 Il'icev &c 1983, T I Ojzerman, entry "Istonja filosofii," ρ 233 
446 Blauberg &c 1982", entry "Istonja filosofii," ρ 128 
447 Cf Blauberg &c 19824, entry "Dialektika," ρ 73 
448 Il'icev &c 1983, L F Ihccv, entry 'IstonCeskij malenahzm," ρ 228 
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-"gnoseological" as Soviet sources have it-, and a methodological function (Rybarczyk 1975, ρ 61f), referring 
to a source ot 1966, but it remains less than clear what exactly these functions are Esp the first, the 
ontological function, the "real process of functioning and development of ideas" is unclear it would eventually 
be, one would say, the "reflection of that process in ifn that performs a function, and then "ontological" might 
mean that it gives us insight in a specific form of being, the logical function seems to correspond to what I 
have labelled the technical function ' [3], the methodological function appears to point to the fact that ifn is a 
field of application of the general laws of materialist dialectics, and therefore can teach something about the 
functioning of these laws in reality, which might be useful in other fields (op cit ρ 62), as to the 
"gnoseological" function, finally, points to the fact that ifn, as a philosophical discipline, contains the 
epistemologica! problems in is studying in history, ι e it is reflexive in this respect On the whole, these 
functions are what ifn ascribed to itself at an early stage of its existence, not what can be regarded as its 
"objective" functions 
451 Cf Іо бик 1970, ρ 13ff 
452 Il'icev &c 1983, T I Ojzerman, entry "Istonja filosofii," ρ 232f 
453 For example, О E Nesterova, "Istonko-filosofskie predposylki ucemja Avguslina o sootnosenu vremeni ι 
veênosti," in IFE '86, pp 35-48, Ρ Ρ Gajdenko, "O fïlosofsko-teoreti6eskich predposylkach meenamki 
Galileja," ibid, pp 69-83, AV Semuäkin, "«Zagadka» Empedokla," in IFE '88, pp 22-37, A A CanySev, 
"Problema cennostnogo ι celevogo edinstva kul'tury ν ideahzme A Sopengauera," in IFE '88, pp 135-150, or 
S S Averincev, "Die Symbolik des frühen Mittelalters, zu einem Problemkreis," in MotroSilova &c 1986, pp 
72-104 
454 Cf also Kamenskij 1992, chapter 1 "Three histories of philosophy" (pp 5-24) 
455 Kamenskij 1984, ρ 125 
456 Kamenskij 1984, ρ 121 
457 Ojzerman 1982b, ρ 7f 
458 Il'icev &c 1983, Τ I Ojzerman, entry "Istonja filosofii," ρ 233 
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459 One that concedes "that the center of interest of any history of philosophy must be philosophical ideas 
themselves and that merely reducing philosophical positions to class interests will miss most of what is 
important and philosophical in these positions" (Kamenka 1965, ρ 99) 
460 F Engels, "Alte Vorrede zum «Anti-Duhnng» [MEWXX]," ρ 330 
461 VI Lenin, 'Е5йе odno uniòtoZenie sociahzma [Yet Another Elimination of Socialism]," in Lenin, PSS 
XXV, ρ 37, ong in Sovremennv) mir 1914, №3 
462 Cf Swiderski 1992, ρ 6 
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Philosophical Symbolism and its Origins in Reality" to "An Inquiry into the Social Nature or Bureaucracy in 
К Marx's Work of 1844-1851" (SS Choruzy, "Filosofskij simvohzm Florenskogo ι ego iiznennye istoki," 
in IFE '88, pp 180-201, and V Ρ Makarenko, "Anahz social noj pnrody bjurokratu ν rabotach К Marksa 1844-
1851 gg," ibid , pp 5-21), from a discussion of "Ockam as a Political Philospher" to "Problems of Com­
munication in the Work of Pedro Lain Entralgo' (N V Efrcmova, "Okkam как pohtiCeskij filosof," in IFE 
'89, pp 77-92, and А В Zykova, "Problemy kommunikacn ν tvorCestve Pedro Lama Entral'go," ibid , pp 111-
125), from "Oriental Conceptions of the «Perfect Human Being» in the Context of World Culture" to 
"Analytical «Philosophy of Consciousness» An Insight into Herbert Feigl's Intellectual Biography" (Μ Τ 
Stepanjanc, "Vostotnye koncepcii «soverSennogo Celoveka» ν kontekste mirovoj kul'tury," in IFE '90, pp 96-
107, and S D Balmaeva, "AnalitiCeskaja «filosofija soznanija» vzgljad skvoz' pnzmu înlellektual'noj biografii 
Gcrberta Fejgla," ibid , pp 123-143), and from "Prospects of Culture in Paul Tillich's Religious Philosophy" 
to archival work on "Unknown Russian Courses in Philosophy of the Mid-18th Century" (MA Sivercev, 
"Sud'by kul'tury ν rehgioznoj filosofii Paulja Tillicha," in ¡FE '91, pp 126-146, and О E Koseleva, B N 
Morozov, "Neizvestnye russkie uiebnye kursy filosofii serediny XVIII ν ," ibid , pp 53-74) 
847 The IF even started a series of studies called Nemeckaja klasstCeskaja filosofija, novye issledovamja 
[German Classical Philosophy, New Investigations], which includes the following titles N V Motrosilova, 
Social no-istonieskic korni nemeckoj klassiôeskoj filosofii [The Socio-Histoncal Roots of German Classical 
Philosophy] (Moskva Nauka, 1990) [= Motrosilova 1990], Т В DlugaC, I Kant ot rannten proizvedemj к 
«Kntike ôistogo razuma» [I Kant From the Early Works to the «Critique of Pure Reason»] (Moskva Nauka, 
1990), V V Lazarev, Filosofija rannego ι pozdnego Sellinga [The Philosophy of the Early and the Late 
Schelling] (Moskva Nauka, 1990), Ρ Ρ Gajdenko, Paradoksy sbvobosy ν uäenn Fichte [The Paradoxes of 
Freedom in Fichte's Doctrine] (Moskva Nauka, 1990), V V Lazarev, IA Rau, Gegel' ι filosofskie diskussii 
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egovremem [Hegel and the Philosophical Discussions of his Day] (Moskva Nauka, 1991), I S Narskij, T I 
Ojzerman, Teonja poznanija Kanta [Kant's Theory of Knowledge] (Moskva Nauka, 1991), MFBykova, 
Absoljutnaja ¡deja ι absoljutnyj duch ν filosofa Gegelja [Absolute Idea and Absolute Spint in the Philosophy of 
Hegel] (Moskva Nauka, 1992) 
848 = Gamcev 1987 
849 Dobrochotov 1986, for a more elaborate discussion, see ν d Zweerde 1990b, pp 63-66 
850 Cf Dobrochotov 1986, ρ 4 
851 Cf Dobrochotov 1986, ρ 229 
852 Dobrochotov 1986, pp 235ff 
853 A L Dobrochotov, "Hcraklit Fragment B52,' in Motroäilova &c 1986a, pp 55-71 
854 Cf Dobrochotov 1986, ρ 4 
855 As N V Motrosilova, victress in that struggle, assured me in 1989 
856 Cf Frolov &c 1989, II, glava 5 "Bytie", 6 "Matenja", and 7 "Dialektika" 
857 Cf Frolov &c 1989, Π, ρ 632 
858 Cf Buchholz 1988a, ρ 5, idem 1991, ρ 274, and vd Zweerde 1992c, ρ 229f 
859 Important names with regard to the "rehabilitation" of Kant by Soviet philosophy are V F Asmus (1894-
1975), and the Georgian historian of philosophy GB Tevzadze, and A V Gulyga, a clear example of the 
attempt to assimilate Kant into a dialectical-materialist framework is Τ I Ojzerman, ' G W F Hegel und das 
Erbe Kants,' in D Henrich (Hrsg ), Kant oder Hegel7 Über Formen der Begründung in der Philosophie 
[Stuttgarter Hegel-Kongress 1981] (Stuttgart Klett Cotta Verlag, 1983), pp 304-318 
860 Cf Kanmskij 1988, ρ 35, reference is to Bykova 1985 
861 Cf Bykova 1990, ρ 20f 
862 Bykova 1990, ρ 30 
863 Kncevskij, A V , 'Ponjatie absoljutnogo ducha ν filosofii Gegelja," in ltb '91 (Moskva Nauka, 1991), 
pp 37-52, Krifcevskij, A V , Avtoreferat Koncepcija absoljutnogo ducha ν fílosoñi Gegelja [Abstract the 
Concept of Absolute Spint in the Philosophy of Hegel] (Moskva IF AN SSSR, 1992), Kncevskij, A V , 
'UCenie Gegelja ob absoljutnom duche как spekuljativnaja teologija [Hegel s Doctrine of Absolute Spirit as 
Speculative Theology]," УЕ 1993, №5, pp 161-172 
864 Bykova &c 1993, ρ 5 
865 Cf Bykova 1990, ρ 28f 
866 Cf Kanmskij 1988, ρ 112, and ibid , ρ 8 
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867 Cf "Anketa ," YE 1987, №8, ρ 73f, answers to the 6th question "Which problems and fields of 
philosophy arc, in your opinion, presently the most elaborated, and advanced, and which are least elaborated, 
most backward''" cf also Fleischer 1988, ρ 19 
868 Cf Schiller 1987, Schaefer 1988, and ν d Zweerde 1989a 
869 Cf Tulaev in "Otvety na anketu «Voprosov filosofi!»," VF 1988, № 1 , ρ 122 
870 Tacho-Godi 1991, ρ 18, reference is to A F Losev, Vladimir Solov'ev (Moskva 1983), and to A F 
Losev, Vladimir Solov'ev ι ego vremja [VI Solov'ev and his Time] (Moskva Progress, 1990) [720 pages] 
871 Cf Goerdt 1984, ρ 475, π 17 
872 Gulyga 1986 
873 In 1990, the journal KmZnoe obozrcnie published a hit parade of books appeared m the USSR in 1989 
Pikul was present in this list with no less than 6 titles, taking places 6, 7, 17, 38, 56, and 98 (cf NK 1990, № 
45-46, ρ 29), on Pikul's popularity, see Laqucur 1990, pp 128-131, who refers to Ogonek 1988, №12 
874 To quote a characteristic passage, commenting "Documenta-8", the well-known exhibition of modern art in 
Kassel "Post-modernism is faceless (jusl like any other modernism) If you look at one or the other of its 
objects, it is impossible to tell where they tome from — from Nagasaki, Kansas City or Dusseldorf Life is 
manifold in ILS appearances, death always looks the same Modernism already led art to suicide, and now it is 
completed Post-modernism is interesting only from the negative side, as a sign of misfortune [beda], as a notice 
— there is nowhere to move on to For humanity, having decided to survive, it is no guiding line" (Gulyga 
1990, ρ 350) 
875 Gulyga 1990, ρ 378Г 
876 Lolita landed on 45 in the hit parade just referred to, but was popular, too in 1990, for example, it was 
published again in 300,000 copies (V Nabokov, Lolita (Moskva ANION, 1990)) 
877 Ρ Ρ Gajdenko, Ju N Davydov, Istonja ι racional'nost' sociologija M Vebera ι veberovskij renessans 
[History and Rationality the Sociology of M Weber and Weber-Renaissance] (Moskva Pohtizdat, 1991), cf 
on the historical background of this theme in Russia В G Rosenthal, "The Search for a Russian Orthodox Work 
Ethic," in E W Clowes e a (eds ), Between Tsar and People Educated Society and the Quest for Public Identity 
m Late Imperial Russia (Princeton UP, 1991), pp 57-74 
878 Motrosilova 1991, ρ 5 
879 Solov'ev 1991, ρ 2, colophon 
880 Cf Fleischer 1988, ρ 19 "Die systematischen Problemgehalte, die in der sowjetphilosophischen 
Systematik heillos verbaut waren, konnten oft nur auf dem «Umweg» über geschichtliche Gestalten (ζ В Kant 
oder Hegel) neu aktualisiert werden " 
881 Cf De George 1984, ρ 17 
882 Blakeley 1975a, ρ 161 
883 Cf V A ¿ибко , "Sovetskaja literatura po teoni ι metodologii istonko-filosofskich issledovanij," in 
Bogomolov &c 1983, pp 273-285, and Kamenskij 1992, ρ 16 'There exists even a special bibliography. 
"Soviet literature on the theory and methodology of investigations in the history of philosophy", composed by 
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V A ZuCkov and enclosed in the monograph by A S Bogomolov and T I Ojzerman just referred to (1983) 
Since that date a good deal of new publications on this theme has appeared " 
884 Interview with Sokolov, March 1986 
885 V V Sokolov, as reported by С G Arzakanjan, "ObsuZdenie metodologièeskich problem istoni filosofn," 
VF 1969, №9 (pp 115-123), ρ 115f, quoted after Rybarczyk 1975, ρ 23, π 27, translation from the German 
mine 
886 Kamenskij dates the first discussion among Soviet philosophers about theoretical questions of history of 
philosophy back to texts by A VarjaS and V F Asmus in 1924 (cf Kamenskij 1992, ρ 19, and ρ 104, η 
40) 
887Malinin 1976, ρ 931, referring to Aleksandrov 19462, ρ 13, Zdanov 1947, ρ 257, and M T Iovcuk, 
Istonja filosofn как пайка, ее predmet, metod ι znaienie (Moskva 1960), ρ 5 (a formulation almost literally 
identical with the one in IovCuk &c 1960, ρ 6) 
888 Ct Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 3, where the emergence of an interest in theoretical and methodological 
questions of history of philosophy is explicitly related to the work on IF6 
889 Ballestrem 1963, ρ 107 
890Bereznoj 1960, ρ 198 
891 They were used to this end by, among others, Bronislav Vasil'evic Bogdánov (cf Bogdanov 1969, idem 
1970a and 1970b, and idem, "Problemy istoni filosofn," in Evgrafov &L 1968-1985, Istonja tìlosofìi ν SSSR, 
Г , pp 555-570) 
892 Ct Bogomolov 1967, Belkina &c 1967, Iovcuk &c 1970, ρ 8f, Delokarov &c 1972, ρ 172, Bogomolov 
&c 1983, ρ 3 
893 =Iov£uk &c 1970, esp the first part, called 'Lenimzm ι mctodologiccskie problemy istoni filosofn" 
894 Μ Τ IovÊuk, G V Plechanov ι ego trudy po istoni filosofa (Moskva 1960), Ζ Ρ Protasenko, Lenin как 
/stonk filosofa (Leningrad 1969, and Bogdanov 1969 
895 Arzakanjan 1962 
896 A G Myslivcenko, "MelodoIogiCeskie problemy istonko-filosofskogo stranovedenija," in Iovcuk &c 
1970, pp 101-113, V E fcvgratov, 'Aktual'nye problemy issledovanija istoni filosofn narodov SSSR," in 
idem, pp 149-170, VA Scipanov, "Voprosy issledovanija istoni russkoj filosofn," in idem, pp 171-180 
897 Bogdanov 1970b, A I Novikov, "O strukture istonko-filosofskogo znanija," m idem, pp 65-75 
898 Ojzerman 1970, and Mamardasvih, 1959, 1960, and 1965 
899 V F Asmus, "Nekotorye voprosy dialektiki istonko-filosofskogo processa e ego poznanija," У£ 1961, 
№4 
900 Malinin 1976, ρ 4 
901 Ojzerman (1969) 19822, ( 1971) 19842,
 a
nd 1979, and Malinin 1976 
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902 Bogdanov 1970a, Brutjan 1979, Potemkin 1973 and 1980 
903 Interviews with Overman and Sokolov, 1984 and 1986 
904 The best source is the standard textbook in philosophy Osnovy marksistsko-lenmskoj fìlosofìi, the 6th 
edition of which appeared 1982 (= Konstanlinov &c 19826), cf also Ioviuk &c 1986, for a display of his 
continuous 'orthodoxy" 
905 On Bogomolov and his significance for IFN, cf esp Antonov &c 1986 
906 Bogomolov &c 1983, the main publications by Ojzerman alone are Ojzerman 1979, 19822, and 19842 
907 The best source in this respect is Kamcnskij 1992 despite its being published in post-Soviet times, it 
continues the position developed by Kamenskij in his earlier publications (cf Kamenskij 1992, ρ 21) 
908 See Bibliography Solov'ev 1981, Gorskij 1981, Canysev 1982, Zelnov 1981, Potemkin 1973, 1980 
909 As Abramov &c wrote euphemistically in their survey of positions in this field "A F Lose\ has expressed 
his own opinion about the significance of the history ot philosophy for the formation of a thought-culture 
[fonmwvanie kul'tury mySlcnija]" (Abramov &c 1986, ρ 32, referring to the liber dmicorum for Losev A F 
Losevu к 90 ¡etiju so dnja roidemja [To A F Losev on Occasion of his 90th Birthday] (Tbilisi 1983)) 
910 Cf Abramov &c 1986, ρ 31 "Here [in connection with the attempt to construct a systematic science of 
the history of philosophy, EvdZ] we must in the first place mention the book by A S Bogomolov and Τ I 
Ojzerman and the generalizing article by Τ I Ojzerman "Islonja filosofii" in the «Philosophical Encyclopedic 
Dictionary» [a source frequently recurred to m the present study as well, EvdZ]", cf also Kissel' 1988, ρ 171 
"The global analysis of the historical process of philosophy is represented in a senes of works by Τ I 
Ojzerman, in particular in a book, written together with A S Bogomolov, 
911 Antonov &c 1986, ρ 285 
912 Ojzerman 1969, ρ 4, and idem 19822, ρ 9 
913Mahnin 1976, ρ 95 
914 Oj¿erman 19822,
 p 9 
915 Malinin 1976, ρ 95 "In the 1940s and 1950s, the broad interpretation of the subject-matter of history of 
philosophy and the inclusion in it of problems of the history of social thought [obSCestvcnnaja mysl'] was very 
widespread It goes without saying that this was a mistake, brought about by a loss of notion of the specific 
nature [speciñka] of philosophical knowledge " 
916 Cf, e g , Canysev 1982, ρ 6 " first of all the question as to what philosophy is in its most general 
form must be answered", cf also Malinin 1976, ρ 4 
917 Michajlov 1970, ρ 160, who adds "Let's take, for example, the question of the definition of philosophy It 
is well known, that philosophy is the science of the universal laws of nature, society, and thought But it is far 
from clear to everybody, that this is not a definition of philosophy as a form of intellectual creativity 
[ivorcesrvo], having a history of over two-thousand years It is, essentially, a definition of Marxist philosophy 
Is it not so that there has been and still exists until the present day a definite tradition of non-scientific and even 
anti-scientific philosophy9 ( ) A scientific theory of philosophy is a history of philosophy, elaborated, 
however, by means of a logical, not a historical method [italics mine, EvdZ] " 
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918 Ojzerman 19822, ρ ц 8 (ρ 147 in the first edition) 
919 0jzerman 19822, ρ о 
920 Cf Ojzerman 19822, pp Ш-133 
921 Ojzerman 19822, ρ 134f 
922 0jzerman 19822, ρ 135 
923 0jzerman 19822, ρ Ц4 
924 Ojzerman 19822, ρ 135 
925 0jzerman 19822, ρ 137 
926 Cf Ojzerman 19822, ρ 139 
927 Ojzerman 19822, ρ I4i 
928 Ojzerman 19822, ρ H2 
929 Ojzerman 19822, ρ 143 
930 Ojzerman 19822, ρ 147 
931 Ojzerman 19822,
 p 14g 
932 Cf Abramov &c 1986, ρ 30ff 
933 Cf CanySev 1982, ρ 182f 
934 Cf Kamenskij 1984, and idem 1992 
935 Cf 2cInov 1981, ρ 90, 110 
936 Reference is to M G Makarov, Razvitie ponjatij 1 predmeta filosofa ν ¡stom ее uSenij [The Development 
of the Concepts and the Subject Matter of Philosophy in the History of its Doctrines] (Leningrad 1982) 
937 Cf also Losev 1984 
938 Cf Abramov &c 1985, ρ 31 
939¿telnov 1981, ρ 52, one of the positions discussed by ¿elnov is the official position, euphemistically 
called synthetic conception" "The force of the «synthetic» position of the «subject-matter of philosophy» and 
of philosophy itself is that in it everything is «taken into account [uiteno]», and it is in its own way 
invulnerable to criticism ( ) Its weakness is the absence of firm initial positions, so essential for a heuristic 
orientation [evnstileskaja ustrcmlcnnost ] A compromise takes the edge of the search for new ways of creative 
perfection of Marxist Leninist philosophy" (¿elnov 1981, ρ 59) He further distinguishes three serious 
positions an ontologica! (represented by S S Avahani, VV Orlov, VV II in, cf 2elnov 1981, ρ 530. a 
logico-epistemologica! [logiko-gnoseologiieskaja] (represented by E V II enkov and Β M Kedrov, cf ¿elnov 
1981, ρ 55f), and a "sociological' and 'activity-" [ «filosofsko-sociologioeskaja» 1 «dejatel'nostnaja» koncepcii] 
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position (represented by V Ρ Tugannov, А К Uledov, Ju К Pletnikov, M Ja Koval'zon, and M S Kagañev, 
cf ¿elnov 1981, ρ 56f), and then sides with Oj/ennan, whom he quotes as distinguishing three fundamental 
philosophical themes, "that of the object-substance, that of the subject, and the relation subject-object " 
940 2elnov 1981, ρ 71, cf Ojzerman 19822, pp 186-205, where Ojzerman indeed discusses these three 
fundamental themes of philosophy, and concludes that "in the philosophy of Marxism all fundamental 
philosophical themes are considered to be equally essential and organically connected with each other" (p 205) 
941 2elnov 1981, ρ 7If, cf Ojzerman 19822, pp 186-205, where Ojzerman indeed discusses these three 
fundamental themes of philosophy, and concludes that "in the philosophy of Marxism all fundamental 
philosophical themes are considered to be equally essential and organically connected with each other" ( ρ 205) 
942 Cf Ojzerman 1982*, pp 186-202 
943 Ojzerman 19822, ρ 202 
944 Cf Ojzerman 19822, ρ 202 "The passivity [sozercaie/'nosfjOf pre-Marxian materialism was determined, 
in many respects, by the fact that, ш elaborating the theme of the primary, substantial reality, it attributed only 
secondary importance to the derivative «second nature», created by mankind — human objective reality, which 
determines the spiritual life of society and subjective reality The bankruptcy of idealism, hypostatizing 
subjective reality, is shown will all evidence in the fact that the subjective, the spiritual is cut off from its 
material ground, is transformed into a self-sufficient reality, ι e is mystified " 
945 Cf Abramov &c 1986, ρ 31 
946 Interview with Sokolov, April 1986, JuK Mel'vil' explicitly agreed with this conception, retraceable, 
probably, to Asmus 
947 Ojzerman 19822, ρ ізб 
948 Ojzerman 19822, ρ 136 
949¿elnov 1981, ρ l i 
950 Iovcuk &c 1960, ρ 6 
951 Bclkma &c 1967, ρ 185, during an interview with Ojzerman in 1986, he confirmed the need to see the 
"basic question" in historical perspective, cf also L F ІГібе &c 1983], T I Ojzerman, entry "Istonja 
filosofh, ' ρ 232 '" Philosophy, Hegel maintained, is a developing system, and so is the history of philosophy 
( )" ( ) The philosopher did not apply this principle onto his own system, ( ) This anti-histoncist view 
was caused by his idealism [italics mine, EvdZ] " 
952 Engels, MEW XXI, ρ 275 "Diejenigen, die die Ursprunglichkeit des Geistes gegenüber der Natur 
behaupteten, also in letzter Instanz eine Weltschopfung irgendeiner Art annahmen -und diese Schöpfung ist oft 
bei den Philosophen, 7 В bei Hegel, noch weit verzwickter und unmöglicher als im Christentum-, bildeten das 
Lager des Idealismus Die andern, die die Natur als das Ursprüngliche ansahen, gehören zu den verschiednen 
Schulen des Materialismus " 
953 Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach [MEWXXI],p 274f 
954 Ojzerman 19842, ρ 16 (in the English translation ρ 19) 
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956 0jzerman 19842, ρ 18 (in the English translation ρ 21) 
957 Ojzerman 19842, ρ 21 (in the English translation 23f) 
958 0jzerman 19822, ρ ц З 
959 Ojzerman 19842, ρ 10 (in the English translation ρ 12), cf also Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 232 (in the 
English translation ρ 291) 
960 Ojzerman 19842, ρ l lf (in the English translation ρ 12f) 
961 Engels, MEW XXI, ρ 275 
962 Lenin, PSS XVIII, ρ 356f 
963 Ojzerman 19842, ρ 11 (in the English translation ρ 12) 
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Der Anspruch der Vernunft I (Berlin [DDR] 1968), ρ 19) 
965 Ojzerman I9842, ρ 9f (in the English translation ρ 121, in a footnote, Ojzerman agrees with the East 
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not lessen the significance of the basic philosophical question" (p 10, note *, reference is to M Buhr, G Irrlitz, 
Der Anspruch der Vernunft I (Berlin [DDR] 1968), ρ 19) 
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is static, immutable, "metaphysical ' (ι e "non-dialectical" — in the special Hegelian sense of the term 
appropriated and misused by Engels), blankly ignore the fact that Anstotle himself made growth and change 
basic to his entire ontology " 
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149 
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empmokriticizm [PSS Х ІП], ρ 277 ' The electron is just as inexhaustible as the atom, nature is infinite, but 
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986 CanySev 1982, ρ 178f 
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998 Cf Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschanen (1930), § 574 [WerJte Χ], ρ 393 
999 Cf Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 86 (in the English translation ρ 105f) 
1000 Hegel, WerJte XIX, ρ 548 
1001 Cf CanySev 1982, ρ 177 
1002 Cf Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 85f (in the English translation ρ 1050. with respect to Mexico, Bogomolov 
refers to a book by a certain M Leon-Portilla, obviously a Mexican, entitled filosotija nagua (Moskva 1961) 
1003 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 86 (in the English translation ρ 106) 
1004 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 86 (in the English translation ρ 106) 
1005 Cf Bogomolov &c 1983, pp 87-94 (in the English translation pp 107-116) 
1006 Cf Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 193 (in the English translation ρ 243) 
1007 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 90 (in the English translation ρ 110) 
1008 Cf CanySev 1982, ρ 22, referring to Gegel, Soimcmja IX, ρ 137, m the German original Hegel, 
WerJte XVIII, ρ 175 
1009 "Hegels idea of a free state-structure and the flourishing of political freedom as a condition for the full 
existence of philosophy is connected with his understanding of philosophy as an anti-dogmatic, free, and 
unselfish spiritual activity, striving for an integral understanding of the world, of philosophy as the objective 
science of truth «To look boldly into the face of truth, to believe in the power of the mind — that is the first 
condition of philosophy», the great German philosopher said " (CanySev 1982, ρ 25, also ρ 22f, reference is 
to Gegel', SocinemjalX.p 5, in the German original Hegel, WerJte XVIII, ρ 13 "Der Mut der Wahrheit, der 
Glaube an die Macht des Geistes ist die erste Bedingung der Philosophie") 
1010 "From the point of view of contemporary materialism, ι e Marxism, the hounds of the approaching of our 
knowledge to objective, absolute truth arc historically conditioned, but the existence of that truth is uncon­
ditional, unconditional is the fact, that we do approximate it' (Lenin PSS Х ІП, ρ 138), cf ibid, ρ 146 
"The only conclusion from opinion, shared by Marxists, that Marx theory is the objective truth, is the 
following going along the road of Marxist theory we will gel nearer and nearer to objective truth (without ever 
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exhausting it), going along any other road, we can not arrive at anything but confusion and falsehood", cf also 
Konstantinov &c 1982<\ pp 142-146 
1011 Ojzerman 19842, ρ 4 (in the English translation ρ 5f) 
1012 Cf Kant, Kntik der remen Vernunft, В 880-884 / А 852-856 [I Kant, Werkaasgabe (Frankfurt am Main 
Suhrkamp, 1968) IV, ρ 709-712] 
1013 Cf Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830),$ 572 [Werke Χ, ρ 379] "Diese 
Bewegung, welche die Philosophie ist, findet sich schon vollbracht, indem sie am Schluß ihren eigenen Begriff 
erfaßt, d ι nur auf ihr Wissen zurücksieht " This retrospection ' has to do both with the historical development 
of philosophy towards its present stage -"Bis hierher ist nun der Wellgeist gekommen Die letzte Philosophie 
ist das Resultat aller früheren, nichts ist verloren, alle Prinzipien sind erhalten Diese konkrete Idee ist das 
Resultat der Bemühungen des Geistes durch fast 2500 Jahre" ( Werke XX, ρ 455), and "So ist die Philosophie 
System in der Entwicklung, so ist es auch die Geschichte der Philosophie, und dies ist der Hauptpunkt, der 
Grundbegriff, den diese Abhandlung dieser Geschichte darstellen wird" (Werke XVIII, ρ 47, and XX, ρ 477)-
and with the construction of the system of philosophy itself, about to be completed by Hegel in this paragraph 
1014 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 271f (in the English translation ρ 335Q 
1015 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 235 (in the English translation ρ 294) 
1016 Ojzerman 19842, ρ 289 (in the English translation ρ 298) 
1017 Cf Blauberg &c 19824, entry ' Nauka, ρ 200 "Scientific knowledge in the full sense of the term begins 
only when behind the totality of facts a regularity [zakonomemost"] is perceived " 
1018 Ojzerman 1979, ρ 44 
1019Agudov&c 1984, ρ 178 
1020Cf, e g , Kamenskij 1984, ρ 114 
1021 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 200 (in the English translation ρ 253f) 
1022 When, e g , Garncev writes that "the historical process of philosophy is one of the fields of application of 
the law of negation of negation," he means little more than the alternation of continuity and change, rejection of 
a preceding position and subsequent resumption of the initial position (Garncev 1987, ρ 188) 
1023 "Dialectical materialism is the most general theory of development The Marxist understanding of the 
historical process of philosophy as a specific form of development, the investigation whereof presupposes the 
elaboration of a corresponding (special) theory of development, is determined by this" (Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 
200 (in the English translation ρ 253)) 
1024 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 201 (in the English translation, not reliable in these paragraphs, ρ 254f) 
1025 Cf Bogomolov &c 1983, pp 216-228 (in the English translation pp 272-286) 
1026 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 228 (in the English translation ρ 286) 
1027 Cf Bogomolov &c 1983, pp 228f (in the English translation ρ 286f) 
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1028 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 229 (in the English translation ρ 2870 
1029 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 230 (in the English translation ρ 289) 
1030 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 231 (in the English translation ρ 291) 
1031 Bogomolov &c 1983, ibid 
1032 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 236 (in the English translation ρ 296) 
1033 Bogomolov &c ρ 237 (in the English translation ρ 296) 
1034 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 229 (in the English translation ρ 2860, this move, though going quite a bit 
further, is of the same nature as that performed by Stalin in the early 1950s 
1035 Cf Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 235 (in the English translation ρ 294) 
1036 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 241 (in the English translation ρ 301) 
1037 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 237-240 (in the English translation ρ 296-300) 
1038 Cf Hegel, Werke Х ПІ, 22 
1039 Cf op cit. ρ 12 
1040 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 241 (in the English translation ρ 300f) 
1041 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 243 (in the English translation ρ 303) 
1042 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 246f (in the English translation ρ 307) 
1043 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 244 en 245 (in the English translation ρ 305 and 306) 
1044 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 243f (in the English translation ρ 304) 
1045 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 245 (in the English translation ρ 306) 
1046 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 245 (in the English translation ρ 306) 
1047 Cf Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 247 (in the English translation ρ 308) " undoubtedly a more 
revolutionary thinker than the materialists Lamcttne, Holbach, Helvelius " 
1048 Bogomolov &c 1983 ρ 250 (in the English translation ρ 311) 
1049 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 245 (in the English translation ρ 306) 
1050 Cf Bogomolov &c ρ 251f (in the Fnghsh translation ρ 3130 
1051 Cf Ojzerman &c 1983, ρ 13 
1052 Cf Bogomolov &c 1983 ρ 257 (in the English translation ρ 320) 
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1053 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 258 (in the English translation ρ 320) 
1054 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 257 (in the English translation ρ 320) 
1055 Ct Ojzerman 1986\ ρ 3 (in the German translation ρ 8), and SCipanov &c 1982, ρ 157 
1056 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 260 (in the English translation ρ 322) 
1057 Cf Ëclnov 1981, ρ 7 
1058 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 226 (in the English translation ρ 283) 
1059 Cf Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 236f (in the English translation ρ 296) 
1060 Cf Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 217 (in the English translation ρ 273) 
1061 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 216 (in the English translation ρ 272) 
1062 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 217 (in the English translation ρ 273) 
1063 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 217f (in the English translation ρ 274), Prcsocralic philosophy, according to 
Oj/erman and Bogomolov, shows "that the differentiation or philosophical doctrines is characterized by an 
essential objective content, ι e expresses not just the subjective claims of a philosopher to an opinion of his 
own, but the development of a particular conception, the advancement to the foreground of various aspects, the 
self-criticism within a given school " 
1064 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 218 (in the English translation ρ 274), it represented, according to Ojzerman and 
Bogomolov, "a single current, a union of like-minded persons, within which, however, there was an essential 
(and fruitful) differentiation of views," due to "two qualitatively different trends the Cartesian and the 
sensualist " 
1065 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 219 (in the English translation ρ 275) 
1066 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 219 (in the English translation ρ 276) 
1067 Cf Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 220f (in the English translation pp 276ff) 
1068 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 222 (in the English translation ρ 279) 
1069 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 223 (in the English translation ρ 280) 
1070 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 226 (in the English translation ρ 284) 
1071 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 227 (in the English translation ρ 285) 
1072 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 227 (in the English translation ρ 284) 
1073 Il'iccv &c 1983, T I Ojzerman, entry "Istonja fllosofu," ρ 232 
1074 Cf also Oj/erman 19842,
 p p 265tf (in the English translation pp 274ff), in interviews in 1986, V V 
Sokolov gave as his opinion that class-struggle and class position are clearly present in political and social 
theories, but only distantly connected to theories in the fields of ontology or epistemology [gnoseologia], and 
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Ju К Mel'vil, who distinguished a scientific and an ideological aspect, felt that it was very difficult, in concrete 
histonographical research, to determine what was scientific, what ideological 
1075Cf, eg , Ojzerman 19842,
 p 266f (in the English translation ρ 275f), Bogomolov &c 1983, pp. 85ff (in 
the English translation pp 105ff), and С G Arzakanjan, VF 1969, №9, pp 115-123 
1076 Hegel, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften (1830), § 548, Anmerkung [Werke Χ, ρ 348fJ, 
and Hegel 1959, ρ B4f [ Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie 1823-1827/28] 
1077 Hegel 1959, ρ 135 "So muß man auch in der Geschichte der Philosophie parteiisch sein, etwas 
voraussetzen, einen Zweck haben, und dieser ist der reine, freie Gedanke " 
1078 Hegel, Enzyklopädie , § 548, Anmerkung [Werke Χ, ρ 349] "Bei einem Richter wird zugleich 
angenommen, daß er sein Amt albern und schlecht verwalten wurde, wenn er nicht ein Interesse, ja das 
ausschließende Interesse für das Recht, es nicht ¿um Zwecke und alleinigen Zwecke halte und wenn er sich des 
Urteilens enthielte Dies Erfordernis an den Richter kann man Parteilichkeit fur das Recht nennen 
1079 Cf Mahnin 1976, ρ 87, as well as Ojzerman 19842.
 p 268 ( in the English translation ρ 277), and 
Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 193f (in the English translation ρ 243) 
lOeOMalinin 1976, ρ 88 
1081 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 193f (in the English translation ρ 243f) 
1082Malinin 1976, ρ 90 
1083 Ojzerman, Sokolov, and Mel'vil' all rejected such a procedure (interviews 1984/6), Sokolov speaking, in 
this connection, of "simplification" and "schematism" 
1084 Cf Ojzerman 19842, ρ lOf (in the English translation ρ llf), Ojzerman 19822, pp 212ff, and 
Bogomolov &c 1983, pp 216ff (in the English translation pp 272, V V Sokolov spoke of materialism and 
idealism as "tendencies" 
1085 For example in Bogomolov &c 1983, where one would expect a discussion of these matters, the question 
as to the penodization of the history of philosophy plays a subordinate role 
1086 In publications at least — in interviews, Soviet historians of philosophy were, in 1984 and 1986, much 
less cautious, for example, Τ I Ojzerman told me that, in his opinion, the statements by Engels and Lenin on 
the history ot philosophy, on the struggle between materialism and idealism, and on the antithesis of dialectic 
and metaphysics, had to be regarded as historically bound, Ju К Mel'vil' and V V Sokolov relativized esp the 
opposition ot dialectic and metaphysics, wrongly made into a central issue by, according to Mel'vil', 
Bogomolov, Mel'vil' did think that every philosophical position can be qualified as either materialist or idealist, 
but he equally fell that this wasn't saying very much, M A Kissel', finally, one of Ojzcrman's collaborators, 
characterized both the opposition of the two main trends and that of the iwo methods as abstractions from the 
actual processes 
1087 Il'icev &c 1983, T I Ojzerman, entry "Istorya filosofn," ρ 232 
1088 Cf Mahnin 1976, ρ 4 
1089 Ojzerman 19842, ρ 35 (in the English translation ρ 38), cf also Zelnov 1981, ρ 11, who refers to the 
same passage on ρ 4 in the first edition of Clavnye napravlcnija 
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1090 Lenin, PSSXVU1, ρ 322 
1091 Pozner 1937, ρ 26 
1092 Cf, e g , Ojzerman 19842, pp 252ff (in the English translation pp 262ff) 
1093 Ojzcrman 19842, ρ 36 (in the English translation ρ 38), reference is to К Marx, "letter to M 
Kowalcwski (1879)" [MEWXXXN], ρ 506 
1094 Ct, e g , Goran 1984, ρ 10, Dzochadze 1977, pp 4ff, Arzakanjan 1962, Bogomolov &c 1983, pp 147ff 
(in the English translation pp 184ff) and Kamenskij 1992, ρ 7 
1095 Cf op cit, ρ 9 
1096 Cf Malinin 1976, pp 16-61 
1097Opcit, ρ 4 
1098Opcit, ρ 62Γ 
1099 Cf Malinin 1976, pp 63 90 
1100 Dzochadze 1977, ρ 7 
1101 Dzochadze 1977, ρ 9 
1102 Malinin, for instance, is far less positive with respect to Hegel (cf Malinin 1976, ρ 37, 39) 
1103 Agudov &c 1984, ρ 178, referring to Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 184 (in the English translation ρ 230), 
and ρ 230 (in the English translation ρ 289) 
1104Arzakanjan 1962, ρ 95 
1105 Ibid, ρ 96 
1106 Arzakanjan 1962, ρ 100, see also ρ 96, cf also Malinin 1976, ρ 19, and Kamenskij 1992, ρ 102, η 
14, according to these sources, al Shahraslani s works are available in a German edition Abu'l -Fath Mohammad 
asch Schahrastany, Rehgionspjrteien und Philosophenschulen, vols Ι-Π (Berlin / Halle 1850-1851), translated 
by Th Haarbrucker Kamenskij informs us that the most interesting part of this book was reprinted in H Ley, 
Geschichte der Aufìilàmng und des Atheismus (Berlin [DDR] 1963), that a Russian translation of the first part 
-the one on religions and sects- appeared 1984 (edited by S M Prozorov), and that a study of his work as a 
historian of philosophy appeared in Tadzikstan, apparently in Russian К Bekov, Muchamed Sachrastam 
(DuSanbe 1987) 
1107Malmin 1976, ρ 19 
1108 Arzakanjan 1962, ρ lOOf 
1109 Arzakanjan 1962, ρ 101 
1110 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 161 (quoted from the English translation, ρ 203) 
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1111 Kamenskij 1992, ρ lOf 
1112 Cf Malimn 1976, ρ 89 "The final bankruptcy of idealism, however, can not be identified with the 
concrete historical importance of this or the other system of idealism The great idealists-rationalists and 
dialecticians of the past (Socrates, Plato, Montaigne, Kant Schelling, Fichte, Hegel, and others), but partly also 
metaphysicians (and even scholastics1) supplied for discussion in philosophy quite a few important problems 
with regard to theoretical knowledge of reality " 
1113 Il'icev &c 1983, Τ I Ojzerman, entry "Istonja filosofu," ρ 233 
1114 Ibid 
1115 Il'icev &c 1983, Τ I Ojzerman, entry "Istonja filosofu," ρ 233 
1116 Cf Ojzerman 1982b, ρ 114, and Ojzerman 1979, pp 45ff 
1117 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 207f (in the English translation ρ 262) 
1118 Cf Bogomolov &c 1970, ρ 347 
1119 Cf Ojzerman 1982b, ρ 121 
1120 See Ojzerman 19822, pp π 4-137 
1121 Aleksandrov 19462, ρ 8 
1122Iov£uk&c 1960,p 11, and Iovcuk &c 19713,ρ 11 (with minor differences between the two editions) 
1123 Pavlov 1966, ρ 135f 
1124 Dzochadze 1977, ρ 284f 
1125 Dzochadze 1977, ρ 287 
1126 Ojzerman 1982, pp 20ff, and ρ 61 
1127 Il'icev &c 1983, Τ I Ojzerman, entry "Istonja filosofu," ρ 232 
1128 Ojzerman 1982, ρ 60 
1129 Cf Hegel in the "Preface" to his "Phänomenologie des Geistes" "Daran mitzuarbeiten, dass die 
Philosophie der Form der Wissenschaft naher komme, - dem Ziele, ihren Namen der Liebe zum Wissen ablegen 
zu können und wirkliches Wissen zu sein ist es, was ich mir vorgesetzt " (Hegel, Werke III, ρ 14/15), cf 
Ojzerman 1982, ρ 60 "Hegel demonstrated, that philosophy just not simply has a history, philosophy 
develops, and its development has, in the end, a progressive character The main trend of this progressive process 
is the coming to-being of scientific philosophy " 
1130 Ojzerman &c 1983. ρ 5 
1131 Cf Matveev 1987, references to Gramsci's discussion of Renaissance philosophy can be found in, e g , 
Ojzcrman's introduction to the book on Luther by Solov'ev (Ojzerman 1984a, ρ 5 ), Matveev, who discussed 
Gramsci's notion in 1987, refers to both that book and to Filosofìja epochi ranmch burfuamych revoljucij 
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(edited by Overman with Solov'ev as one of its authors [see Ch 11 in b]) as examples of the recognition in 
Soviet literature of Gramsci's notion (Matvecv 1987, ρ 6f, for a much earlier discussion of Gramsci s ideas 
about history of philosophy see Ζ N Mele5£enko, "Voprosy іыопі filosofu ν trudach Antonio GramSi," ЕЫ 
1961, №1, pp 157-164) (references are to the 3rd volume of a three-volume edition of Selected Works by 
Gramsci in Russian (Moskva 1959), ρ 15-38 85, to A Gramsci, II materialismo storico с la filosofía di 
Benedetto Croce (Roma 1979), ρ 167, 188-189, 287, 298-299, and to A Gramsci, Quaderni del carcere 
(Tonno 1975), pp 423-424 ) 
U32Matveev 1987, ρ 5 
1133 0jzcrman 1988, ρ 54 
1134 E g " Vvedeme ," VE 1989, №2, ρ 219, and №9, ρ 55, Frolov &c 1989,1, ρ 68, Ojzerman 1989, ρ 
632, Koccrgin 1990, ρ 7 
1135 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 255 
1136 Ojzerman &c 1983, ρ 5 
1137 Ojzerman &c 1983, ρ 5 
1138 К Marx, "Der leitende Artikel in Nr 179 der Kolnischen Zeitung." Rheinische Zeitung 1842, № 191 
[10/07/1842] [MEWl], ρ 97 (pp 86-104) "jede wahre Philosophie (ist) die geistige Quintessenz ihrer Zeit, " 
1139 Ojzerman did add the adjective "genuine" [istinnaja, wahre] in Formirovame filosofi! marksizma (cf 
Ojzerman 19861, ρ 99 (in the German translation ρ 140)) 
1140 Cf Ojzerman 19861, chapter II 2, pp 99-112, passim (in the German translation pp 138-158), it was in 
1843, Lenin wrote, that Marx was "only just becoming Marx [tol'ko ito stanovitsja Marksom]" (Lenin, PSS 
XVIII, ρ 357, cf Oj/crman 19863, ρ 9 (m the German translation ρ 17)) 
1141 Frolov &c 1989, I, ρ 68, the formulation in question can not, to my knowledge, be found in Hegel's 
writings, but refers clearly to the notion of philosophy as "ihre Zeit in Gedanken erfaßt" (Hegel, Werke XII, ρ 
26), more specifically to such passages as "Dies ist die Stellung der Philosophie unter den Gestaltungen Eine 
Folge davon ist, daß die Philosophie ganz identisch ist mit ihrer Zeit Sie steht daher nicht über ihrer Zeit, sie 
ist Wissen des substantiellen ihrer Zeit" (XVIII, ρ 73), or " das Gestalten seines [of Geist, EvdZ] Begriffs, 
sein Denker seiner, ist zugleich Gestaltung seines ganzen Umfangs, semer konkreten Totalität in der Geschichte 
Die Idee, welche das philosophische System einer Zeit ausdruckt, hat dies Verhältnis zu seiner [again of Geist, 
EvdZ] übrigen Gestaltung, daß sie die Substanz seines Universums, sein allgemeines Wesen, [seine] Blute ist, 
das wissende Leben im reinen Denken des einfachen Selbstbewußtseins" (XX, ρ 508) Not only can this 
formulation not be found in Hegels texts, it also presents an interpretation that diverges from Hegels idea 
philosophy is the "self-consciousness" ot an epoch only because it is the (self-)knowledge of the spiritual 
substance that manifests itself in that epoch, and, in philosophy, returns to itself [für-sich sein] In this respect, 
Hegel would have agreed, presumably, to call philosophy the essence" of an epoch, not its "quintessence" 
1142 0j/erman 1988, ρ 49 
1143 Ojzerman 1988, ρ 53 
U44 0j7crman 1988, ρ 54 
1145 Ilicev &c 1983, T I Ojzerman, entry "Istonja filosofi!," ρ 232 
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1146 Hegel " man muss diese reinen Begriffe in dem zu erkennen wissen, was die geschichtliche Gestalt 
enthalt" (Werke XX, ρ 478) and " um in der empirischen Gestalt und Erscheinung, in der die Philosophie 
geschichtlich auftritt, ihren Fortgang als Entwicklung der Idee zu erkennen, muss man freilich die Erkenntnis der 
Idee schon mitbringen" (ibid ρ 479) 
1147 Il'icev &c 1983, T I Ojzerman, entry "Istonja filosofii," ρ 232 
1148 Cf Ojzerman 1980, ρ 112f 
1149 Cf Hegel, Werte Х ІП, ρ 57 
1150 A V Panin in "Obsuïdenie uïebnika «Vvédeme ν filosofiju»," ρ 171 
1151 Il'icev &c 1983, T I Ojzerman, entry "Istonja filosofii," ρ 233 
1152Il'iSev &c 1983, AG Spirkin, entry "Istina," ρ 226 
1153 ІГібе &c 1983, E G Judin, entry ' Razvitie," ρ 561 
1154Il'icev &c 1983, A G Spirkin, entry "Filosofija," ρ 726 
1155 H'iCev &c 1983, A Ρ Ogurcov, entry "Substancija," ρ 660 
1156 Il'icev &c 1983, entry "Zname," ρ 192 
1157 Il'icev &c 1983, V N Sadovskij, entry "Sistema," ρ 610 
1158 Il'iïev &c 1983, A G Spirkin, entry "Dialekticeskij matenalizm," ρ 159 
1159 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 260 (in the English translation ρ 322) 
1160Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 235 (in the English translation ρ 294) 
1161 Bogomolov &c 1983, ρ 228 (in the English translation ρ 286) 
1162 Cf "Vvedenie. ," YE 1988, № 9, ρ 25 
1163 Cf Frolov &c 1989 Ι, ρ 8 and ρ 221-279 
1164 Cf "Vvedenie ", VE 1988, № 9, ρ 17, and Frolov &c 1989,1, ρ 18, this reader, announced as Chres-
tomatija pò filosofa in 1988, and for 1990 as Kmga dlja itemja po filosofii in 1989 (NK 1989, №7, nr 40) , 
Finally appeared in two volumes (Gurevii &c 1991) 
1165 " Vvedenie ," EK 1989, №2, ρ 78f, as well as, with minor changes, Frolov &c 1989,1, ρ 43f 
1166 E g , Ljubulin & Pivovarov in "Zaocnaja ," EN 1989, №6, ρ 69 
1167 JFE '86, ρ 295 
1168 In their review of the two first IFEs, Ljubutin and Percev complained "Perestrojka in philosophy, ι e the 
surmounting of vulgarization and schematism, of a simplistic comprehension of the tenets of the classics of 
Marxism-Leninism, in a word, the return to dialectical-materialist philosophy in all its complexity and the 
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height of its theoretical thought, demands most of all also an attitude towards the scientific history of 
philosophy as a most complex science But this is inconceivable without a qualitative break in the field of the 
theory and methodology of research into the history of philosophy What can the «Eiegodmk» offer its reader in 
this respect'' So far, there is no special rubric Problems of the theory and methodology of history of 
philosophy as a science' In spite of the persuasiveness and actuality of those materials, that include theoretical 
and methodological ideas, there is still a shortcoming in fundamental articles dedicated to these ideas only" 
(Ljubutin &c 1988, ρ 169) 
1169 Cf Kamenskij 1992, ρ 16 
1170 'Problemy i/u£enija lstoni russkoj filosofii ι kultury Matenaly «kruglogo stola»,' VF 1988, №9, pp 
92-161, cf esp Goerdt 1989b 
1171 Oj7erman 1988a, ρ 31 
1172 Ojzerman 1988a, ρ 32 
1173 Ojzerman 1988a, ρ 32 
1174 Cf Overman 1988a, ρ 39 
1175 Cf Ojzerman 1988a, pp 33ff, for instance, Plato was right, according to Ojzerman in criticizing early 
materialists for not recognizing other than corporeal reality 
1176 Ojzerman 1988a, ρ 37, e g , J J Rousseau was an idealist whose philosophy was the most revolutionary 
ot his time, expressing the interests of those below (op cit, ρ 38) 
1177 Ojzerman 1988a, ρ 39 
1178 Ojzerman 1988a, ρ 39 
1179 Kissel' 1988, ρ 172 
1180 Kissel' 1988, ρ 174 
1181 Kissel' 1988, ρ 174 
1182 Quoted from Kissel' 1988, ρ 174 
1183 Kamenskij 1992, ρ 22 
1184 Kissel' 1988, ρ 174 
1185 With this title Dobrochotov alluded to Kant's Preisschrift 'Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte 
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"In der Geschichte tritt... die Philosophie nur da auf, wo und insofern freie 
Verfassungen sich bilden."' 
G.W.F. Hegel, 1817 
"We will not get freedom from anywhere, if we do take the decision to be 
free."2 
N.V. Motrosilova, 1991 
In this epilogue, I shall draw some more general and daring conclusions from my investigation 
of the Soviet philosophical phenomenon. They indicate the impact of what I have been doing in 
terms of results and of approach, and include a statement about the state of post-Soviet 
philosophy. Rather than suggesting some final, synthetic conclusion, they reflect and defend a 
position and an outlook. 
Freedom as a Condition of Philosophical Thought and Culture 
Philosophy is related to freedom in two senses. In the objective sense of the (more or less 
secured) existence of freedom of expression, publication, discussion, and in the subjective 
sense of free, i.e. uninhibited and self-determining thought. The first is a necessary condition 
for philosophy to become objective and intersubjective, and thus a condition for philosophical 
culture to flourish and develop according to its own logic. The second is a necessary condition 
for the existence of philosophical thought, and it must, moreover, be realized in an individual. 
Both senses of freedom are gradual, as they may be limited to some areas or subjects, but since 
in both cases freedom is a matter of principle, the limits of freedom are objective and 
perceptible: censorship, prohibitions, dogmas, prejudices, inhibitions, or taboos. Philosophy 
and philosophical culture therefore can also exist and develop under less than totally free 
conditions, but in a limited sense. 
This is clearly the case with Soviet philosophy, the more so since the Soviet system 
meant a decline with respect to an "already attained civilized being."3 As a result, the idea of 
freedom inevitably became an oppositional idea. Thought without presuppositions is 
impossible, as there always has to be something to begin with, to depart from, whether we 
label it "ideology,"4 "prejudice", "natural consciousness", or a "given position". But 
philosophy is self-critical thought in the sense that it seeks to get hold of its own presup-
positions and subject them to critical investigation. Free thought means self-determining 
thought in the sense of relating freely to what is given to it, being able to affirm or reject it. 
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Hence, it is not the presence of unquestioned presuppositions that renders philosophy 
impossible, but their continued presence as unquestionable after they have been questioned. 
With regard to the objective side, there was not, in the USSR, a free constitution. This 
implies that philosophy could not be freely developed because there was no freedom of 
expression, publication, and discussion. At the same time, the idea of a free constitution was 
present and "at work" in Soviet society, not only in the minds of many -including Marxist-
intellectuals, but also in the fact that the USSR was given a seemingly free constitution by 
Stalin. A large proportion of dissidents' critique was that the USSR did not observe its own 
constitution. 
With regard to the subjective side, there were, as we have seen, freely thinking 
individual philosophers [Ch.4, Ch.9]. Regardless of the extent to which the "indoctrination" of 
the Soviet people or of the members of the CPSU was successful, there were, at every stage in 
Soviet philosophy, individuals who acted as autonomous philosophers, however local and 
limited the field of their activity. In this sense, philosophy never died in the USSR. 
Philosophical Culture: the Interplay of Outer and Inner Logic 
"Soviet philosophy" was not a philosophical position, school, or system, but a specific 
philosophical culture. The idea of a philosophical culture has proved to be a valuable tool in 
understanding the "Soviet philosophical phenomenon" (Blakeley). But it is valuable outside the 
context of this study as well. Of course, it is possible to take any philosophical text, and 
"simply" read it as a product of human thought. While thinking you are reading it "purely", 
you will be reading it as if it were written by a colleague next door. In the case of Soviet 
philosophical texts, the result would be to read most of them as texts by Marxists or Leninist 
who had understood little of Marx and even Lenin. What would be missed is the specific nature 
of Soviet philosophical culture, and the way in which it affected all philosophical activity 
within that culture. All philosophical texts, even the greatest, stem from particular philosophical 
cultures, and to disregard that fact is to miss something important. All philosophy is done 
concretely by individuals: here or there, then or now, by her or by him. And there are no 
neutral places, no time outside history, no blank individuals. This is not to deny that there is 
something universal in philosophical thought. There is, and it is very important, but it never is 
the whole story. 
One of the determinants of philosophical culture is the situation it exists in, a situation 
that favors some philosophical positions while disfavoring or excluding others. The Soviet 
case was extreme inasmuch as one particular philosophical position, the problematic nature 
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whereof was evident even within Russian Marxism [Ch.4.i, Ch.9.ii], was not simply favored in 
the sense of gaining public dominance, but directly linked to political power and given an 
official status [Ch.4.ii, Ch.8]. This not only meant the end of Marxism(-Leninism) as a living 
philosophy [Ch.4.iii, Ch.5], it also meant that the "natural" proliferation of positions according to 
the inner logic of philosophy was obstructed by an oufer limitation. This implied that 
development was possible only in marginal forms or in a process of specialization and 
professionalization |Ch.9ii-iii]. 
This process of specialization, exemplified in this study by IFN [Ch.lu, Ch. 11], formed 
an escape from official philosophy, and created a "niche" where philosophy was preserved, but 
it also realized a major condition for the development of philosophical culture: improvement of 
technical an historical competence, selective appropriation of the content of "contemporary 
bourgeois philosophy", restoration of the heritage of West European philosophy. However 
limited, and though mobilized for direct and indirect ideological ends, this process led to a 
philosophical culture in the USSR in the 1980s that was incomparable to the primitivism of the 
"dead period". 
The development of IFN not only shows the inner limitations of Soviet philosophical 
culture, and the importance of relatively independent professional disciplines as a means to 
retain a certain level of philosophical culture and prepare the ground for better times, but it also 
points to the actual contribution of philosophers who worked in IFN. They have produced 
works that represent a philosophical interest in themselves, and will continue to do so. It is the 
fact that these philosophers were working under the predominance of a strongly "ideologized" 
official philosophy, and tried to establish and "save" philosophy as a field of intellectual 
activity in its own right, that has urged them to focus, in their theoretical conceptions and in 
their practice, on aspects of the "socio-historical embeddedness" of philosophy that are easily 
forgotten in the seemingly self-evident freedom of our philosophical culture. In other words: 
they both demonstrate and illustrate that philosophy always and necessarily exists and is done 
in a concrete socio-historical situation, within a philosophical culture, with its own tradition, 
industry, public space, and always requires an ideology of philosophy, and they also show that 
philosophy never coincides with its being thus situated. 
Sluzanka ideologii - ideologija sluzanki 
The main determination of Soviet philosophy by the situation it existed in was its fundamental 
subordination to an ideological function, its inclusion in the ideological legitimization of the 
Soviet system [Ch.7], and its elevation to the status of theoretical foundation of Marxist-Leninist 
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ideology. This subordination was effectuated through an ideology of Soviet philosophy that 
asserted its partisan, scientific, and systematic character [Ch.8]. Soviet philosophy was Marxist-
Leninist by definition. This simultanuously excluded the legitimacy of deviant philosophical 
positions, legitimized the eventual interference by political authorities, and assigned primary 
importance to philosophy as the basis of a guiding ideology, a motivating world-view. The 
independently thinking individual philosopher was excluded in practice [Ch.9.ii] and in theory 
[Ch.8.iii and Ch. I2.ii-iii], but Philosophy was placed at the very heart of the Soviet system. 
As a result, the Soviet system was in need of a permanently sophisticated, adapted, and 
updated philosophical theory, and this met the urge of philosophers to "make sense of their 
experience" (Scanlan) and "to go all the way" (Jeu) by creating a iegitimateplace for philoso­
phical work. At the same time, the resulting inner dynamic of philosophy had to be contained. 
This implied the deployment of ideological mechanisms from above and from below, since 
whatever was actually done in Soviet philosophical culture had to be legimitized, and had to 
legitimize itself in terms of the ideology of Soviet philosophy [Ch.S.iii]. Soviet theory of the 
history of philosophy offers an example of this ideology from above and from below in the 
"sophisticated mainstream position" of Bogomolov and Ojzerman, that served as a link and 
buffer between the official system of philosophy and the work actually done in IFN [Ch. 12.Ш]. 
Sdentine Philosophy as the Neutralization of Philosophy 
Just as IFN was claimed to be a science of the history of philosophy, Soviet philosophy as a 
whole was claimed to be a scientific philosophy, and to found Marxism-Leninism as, in 
Ojzerman's words, a "scientific philosophical world-view". Nauönost' was a key concept of 
the ideology of Soviet philosophy [Ch.8.ii], accounting for its superiority, its collective nature, 
and its monopoly: if a true and scientific system of philosophy is a fact, there can be no 
legitimate place for alternative philosophical positions, and the plurality of "bourgeois" 
philosophy must be a sign of the latter's weakness and crisis. Philosophy was reduced to the 
status of "normal science": it was accumulative, it could be planned and collectively developed. 
While this created a legitimate place for a considerable, and in fact massive activity in 
the field of philosophy, it meant, at the same time, the exclusion of the individual philosopher 
and the exclusion of philosophical positions: both were either included in the overall frame-
work of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, or excluded from it as deviations. If philosophy neces-
sarily is done by individuals in a socio-historical situation, this implies that every philosophical 
position is a political position, too (whether it acknowledges, denies or ignores this). To act as 
a freely thinking individual is a political act, and a risky one in many situations. In this respect, 
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philosophy is partisan in the sense of never being neutral, not because philosophers want to be 
partisan, but because there are no neutral places 
In the Soviet case the partisan nature of philosophy, together with its claim to be a 
scientific philosophy, meant to neutralize philosophy's critical potential, and to turn it, behind a 
facade of Leninist militancy, into an instrument, a "handmaid of politics" The notion of Soviet 
philosophy as a handmaid of ideology, by contrast, is a negative version of the ideology of 
Soviet philosophy itself, which proudly assigned to philosophy the status of theoretical 
foundation of Marxist-Leninist ideology This ' stereotype that, despite its critical pretension, in 
fact only reproduces the image that Stalinism gave of itself' (Zapata), conceals the actual 
complexity and "relative mdepence" of Soviet philosophical culture, even if the latter was also 
determined by the socio-political situation it existed in, albeit not "in the final analysis" 
(because the situation of philosophy is only one of its determinants) 
Whether philosophy is a science or not is one of the questions that ensue from the basic 
(meta)-philosophical question "What is philosophy9" Because philosophy is self-determining 
(self-foundationals and self-critical) thought, any answer to these questions is a philosophical 
position already In other words philosophy neither "is" nor "is not" a science, but can deter-
mine itself as scientific The idea of scientific philosophy is a powerful motive in Western philo-
sophical culture, too, one that performs a pivotal ideological functions in the legitimization 
'from below' of philosophy as an intellectual and economic activity At the same time, Western 
philosophical culture displays the incessant manifestation of counter-motives, within, and esp 
outside of the academic philosophical community 
In the Soviet case, the dogmatic official "yes" to the question about the scientific nature 
of philosophy meant to marginalize alternative forms of philosophical thought, to destroy the 
critical function of philosophy, to legitimize subordination and planning, and to limit 
philosophy to well-delineated areas, viz professional philosophical disciplines like IFN In the 
latter case, to claim to be a science of the history of philosophy both legitimized and limited the 
study of past philosophy the reconstruction of a history of philosophy from a philosophical 
position (dis)appeared as the scientific investigation of the objective historical process of 
Philosophy 
Marx /Hegel 
The idea of a transition from philosophy to science was common to Hegel and Marx, even if 
they interpreted it differently This points to the ambiguous role of Hegel with respect to Soviet 
philosophy As we have seen m the case of IFN. the return to Hegel served to move away 
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from reduction and politically motivated dichotomization to the proper history of philosophy 
and legitimized the study of the whole past of philosophy, but the totalizing trend at the same 
time meant to insert the entire development of pre-Marxist philosophy in the ideological self-
defence of Soviet Marxism-Leninism as the prehistory of true scientific philosophy 
At several points, the parallel of IFN with Hegel's conception of the history of 
philosophy has been noted a growing appreciation of his conception, a "hegeliamzing trend" in 
Soviet theory of the history of philosophy, and a remarkable correspondence in the "lay-out" of 
philosophy's history [ChiOnd, Chiim, and Ch 12 и m] Hegel, given his conception of 
philosophy as absolute knowledge, could not but present his own system as the present final 
result of the entire historical development of philosophy, and 'deduce" from his proper system 
a (rational) reconstruction of philosophy's history up to and including its result The rationality 
and truth of the resultant history of philosophy is only possible, from the perspective of 
absolute idealism, when and because the result has resulted5 
The Soviet conception of philosophy's history preserved this constellation, and it had 
to do so, as it conceived of itself as 'true knowledge", result of a "revolution in philosophy" 
Regarding not Hegel, but itself -diamat and istmat- as the totalizing result of philosophy's 
history thus far, as the (only) right answer to all basic questions of philosophy, it inevitably 
conceived ot history of philosophy until that "revolution" as the genesis of truth, and with 
respect to philosophical development since that revolution, it equally inevitably split it up in 
two opposed parts a history of the steady and continuous development of Marxist-Leninist 
philosophy into its "Leninist stage", and the continued "development" of bourgeois 
philosophy, which, because it had reached its highest point in Hegel, could be nothing but 
decline and repetition, and could therefore be "criticized" from the position of true philosophy 
It should be stressed that in itself this is a mere consequence of the idea of philosophy 
as achieved and manifest true theory Any philosophical position that claims to embody "true 
knowledge" and to provide the right answers to the main questions of philosophy, has to 
conceive of the past as either a collection of errors and a few right guesses, or as its own 
genesis (the latter interpretation is the most pretentious and the most modest one), and has to 
conceive of contemporary philosophy as 'persistent error', object of fully justified criticism 
and / or source of improvement in detail of one's proper position This is a necessary 
constellation Only, in most cases (including the case of Western philosophy after Hegel), 
philosophy continues to develop "antagonistically' (the split of left- and right-Hegelians is a 
prime example) In the case of Soviet philosophical culture, however, the position that 
conceived of itself as resulting from a final revolution in philosophy was preserved, 
immortalized, dogmaticized, petrified Consequently, what was in the case of Hegel a virtual 
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point of absolute insight, became in the case of Soviet philosophy a prolonged history of some 
100 years (if we let it begin with Engels' Ludwig Feuerbach... (1888), who first formulated 
the totalizing Marxist historical self-conception). 
One of the questions raised with respect to Hegel's conception of philosophy's history 
is "But how can philosophy develop after Hegel?", and the fact that it did develop often 
appears as a refutation of Hegel's conception. The question as to further historical development 
was left open by Hegel, deliberately and rightly so. Which does not solve the problem, but 
puts it where it belongs: at the core of Western philosophy as pretension at true knowledge. 
Soviet philosophy gave an answer to that question: after the revolution in philosophy, 
philosophical truth will develop only in the sense of further perfection, not of change. In that 
sense, it was predictable, and one of the things Soviet party-philosophers did, was "announce" 
its further development in years to come. They could announce it only because they were in 
charge and control of what actually happened in Soviet philosophical culture, and because they 
could exclude any development that did not fit their announcements. 
From this perspective, Soviet philosophy, in the sense of a permanently developing 
true philosophical system, was an anachronism as to its idea, and a chimaera as to its reality, 
existing only as part of the Soviet socio-political system, i.e. due to a political backing, and 
"concealed" by the ideology of Soviet philosophy. As I have tried to show, this ideology was 
not a lie -there may have been times when it was a true account, i.e. when indeed Soviet 
philosophers adhered to the system of diamai and istmat- but an ideologically functioning 
theory, functioning (motivating / legitimizing) irrespective of its being true or false, and 
irrespective of its being believed in or not. 
The Future of the Past: post-Soviet Philosophical Culture 
Soviet philosophy was an episode in Russian philosophy and part of Russia's history. As 
such, it has its historical background, but also its future within the tradition of Russian 
philosophical culture. It is a much-discussed topic whether Marxism-Leninism was primarily 
imported from Europe, or a product of Russian thought. Two things seem clear to me: 
Marxism is part of Western philosophical culture, and "Marxism-Leninism" is not only 
radically different from, but opposed to it, esp. with respect to the relationship of ideas and 
historical reality. Of course, Soviet "Marxism-Leninism" was manipulated and adapted to the 
ends of the Soviet Party-State, but several of its elements can be found in the Russian tradition: 
the stress on the systematic and all-encompassing nature of diamat, the messianistic pathos, the 
desire to contribute to an immediate solution of Russia's problems. 
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Russia is blessed today with a constitution that realizes basic conditions for a 
flourishing philosophical culture: freedom of expression, publication, and discussion. A the 
same time, the need for philosophy that was part of the Soviet situation has disappeared, and a 
new legitimacy has yet to be found. In their search for it, Soviet philosophers permanently risk 
to be assigned the role of providers of a new ideology, a "philosophy for Russia", and to fill 
the alleged "ideological vacuum" [Ch.6.ii]: "a holy place does not tend to be empty" (Tolstych). 
That may well be true, but it does not imply that philosophers should see it ask their task to fill 
it. Philosophical theories may perform an ideological function without stopping to be 
philosophical, but Soviet history gives ample evidence of the devastating effects of making this 
function the primary one. The fate of post-Soviet philosophical culture will not in the least 
depend upon the determination of philosophers to posit themselves as freely thinking 
individuals, to "take the decision to be free" (Motroäilova). 
Soviet philosophy definitely is a thing of the past, which enables us to perceive it in its 
entirety and development. An adequate account and a plurality of interpretations of Russia's 
philosophical history during the Soviet period is, moreover, of vital importance for the 
development of posf-Soviet philosophical culture, because it is the only way to perceive the 
lasting effects and the positive results of Soviet philosophical culture in, e.g., IFN. It seems 
questionable to me, however, whether a more or less full history of Soviet philosophy can be 
expected for the near future, if we do not possess a multitude of works like Bakhurst's book 
on Il'enkov, and not only on other Soviet philosophers, but also, as Larvor argued, more 
books on Il'enkov like Bakhurst's.6 Who is going to write monographs on Losev, Kedrov, 
Petrov, MamardaSvili, Asmus, LifSic, Luppol, Bakradze, who is going to reinvestigate and 
reinterpret discussions among Soviet philosophers, now that we have, in principle, full access 
to source material? 
If the present book can stimulate such more detailed investigations and serve as part of their 
background, if the idea of philosophical culture as a basic element in a realist conception of the 
history of philosophy has found a justification in the results of this study, and if my work has 
succeeded in de-diabolicizing Soviet philosophy, its main tasks have been fulfilled. 
*** 
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Ì.Hegel, Werke Х Ш, p. 117. 
2.Motrosilova 1991, p. 461. 
3.Motro5ilova 1990, p. 190. 
4Jeu 1969, p. 25. 
5.Cf. Hegel, Werke XVIII, p. 49: ".. .um in der empirischen Gestalt und Erscheinung, ¡η der die Philosophie ges­
chichtlich auftritt, ihren Fortgang als Entwicklung der Idee zu erkennen, muß man freilich die Erkenntnis der 
Idee schon mitbringen..." 
6.Cf. B. Larvor, "Re-Reading Soviet Philosophy: Bakhurst on Ilyenkov," SST 44 (1992), p. 28; part of this 
requirement is met by the discussion of Il'enkov's thought in Friedrich 1993, chapter 1 (pp. 17-64). 
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An Overview of Soviet History^ 
Year: Main Historical Events: Important Events in Philosophy: Year; 
1917 
1920 
1925 
1930 
1935 
1940 
1945 
1950 
February and October Revolutions 
RSFSR founded, beginning Civil War 
Foundation of Comintern 
End of Civil War 
NÉP, Kronstadt, famine 
USSR proci, IV Stalin gensck 
t Lenin, 1st Soviet Constitution 
End of NÉP, Trockij exiled, industrialization 
Collectivization 
Famine 
Recognition USSR by USA 
Entry into League of Nations, Kirov murder 
Great Purge, 2nd, "Stalin" Constitution 
18th Congress CPSU, Stalin - ν Ribbentrop 
Annexation of Baltics and Bessarabia 
World War Π 
; Stalingrad, Comintern dissolved 
Jaita & Potsdam 
Famine, beginning of ¿danovSâma 
Cominform founded 
GDR, Comecon and NATO f 
19th Congress CPSU 
t Stalin, N S ChruScev gensek 
Berdjaev professor at Moscow university 
Phil profs dismissed, phil facs closed 
Exile of "idealists", PZM 
Condemnation of "liquidationism" 
OVM founded 
Dialektik der Natur, Р_ц£ (Paris, 1925-1940) 
OVMD 
Cond of "mechanicism", Filoioftkie tetrady 
"Bolshevizators", phil tac MGU establ 
Cond of "debonnism", MIFI founded 
Окоп -phil Manuskripte 
1st central uöebmkof diahistomat 
MIFLI 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
Closure of MIFLI phil fac. 
Kratkij kurs , reopening MIFLI phil fac 
Fusion of MIFLI and MGU 
Stahn-pnze for Istonja fílosofíi, vol ι Ι-Π 
Condemnation of Istonja fìlosofìi, vol ΙΠ 
1 st edition of Aleksandrov's Istonja . 
2nd edition of Aleksandrov's Istonja 
Aleksandrov-discussion, YE f 
Marksizm ι voprosy jazykoznanij'a 
1 st Soviet deleg to intem phil congress 
1938 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1944 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1950 
1954 
'This overview is based on more comprehensive ones in Bezemer 1988 and Neander 1976, the overview of 
events in Soviet philosophy on a variety of sources Abbreviations gensek = general'nyj sekretar' [general 
secretary of the VKP(b) / CPSU], NEP = Novaja Ekonomiieskaja politika [New Economic Policy], for other 
abbreviations see "List of Abbreviations" 
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Year: 
1955 
-
-
-
Mainhi s tonca levents : 
Warsaw Pact 
20th Congress, end of Commform, Hungary 
Main events in philosophy: 
Izranmchproizvcdemj 
Istonja filosofa ν 6-i tt, vol I 
Osnovy marksatskoj fìlosofìi, FN 
Year: 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1960 
1965 
22nd Congress, Jury Gagarin 
Cuba-crisis 
Rupture USSR - PR China 
Downfall of Chruäcev, L I Breznev gensek 
Trial of Daniel' and Sinjavskij 
Invasion CSSR 
Filosofskaja Enciklopedija, vol I 
Istonja filosofa ν 6-i tt, vol VI-2 
I Τ Frolov editor-in-chief of VF 
1960 
1965 
1968 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
1990 
1993 
SALT 1 
Solzenicy η exiled 
Helsinki agreements 
3rd, "Breznev"-Constitution 
SALT 2, Afghanistan war 
Sacharov exiled to Gor'kij 
t Breznev 
f Ju V Andropov 
t К U Cernenko, M S Gorbaïev gensek 
27th Congress, proclamation of uskorenie 
proclamation oí perestrojka & glasnost' 
28th Congress; renunciation of communism 
August coup, CPSU banned 
Β N El'cyn president 
Filosofskaja Encikopedija, vol V 
FO SSSR founded 
Iz-podglub 
t H'enkov 
6th ed of Osnovy m -I filosofa 
Filosofskij EncikiopediCeskij Slovaf 
1 st Istonko-fìlosofskij eíegoámk 
"Anketa" 
18th FISP-congress, humanist turn; t Losev 
WeJenje ν fìlosofìju, "ZTK" 
Celovek. t MamardaSvili. t BatiSíev 
Naíala. Logos 
Put. Novvi knip. FO SSSR —> RFO 
19th FISP (Moscow). Filosofskie issledov 
1970 
1971 
1974 
1975 
1979 
1980 
1982 
1983 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
626 
Soviet Philosophy — the Ideology and the Handmaid 
A Historical and Critical Analysis 
of Soviet Philosophy, 
with a Case-study into Soviet History of Philosophy 
Summary 
In this study, I have set out to answer, first of all, the question: "What is Soviet Philosophy?", 
and, in the second place, questions about the Soviet perception of philosophy's history and the 
"hegelianizing" trend present in that perception. These two focuses of attention have organized 
the structure and argument of this book. The results of my research can be briefly summarized 
as follows. 
In the first part, which is dedicated to the elaboration of a suitable set of instruments, I develop 
a conception of the concrete existence of philosophy that includes the notions of a philosophical 
culture as the place where philosophy is practiced, stressing the significance of such often 
neglected factors as the material basis of philosophy and philosophical industry, and pointing 
out the importance of the work of small and medium philosophers (including historians of 
philosophy) in realizing the conditions for "great philosophy", as well as to the differentiation 
of possible functions of philosophy, potentially conflicting, but not necessarily excluding each 
other [Ch.l]. 
Secondly, I link this idea of philosophical culture to a historical perspective, departing 
from Hegel's philosophical conception of the historical development of philosophy, amending 
his conception at crucial points in order to arrive at a conception of philosophy's history as a 
differentiation of philosophical cultures, as a plurality of "tracks" cleared through a field of 
possible philosophical positions, and as -within a philosophical culture- a cumulative process 
with an increasing awareness of its own histority [Ch.2]. 
Thirdly, I elaborate a conception of ideology as a possible function of theories (next to 
other functions), which consists in motivating human action or legitimizing a status quo, and as 
depending on the truth-claim, not on the actual truth of the theory in question, nor on the belief 
of its subjects, further as necessarily concealing its ideological nature, and finally as a 
universal, not necessarily "evil" but possibly "harmful" phenomenon of any society [Ch.3]. 
Together, this leads to a formulation of three relations between ideology and philosophy: 
ideology as one of the possible functions of philosophical theory, at odds with the (self-)criti-
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cal function of philosophical thought, ideology as a social phenomenon that philosophers (have 
to) deal with in various ways, and ideology as indispensable in the legitimization of the 
existence of philosophy itself within a historical situation 
Thus, the basis is provided for an analysis of Soviet philosophy as a particular 
philosophical culture, existing in a determinate historical situation, the decisive element of 
which was the subordination of philosophy to an ideological function 
In the second part, Soviet philosophical culture is followed through its historical development, 
departing from this definition of Soviet philosophy as philosophy subordinated to an ideologi­
cal function I distinguish three main stages a first period in which the subordination of 
philosophy to its ideological function took shape, and resulted m the so-called "dead period" 
[Ch 41 m], a second period, in which Soviet philosophy was, first, vainly resuscitated, then left 
to develop, to some extent, according to its own inner logic, and finally re-domesticated [Ch 51-
in], and a period in which Soviet philosophical culture gradually reached the limits of its 
development, which resulted in "stagnation", and, under the conditions of perestrojka and 
glasnost', in the rapid disappearance of its Soviet character [Ch 61 »] 
If we survey this development as a whole, three puzzling questions come to the fore 
why was there such a thing as philosophy at all within the Soviet system, ι e why was it not 
simply abolished as the "liquidationists" of the 1920s urged, why was the stagnant" period 
not a second "dead period" but a period of increasing professionahzation and specialization, 
and how must the fact be understood that the vast majority of Soviet philosophers abruptly 
stopped being ' Marxists-Leninists" during the penod of perestrojka^ 
These questions point to the necessity to submit the ' Soviet philosophical phenomenon" to 
closer critical analysis In the third part, therefore, I apply the conceptions of philosophical 
culture and of ideology, developed earlier, to Soviet philosophy As a first step, I analyze 
official Soviet ideology, Marxism-Leninism, as an extreme case of ideology the enigmatic fact 
that Soviet ideology did not conceal its ideological nature, but claimed it (claiming to be a true 
ideology as opposed to all other, false ones), is explained by pointing out that Marxism-
Lenmism was, in the Soviet situation, not only primarily a legitimizing ideology, but, 
moreover, a universal medium of legitimacy, which implies that it had to legitimize itself as 
well and therefore contained a "meta-ideology' [Ch 7] 
This "meta-ideology" (a theory about Marxism-Leninism that functioned to legitimize it) 
included the allegation of the theoretical foundation of Marxism-Leninism in philosophy, more 
precisely, in dialectical and historical materialism, and thus entailed an elaborate "ideology of 
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Soviet philosophy", raising claims as to the partisan, scientific, and systematic nature of 
philosophy. This ideology not only effectuated the subordination of philosophy to ideology, 
but also was the medium through which Soviet philosophers had to legitimize what they 
actually were doing [Ch.81. 
The ideological image of Soviet philosophy was not an adequate reflection of Soviet 
philosophy, as is shown through a comparison of the Soviet account of its functions with the 
functions it actually performed, but it was a determining factor within Soviet philosophical 
culture, both limiting and enabling its existence and development. It fostered the "colonization" 
of fundamental philosophical questions by a dogmatic system of diamat and istmat, thus 
blocking the inner logic of development of philosophy. It defined the legitimate space of 
philosophy, and, by the same token, set its limits. And it covered the basic tension between 
dogmatic "truth" and necessary development of theory, present in Soviet philosophy. The 
need, from the side of the Party, to improve and update the philosophical foundation of official 
ideology, and the urge, from the side of philosophers, to engage in philosophical thought 
(which, among others, implies the questioning in principle of any dogmatically imposed truth), 
made philosophy reach the limits of Soviet philosophical culture [Ch.9]. 
The ideological nature of "Marxism-Leninism", the ruling "ideology of philosophy", 
and the need and urge just indicated together serve to explain why philosophy did not simply 
vanish, why it led to a phase in which Soviet philosophy as a whole was stagnant while some 
specialist, professional disciplines flourished, and why Soviet philosophers stopped being 
"Marxists-Leninists" so smoothly. 
In order to make this general analysis more concrete, I investigate, in the fourth part, one 
branch of Soviet philosophy, namely history of philosophy [istoríko-fílosofskaja пайка: IFN]. 
IFN offers a characteristic example of a relatively independent discipline within the framework 
of Soviet philosophy. As such, it was a major instance of professionalization as an alternative 
to marginalization, and served as a "refuge" for philosophers who sought to address fun­
damental philosophical and meta-philosophical issues, i.e. issues colonized by the "system" of 
diamat and istmat and issues usurped by the ideology of Soviet philosophy with its official 
answer to the question "What is philosophy?" At the same time, it was subject to subordination 
to an ideological function, both directly, in showing dialectical materialism to be the supreme 
result of the entire historical development of philosophy, and indirectly, in being by definition 
Marxist(-Leninist), partisan, scientific, and systematic. 
Taking its departure from the klassikimarksizma-leninizma, who had left a heritage of 
three theoretical impulses with respect to philosophy's history (a reductionist, a dichotomizing, 
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and a totalizing position), IFN gradually moved away from the first to the second, and in the 
end towards the totalizing position [Ch.lO.i]. The course of its development ran roughly parallel 
to that of Soviet philosophy as a whole [Ch.lO.ii.a-e], leading to the firm establishment of IFN as 
a both quantitatively and qualitatively important branch of Soviet philosophical culture in the 
1980s [Ch.lO.iii]. 
The main task of IFN was the production of a Marxist(-Leninist) history of 
philosophy, i.e. a historiographical practice. This included, in the first place, the establishment 
of a surprisingly broad material basis (editions and translations) [Ch.l l.i], and the "production" 
of Soviet historians of philosophy with an increasing level of sophistication and profes-
sionalism [Ch.ll.ii]. 
The actual account of philosophy's history yielded by Soviet historians is impressive in 
size and scope, but strongly varying in quality and level of idcologization. With respect to the 
history of philosophy before Marx, the (ideological) requirement to substantiate the status of 
Marxism as "true philosophical theory" and as resulting from the entire preceding development 
legitimized a growing positive appreciation of much of the Western tradition in philosophy 
[Ch.Il.iii.a-b]. 
By contrast, the study of "bourgeois" philosophy after Marx, and of the development 
of Marxism itself were strongly ideologized. In the first case, kritika burzuaznoj filosofa was 
virtually the only way to assimilate in a legitimate manner the content of contemporary 
philosophy [Ch.ll.iii.c]. In the second, the major task of "history of Marxist-Leninist 
philosophy" was to demonstrate the superiority of its present Soviet version [Ch.ll.iii.d]. 
The two remaining fields, history of philosophy in other than the Western and Russian 
traditions and "history of philosophy of the peoples of the USSR", show a mixture of 
"proletarian internationalism" (with its concentration on the spreading of progressive ideas in 
general and of Marxism(-Leninism) in particular), critique of Eurocentrism, and "philosophical 
patriotism", inflating the role of esp. Russian philosophy (more specifically of "revolutionary 
democrats") in preparing the ground for Marxism(-Leninism) in Russia and the other Soviet 
republics [Ch.ll.íií.e-f]-
The dissolution of IFN during the period of decay of Soviet philosophy demonstrates 
that IFN often served as a place where philosophical issues could be adressed "safely" in a 
historical perspective, and also that IFN performed an important epistemic function in giving 
Soviet philosophical culture access to much of non-Marxist philosophy in a legitimate way 
[Ch.ll.iv]. 
The position of IFN between ideology and professionalism points to the importance of 
the theory of the history of philosophy developed by Soviet philosophers. Within this sub-
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discipline a diversity of positions came into existence, one of them acquiring the status of 
"sophisticated mainstream position' (Ojzerman and Bogomolov) [Ch 121] Careful analysis of 
this position shows how its aim was to develop a tenable theory of the history of philosophy 
-as a process- and of history of philosophy -as a discipline-, that served as link and buffer 
between ideological exigencies and actually existing histonographical practice (thus offering an 
example of the interplay of situational limitations, the subjective urge to engage in 
philosophizing, and the objective need for the improvement of official Soviet philosophy, as 
well as of the interplay of ideology "from above" and "from below") [Ch 12 и] 
Due to the claim of dialectical materialism to be an objectively true system of 
philosophy and the Final result of the historical development of philosophy, Soviet theory of 
the history of philosophy displays a remarkable hegehanzing trend, leading to a conception of 
philosophy as the self-consciousness of an epoch [Ch 12 ш] Here too, the period of decay of 
Soviet philosophy led to a dissolution of the field in question, more specifically, to the 
appearance of a number of corrections of, and reactions to the "sophisticated mainstream 
position", which together highlight important aspects of the historical existence of philosophy 
[Ch 12 iv], and which have been part of the inspiration of this study 
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Sovjetfílosofíe: de ideologie en de dienstmaagd 
Een historische en kritische analyse van de sovjetfílosofíe, 
met een studie van de filosofie-geschiedschrijving in de USSR 
Samenvatting 
Dit proefschrift tracht een antwoord te geven op de vraag "Wat is sovjetfilosofie?", en behelst 
voorts een toegespitst onderzoek naar de in de sovjet-filosofie vigerende perceptie van de 
geschiedenis van de filosofie en de in die perceptie aanwezige "hegelianiserende" tendens. Deze 
twee doelstellingen bepalen de argumentatieve opbouw van dit boek. De resultaten van het 
verrichte onderzoek kunnen als volgt beknopt samengevat worden. 
Het eerste deel is gewijd aan het in stelling brengen van het benodigde theoretische en 
analytische instrumentarium. In het eerste hoofdstuk ontwikkel ik een conceptie van de 
concrete bestaanswijze van filosofie. Dit resulteert in het idee van een filosofische cultuur als de 
plaats waar filosofie bedreven wordt, waarbij de nadruk gelegd wordt op onderbelichte 
factoren als de materiële basis van filosofie en het filosofisch bedrijf, waarin gewezen wordt op 
het belang van kleine en middelmatige filosofen (met inbegrip van filosofie-historici) voor het 
realiseren van de voorwaarden voor "grote filosofie", en op de differentiatie van mogelijke 
functies van filosofie, functies die kunnen conflicteren maar die elkaar niet noodzakelijk 
uitsluiten [Ch.i]. 
Vervolgens verbind ik dit idee van een filosofische cultuur aan een historisch perspec-
tief, waarbij ik uitga van Hegels filosofische conceptie van de historische ontwikkeling van de 
filosofie. Deze conceptie wordt op enkele cruciale punten geamendeerd teneinde te komen tot 
een opvatting van filosofiegeschiedenis als een differentiatie van filosofische culturen, als een 
veelheid van "sporen", getrokken door een veld van logisch mogelijke filosofische posities, en 
als -binnen een filosofische cultuur- een cumulatief proces met een toenemend besef van zijn 
eigen historisch karakter [Ch.2]. 
Tenslotte ontwikkel ik een conceptie van ideologie als een mogelijke functie van 
theorieën naast andere functies. Deze functie bestaat er in menselijk handelen te motiveren en / 
of een status quo te legitimeren. Ideologie berust op de waarheidspretentie, maar niet op de 
feitelijke waarheid van de theorie in kwestie of op de overtuiging van betrokken personen. 
Ideologie verbergt haar eigen ideologische aard, en is een universeel maar niet noodzakelij-
kerwijs "slecht" element van iedere maatschappelijke orde [Ch.3]. Tussen ideologie en filosofie 
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zijn drie verhoudingen mogelijk: ideologie als een van de mogelijke functies van filosofische 
theorie, een functie die op gespannen voet staat met de zelf-kritische functie van filosofie; 
ideologie als een maatschappelijke fenomeen waar filosofen op uiteenlopende wijze mee te 
maken hebben: als dat waaraan zij participeren, als object van kritiek, als factor in de situatie 
waarin zij filosofie bedrijven; ideologie als legitimatie van het bestaan van de filosofie zelf in 
een historische situatie. 
Daarmee is het theoretisch fundament gelegd voor een analyse van sovjetfilosofie als 
een specifieke filosofische cultuur, bestaande in een welbepaalde historische situatie, met als 
beslissend element de principiële onderschikking van filosofie aan een ideologische functie. 
Het tweede deel volgt de sovjetfilosofische cultuur in haar historische ontwikkeling, vertrek-
kend vanuit deze definitie van sovjetfilosofie als filosofie die ondergeschikt gemaakt is aan een 
ideologische functie. In deze ontwikkeling onderscheid ik drie fasen: een eerste periode waarin 
de onderschikking van filosofie aan een ideologische functie gestalte kreeg en uiteindelijk 
uitmondde in de zogeheten "dode periode" [Ch.4.i-iü]; een tweede periode, waarin sovjet-
filosofie aanvankelijk vergeefs gereanimeerd werd, daarna de kans kreeg zich tot op zekere 
hoogte volgens haar eigen innerlijke logica te ontwikkelen, en uiteindelijk opnieuw geregimen-
teerd werd [Ch.5.i-iü]; en een derde periode, waarin de sovjetfilosofische cultuur geleidelijk de 
grenzen van haar mogelijke ontwikkeling bereikte, hetgeen resulteerde in "stagnatie", waarna 
zij in de periode van perestrojka en g/asnost'haar sovjetkarakter snel verloor [Ch.6.i-ii]. 
Wanneer we deze ontwikkeling in haar geheel overzien, dan moeten we de volgende 
drie vragen stellen: waarom bestond er filosofie binnen het sovjetsystem en was zij niet afge-
schaft zoals de "liquidationisten" in de twintiger jaren wilden, waarom was de periode van 
"stagnatie" niet een tweede "dode periode" maar juist een periode van toenemende profes-
sionalisering en specialisatie in de filosofie, en hoe kunnen we verklaren waarom de overgrote 
meerderheid der sovjetfilosofen gedurende de pere.stro/£a-periode plotseling ophield "mar-
xistisch-leninistische" filosofen te zijn? 
Deze vragen nopen tot een nadere analyse van het "sovjetfilosofische fenomeen". In het derde 
deel pas ik daarom de eerder ontwikkelde concepties van filosofische cultuur en van ideologie 
toe op de sovjetfilosofie. Een eerste stap is daarbij een analyse van de officiële sovjetideologie, 
het marxisme-leninisme, als een extreem geval van ideologie. Het raadselachtige gegeven dat 
de sovjet-ideologie haar eigen ideologische karakter niet verhulde maar juist benadrukte in haar 
claim een ware ideologie te zijn wordt verklaard vanuit het feit dat het marxisme-leninisme in de 
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sovjetsituatie niet slechts een primair legitimerende ideologie was, maar ook een universeel 
legitimitie-medium.Omz/chze7fte kunnen legitimeren bevatte het een "meta-ideologie" [Ch.7]. 
Deze "meta-ideologie" (een theorie over het marxisme-leninisme) bevatte onder andere 
de verzekering dat het marxisme-leninisme gefundeerd was in de filosofie, en wel in het 
dialectisch en historisch materialisme, en omvatte aldus een uitgewerkte "ideologie van de 
sovjetfilosofie" die de laatste als partijdig, wetenschappelijk en systematisch afficheerde. Deze 
ideologie bewerkstelligde de onderschikking van filosofie aan een ideologische functie en was 
tevens het middel waardoor sovjetfilosofen dat wat zij feitelijk deden moesten legitimeren 
[Ch.8]. 
Het ideologische zelfbeeld van de sovjetfilosofie was geen adequate afspiegeling van de 
sovjetfilosofie, hetgeen aangetoond wordt middels een vergelijking van de eigen weergave van 
de functies die filosofie in de Sovjet-Unie vervulde met de functies die ze feitelijk vervulde. Het 
was echter wel een bepalende factor van de sovjetfilosofische cultuur, die het bestaan en de 
ontwikkeling van filosofie tegelijkertijd beperkte en mogelijk maakte. Het maakte de 
"kolonisatie" van fundamentale filosofische vragen door een dogmatisch systeem van diawat en 
istmat mogelijk, en blokkeerde aldus de innerlijke ontwikkeling van de filosofie. Het bepaalde 
de legitieme ruimte van de filosofie en daarmee ook haar grenzen. En het controleerde de 
spanning tussen dogmatische "waarheid" en de noodzakelijke ontwikkeling van de filosofie die 
in de sovjetfilosofie aanwezig was. De noodzaak, van de kant van de Partij, om het filosofisch 
fundament van de officiële ideologie permanent te verbeteren en aan te passen, en de behoefte, 
van de kant van de filosofen, om daadwerkelijk filosofie te bedrijven (wat onder andere de 
principiële betwijfeling van iedere dogmatische waarheid inhoudt), leidde ertoe dat het 
filosofische denken op de grenzen van de sovjetfilosofische cultuur stuitte [Ch.9]. 
Het ideologische karakter van het "marxisme-leninisme", de heersende "ideologie van 
de filosofie", en de hierboven genoemde noodzaak en behoefte leveren samen de verklaring 
voor het feit dat filosofie niet verdween maar juist een centrale plaats innam, waarom in een 
latere fase sovjetfilosofie als geheel stagneerde terwijl enkele specialistische disciplines juist 
floreerden, en waarom sovjetfilosofen zonder veel moeite ophielden "marxisten-leninisten" te 
zijn. 
Om deze algemene analyse te concretiseren is het vierde deel gewijd aan een onderzoek naar 
een tak van sovjetfilosofie, namelijk filosofiegeschiedenis [istoriko-filosofskaja nauka: IFN]. 
/FN vormt een karakteristiek voorbeeld van een relatief onafhankelijke discipline binnen het 
kader van de sovjetfilosofie. Als zodanig illustreert zij het belang van professionalisering als 
alternatief voor marginalisering. IFN diende bovendien als "hoogwaterplaats" voor filosofen 
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die fundamentele filosofische en meta-filosofïsche kwesties aan de orde wilden stellen, 
kwesties die gekoloniseerd waren door het "systeem" van diamat en istmat, en kwesties die 
bezet waren door de ideologie van de sovjetfilosofie met haar officiële antwoord op de vraag 
"Wat is filosofie?" Tegelijkertijd was IFN zelf ook aan een ideologischefunctie onverworpen, 
zowel in directe zin omdat zij het dialectisch materialisme voorstelde als het superieure resultaat 
van de historische ontwikkeling van de filosofie, als in indirecte zin doordat zij zelf per definitie 
marxistisch-leninistisch, partijdig, wetenschappelijk en systematisch was. 
De klassikimarksizma-leninizma (Marx, Engels, Lenin) hadden drie theoretische impul-
sen met betrekking tot de geschiedenis van de filosofie nagelaten: een reductionistische, een 
dichotomiserende, en een totaliserende. IFN maakte een geleidelijke ontwikkeling door van de 
eerste naar de tweede positie, om uiteindelijk in de richting van de totaliserende positie te gaan 
[Ch.lO.i]. De ontwikkeling van IFN verliep in grote lijnen parallel aan die van de sovjetfilosofie 
als geheel [Ch.io.ü.a-e], en leidde in de tachtiger jaren tot een stabiele positie van IFN als een 
zowel in kwantitatief als kwalitatief belangrijke tak van de sovjetfilosofie [Ch.iO.üi]. 
De voomaamse taak van IFN was het produceren van een marxistisch-leninistische 
filosofiegeschiedenis, dat wil zeggen het ontwikkelen van een praktijk van filosofiege-
schiedschrijving. Dit hield om te beginnen het creëren van een opmerkelijk brede materiële 
basis (tekstuitgaven en vertalingen) [Ch.ll.i] en het afleveren van sovjet-filosofiehistorici met 
een toenemend professioneel niveau in [Ch.l l.ü]. 
De feitelijke weergave van de geschiedenis van de filosofie door sovjet-filosofiehistorici 
is indrukwekkend qua omvang, maar varieert sterk in kwaliteit en graad van ideologisering. 
Met betrekking tot de geschiedenis van de filosofie totaan Marx legitimeerde het (ideologische) 
vereiste om het marxisme te onderbouwen in zijn positie van "ware filosofische theorie" en van 
resultaat van de gehele voorafgaande ontwikkeling een toenemende positieve waardering van 
grote delen van de Westerse filosofische traditie [Ch. 11 .iü.a-b]. 
De bestudering van de "burgerlijke" filosofie sinds Marx en van de ontwikkeling van 
het marxisme zelf daarentegen waren sterk ideologisch geladen. In het eerste geval was de 
zogeheten kritika burzuaznoj fìlosofìi [kritiek van de burgerlijke filosofìe] de enige legitieme 
manier om de inhoud van de hedendaagse niet-marxistische filosofie te benaderen en te 
assimileren [Ch.ll.üi.c]. In het tweede geval bestond de taak van de "geschiedenis van de 
marxistisch-leninistische filosofie" er vooral in de superioriteit van de huidige sovjetversie van 
het marxisme aan te tonen [Ch.l ï.üi.di. 
De twee resterende gebieden, dat van de geschiedenis van de filosofie in andere tradities 
dan de westerse en de Russische, en dat van de "geschiedenis van de filosofie van de sovjet-
volkeren" laten een mengeling zien van "proletarisch internationalisme" (met sterke nadruk op 
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de verspreiding van progressive ideeën in het algemeen en van het marxisme(-leninisme) in het 
bijzonder), kritiek op het eurocentrisme van de westerse filosofiegeschiedschrijving, en een 
"filosofisch patriottisme" dat de rol van met name de Russische filosofie als voorbereiding op 
het marxisme in Rusland en de andere sovjetrepublieken tot voorbij de grenzen van de 
geloofwaardigheid benadrukte en andere tradities navenant verwaarloosde [Ch. 11 .üi.e-f]. 
Het uiteenvallen van IFN in de periode van verval van de sovjetfilosofie toont aan dat 
IFN vaak fungeerde als een plaats waar filosofische thema's in een historisch perspectief 
"veilig" aangesneden konden worden, en ook dat IFN een belangrijke epistemische functie 
vervulde door de sovjetfilosofische cultuur een legitieme ingang te verschaffen tot grote delen 
van de niet-marxistische filosofie [Ch.ll.iv]. 
De positie van IFN tussen ideologie en professionalisme wijst tenslotte op het belang 
van de theorie van de geschiedenis van de filosofie die door sovjetfilosofen ontwikkeld is. In 
deze sub-discipline kreeg een aantal uiteenlopende posities gestalte, waarbij een positie de 
status van "sophisticated mainstream position" verwierf (Ojzerman and Bogomolov) [Ch.l2.i]. 
Een precieze analyse van deze positie laat zien dat zij gericht was op het ontwikkelen van een 
verdedigbare theorie over de filosofiegeschiedenis -als proces- en van de geschiedenis van de 
filosofie -als discipline-, die zowel een verbinding als een bufferzone creëerde tussen 
ideologische vereisten enerzijds en de feitelijke praktijk van geschiedschrijving anderzijds. Dit 
levert tevens een voorbeeld van de wisselwerking tussen de beperkingen opgelegd door de 
historische situatie, de subjectieve behoefte om filosofie te bedrijven, en de objective noodzaak 
om de officiële filosofie verder te vervolmaken, alsook van de wisselwerking tussen ideologie 
"van boven" en "van beneden" [Ch.12.ii]. 
Als gevolg van de claim van het dialectisch materialisme een objectief waar filosofisch 
systeem te zijn en het eindresultaat van de historische ontwikkeling van de filosofie vertoont de 
sovjetconceptie een opvallende hegelianiserende tendens, die tot uiting komt in een opvatting 
van filosofie als zelfbewustzijn van een epoche [Ch.l2.iü]. De periode van verval van de 
sovjetfilosofie leidde ook hier tot een uiteenvallen van dit veld van onderzoek en tot het 
verschijnen van een aantal correcties en reacties op de "sophisticated mainstream position". 
Gezamenlijk stellen deze een aantal belangrijke aspecten van het historische bestaan van de 
filosofie aan de orde, die mede deel zijn geweest van de inspiratie voor dit boek [Ch.12.iv]. 
*** 
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